A. T. (Alfred Thayer) Mahan - The Life of Nelson, Vol. II. (of 2)

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Parker had no sooner departed than Nelson made the signal for the
fleet to weigh, and started at once for Revel. He did not know whether
or not the Russian ships were still there, and he felt that the change
of sovereigns probably implied a radical change of policy; but he
understood, also, that the part of a commander-in-chief was to see
that the military situation was maintained, from day to day, as
favorable as possible to his own country. He anticipated, therefore,
by his personal judgment, the instructions of the Cabinet, not to
enter upon hostilities if certain conditions could be obtained, but to
exact of the Russian Government, pending its decision, that the Revel
ships should remain where they were. "My object," he said, writing the
same day he took command, "_was_ to get at Revel before the frost
broke up at Cronstadt, that the twelve sail of the line might be
destroyed. I shall _now_ go there as a friend, _but the two fleets
shall not form a junction_, if not already accomplished, unless my
orders permit it." For the same reason, he wrote to the Swedish
admiral that he had no orders to abstain from hostilities if he met
his fleet at sea. He hoped, therefore, that he would see the wisdom of
remaining in port.

His visit to Revel, consequently, was to wear the external appearance
of a compliment to a sovereign whose friendly intentions were assumed.
To give it that color, he took with him only twelve ships-of-the-line,
leaving the others, with the small vessels of distinctly hostile
character, bombs, fireships, etc., anchored off Bornholm Island, a
Danish possession. The resolution to prevent a junction was contingent
and concealed. On the 12th the squadron arrived in the outer bay of
Revel, and a complimentary letter, announcing the purpose of his
coming, was sent to St. Petersburg. The next day he paid an official
visit to the authorities, when his vanity and love of attention
received fresh gratification. "Except to you, my own friend, I should
not mention it, 'tis so much like vanity; but hundreds come to look at
Nelson, '_that is him, that is him_,' in short, 'tis the same as in
Italy and Germany, and I now feel that a good name is better than
riches, not amongst our great folks in England; but it has its fine
feelings to an honest heart. All the Russians have taken it into their
heads that I am like _Suwaroff, Le jeune Suwaroff_;" thus confirming
the impression made upon Mrs. St. George at Dresden.

On the 16th of May a letter arrived from Count Pahlen, the Russian
minister. The Czar declined to see a compliment in the appearance in
Russian waters of so formidable a force, commanded by a seaman whose
name stood foremost, not merely for professional ability, but for
sudden, resolute, and aggressive action. "Nelson's presence," Niebuhr
had written, "leads us to think, judging of him by his past conduct,
that a furious attack will be made upon our harbor;" and he himself
had recorded with complacency that a Danish officer, visiting the
"London," upon learning that he was with the fleet in the Kattegat,
had said, "Is he here? Then I suppose it is no joke, if he is come."
"The Baltic folks will never fight me, if it is to be avoided." "The
Emperor, my Master," wrote Pahlen, "does not consider this step
compatible with the lively desire manifested by His Britannic Majesty,
to re-establish the good intelligence so long existing between the two
Monarchies. The only guarantee of the loyalty of your intentions that
His Majesty can accept, is the prompt withdrawal of the fleet under
your command, and no negotiation with your Court can take place, so
long as a naval force is in sight of his ports."

Nelson had of course recognized that the game was lost, as soon as he
saw that the Russian fleet was gone. The conditions which had mainly
prompted his visit were changed, and the Russian Government was in a
position to take a high tone, without fear of consequences. "After
such an answer," he wrote indignantly to St. Vincent, "I had no
business here. Time will show; but I do not believe he would have
written such a letter, if the Russian fleet had been in Revel." "Lord
Nelson received the letter a few minutes before dinner-time," wrote
Stewart. "He appeared to be a good deal agitated by it, but said
little, and did not return an immediate reply. During dinner, however,
he left the table, and in less than a quarter of an hour sent for his
secretary to peruse a letter which, in that short absence, he had
composed. The signal for preparing to weigh was immediately made; the
answer above-mentioned was sent on shore; and his Lordship caused the
fleet to weigh, and to stand as far to sea as was safe for that
evening."

Nelson took hold of Pahlen's expression, that he had come "with his
whole fleet" to Revel. Confining himself to that, he pointed out the
mistake the minister had made, for he had brought "not one-seventh of
his fleet in point of numbers." He mentioned also the deference that
he had paid to the Revel authorities. "My conduct, I feel, is so
entirely different to what your Excellency has expressed in your
letter, that I have only to regret, that my desire to pay a marked
attention to His Imperial Majesty has been so entirely misunderstood.
That being the case, I shall sail immediately into the Baltic."
Retiring thus in good order, if defeated, he had the satisfaction of
knowing that it was not his own blunder, but the wretched dilatoriness
of his predecessor, that had made the Czar, instead of the British
admiral, master of the situation.

Stopping for twenty-four hours at Bornholm on the way down, Nelson on
the 24th anchored in Rostock Bay, on the German coast of the Baltic,
and there awaited the relief he confidently expected. He had scarcely
arrived when a second letter from Pahlen overtook him. The minister
expressed his regret for any misunderstanding that had arisen as to
the purpose of his first visit, and continued, "I cannot give your
excellency a more striking proof of the confidence which the Emperor
my Master reposes in you, than by announcing the effect produced by
your letter of the 16th of this month. His Imperial Majesty has
ordered the immediate raising of the embargo placed upon the English
merchant ships." Nelson plumed himself greatly upon this result of his
diplomacy. "Our diplomatic men are so slow. Lord St. Helens told me
that he hoped in a month he should be able to tell me something
decisive. Now, what can take two hours I cannot even guess, but
Ministers must do something for their diamond boxes. I gained the
unconditional release of our ships, which neither Ministers nor Sir
Hyde Parker could accomplish, by showing my fleet. Then they became
alarmed, begged I would go away, or it would be considered as warlike.
On my complying, it pleased the Emperor and his ministers so much,
that the whole of the British shipping were given up." There is
nothing like the point of view; but it must be admitted that Nelson
extricated himself from an unpleasant position with great good temper
and sound judgment.

He remained in his flagship between Rostock and Kioge Bay, until
relieved by Vice-Admiral Pole on the 19th of June. Nothing of official
importance occurred during these three weeks; for the naval part of
the Baltic entanglement was ended, as he had foreseen. A pleasant
picture of his daily life on board the "St. George" at this time has
been preserved for us by Colonel Stewart: "His hour of rising was four
or five o'clock, and of going to rest about ten; breakfast was never
later than six, and generally nearer to five o'clock. A midshipman or
two were always of the party; and I have known him send during the
middle watch[36] to invite the little fellows to breakfast with him,
when relieved. At table with them, he would enter into their boyish
jokes, and be the most youthful of the party. At dinner he invariably
had every officer of the ship in their turn, and was both a polite and
hospitable host. The whole ordinary business of the fleet was
invariably despatched, as it had been by Earl St. Vincent, before
eight o'clock. The great command of time which Lord Nelson thus gave
himself, and the alertness which this example imparted throughout the
fleet, can only be understood by those who witnessed it, or who know
the value of early hours.... He did not again land whilst in the
Baltic; his health was not good, and his mind was not at ease; with
him, mind and health invariably sympathized."

While thus generally pleasant on board ship, he resolutely refused
intercourse with the outside world when not compelled by duty. In this
there appears to have been something self-imposed, in deference to
Lady Hamilton. There are indications that she felt, or feigned, some
jealousy of his relations with others, especially with women,
corresponding to the frenzied agitation he manifested at the
association of her name with that of any other man, and especially
with that of the then Prince of Wales. Whatever her real depth of
attachment to him, her best hope for the future was in his constancy,
and that he would eventually marry her; for Sir William's death could
not be far distant, and matters might otherwise favor the hope that
both he and she cherished. Her approaching widowhood would in fact
leave her, unless her husband's will was exceptionally generous, in a
condition as precarious, her acquired tastes considered, as that from
which her marriage had rescued her; and her uneasiness would naturally
arouse an uncertain and exacting temper, as in the old days at Naples,
when Hamilton could not make up his mind. The condition of Nelson's
health furnished him an excuse for declining all civilities or calls,
even from a reigning prince, on the ground that he was not well enough
to go ashore and return them. Soon after this, however, he was able to
write Lady Hamilton that he was perfectly recovered. "As far as
relates to health, I don't think I ever was stronger or in better
health. It is odd, but after severe illness I feel much better." Thus
he was, when definitely informed that his relief was on the way. "To
find a proper successor," said Lord St. Vincent, when announcing the
fact to him, "your lordship knows is no easy task; for I never saw the
man in our profession, excepting yourself and Troubridge, who
possessed the magic art of infusing the same spirit into others, which
inspired their own actions; exclusive of other talents and habits of
business, not common to naval characters." "I was so overcome
yesterday," wrote Nelson to Lady Hamilton, "with the good and happy
news that came about my going home, that I believe I was in truth
scarcely myself. The thoughts of going do me good, yet all night I was
so restless that I could not sleep. It is nearly calm, therefore
Admiral Pole cannot get on. If he was not to come, I believe it would
kill me. I am ready to start the moment I have talked with him one
hour."

On the 19th of June Nelson left the Baltic in the brig "Kite," and on
the 1st of July landed at Yarmouth.

FOOTNOTES:

[22] Naval Chronicle, vol. xxxvii. p. 445.

[23] _Ante_, vol. i. pp. 199-202.

[24] Nelson to Lady Hamilton. Pettigrew, vol. i. pp. 442-444.

[25] Pitt had resigned from office since then.

[26] Naval Chronicle, vol. xxxvii. p. 446.

[27] Naval Chronicle, vol. xxxvii., art. "Layman."

[28] That is, from north to south. It may be well to notice that to go from
the Kattegat to the Baltic is _up_, although from north to south.

[29] Trekroner, which was then a favorite military name in Denmark, refers
to the three Crowns of Denmark, Norway, and Sweden, once united.

[30] They are to be found in Nicolas's "Despatches and Letters of Lord
Nelson," vol. iv. p. 304.

[31] Except numbers 4 and 5, whose stations, as has been said, were abreast
the two southernmost Danes.

[32] The following is the order of the ships in the column of attack, as
originally prescribed:--

1. Edgar, 74. 2. Ardent, 64. 3. Glatton, 54. 4. Isis, 50. 5. Agamemnon, 64.
6. Bellona, 74. 7. Elephant, 74. 8. Ganges, 74. 9. Monarch, 74. 10.
Defiance, 74. 11. Russell, 74. 12. Polyphemus, 64.

[33] To acknowledge a signal is simply to hoist a flag, showing that it has
been seen and understood. To repeat is to hoist the signal yourself, thus
transmitting it as an order to those concerned.

[34] Life of Rev. Dr. A.J. Scott, p. 70

[35] Norway was then attached to the Danish Crown, as now to that of
Sweden.

[36] Midnight to four A.M.

CHAPTER XVII.

NELSON COMMANDS THE "SQUADRON ON A PARTICULAR SERVICE," FOR THE
DEFENCE OF THE COAST OF ENGLAND AGAINST INVASION.--SIGNATURE OF
PRELIMINARIES OF PEACE WITH FRANCE.

JULY-OCTOBER, 1801. AGE, 43.

Before sailing for the Baltic, and throughout his service in that sea,
the longing for repose and for a lover's paradise had disputed with
the love of glory for the empire in Nelson's heart, and signs were not
wanting that the latter was making a doubtful, if not a losing, fight.
Shortly before his departure for the North, he wrote to St. Vincent,
"Although, I own, I have met with much more honours and rewards than
ever my most sanguine ideas led me to expect, yet I am so
circumstanced that probably this Expedition will be the last service
ever performed by your obliged and affectionate friend." His old
commander was naturally perturbed at the thought that the illustrious
career, which he had done so much to foster, was to have the ignoble
termination to be inferred from these words and the notorious facts.
"Be assured, my dear Lord," he replied, "that every _public_[37] act
of your life has been the subject of my admiration, which I should
have sooner declared, but that I was appalled by the last sentence of
your letter: for God's sake, do not suffer yourself to be carried away
by any sudden impulse."

During his absence, the uncertain deferment of his desires had worked
together with the perverse indolence of Sir Hyde Parker, the fretting
sight of opportunities wasted, the constant chafing against the curb,
to keep both body and mind in perpetual unrest, to which the severe
climate contributed by undermining his health. This unceasing
discomfort had given enhanced charm to his caressing dreams of
reposeful happiness, soothed and stimulated by the companionship which
he so far had found to fulfil all his power of admiration, and all his
demands for sympathy. Released at last, he landed in England
confidently expecting to realize his hopes, only to find that they
must again be postponed. Reputation such as his bears its own penalty.
There was no other man in whose name England could find the calm
certainty of safety, which popular apprehension demanded in the new
emergency, that had arisen while he was upholding her cause in the
northern seas. Nelson repined, but he submitted. Within four weeks his
flag was flying again, and himself immersed in professional anxieties.

War on the continent of Europe had ceased definitively with the treaty
of Luneville, between France and Austria, signed February 9, 1801.
Over four years were to elapse before it should recommence. But, as
Great Britain was to be the first to take up arms again to resist the
encroachments of Bonaparte, so now she was the last to consent to
peace, eager as her people were to have it. Malta had fallen, the
Armed Neutrality of the North had dissolved, the French occupation of
Egypt was at its last gasp. Foiled in these three directions by the
sea-power of Great Britain, unable, with all his manipulation of the
prostrate continent, to inflict a deadly wound, Bonaparte now resorted
to the threat of invasion, well aware that, under existing conditions,
it could be but a threat, yet hoping that its influence upon a people
accustomed to sleep securely might further his designs. But, though
the enchanter wove his spells to rouse the demon of fear, their one
effect was to bring up once more, over against him, the defiant form
of his arch-subverter. Both the Prime Minister, Addington, and the
First Lord of the Admiralty assured Nelson that his presence in charge
of the dispositions for defence, and that only, could quiet the public
mind. "I have seen Lord St. Vincent," he wrote the former, "and submit
to your and his partiality. Whilst my health will allow, I can only
say, that every exertion of mine shall be used to merit the
continuance of your esteem." St. Vincent, writing to him a fortnight
later, avowed frankly the weight attached to his very name by both
friend and foe. "Our negotiation is drawing near its close, and must
terminate one way or another in a few days, and, I need not add, how
very important it is that the enemy should know that _you_ are
constantly opposed to him."

The purpose of Bonaparte in 1801 is not to be gauged by the same
measure as that of 1803-1805. In 1798 he had told the then government
of France that to make a descent upon England, without being master of
the sea, would be the boldest and most difficult operation ever
attempted. Conditions had not changed since then, nor had he now the
time or the money to embark in the extensive preparations, which
afterwards gave assurance that he was in earnest in his threats. An
adept in making false demonstrations, perfectly appreciative of the
power of a great name, he counted upon his own renown, and his amazing
achievement of the apparently impossible in the past, to overawe the
imagination of a nation, whose will, rather than whose strength, he
hoped to subdue. Boulogne and the small neighboring ports, whose
nearness clearly indicated them as the only suitable base from which
an invasion could start, were in that year in no state to receive the
boats necessary to carry an army. This the British could see with
their own eyes; but who could be sure that the paper flotilla at
Boulogne, like the paper Army of Reserve at Dijon a year before, had
not elsewhere a substantial counterpart, whose sudden appearance might
yet work a catastrophe as unexpected and total as that of Marengo? And
who more apt than Bonaparte to spread the impression that some such
surprise was brewing? "I can venture to assure you that no embarkation
of troops can take place at Boulogne," wrote Nelson, immediately after
his first reconnoissance; but he says at the same time, "I have now
more than ever reason to believe that the ports of Flushing and
Flanders are much more likely places to embark men from, than Calais,
Boulogne, or Dieppe; for in Flanders we cannot tell by our eyes what
means they have collected for carrying an army." "Great preparations
at Ostend," he notes a week later; "Augereau commands that part of the
Army. I hope to let him feel the bottom of the Goodwin Sand." It was
just this sort of apprehension, specific in direction, yet vague and
elusive in details, that Bonaparte was skilled in disseminating.

St. Vincent, and the Government generally, agreed with Nelson's
opinion. "We are to look to Flanders for the great effort," wrote the
Earl to him. Neither of them had, nor was it possible for clear-headed
naval officers to have, any substantial, rational, fear of a descent
in force; yet the vague possibility did, for the moment, impress even
them, and the liability of the populace, and of the commercial
interests, to panic, was a consideration not to be overlooked.
Besides, in a certain way, there was no adequate preparation for
resistance. The British Navy, indeed, was an overwhelming force as
compared to the French; but its hands were fully occupied, and the
fleet Nelson had just left in the Baltic could not yet be recalled. It
was, however, in purely defensive measures, in the possession of a
force similar to that by which the proposed attack was to be made, and
in dispositions analogous to coast defences, that the means were
singularly defective, both in material and men. "Everything, my dear
Lord," wrote Nelson, the day after he hoisted his flag at Sheerness,
"must have a beginning, and we are literally at the foundation of our
fabric of defence;" but, he continues, reverting to his own and St.
Vincent's clear and accurate military intuitions, "I agree perfectly
with you, that we must keep the enemy as far from our own coasts as
possible, and be able to attack them the moment they come out of their
ports."

"Our first defence," he writes a fortnight later, showing the gradual
maturing of the views which he, in common with St. Vincent, held with
such illustrious firmness in the succeeding years, "is close to the
enemy's ports. When that is broke, others will come forth on our own
coasts." It was in the latter that the unexpected anxieties of 1801
found the Government deficient, and these it was to be Nelson's first
care to organize and dispose. By the time his duties were completed,
and the problems connected with them had been two months under his
consideration, he had reached the conclusion which Napoleon also held,
and upon which he acted. "This boat business may be a part of a great
plan of Invasion, but can never be the only one." From the first he
had contemplated the possibility of the French fleets in Brest and
elsewhere attempting diversions, such as Napoleon planned in support
of his later great projects. "Although I feel confident that the
fleets of the enemy will meet the same fate which has always attended
them, yet their sailing will facilitate the coming over of their
flotilla, as they will naturally suppose our attention will be called
only to the fleets."

What was feared in 1801 was not a grand military operation, in the
nature of an attempt at conquest, or, at the least, at injury so
serious as to be disabling, but rather something in the nature of a
great raid, of which the most probable object was the city of London,
the chief commercial centre. It was upon this supposition that the
instructions of the Admiralty to Nelson were framed, and upon this
also the memorandum as to methods, submitted by him to it, on the 25th
of July, 1801. "It is certainly proper to believe that the French are
coming to attack London. I will suppose that 40,000 men are destined
for this attack, or rather surprise." His plan is given first in his
own words, as due to a matter of so much importance; and to them the
writer appends a summary of the principal features, as understood by
him. These are not always easily to be seen on the face of the paper,
owing to the small time for its preparation, and the consequent
haste--off-hand almost--with which it was drawn up, as is further
indicated from the copy in the Admiralty being in his own writing.

MEMORANDA BY LORD NELSON, ON THE DEFENCE OF THE THAMES, ETC.

25th July, 1801.

Besides the stationed Ships at the different posts between the
North Foreland and Orfordness, as many Gun-vessels as can be
spared from the very necessary protection of the Coast of Sussex
and of Kent to the westward of Dover, should be collected, for
this part of the Coast must be seriously attended to; for
supposing London the object of surprise, I am of opinion that
the Enemy's object _ought_ to be the getting on shore as
speedily as possible, for the dangers of a navigation of
forty-eight hours, appear to me to be an insurmountable
objection to the rowing from Boulogne to the Coast of Essex. It
is therefore most probable (for it is certainly proper to
believe the French are coming to attack London, and therefore to
be prepared) that from Boulogne, Calais, and even Havre, that
the enemy will try and land in Sussex, or the lower part of
Kent, and from Dunkirk, Ostend, and the other Ports of Flanders,
to land on the Coast of Essex or Suffolk; for I own myself of
opinion that, the object being to get on shore somewhere within
100 miles of London, as speedily as possible, that the Flats in
the mouth of the Thames will not be the only place necessary to
attend to; added to this, the Enemy will create a powerful
diversion by the sailing of the Combined Fleet, and the either
sailing, or creating such an appearance of sailing, of the Dutch
Fleet, as will prevent Admiral Dickson from sending anything
from off the great Dutch Ports, whilst the smaller Ports will
spew forth its Flotilla,--viz., Flushing, &c. &c. It must be
pretty well ascertained what number of small Vessels are in each
Port.

"I will suppose that 40,000 men are destined for this attack, or
rather surprise, of London; 20,000 will land on the west side of
Dover, sixty or seventy miles from London, and the same number
on the east side: they are too knowing to let us have but one
point of alarm for London. Supposing 200 craft, or 250,
collected at Boulogne &c, they are supposed equal to carry
20,000 men. In very calm weather, they might row over, supposing
no impediment, in twelve hours; at the same instant, by
telegraph, the same number of troops would be rowed out of
Dunkirk, Ostend, &c. &c. These are the two great objects to
attend to from Dover and the Downs, and perhaps one of the small
Ports to the westward. Boulogne (which I call the central point
of the Western attack) must be attended to. If it is calm when
the Enemy row out, all our Vessels and Boats appointed to watch
them, must get into the Channel, and meet them as soon as
possible: if not strong enough for the attack, they must watch,
and keep them company till a favourable opportunity offers. If a
breeze springs up, our Ships are to deal _destruction_; no
delicacy can be observed on this great occasion. But should it
remain calm, and our Flotilla not fancy itself strong enough to
attack the Enemy on their passage, the moment that they begin to
touch our shore, strong or weak, our Flotilla of Boats must
attack as much of the Enemy's Flotilla as they are able--say
only one-half or two-thirds; it will create a most powerful
diversion, for the bows of our Flotilla will be opposed to their
unarmed sterns, and the courage of Britons will never, I
believe, allow one Frenchman to leave the beach. A great number
of Deal and Dover Boats to be on board our vessels off the Port
of Boulogne, to give notice of the direction taken by the Enemy.
If it is calm, Vessels in the Channel can make signals of
intelligence to our shores, from the North Foreland to
Orfordness, and even as far as Solebay, not an improbable
place, about seventy or eighty miles from London.

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