A. T. (Alfred Thayer) Mahan - The Life of Nelson, Vol. II. (of 2)

A >> A. T. (Alfred Thayer) Mahan >> The Life of Nelson, Vol. II. (of 2)

Pages:
1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | 8 | 9 | 10 | 11 | 12 | 13 | 14 | 15 | 16 | 17 | 18 | 19 | 20 | 21 | 22 | 23 | 24 | 25 | 26 | 27 | 28 | 29 | 30 | 31 | 32 | 33 | 34 | 35

A characteristic letter was elicited from Nelson by the loss of the
despatch-vessel off Cadiz, the brig "Raven," whose commander, Captain
Layman, had gained his cordial professional esteem in the Copenhagen
expedition, in connection with which he has already been mentioned. As
usual in the case of a wreck, a court-martial was held. This censured
the captain, much to Nelson's vexation; the more so because, at his
request, Layman had not produced before the court certain orders for
the night given by him, the proved neglect of which would have brought
a very heavy punishment upon the officer of the watch. In weighing the
admiral's words, therefore, allowance may be made for a sense of
personal responsibility for the finding of the court; but the letter,
which was addressed to the First Lord, contains expressions that are
most worthy of attention, not only because illustrative of Nelson's
temperament and mode of thought, but also for a point of view too
rarely taken in the modern practice, which has grown up in peace.

MY DEAR LORD,--Give me leave to recommend Captain Layman to your
kind protection; for, notwithstanding the Court Martial has
thought him deserving of censure for his running in with the
land, yet, my Lord, allow me to say, that Captain Layman's
misfortune was, perhaps, conceiving other people's abilities
were equal to his own, which, indeed, very few people's are.

I own myself one of those who do not fear the shore, for hardly
any great things are done in a small ship by a man that is;
therefore, I make very great allowances for him. Indeed, his
station was intended never to be from the shore in the straits:
and if he did not every day risk his sloop, he would he useless
upon that station. Captain Layman has served with me in three
ships, and I am well acquainted with his bravery, zeal,
judgment, and activity; _nor do I regret the loss of the Raven
compared to the value of Captain Layman's services, which are a
national loss_.[89]

You must, my dear Lord, forgive the warmth which I express for
Captain Layman; but he is in adversity, and, therefore, has the
more claim to my attention and regard. If I had been censured
every time I have run my ship, or fleets under my command, into
great danger, I should long ago have been _out_ of the Service,
and never _in_ the House of Peers.

I am, my dear Lord, most faithfully, your obedient servant,

NELSON AND BRONTE.

It is something to meet with the clear recognition that a man may be
of more value than a ship. As Clarendon said, it is not all of an
officer's duty to bring his ship safe home again.

On the voyage back from Alexandria be had busied himself with
vindications of his course in going there, manifesting again that
over-sensitiveness to the judgment of others, which contrasts so
singularly with his high resolve and self-dependence when assuming the
greatest responsibilities. To Ball, to the Admiralty, and to the First
Lord privately, he sent explanations of his action, accompanied by a
summary of his reasons. As the latter have been given, one by one, as
each step was taken, it is not necessary here to say more than that,
in the author's judgment, each successive movement was made upon good;
grounds, and rightly timed. This is true, although Nelson was entirely
misled as to Bonaparte's object. The ruse of the latter, as put into
effect by Villeneuve, not only deceived the British admiral, but, in
its issue, confounded the French. The critical moment of decision, for
the whole fruitless campaign, was when Nelson determined to go first
off Messina, then to the Morea, and finally to Egypt, upon the
inference that by this time one of three things must have happened.
Either (1) he must have met the French fleet, personally or by his
lookouts, or (2) it had returned to Toulon, or (3) it had gone on to
Egypt. The first being eliminated, the choice he made between the
others, wide as was the flight for which it called, was perfectly
accurate. It is difficult to know which most to admire,--the sagacity
which divined the actual, though not the intended, movements of the
enemy, the fiery eagerness which gave assurance of a fierce and
decisive battle, or the great self-restraint which, in all his fever
of impatience, withheld him from precipitating action before every
means of information was exhausted. There will be occasion to note
again the same traits in the yet sharper trial he was soon to undergo.

His conclusion upon the whole matter, therefore, though erroneous as
to the fact, may be accepted as entirely justified by all the
indications; and it must be added that, with the dispositions he took,
nothing could have saved the French fleet but its prompt retreat to
Toulon. "Had they not been crippled," he wrote Davison, "nothing could
have hindered our meeting them on January 21st, off the south end of
Sardinia." "I have not the smallest doubt," he concluded his letter to
the Admiralty, "but that the destination of the French armament which
left the coast of France on the 18th of January, was Alexandria; and,
under all the circumstances which I have stated, I trust their
Lordships will approve my having gone to Egypt in search of the French
fleet." There was, however, no occasion for him to be forward in
suggesting the sacrifice of himself, as he did to Melville. "At this
moment of sorrow I still feel that I have acted right. The result of
my inquiries at Coron and Alexandria confirm me in my former opinion;
and therefore, my Lord, if my obstinacy or ignorance is so gross, I
should be the first to recommend your superseding me." It may be noted
here that Nelson never realized--he did not live long enough to
realize--how thoroughly Bonaparte had learned from Egypt his lesson as
to the control of the sea by sea-power, and what it meant to a
maritime expedition which left it out of the account. To the end of
his reign, and in the height of his sway, he made no serious attempt
to occupy Sardinia or even Sicily, narrow as was the water separating
the latter from Naples, become practically a French state, over which
his brother and brother-in-law reigned for six years. Nelson to the
last made light of the difficulties of which Bonaparte had had bitter
experience. "France," he wrote to the Secretary for War, "will have
both Sardinia and Sicily very soon, if we do not prevent it, and Egypt
besides." "We know," he said in a letter to Ball, "there would be no
difficulty for single polaccas to sail from the shores of Italy with
300 or 400 men in each, (single ships;) and that, in the northerly
winds, they would have a fair chance of not being seen, and even if
seen, not to be overtaken by the Russian ships. Thus, 20,000 men would
be fixed again in Egypt, with the whole people in their favour. Who
would turn them out?"

Nelson left the Gulf of Palmas as soon as the wind served, which was
on the 9th of March. It was necessary to revictual; but, as the time
of the storeships' arrival was uncertain, he thought best to make a
round off Toulon and Barcelona, to renew the impression of the French
that his fleet was to the westward. This intention he carried out,
"showing myself," to use his own words, "off Barcelona and the coast
of Spain, and the islands of Majorca and Minorca, until the 21st of
March." "I shall, if possible," he wrote to a captain on detached
service, "make my appearance off Barcelona, in order to induce the
enemy to believe that I am fixed upon the coast of Spain, when I have
every reason to believe they will put to sea, as I am told the troops
are still embarked. From Barcelona I shall proceed direct to
Rendezvous 98."[90] Accordingly, on the 26th of March he anchored at
Palmas, and began at once to clear the transports. "By the report of
the Fleet Captain, I trust [it will be evident that] it could not with
propriety be longer deferred." Still satisfied that the French were
bound to Egypt, he would here be close to their necessary route, and
with a lookout ship thirty miles to the westward felt assured they
would not escape him. Four days after he anchored, Villeneuve started
on his second venture, and thinking, as Nelson had plotted, that the
British fleet was off Cape San Sebastian, he again shaped his course
to pass east of the Balearics, between them and Sardinia. The news of
his sailing reached Nelson five days later, on April 4th, at 10 A.M.
He had left Palmas the morning before, and was then twenty miles west
of it, beating against a head wind. The weary work of doubt,
inference, and speculation was about to begin once more, and to be
protracted for over three months.

In the present gigantic combination of Napoleon, the Brest squadron,
as well as those of Rochefort and Toulon, was to go to the West
Indies, whence the three should return in mass to the English Channel,
to the number of thirty-five French ships-of-the-line. To these it was
hoped to add a number of Spanish ships, from Cartagena and Cadiz. If
the movements were successful, this great force would overpower, or
hold in check, the British Channel Fleet, and secure control of the
Straits of Dover long enough for the army to cross. It is with the
Toulon squadron that we are immediately concerned, as it alone for the
present touches the fortunes of Nelson. Villeneuve's orders were to
make the best of his way to the Straits of Gibraltar, evading the
British fleet, but calling off Cartagena, to pick up any Spanish ships
there that might be perfectly ready to join him. He was not, however,
to delay for them on any account, but to push on at once to Cadiz.
This port he was not to enter, but to anchor outside, and there be
joined by the "Aigle," the ship that had so long worried Nelson, and
also by six or eight Spanish ships believed to be ready. As soon as
these came out, he was to sail with all speed for Martinique, and
there wait forty days for the Brest squadron, if the latter, whose
admiral was to be commander-in-chief of the allied fleets, did not
appear sooner. Villeneuve had other contingent instructions, which
became inoperative through the persistent pursuit of Nelson.

The French fleet sailed during the night of March 30, with a light
northeast wind, and steered a course approaching due south, in
accordance with Villeneuve's plan of going east of Minorca. The
British lookout frigates, "Active" and "Phoebe," saw it at eight
o'clock the next morning, and kept company with its slow progress till
eight P.M., when, being then sixty miles south by west, true, from
Toulon, the "Phoebe" was sent off to Nelson. During the day the wind
shifted for a time to the northwest. The French then hauled up to
southwest, and were heading so when darkness concealed them from the
British frigates, which were not near enough for night observations.
After the "Phoebe's" departure, the "Active" continued to steer as the
enemy had been doing when last seen, but at daybreak they were no
longer in sight. Just what Villeneuve did that night does not appear;
but no vessel of Nelson's knew anything more about him till April
18th, when information was received from a chance passer that he had
been seen on the 7th off Cape de Gata, on the coast of Spain, with a
fresh easterly wind steering to the westward.

Villeneuve doubtless had used the night's breeze, which was fresh, to
fetch a long circuit, throw off the "Active," and resume his course to
the southward. It was not till next day, April 1st, that he spoke a
neutral, which had seen Nelson near Palmas. Undeceived thus as to the
British being off Cape San Sebastian, and the wind having then come
again easterly, the French admiral kept away at once to the westward,
passed north of the Balearic Islands, and on the 6th appeared off
Cartagena. The Spanish ships there refusing to join him, he pressed
on, went by Gibraltar on the 8th, and on the 9th anchored off Cadiz,
whence he drove away Orde's squadron. The "Aigle," with six Spanish
ships, joined at once, and that night the combined force, eighteen
ships-of-the-line, sailed for Martinique, where it arrived on the 14th
of May. By Villeneuve's instructions it was to remain in the West
Indies till the 23d of June.

When the captain of the "Active" found he had lost sight of the
French, he kept away for Nelson's rendezvous, and joined him at 2 P.M.
of April 4th, five or six hours after the "Phoebe." Prepossessed with
the opinion that Naples, Sicily, or Egypt was the enemy's aim, an
opinion which the frigate's news tended to confirm, Nelson at once
took the fleet midway between Sardinia and the Barbary coast,
spreading lookouts on either side. Thus, without yielding ground to
leeward, he covered all avenues leading to the eastward. He summed up
his purpose in words which showed an entire grasp of the essentials of
his perplexing situation. "I shall neither go to the eastward of
Sicily, or to the westward of Sardinia, until I know something
positive." Amid the diverse objects demanding his care, this choice of
the strategic position was perfectly correct; but as day followed day
without tidings, the distress of uncertainty, and the strain of
adhering to his resolve not to move without information to guide him,
became almost unbearable--a condition not hard to be realized by
those who have known, in suspense, the overpowering impulse to do
something, little matter what. It is an interesting illustration of
the administrative difficulties of the fleet, that three supply-ships
joined him on the 5th of April, and their stores were transferred at
sea while momentarily expecting the enemy's appearance; one at least
being completely discharged by the night of the 6th.

On this date, Nelson, having waited forty-eight hours to windward of
Sicily, decided to fall back on Palermo; reckoning that if any attempt
had been made upon Naples or Sicily, he should there hear of it. The
lookouts which were scattered in all directions were ordered to join
him there, and a frigate was sent to Naples. On the 9th and 10th he
was off Palermo, and, though he got no word of the French, received
two pieces of news from which his quick perceptions jumped to the
conclusion that he had been deceived, and that the enemy had gone
west. "April 10, 7 A.M. Hallowell is just arrived from Palermo. He
brings accounts that the great Expedition is sailed,[91] and that
seven Russian sail-of-the-line are expected in the Mediterranean;
therefore I may suppose the French fleet are bound to the westward. I
must do my best. God bless you. I am very, very miserable, but ever,
my dear Ball," etc.

A week more was to elapse before this dreadfully harassing surmise was
converted into a certainty. On the 9th he started back from Palermo,
intending to go towards Toulon, to make sure that the French had not
returned again. Meeting a constant strong head wind, he was nine days
getting again to the south of Sardinia, a distance of less than two
hundred miles. There, on the 18th, the vessel was spoken which
informed him that she had seen the French off Cape de Gata, three
hundred miles to the westward, ten days before. "If this account is
true," he wrote to Elliot, "much mischief may be apprehended. It
kills me, the very thought." Yet, now that the call for decision
sounds, he knows no faltering, nor does he, as in hours of reaction,
fret himself about the opinions of others. "I am going out of the
Mediterranean," he says in farewell. "It may be thought that I have
protected too well Sardinia, Naples, Sicily, the Morea, and Egypt; but
I feel I have done right, and am, therefore, easy about any fate which
may await me for having missed the French fleet."

The following day a vessel joined from Gibraltar, with certain
information that the enemy had passed the Straits. Nelson had no need
to ponder the next step. His resolve had been taken long before to
follow to the Antipodes. He comforted himself, mistakenly, that his
watchfulness was the cause that the French had abandoned the attempt
against Egypt in force. "Under the severe affliction which I feel at
the escape of the French fleet out of the Mediterranean," he wrote the
Admiralty, "I hope that their Lordships will not impute it to any want
of due attention on my part; but, on the contrary, that by my
vigilance the enemy found it was impossible to undertake any
expedition in the Mediterranean." Mindful, also, that Bonaparte's
great attempt of 1798 had depended upon the absence of the British
fleet, he left a squadron of five frigates to cruise together to the
windward of Sicily, lest the French even now might try to send
transports with troops to the eastward, under the protection of small
armed vessels.

The number of letters written on the 18th and 19th of April show how
thoroughly his mind was prepared for contingencies. Despatched, in all
directions, they outline his own intended course, for the information
of those who might have to co-operate, as well as that which he wished
to be pursued by the officers under his orders. They are issued neat
and complete, at one cast, and no other follows for a week. He
surmises, from the fact of the Spanish ships accompanying the
movement, that it is directed, not against the West Indies, but for
either Ireland or Brest; not a bad "guess," which is all he would have
claimed for it, for the West Indies were actually only a
rallying-point on the roundabout road to the Channel prescribed by
Napoleon. "Therefore," he wrote to the Admiralty, "if I receive no
intelligence to do away my present belief, I shall proceed from Cape
St. Vincent, and take my position fifty leagues west from Scilly,
approaching that island slowly, that I may not miss any vessels sent
in search of the squadron with orders. My reason for this position is,
that it is equally easy to get to either the fleet off Brest, or to go
to Ireland, should the fleet be wanted at either station." The
suitableness of this position to any emergency arising about the
British Islands can be realized at a glance, bearing in mind that
westerly winds prevail there. A copy of the letter was sent to
Ireland, and another to the commander of the Channel fleet off Brest.
"I have the pleasure to say," he concludes, "that I shall bring with
me eleven as fine ships of war, as ably commanded, and in as perfect
order, and in health, as ever went to sea."

It will be interesting to support even Nelson's opinion of his own
squadron by that of an unbiassed and competent witness. Sir Edward
Codrington was associated with it, still nearly entire, some three
months later, after the return from the West Indies; the "Orion,"
which he commanded, being one of a detachment of eighteen
ships-of-the-line sent off from Brest by Admiral Cornwallis. "Lord
Nelson's squadron (of which we have now eight with us) seems to be in
very high order indeed; and although their ships do not look so
handsome as objects, they look so very warlike and show such high
condition, that when once I can think Orion fit to manoeuvre with
them, I shall probably paint her in the same manner." There was, it
would seem, a Nelson pattern for painting ships, as well as a "Nelson
touch" in Orders for Battle. "I have been employed this week past,"
wrote Captain Duff of the "Mars," "to paint the ship _a la Nelson_,
which most of the fleet are doing." This, according to the admiral's
biographers, was with two yellow streaks, but the portholes black,
which gave the sides an appearance of being chequered.

The frigate "Amazon," sent ahead with the letters, was ordered to go
on to Lisbon, get all the news she could, and rejoin at Cape St.
Vincent. She passed Gibraltar on the 29th, and, getting decisive
information just outside the Straits, held on there. It was not till
the 6th that Nelson reached Gibraltar, where he anchored for only four
hours. This gain of a week by a frigate, in traversing ground for
which the fleet took seventeen days, may well be borne in mind by
those unfamiliar with the delays attending concerted movements, that
have to be timed with reference to the slowest units taking part in
the combination.

The days of chase, over which we have hurried in a few lines, passed
for Nelson not only wearily, but in agony of soul. Justified as his
action was to his own mind, and as it must be by the dispassionate
review of military criticism, he could not but be tormented by the
thought of what might have been, and by his temper, which lacked
equanimity and fretted uncontrollably to get alongside the enemy--to
do the duty and to reap the glory that he rightly conceived to be his
own. "I am entirely adrift," he complained, "by my frigates losing
sight of the French fleet so soon after their coming out of port." His
purpose never faltered, nor did the light that led him grow dim. His
action left nothing to be desired, but the chafing of his spirit
approached fury. Lord Radstock, writing from London to his son, says:
"I met a person yesterday, who told me that he had seen a letter from
Lord Nelson, concluding in these words: 'O French fleet, French fleet,
if I can but once get up with you, I'll make you pay dearly for all
that you have made me suffer!' Another told me that he had seen a
letter from an officer on board the Victory, describing his chief 'as
almost raving with anger and vexation.' This," continues Radstock,
who knew him very well, "I can readily credit, so much so, indeed,
that I much fear that he will either undertake some desperate measure
to retrieve his ground, or, should not such an opportunity offer, that
he will never suffer us to behold him more."

Being in London, the writer just quoted was in close touch with the
popular feeling of anxiety, a suspicion of which he could well imagine
Nelson also had, and which added to his burden. "It is believed here,"
he says on the 21st of May, "that the combined fleet from Cadiz is
bound to the West Indies. This is by no means improbable.... The City
people are crying out against Sir J.O.,[92] and, as usual, are equally
absurd and unjust. Some are so ridiculous as to say that he ought to
have captured some of the Toulon squadron, whilst others, more
moderate, think that he might at all events, have so crippled the
enemy as to have checked the expedition.[93] You may readily guess
that your chief is not out of our thoughts at this critical moment.
Should Providence once more favour him, he will be considered our
guardian angel; but, on the other hand, should he unfortunately take a
wrong scent, and the Toulon fleet attain their object, the hero of the
14th of February and of Aboukir will be--I will not say what, but the
ingratitude of the world is but too well known on these occasions."

A week before, on the 13th of May, the same officer had written:
"Where are you all this time?[94] for that is a point justly agitating
the whole country more than I can describe. I fear that your gallant
and worthy chief will have much injustice done him on this occasion,
for the cry is stirring up fast against him, and the loss of Jamaica
would at once sink all his past services into oblivion. All I know for
certain is that we ought never to judge rashly on these occasions, and
never merely by the result. Lord Barham[95] told me this morning that
the Board had no tidings of your squadron. This is truly melancholy,
for certainly no man's zeal and activity ever surpassed those of your
chief.... The world is at once anxious for news and dreading its
arrival." The Admiralty itself, perplexed and harassed by the hazards
of the situation, were dissatisfied because they received no word from
him, being ignorant of the weather conditions which had retarded even
his frigates so far beyond the time of Villeneuve's arrival at Cadiz.
Radstock, whose rank enabled him to see much of the members of the
Board, drew shrewd inferences as to their feelings, though mistaken as
to Nelson's action. "I fear that he has been so much soured by the
appointment of Sir John Orde, that he has had the imprudence to vent
his spleen on the Admiralty by a long, and, to the Board, painful
silence. I am sure that they are out of humour with him, and I have my
doubts whether they would risk much for him, were he to meet with any
serious misfortune."

Through such difficulties in front, and such clamor in the rear,
Nelson pursued his steadfast way, in anguish of spirit, but constant
still in mind. "I am not made to despair," he said to Melville, "what
man can do shall be done. I have marked out for myself a decided line
of conduct, and I shall follow it well up; although I have now before
me a letter from the physician of the fleet, enforcing my return to
England before the hot months." "Brokenhearted as I am, at the escape
of the Toulon fleet," he tells the governor of Gibraltar, "yet it
cannot prevent my thinking of all the points intrusted to my care,
amongst which Gibraltar stands prominent." "My good fortune seems
flown away," he cries out to Ball. "I cannot get a fair wind, or even
a side wind. Dead foul!--dead foul! But my mind is fully made up what
to do when I leave the Straits, supposing there is no certain
information of the enemy's destination. I believe this ill-luck will
go near to kill me; but as these are times for exertions, I must not
be cast down, whatever I feel." A week later, on the 26th of April, he
complains: "From the 9th I have been using every effort to get down
the Mediterranean, but to this day we are very little advanced. From
March 26th, we have had nothing like a Levanter,[96] except for the
French fleet. I have never been one week without one, until this very
important moment. It has half killed me; but fretting is of no use."
On the 1st of May he wrote to the Admiralty, "I have as yet heard
nothing of the enemy;" beyond, of course, the fact of their having
passed the Straits.

Pages:
1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | 8 | 9 | 10 | 11 | 12 | 13 | 14 | 15 | 16 | 17 | 18 | 19 | 20 | 21 | 22 | 23 | 24 | 25 | 26 | 27 | 28 | 29 | 30 | 31 | 32 | 33 | 34 | 35