A. T. (Alfred Thayer) Mahan - The Life of Nelson, Vol. II. (of 2)

A >> A. T. (Alfred Thayer) Mahan >> The Life of Nelson, Vol. II. (of 2)

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Sir James Erskine, thus importuned, did not see his way to sending the
troops. Naturally, as a soldier, he did not rely as much upon the
navy preventing a landing in his island, as upon his own powers of
resistance after it was effected, and was therefore unwilling to spare
from the latter. The point of view of a seaman was, and is, different.
He complained, too, that Duckworth had taken a great many ships to
Gibraltar. Nelson admits the mistake, and expresses his regret, but no
word of dissatisfaction with Erskine transpires through his evident
disappointment. He only says, "Pardon what I am going to repeat, that
either in Malta or on the Continent, a field of glory is open."
"Minorca," he wrote to Spencer, "I have never yet considered in the
smallest danger, but it has been a misfortune that others have thought
differently from me on that point." Towards the end of September,
Troubridge, without the aid of British troops, but supported by the
arrival of a division sent by Suwarrow, reported the evacuation of
Rome and Civita Vecchia. "How happy you have made us!" wrote Nelson to
him. "My pen will not say what I feel." The King, however, would not
return to Naples, now that this obstacle was withdrawn. "The Queen has
a noble generous disposition," said Nelson two months later.
"Unfortunately the King and her Majesty do not at this moment draw
exactly the same way; therefore, his Majesty will not go at this
moment to Naples, where his presence is much wanted." "We do but waste
our breath," he avowed afterwards.

In the beginning of October, a visit which he had intended making to
Minorca was hastened by a report that thirteen hostile
ships-of-the-line had been seen off Cape Finisterre, and it was
thought they might be destined for the Mediterranean. Nelson hoped to
assemble ten to meet them; but the news proved to be false. He left
Palermo for this trip on the 5th of October, and returned again on the
22d, having remained five days in Port Mahon. The arrangements for the
naval force, depending entirely upon himself, were soon settled; but
he was disappointed in obtaining, as he had hoped to do from a
personal interview with Erskine, a detachment of two thousand troops
for Malta. About that island he was, to use his own words, almost in
despair. For over a year La Valetta had been blockaded by land and
sea. For the latter he could with difficulty find ships; for the
former he could obtain no men to aid the islanders, who, half
starving, dependent for food chiefly upon Sicily, were sustained in
their resistance mainly by hatred of the invaders, and by the tactful
appeals and encouragement of Captain Ball, who lived ashore among
them. The Barbary pirates, by virtue of their war with Naples,
captured many of the vessels laden with supplies, despite Nelson's
passports; while the Sicilian Court, though well disposed, lacked the
energy and the propelling force necessary to compel the collection and
despatch of the needed grain. On one occasion Troubridge or Ball,
desperate at the sight of the famine around them, sent a ship of war
into Girgenti, a Sicilian port, seized, and brought away two
corn-laden vessels. "The measure was strong," said Nelson, but he
refrained from censuring; and, while apologizing to the Government,
added he hoped it "would not again force officers to so unpleasant an
alternative." He feared that in their misery the Maltese would abandon
the struggle, particularly if they got wind of the purpose of Great
Britain to restore the hated Order of Knights, in deference to the
wishes of the Czar. "The moment the French flag is struck," he had
been obliged to write to Ball, "the colours of the Order must be
hoisted and no other; when it was settled otherwise, the orders from
England were not so strong."

About this time came information that several ships were fitting out
at Toulon, with supplies for the besieged. This increased Nelson's
anxieties, and at the same time emphasized the necessity which he had
always urged of using speedier and surer means to reduce the place,
while the undisputed mastery of the sea gave the opportunity. "What
might not Bruix have done, had he done his duty?" was his own comment
upon that recent incursion; and who could tell how soon as great a
force might appear again under an abler man? He turned in every
direction, and was instant in his appeals for aid. He wrote to Acton
that he had positive information that seven ships were loaded in
Toulon. "I therefore beg leave to propose to your Excellency, whether
under our present circumstances, it would not be right for his
Sicilian Majesty to desire that the English garrison at Messina should
instantly go to Malta, for I am clear, that if Malta is relieved, that
our forces got together could not take it, and the commencement of a
new blockade would be useless. All the Barbary cruisers would there
have their rendezvous, and not a vessel of his Sicilian Majesty's
could put to sea." He exhorts the minister also to apply to the
Russians for immediate help at Malta.

At the same time, to augment his embarrassments, orders came from
Lisbon recalling the Portuguese squadron, which formed the larger part
of the sea blockade. Nelson forgot how often he had abused them as
useless, and grappled with that part of the difficulty with
characteristic boldness. He peremptorily forbade the admiral to obey
his orders. "As the reduction of the Island of Malta is of the
greatest consequence to the interests of the allied Powers at war with
France, and the withdrawing of the squadron under your command, at
this time, from the blockade of that island, will be of the most
ruinous consequences to their interests ... you are hereby required
and directed, in consideration of the above circumstances, and
notwithstanding the orders you may have received from your Court to
return to Lisbon, not on any consideration whatsoever to withdraw one
man from that island, which may have been landed from the squadron
under your Excellency's command, or detach one ship down the
Mediterranean, until further orders from me for that purpose." Your
orders, he tells Niza in a private letter, were founded upon the
belief that your presence was no longer necessary; "but the contrary
is the fact--for your services were never more wanted than at this
moment, when every exertion is wanting to get more troops of English
and Russians to Malta." He is evidently thinking of his difference
with Keith; but now he is within the limits of his commission as
Commander-in-chief. Doubting, however, whether his official authority
will prevail with Niza to disobey his recall, he plies him skilfully
with appeals to those sentiments of honor which had received such
illustration in his own noble career. "If you quit your most important
station till I can get" reliefs for you, "depend upon it, your
illustrious Prince will disapprove of (in this instance) your
punctilious execution of orders." "We shall soon get more troops from
Messina and Minorca; and I am not a little anxious for the honour of
Portugal and your Excellency, that you should be present at the
surrender. I hold myself responsible." "You was the first at the
blockade. Your Excellency's conduct has gained you the love and esteem
of Governor Ball, all the British officers and men, and the whole
Maltese people; and give me leave to add the name of Nelson as one of
your warmest admirers, as an officer and a friend."

As he dealt with the Portuguese admiral, so, in due measure, he
conducted his intercourse with all others who came within the scope of
his widely ranging activities. Already more Neapolitan than the King,
to the Russian he became as a Russian, to the Turk as a Turk, all
things to all men, if he could by any means promote the interest of
the Allied cause and save Malta. Amid the diverse and conflicting
motives of a coalition, Nelson played a steady hand, his attention
unified, and his sight cleared, by an unwavering regard to the single
object which he compressed into the words, "Down, down, with the
French!" In that sense, he asserts truthfully enough to each and all
of his correspondents that the advantage of their country and their
monarch is as dear to him as that of Great Britain. He touches with
artful skill upon the evident interests of each nation, appeals to the
officer's sense of the cherished desires of his sovereign, and, while
frankly setting forth the truths necessary to be spoken, as to the
comparative claims upon himself of the various portions of the field,
he insinuates, rather than suggests, what the person immediately
addressed ought to be doing in furtherance of the one great aim.
Withal, despite the uneasiness to which he is constantly a prey on
account of the failures of others, no lack of confidence in the one to
whom he is writing is suffered to appear. Each is not only exhorted
and cheered, but patted on the back with an implied approbation, which
in his own service constituted much of his well-deserved influence. He
is as hearty and generous in his praises to Sir Sidney Smith, whom he
never fully trusted, for his services at Acre, as he is to the valued
friend, and pattern of all naval efficiency, Troubridge. To the
Emperor of Russia he paid the politic attention of sending a detailed
report of all that had been done about Malta, made to him as Grand
Master of the Order,--a delicate and adroit flattery at the moment,
for the Czar then valued himself more as the restorer of an ancient
order of chivalry than as the inheritor of a great Sovereignty; and
his position was further recognized by asking of him the insignia of
the Order for Captain Ball and Lady Hamilton.

This immense load of correspondence and anxiety was additional to the
numerous unrecorded cares and interviews, relating to the routine work
and maintenance of a great squadron, often left bare of resources from
home, and to the support of the destitute population of Malta,--sixty
thousand souls; and all was carried on amid the constant going and
coming of the ambassador's house, kept open to naval officers and
others. This public sort of life and excitement involved considerable
expense, and was little to the taste of either Nelson or Hamilton,
the latter of whom was now approaching his seventieth year; but in it
Lady Hamilton was in all her glory, overwhelmed with compliments, the
victor of the Nile at her feet, and "making a great figure in our
political line," to use her husband's words. "Except to the Court,"
wrote Nelson, replying to a censure from the Admiralty for failing to
send a letter by a certain channel, when he had sent duplicates by two
other conveyances,--"except to the Court, till after eight o'clock at
night I never relax from business. I have had hitherto, the Board
knows, no one emolument--no one advantage of a Commander-in-chief." It
was in reference to this captious rebuff, received when immersed in
cares, that he wrote to Spencer: "Do not, my dear Lord, let the
Admiralty write harshly to me--my generous soul cannot bear it, being
conscious it is entirely unmerited."

While he was striving to gain assistance for the Maltese, he does not
forget to sustain them with hopes, not always too well founded. He
tells Ball he trusts the Messina troops will soon be with him. "You
may depend, in October, I will get 2,000 men on shore at Malta. Niza
is ordered to Lisbon, but I have directed his stay off Malta." He
appeals personally to the British commander at Messina, and to the
Russian minister at Palermo, reminding the latter how dear Malta and
its Order were to his sovereign. "Malta, my dear Sir, is in my
thoughts sleeping or waking." The Portuguese, he tells him, are
ordered home; but, wishing Russian assistance, he does not say that he
has stopped them,--as to which, indeed, he could not feel sure.

The same object pressed upon him while in Port Mahon, and he
succeeded, by his personal enthusiasm, in arousing Erskine's interest
in the matter; but the latter was loaded to the muzzle with
objections. "Sir James," said Nelson to Troubridge, with the amusing
professional prejudice they both entertained, "enters upon the
difficulty of the undertaking in a true soldier way." "I am just come
from Sir James," he wrote to Hamilton on the 13th of October. "He sees
all the difficulty of taking Malta in the clearest point of views, and
therefore it became an arduous task to make him think that with God's
blessing the thing was possible." He has, however, consented to
prepare fifteen hundred men with stores and equipments, but only on
condition that the Russians will also give a thousand,--a further
draft on Nelson's diplomacy,--and a thousand be landed from the
squadron, etc. Besides, there is the further difficulty that a
superior officer is expected from England, and what will he say? And
will Erskine be justified in sending men before his entirely uncertain
arrival? It may be imagined what such proceedings were to Nelson's
nervous, ardent, unhesitating temperament, and they elicited the
characteristic comment, "This has been my first conference. It has
cost me four hours hard labour, and may be upset by a fool." "My heart
is, I assure you, almost broke with this and other things," he wrote
to Spencer. "If the enemy gets supplies in, we may bid adieu to Malta.
This would complete my misery; for I am afraid I take all services too
much to heart. The accomplishing of them is my study, night and day."

"My dear Sir James," he writes to Erskine after returning to Palermo,
"I am in desperation about Malta--we shall lose it, I am afraid, past
redemption. I send you copies of Niza's and Ball's letters, also
General Acton's, so you will see I have not been idle." As it is, Ball
can hardly keep the inhabitants in hope of relief; what then will it
be if the Portuguese withdraw? "If the islanders are forced again to
join the French, we may not find even landing a very easy task, much
less to get again our present advantageous position. I therefore
entreat for the honour of our King, that whether General Fox is
arrived or not, at least the garrison of Messina may be ordered to
hold post in Malta until a sufficient force can be collected to
attack it.... I know well enough of what officers in your situation
can do; the delicacy of your feelings on the near approach of General
Fox I can readily conceive; but the time you know nothing about; this
is a great and important moment, and the only thing to be considered,
_is his Majesty's service to stand still for an instant?_ ... Was the
call for these troops known at home, would they not order them to
proceed when the service near at hand loudly calls for them? _this is
the only thing in my opinion for consideration_. If we lose this
opportunity it will be impossible to recall it." From this desperate
appeal he turns to Ball, with words of encouragement for his
islanders. "We shall soon hear to a certainty of at least 5,000
Russian troops for the service of Malta. Within a month I hope to see
10,000 men in arms against La Valetta. I have sent for Troubridge and
Martin, that I may get a force to relieve Niza. I trust he will not go
till I can get not only a proper force to relieve his ships, but those
of his people who are on shore." "The great order of all," he writes
Erskine three weeks later, "is to destroy the power of the French. Two
regiments for two months would probably, with the assistance of the
Russians, give us Malta, liberate us from an enemy close to our doors,
gratify the Emperor of Russia, protect our Levant trade, relieve a
large squadron of ships from this service, and enable me the better to
afford naval protection to the island of Minorca, and assist our
allies on the northern coast of Italy, and to annoy the enemy on the
coast of France."

Nelson's entreaties and efforts met with success, sufficient at least
to stay the ebbing tide. General Fox arrived in Minorca, gave
permission for the garrison of Messina to go to Malta, and on the 25th
of November Troubridge, bringing this news, arrived off Palermo.
Nelson's haste did not permit the "Culloden" to anchor. Shifting his
flag to a transport, he sent out the "Foudroyant" to meet her, with
orders for both to go to Messina, embark the garrison, and get off
Malta as soon as possible. The "Northumberland," seventy-four, was
also to join off Malta, forming a division to replace the Portuguese
squadron. The latter quitted the blockade in December, Nelson
notifying Niza on the 18th of the month that he no longer considered
him under his command. The Messina troops landed at Malta on the 10th.
The British then had fifteen hundred men on the island, supported by
two thousand Maltese, well disciplined and armed, besides a number of
native irregulars upon whom only partial dependence could be placed.
The Russians never came to take part. They got as far as Messina, but
there received orders to go to Corfu, both ships and men. This was in
pursuance of a change of policy in the Czar, who, being enraged at the
conduct of his allies, particularly of the Austrians, in the late
campaign, intended withdrawing from the Coalition, and was
concentrating troops at Corfu. This revived Nelson's fears for Malta.
"I trust Graham will not think of giving the island to the French by
withdrawing, till he receives orders from General Fox." The troops
remained, but in numbers too small to admit active operations. The
result was left perforce to the slow pressure of blockade; and final
success, insured mainly by Nelson's untiring efforts, was not attained
until after he had left the Mediterranean.

The six months of his independent command, though unmarked by striking
incidents at sea, were crowded with events, important in themselves,
but far more important as pregnant of great and portentous changes in
the political and military conditions of Europe. When Keith passed the
Straits in pursuit of the Franco-Spanish fleet, on the 30th of July,
the forces of the Coalition in Upper Italy were in the full tide of
repeated victories and unchecked success. On that same day the
fortress of Mantua, the siege of which in 1796 had stayed for nine
months the triumphal progress of Bonaparte, was surrendered by the
French, whose armies in the field, driven far to the westward, were
maintaining a difficult position on the crests of the Apennines.
Seeking to descend from there into the fields of Piedmont, they were
met by Suwarrow, and on the 15th of August, at Novi, received once
more a ruinous defeat, in which their commander-in-chief was slain.

At this moment of success, instead of pressing onward to drive the
enemy out of Italy, and possibly to pursue him into France, it was
decided that the Russians should be sent across the Alps into
Switzerland, to take the place of a number of Austrians. The latter,
in turn, were to move farther north, on the lower Rhine, to favor by a
diversion an intended invasion of Holland by a combined force of
Russians and British. This gigantic flank movement and change of plan
resulted most disastrously. In the midst of it the French general
Massena, commanding in Switzerland, the centre of the great hostile
front which extended from the Mediterranean to the North Sea, made a
vehement and sustained attack upon the Austro-Russians at Zurich, on
the 25th of September. Gaining a complete victory, he drove the enemy
back beyond the point where Suwarrow expected to make his junction.
The veteran marshal, who had left Italy on the 11th of September,
arrived two days after the Battle of Zurich was fought. Isolated in
insufficient numbers from the friends he expected to meet, it was only
after severe hardships and superhuman efforts, extending over ten
days, that he at length, on the 9th of October, reached a place of
safety at Ilanz. Declining further co-operation with the Austrians,
and alleging the need of rest for his troops after their frightful
exposure in the mountains, he withdrew into winter quarters in Bavaria
at the end of the month. Thus Switzerland remained in possession of
the French, inactivity continued in Italy, and the Czar, furious at
the turn events had taken, was rapidly passing into hatred of both
Austria and Great Britain.

On the 9th of October, also, Bonaparte landed in France, after a six
weeks' voyage from Alexandria. The immense consequences involved in
this single event could not then be foreseen; but it none the less
caused mortification and regret to Nelson. It was a cardinal principle
with him, vehemently and frequently uttered, that not a single
Frenchman should be allowed to return from Egypt; and here their
commander-in-chief had passed successfully from end to end of the
station, unseen by any British cruiser. He did not, however, consider
himself at fault, and his judgment may be allowed, although in his own
case. "If I could have had any cruisers, as was my plan, off Cape Bon,
in Africa, and between Corsica and Toulon, Mr. Buonaparte could not
probably have got to France." This he said to Earl Spencer. Elsewhere
he wrote: "I have regretted sincerely the escape of Buonaparte; but
those ships which were destined by me for the two places where he
would certainly have been intercepted, were, from the Admiralty
thinking, doubtless, that the Russians would do something at sea,
obliged to be at Malta, and other services which I thought the Russian
Admiral would have assisted me in--therefore, no blame lies at my
door." He took some comfort in contrasting the stealthy return of the
French general, with the great armada that accompanied his departure.
"No Crusader ever returned with more humility--contrast his going in
L'Orient, &c. &c."

A report that Bonaparte had passed Corsica reached Nelson on October
24th. The same day came despatches from Sir Sidney Smith, narrating a
disastrous defeat sustained by the Turks on the shores of Aboukir Bay.
Smith's period of command in the Levant had been chiefly, and
brilliantly, distinguished by the successful defence of Acre against
Bonaparte. The latter, threatened by simultaneous attacks by the Turks
from Syria and from the sea, had determined to anticipate such a
combination by going himself against the enemy on the land side,
before the weather conditions made it possible to disembark any
formidable body of men on the shores of Egypt. Starting with this
purpose in February, he had proceeded with slight resistance until the
18th of March, when his army appeared before Acre. Smith was then
lying in the roads with two ships-of-the-line. The siege which ensued
lasted for sixty-two days, so great was Bonaparte's pertinacity, and
anxiety to possess the place; and in its course Smith displayed, not
only courage and activity, which had never been doubted, but a degree
of conduct and sound judgment that few expected of him. His division
was fortunate enough to capture the French siege train, which had to
be sent by water, and he very much disturbed the enemy's coastwise
communications, besides contributing materially to the direction of
the defence, to which the Turks, though brave enough, were not
adequate. After several desperate assaults the siege was raised on the
20th of May, and Bonaparte retreated to Egypt, regaining Cairo on the
14th of June.

Following up the success at Acre, a Turkish fleet of thirteen
ships-of-the-line anchored in Aboukir Bay on the 11th of July,
attended by a body of transports carrying troops, variously estimated
at from ten to thirty thousand. Smith with his ships accompanied the
expedition. The Turks landed, and stormed the castle of Aboukir; but
on the 25th Bonaparte, having concentrated his forces rapidly, fell
upon them and totally defeated them. All who had landed were either
killed, driven into the sea and drowned, or taken prisoners; the
commander-in-chief being among the latter. Four weeks later, as is
already known, Bonaparte embarked for France.

It was thus conclusively demonstrated that for the present at least,
and until the French numbers were further diminished by the inevitable
losses of disease and battle, the Turks could not regain control of
Egypt. On the other hand, it was equally evident, and was admitted by
both Bonaparte and his able successor, Kleber, that without
reinforcements, which could not be sent while the British controlled
the sea, the end of the French occupation was only a question of time.
After Bonaparte's departure, Kleber wrote home strongly to this
effect. His letters, being addressed to the Government, fell upon
arrival into Bonaparte's hands; but, with these convictions, he was
ready to enter into an arrangement for the evacuation of the country,
upon condition of being allowed to return freely to Europe.

Such also appears to have been the disposition of the British
representatives in the East. Immediately after taking over the command
in the Levant from Troubridge, Smith gave him, among other papers, a
form of passport which he intended to use, permitting individual
Frenchmen to go to Europe by sea. This Troubridge handed to Nelson,
telling him also that it was Smith's intention to send word into
Alexandria, that all French ships might pass to France. This passport,
adopted after Smith had been to Constantinople, had doubtless the
sanction of the joint minister, his brother, and was signed by himself
both as plenipotentiary and naval officer. Nelson had by this time
been instructed that Smith was under his command, and he at once sent
him an order, couched in the most explicit, positive, and peremptory
terms, which merit especial attention because Smith disobeyed them.
"_As this is in direct opposition to my opinion_, which is, _never to
suffer any one individual Frenchman to quit Egypt_--I must therefore
_strictly charge and command you_,[2] never to give any French ship or
man leave to quit Egypt. And I must also desire that _you will oppose
by every means in your power, any permission which may he attempted to
be given by any foreigner_, Admiral, General, or other person; and you
will acquaint those persons, that I shall not pay the smallest
attention to any such passport after your notification; and _you are
to put my orders in force, not on any pretence to permit a single_
_Frenchman to leave Egypt_." It seems clear from these expressions
that Nelson had gathered, through Troubridge, that it was the policy
of the Sultan and of the British representatives to get the French out
of Egypt at any cost,--to look, in short, to local interests rather
than to the general policy of the Allies. This he was determined to
prevent by instructions so comprehensive, yet so precise, as to leave
no loophole for evasion.

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