A. T. (Alfred Thayer) Mahan - The Life of Nelson, Vol. II. (of 2)

A >> A. T. (Alfred Thayer) Mahan >> The Life of Nelson, Vol. II. (of 2)

Pages:
1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | 8 | 9 | 10 | 11 | 12 | 13 | 14 | 15 | 16 | 17 | 18 | 19 | 20 | 21 | 22 | 23 | 24 | 25 | 26 | 27 | 28 | 29 | 30 | 31 | 32 | 33 | 34 | 35

I am, &c.

NELSON AND BRONTE.

This letter fulfils his own request to the Admiralty: "All I wish and
submit to their Lordships is, that if the business is left to me, my
orders may be decisive."

Later in the same day that Nelson received Gore's letter, the
Admiralty's orders arrived, sent, as despatches too often were, by a
vessel so small and slow that it would seem they counted upon her
insignificance to elude an enemy's notice. The delay served, as has
been said, to give proof of the rapidity of Nelson's action; the
receipt of the orders enabled him also to show how much clearer were
his conceptions of adequacy than those of ordinary men. To stop
treasure-ships, or to embargo merchant-ships, when difficulty was
threatening, was no new idea to the British Government. The latter had
been done with Baltic merchantmen at the time of the Armed Neutrality.
In the case of Spain, it was a measure particularly efficacious, for
the financial solvency and belligerent capacity of that country
depended upon the galleons, which brought to her the tribute of her
colonies; and her relations and dealings with France at this time were
so partial and suspicious as to justify precautions. Evidently,
however, such a step, being avowedly preventive and not offensive,
should be taken in such a way as to avert all chance of possible
disaster. Several Spanish frigates being expected, the British
Government charged four vessels of the same rate with the task of
arresting them. Nelson, the instant he got his orders, detached to the
spot an eighty-gun ship, to which he added four other cruisers,
thinking, as he said in his orders to the captain selected, that "this
is a service of the highest importance, and that an officer of your
rank and experience should be employed therein." With such odds
against him, the Spanish commander would need no military
justification for submission. As it was, he resisted, necessitating a
fight, which under the circumstances was barbarous and brutal, and
ended in one of the Spanish vessels blowing up with several women on
board; a result due wholly to the blundering lack of foresight which
sent a corporal's guard to do the work of a sheriff's posse.

This incident, of the order to arrest the treasure-ships, which was
made general for all vessels of that class, was probably the
determining occasion of Nelson's decision to remain in the
Mediterranean. War with Spain, with consequent increased activity on
the part of France, though not certain, became probable. There was at
that time on board the "Victory" a Dr. Lambton Este, who had gone to
the Mediterranean in a civil capacity, and was on his way home.
Nelson, hoping to return soon himself, asked Este to remain until he
started, and to accompany him in a worn-out seventy-four, the
"Superb," which he was holding for that purpose. It seems that, in
looking forward to the resumption of his command, he expected it would
be the scene of a more wide-spread political activity, especially in
the far East where Este had been employed, and that, for this purpose,
he wished to attach the latter to his person. "There may be more
occupation there for us all, hereafter, than we just now foresee, or
may expect."

In confirmation of this general forecast, we are told by Dr. Scott
that, when the admiral left England before Trafalgar, arrangements had
been made with the Foreign Office for Este with six clerks to be
attached to the flagship, to conduct the diplomatic correspondence.
The fact is doubly interesting. It shows, on the one hand, the
accuracy of Nelson's foresight as to the vast importance the
Mediterranean was about to assume, to meet which he thus was making
provision in a general way; although neither he nor any other man
could have anticipated the extraordinary, complicated snarl of the
political threads in Napoleon's later years. The cares from these, it
may be said in passing, were by Nelson's death devolved upon
Collingwood; who, though a strong man, was killed by them, through
general debility resulting from confinement, and through organic
injury produced by bending over his desk. On the other hand, it cannot
but be grateful to those who admire the hero, to see that Nelson
looked forward to no inglorious ease, but to a life of strenuous work,
as well as, if it might be so, of military honor. Had he lived, we may
hope, the days after Trafalgar would not have been the grave of his
renown.

On the first of November his decision was taken. He sent for Este and
said, "Oh, my good fellow! I have abandoned the idea of going to
England, at present. I shall not go yet, and when I may go is quite
uncertain--must depend upon events, and upon my own precarious health;
at the same time, I am doing you an evident injustice, by detaining
you here so long in uncertainty." Este of course expressed his
willingness to remain while needed, but Nelson interrupted him,
saying, "No, _my_ wish is that you should go,--I am anxious that you
should go, and go without further delay. To tell you the truth, I am
not entirely disinterested. Go home; get confirmed in your
appointment, according to my desire, and return to me as soon
afterwards as you can. Should I retain my command in the
Mediterranean, with the powers already conceded to me, I shall require
your assistance." It seems probable that he was anxious to get some
one home as rapidly as possible, to forestall, if time permitted, a
final recall, which the appointment of a successor would be. "Long
before this time," he had written Lady Hamilton, "I expect, another
admiral is far on his way to supersede me. I should for your sake, and
for many of our friends, have liked an odd hundred thousand pounds [by
a Spanish war]; but, never mind. If they give me the choice of staying
a few months longer, it will be very handsome; and, for the sake of
others, we would give up very much of our own felicity."

The despatches and routine papers were got ready rapidly, and placed
in charge of Este, who sailed for Lisbon, in a sloop-of-war, on the
6th of November, furnished with orders to all officials to expedite
him on his way, and particularly to captains not to communicate with
the ship, because the plague, then raging in Gibraltar, would involve
her, if visited, in the delays of quarantine. On the 18th of November,
off Cape St. Vincent, Este met the "Swiftsure," seventy-four, bringing
Orde out. It has been charged that the latter discourteously delayed
to notify Nelson of his taking over part of the station.[78] It
appears, however, from this encounter, that his letter to that
effect, dated the 17th,[79] though headed "off Cadiz," was actually
prepared before he reached his position there. It was forwarded to
Nelson by the "Anson," whose captain was senior officer of the
division till then blockading the port, whom Orde relieved and sent on
with his despatch. The "Anson" joined Nelson on the 15th of December.
The "Swiftsure," which was also destined to his squadron, did not
reach him until the 25th. It seems, therefore, fair to acquit Orde of
a discourtesy as aimless as it would be reprehensible.

Just before Este's departure Nelson had reconnoitred Toulon. A new
vice-admiral had hoisted his flag in place of Latouche Treville, who
had died on the 20th of August. "He has given me the slip," wrote
Nelson, who felt himself balked of his vengeance. "The French papers
say he died of walking so often up to the signal-post, upon Sepet, to
watch us: I always pronounced that would be his death." His successor
was Villeneuve, the predestined victim of Trafalgar. "They now amuse
themselves with night-signals," Nelson informed the First Lord; "and
by the quantity of rockets and blue lights they show with every
signal, they plainly mark their position. These gentlemen must soon be
so perfect in theory, that they will come to sea to put their
knowledge into practice. Could I see that day, it would make me
happy." The time was now not far distant. The weariness of waiting was
soon to give way to the anxious fever of doubtful and protracted
pursuit, of prolonged uncertainty and steadfast endurance, through
which he advanced to his final triumph, just as he had to those of the
past.

The seizure of the Spanish treasure-ships, with its lamentable
catastrophe, took place on the 5th of October. Nelson had the news on
the 8th of November, which, extraordinary as it may appear, was before
the fact was known in Madrid. On the 10th of November, when the
British minister received his passports upon his own demand, no word
had reached there. On the 15th, Nelson was informed that a British
vessel had been fired upon by the batteries of Barcelona, which was an
error; but receiving at the same time a letter from the minister,
probably to the effect that he would break off relations on the 10th,
he inferred that war existed, and issued orders for a general seizure
of Spanish vessels of war and commerce throughout the station. This
was done on his own responsibility, but he guarded himself by
stringent provisions against any injury beyond detention being
inflicted; and he alleged, very reasonably, that a commander-in-chief
who never got letters from home less than two months old must act upon
his own motion. "I am completely in the dark. It is now more than two
months since the John Bull [the last despatch boat] sailed." "I have
set the whole Mediterranean to work," he tells Lady Hamilton on the
23d; "and if I had had the spare troops at Malta at my disposal,
Minorca would at this moment have had English colours flying." A
Swedish ship, carrying a Spanish regiment from Barcelona to the latter
island, was among the first captures.

"With respect to my making war upon Spain, and Sir John Orde not
having done it," so he wrote to Elliot, "I believe you will think I
have acted not precipitately, but consistent with the firmness of John
Bull. I can't tell what schemes ministers may have; but when I am
without orders, and unexpected occurrences arise, I shall always act
as I think the honour and glory of my King and Country demand. Upon
the most mature and serious consideration I can give the subject, the
present lays within the compass of a nutshell. Our Ministers demand
certain points to be conceded to them; they, to give a spur, detain
the Spanish treasure. Spain, the moment she hears of it, kicks your
minister out of Madrid; a plain proof they had not acceded to our
propositions. Indeed, Mr. Frere,[80] you will see by his letter, did
not believe it would have a favourable termination, even had not the
frigates been detained. I send your Excellency his letters. I feel I
have done perfectly right. No desire of wealth could influence my
conduct; for I had nothing to take worth two-pence to me. Sir John
Orde was sent, if it was a Spanish war, to take the money; but until
he saw my orders, he did not act. I suppose he was fearful of that
responsibility which I am ever ready to take upon me; and now he is to
wallow in wealth, whilst I am left a beggar. But such things are. I
receive the kindest letters from Lord Melville and the Secretary of
State, but they think the French fleet is prize enough for me." No
wonder Nelson found that diplomatists were slow, measured by himself
as a standard; but what a wonderful instinct it shows in him, that,
with action ever prompt to the verge of precipitancy, he made so few
blunders in deed. There are several errors of fact in his summary of
reasons, but his action was absolutely well-timed--to the very hour.

Meanwhile, and up to the 15th of December, when Orde's letter was
received, no reply had come to his application for leave, and no
intimation of a successor. A fresh complication here arose by the
entire break-down of one of his two junior admirals--Rear-Admiral
Campbell--whose health became so affected that it was necessary to
send him immediately home. He quitted the fleet on the 4th of
December. Nelson rightly felt that he himself could not go, leaving
Bickerton without any assistant. He went further; for, when a rumor
came that Orde was to relieve him, he determined that he would offer
his services to him, as second, until a successor to Campbell should
arrive. As there was friction between himself and Orde, who had,
besides, a not very pleasant official reputation, this intention, to
take a lower place where he had been chief, was not only
self-sacrificing, but extremely magnanimous; it was, however,
disfigured by too much self-consciousness. "I have wrote to Lord
Melville that I should make such an offer, and that I entreated him to
send out a flag-officer as soon as possible, but I dare say Sir John
Orde is too great a man to want my poor services, and that he will
reject them; be that as it may, you will, I am sure, agree with me,
that I shall show my superiority to him by such an offer, and the
world will see what a sacrifice I am ready to make for the service of
my King and Country, for what greater sacrifice could I make, than
serving for a moment under Sir John Orde, and giving up for that
moment the society of all I hold most dear in this world?"

Orde's letter reached Nelson in Pula Roads, in the Gulf of Cagliari,
at the southern extremity of Sardinia; an out-of-the-way position
which probably accounts for much of its delay. He remained there, or
in the Gulf of Palmas, a little to the westward, for about a week, and
on the 19th of December left for his station off Cape San Sebastian.
At the latter place, on Christmas Day, he was joined by the
"Swiftsure," which brought him a great batch of official mail that had
come out with Orde. He thus received at one and the same time his
leave to go home and the Admiralty's order reducing his station.
Unluckily, the latter step, though taken much later than the issuing
of his leave, had become known to him first, through Orde; and the
impression upon his mind remained with that firmness of prejudice
which Radstock had noted in him. He does not appear at any time to
have made allowance for the fact that his command was cut down under a
reasonable impression that he was about to quit it.

Immediately after the "Swiftsure" joined at Rendezvous 97, he took the
fleet off Toulon. The enemy was found to be still in port, but the
rumors of an approaching movement, and of the embarkation of troops,
were becoming more specific. He remained off the harbor for at least
a week, and thence went to Madalena, where he anchored on the 11th of
January, 1805. This was, though he knew it not, the end of the long
watch off Toulon.

Short as the time was, Nelson had already experienced the
inconvenience of a senior admiral, lying, like an enemy, on the flank
of his communications with Great Britain, and dealing as he pleased
with his vessels. One frigate at least had been sent already to
England, without his knowledge and consent. "I have in a former
letter," he tells the First Lord, "stated my opinion freely upon the
stations of Gibraltar and Cadiz being given to the same officer; for
without that is done, our convoys can never be considered safe. There
is also another consideration, why the Officer at Gibraltar should be
under the orders of the Admiral commanding the Mediterranean
fleet--which is, that any admiral independent of that station, takes
all the stores he chooses, or fancies he wants, for the service of his
fleet; thereby placing the fleet in the Gulf of Lyons in great
distress for many articles."

Off Toulon, having a large official mail to make up in reply to that
brought by the "Swiftsure," he thought it both quicker and safer,
under all the conditions of the time, to send it to Lisbon. He
therefore called on board the "Victory" a smart young frigate-captain,
William Parker, a nephew of Lord St. Vincent, gave him orders to take
the despatches to Lisbon, and added, "Sir John Orde takes my frigates
from me, and sends them away in some other direction from what I wish.
I cannot even get my despatches home. You must contrive to get to the
westward and go into Lisbon, and avoid his ships. I have not signed
your orders," alluding to memorandum instructions separate from the
formal orders, "because Sir John Orde is my senior officer; but, if it
should come to a Court Martial, Hardy can swear to my handwriting, and
you shall not be broke. Take your orders, and good bye; and remember,
Parker, if you cannot weather _that fellow_, I shall think you have
not a drop of your old uncle's blood in your veins." The memorandum
directed him to pass Cape Spartel in the night, steering to the
southward and westward to avoid Orde, and ended thus: "Bring-to [stop]
for nothing, if you can help it. Hoist the signal for quarantine, and
that you are charged with dispatches. If you are forced to speak by a
superior officer, show him only my order for not interfering with you;
and unless he is an admiral, superior to me, you will obey my orders
instead of any pretended ones from him, from my superior officer."

Parker executed his commission successfully, but in doing so met with
a curious adventure. Leaving Gibraltar with a north wind, favorable
for his purpose, he passed Spartel as directed, and, the night being
moonlight, saw in the distance Orde's squadron cruising under easy
sail. Unluckily, one of the outlying lookout frigates discovered him,
gave chase, and overtook him. Her captain himself came on board, and
was about to give Parker orders not to proceed to the westward, Orde
jealously objecting to any apparent intrusion upon his domain. Parker
stopped him hastily from speaking on the quarter-deck, within earshot
of others, and took him into the cabin. The stranger had been one of
Nelson's old midshipmen and a favorite; had started with him in the
"Agamemnon," and by him had been made a commander after the Nile.
"Captain Hoste," said Parker, "I believe you owe all your advancement
in the service to my uncle, Lord St. Vincent, and to Lord Nelson. I am
avoiding Sir John Orde's squadron by desire of Lord Nelson; you know
his handwriting; _I must go on_."[81] (Parker being senior to Hoste,
the latter could not detain him by his own authority; and he
understood from this avowal that Orde's orders, if produced, would
become a matter of record, would be disobeyed, and a court-martial
must follow.) "The question of a court-martial would be very
mischievous. Do you not think it would be better if you were not to
meet the 'Amazon' this night?" Captain Hoste, after a little
reflection, left the ship without giving his admiral's orders to
Parker.[82]

Having determined not to leave Bickerton alone, Nelson decided to keep
secret his own leave to return to England. "I am much obliged by their
Lordships' kind compliance with my request, which is absolutely
necessary from the present state of my health," he writes on the 30th
of December; "and I shall avail myself of their Lordships' permission,
the moment another admiral, in the room of Admiral Campbell, joins the
fleet, unless the enemy's fleet should be at sea, when I should not
think of quitting my command until after the battle." "I shall never
quit my post," he tells a friend, "when the French fleet is at sea, as
a commander-in-chief of great celebrity once did,"--a not very
generous fling at St. Vincent. "I would sooner die at my post, than
have such a stigma upon my memory." "Nothing has kept me here," he
writes Elliot, "but the fear for the escape of the French fleet, and
that they should get to either Naples or Sicily in the short days.
Nothing but gratitude to those good Sovereigns could have induced me
to stay one moment after Sir John Orde's extraordinary command, for
his general conduct towards me is not such as I had a right to
expect."

During this last month of monotonous routine, while off Toulon and at
Madalena, he had occasion to express opinions on current general
topics, which found little room in his mind after the French fleet
began to move. There was then a report of a large expedition for
foreign service forming in England, and rumor, as usual, had a
thousand tongues as to its destination. "A blow struck in Europe,"
Nelson wrote to Lord Moira, "would do more towards making us
respected, and of course facilitate a peace, than the possession of
Mexico or Peru,"--a direction towards which the commercial ambitions
of Great Britain had a traditional inclination, fostered by some
military men and statesmen, who foresaw the break-up of the Spanish
colonial system. "Above all, I hope we shall have no buccaneering
expeditions. Such services fritter away our troops and ships, when
they are so much wanted for more important occasions, and are of no
use beyond enriching a few individuals. I know not, if these
sentiments coincide with yours; but as glory, and not money, has
through life been your pursuit, I should rather think that you will
agree with me, that in Europe, and not abroad, is the place for us to
strike a blow." "I like the idea of English troops getting into the
Kingdom of Naples," he tells Elliot at this same time; whence it may
be inferred that that was the quarter he would now, as upon his first
arrival, choose for British effort. "If they are well commanded, I am
sure they will do well. They will have more wants than us sailors."
The expedition, which sailed the following spring, was destined for
the Mediterranean, and reinforced the garrisons of Gibraltar and Malta
to an extent that made the latter a factor to be considered in the
strategy of the inland sea; but when it arrived, Nelson had left the
Mediterranean, not to return.

As regards general politics, Nelson, writing to the Queen of Naples,
took a gloomy view of the future. The Prime Minister of the Two
Sicilies, Sir John Acton, had some time before been forced out of
office and had retired to Palermo, an event produced by the pressure
of French influence, which Nelson regarded now as absolutely dominant
in that kingdom, and menacing to Europe at large. "Never, perhaps, was
Europe more critically situated than at this moment, and never was the
probability of universal Monarchy more nearly being realized, than in
the person of the Corsican. I can see but little difference between
the name of Emperor, King, or Prefect, if they perfectly obey his
despotic orders. Prussia is trying to be destroyed last--Spain is
little better than a province of France--Russia does nothing on the
grand scale. Would to God these great Powers reflected, that the
boldest measures are the safest! They allow small states to fall, and
to serve the enormous power of France, without appearing to reflect
that every kingdom which is annexed to France, makes their own
existence, as independent states, more precarious." How shrewd a
prophecy this was as regards Prussia and Spain, those two countries
were to learn by bitter experience; and remote Russia herself, though
she escaped the last humiliation, saw in the gigantic hosts whose
onset a few years later shook her to her centre, the armed subjects of
the many smaller states, in whose subjugation she had acquiesced
during the period of the Czar's moral subservience to Napoleon.

Nelson's essentially military genius had in political matters a keenly
sensitive intuition of the probable action of his fellow-warrior,
Bonaparte. "Russia's going to war in the way I am sure she will, will
cause the loss of Naples and Sardinia; for that Court will not send
100,000 men into Italy, and less are useless for any grand purpose."
"Your Excellency's summary account of the situation of Naples since
the negotiations with Russia," he wrote to Elliot in October, "are
perfectly clear; but the times are such that kingdoms must not be
played with. So far from Russia assisting Naples, it may involve her,
without the greatest care and circumspection, in total ruin. Naples
must not be hastily involved in war with France. Sicily must be saved.
The Calabrians must be kept from the entrance of French troops. If we
are consulted, we must assist Naples in keeping off the blow as long
as possible." That Napoleon's action would have been as here surmised,
had his purposes then tended towards the Mediterranean instead of the
English Channel, we have his own assertion. "At the solicitation of
your ambassador at St. Petersburg," wrote he to the Queen of Naples,
three months later, referring to the same subject, "ten thousand
Russians have been sent to Corfu.... If it had entered into my plans
to make war upon the King of Naples, I should have done it on the
entrance of the first Russian in Corfu, but I wish for peace with
Naples, with Europe entire, with England even." Napoleon's wishes for
peace, except on the condition of having his own way, are scarcely to
be taken seriously; but his care to keep things quiet in the South
corroborates the other indications of his firm purpose to invade
England. He was too astute to precipitate troubles elsewhere while
that was pending. The appearance of the Russians in Corfu, although
unwise in Nelson's view, relieved his fears for the islands and the
Morea, and enabled him to reduce a little his detachment about the
heel of Italy.

Pages:
1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | 8 | 9 | 10 | 11 | 12 | 13 | 14 | 15 | 16 | 17 | 18 | 19 | 20 | 21 | 22 | 23 | 24 | 25 | 26 | 27 | 28 | 29 | 30 | 31 | 32 | 33 | 34 | 35