A. T. (Alfred Thayer) Mahan - The Life of Nelson, Vol. II. (of 2)

A >> A. T. (Alfred Thayer) Mahan >> The Life of Nelson, Vol. II. (of 2)

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It was at about this time that Nelson expressed, to one or more of his
captains, his views as to what he had so far effected, what he had
proposed to do if he had met the hostile fleets, and what his future
course would be if they were yet found. "I am thankful that the enemy
have been driven from the West India Islands with so little loss to
our Country. I had made up my mind to great sacrifices; for I had
determined, notwithstanding his vast superiority, to stop his career,
and to put it out of his power to do any further mischief. Yet do not
imagine I am one of those hot brained people, who fight at an immense
disadvantage, _without an adequate object_.[1] My object is partly
gained," that is, the allies had been forced out of the West Indies."
If we meet them, we shall find them not less than eighteen, I rather
think twenty sail of the line, and therefore do not be surprised if I
should not fall on them immediately: _we won't part without a
battle_.[104] I think they will be glad to leave me alone, if I will
let them alone; which I will do, either till we approach the shores
of Europe, or they give me an advantage too tempting to be resisted."

It is rare to find so much sagacious appreciation of conditions,
combined with so much exalted resolution and sound discretion, as in
this compact utterance. Among the external interests of Great Britain,
the West Indies were the greatest. They were critically threatened by
the force he was pursuing; therefore at all costs that force should be
so disabled, that it could do nothing effective against the defences
with which the scattered islands were provided. For this end he was
prepared to risk the destruction of his squadron. The West Indies were
now delivered; but the enemy's force remained, and other British
interests. Three months before, he had said, "I had rather see half my
squadron burnt than risk what the French fleet may do in the
Mediterranean." In the same spirit he now repeats: "Though we are but
eleven to eighteen or twenty, we won't part without a battle." Why
fight such odds? He himself has told us a little later. "By the time
the enemy has beat our fleet soundly, they will do us no harm this
year." Granting this conclusion,--the reasonableness of which was
substantiated at Trafalgar,--it cannot be denied that the sacrifice
would be justified, the enemy's combinations being disconcerted. Yet
there shall be no headlong, reckless attack. "I will leave them alone
till they offer me an opportunity too tempting to be resisted,"--that
speaks for itself,--or, "until we approach the shores of Europe," when
the matter can no longer be deferred, and the twenty ships must be
taken out of Napoleon's hosts, even though eleven be destroyed to
effect this. The preparedness of mind is to be noted, and yet more the
firmness of the conviction, in the strength of which alone such deeds
are done. It is the man of faith who is ever the man of works.

Singularly enough, his plans were quickly to receive the best of
illustrations by the failure of contrary methods. Scarcely a month
later fifteen British ships, under another admiral, met these twenty,
which Nelson with eleven now sought in vain. They did not part without
a battle, but they did part without a decisive battle; they were not
kept in sight afterwards; they joined and were incorporated with
Napoleon's great armada; they had further wide opportunities of
mischief; and there followed for the people of Great Britain a period
of bitter suspense and wide-spread panic. "What a game had Villeneuve
to play!" said Napoleon of those moments. "Does not the thought of the
possibilities remaining to Villeneuve," wrote Lord Radstock of
Calder's fruitless battle, "make your blood boil when you reflect on
the never to be forgotten 22d of July? Notwithstanding the inferiority
of Lord Nelson's numbers," he says at the same time, with keen
appreciation of the man he knew so well, "should he be so lucky as to
fall in with the enemy, I have no doubt that _he would never quit
them_[105] until he should have destroyed or taken some of the French
ships; and that he himself would seek the French admiral's ship, if
possible, I would pledge my life on it." "There is such an universal
bustle and cry about invasion, that no other subject will be listened
to at present by those in power. I found London almost a desert, and
no good news stirring to animate it; on the contrary, the few faces I
saw at the Admiralty at once confirmed the truth of the report of the
combined squadron having safely arrived at Ferrol." This was after
Calder had met and fought them, and let them get out of his sight.

Lord Minto, speaking of the same crisis, says: "There has been the
greatest alarm ever known in the city of London, since the combined
fleet [Villeneuve's] sailed from Ferrol. If they had captured our
homeward-bound convoys, it is said the India Company and half the city
must have been bankrupt." These gleams of the feelings of the times,
reflected by two men in close contact with the popular apprehensions,
show what Nelson was among British admirals to the men of his day, and
why he was so. "Great and important as the victory is," wrote Minto,
three months later, after the news of Trafalgar, "it is bought too
dearly, even for our interest, by the death of Nelson. We shall want
more victories yet, and to whom can we look for them? The navy is
certainly full of the bravest men, but they are mostly below the rank
of admiral; and brave as they almost all are, there was a sort of
heroic cast about Nelson that I never saw in any other man, and which
seems wanting to the achievement of _impossible things_ which became
easy to him, and on which the maintenance of our superiority at sea
seems to depend against the growing navy of the enemy." "The clamour
against poor Sir Robert Calder is gaining ground daily," wrote
Radstock, condemnatory yet pitiful towards the admiral who had failed
duly to utilize the opportunity Nelson then was seeking in vain, "and
there is a general cry against him from all quarters. Thus much one
may venture to say, that had your old chief commanded our squadron,
the enemy would have had but little room for lying or vapouring, as I
have not a shadow of a doubt but that he would either have taken or
destroyed the French admiral."

But there was but one Nelson, and he meantime, faint yet pursuing,
toiled fruitlessly on, bearing still the sickness of hope deferred and
suspense protracted. "Midnight," he notes in his private diary of June
21st. "Nearly calm, saw three planks which I think came from the
French fleet. Very miserable, which is very foolish." "We crawled
thirty-three miles the last twenty-four hours," he enters on the 8th
of July. "My only hope is, that the enemy's fleet are near us, and in
the same situation. All night light breezes, standing to the eastward,
to go to the northward of St. Michael's.[106] At times squally with
rain." Amid these unavoidable delays, he was forecasting and
preparing that no time should be lost when he reached the Straits and
once more came within the range of intelligence. The light winds, when
boats could pass without retarding the ships, were utilized in
preparing letters to the officials at Gibraltar and Tangiers, to have
ready the stores necessary for the fleet upon arrival. These papers
were already on board the two frigates remaining with him, with the
necessary instructions for their captains, so that they might part at
any moment judged fitting, irrespective of weather conditions. Again
he cautions the authorities to keep his approach a profound secret. No
private letters for Gibraltar were permitted in the mail-bags, lest
they should unwittingly betray counsel. The vessels were directed to
rejoin him forty miles west of Cape Spartel, giving him thus time to
decide upon his course before he reached Gibraltar; for it was quite
on the cards that he might find it imperative to hurry north without
anchoring. On the 13th of July, five hundred miles from Cape St.
Vincent, one of these ships left him, probably the last to go.

On the 18th of July, Cape Spartel was sighted. "No French fleet,"
wrote the admiral in his diary, "nor any information about them: how
sorrowful this makes me, but I cannot help myself!" "I am, my dear Mr.
Marsden," he wrote to the Secretary of the Admiralty, "as completely
miserable as my greatest enemy could wish me; but I blame neither
fortune or my own judgment. Oh, General Brereton! General Brereton!"
To his friend Davison he revealed yet more frankly the bitterness of
his spirit, now that the last hope was dashed, and it was even
possible that the mis-step of going to Trinidad had caused him to
incur a further mistake, by leaving the allies in the West Indies.
"But for General Brereton's damned information, Nelson," he said, half
prophetically, "would have been, living or dead, the greatest man in
his profession that England ever saw. Now alas! I am nothing--perhaps
shall incur censure for misfortunes which may happen, and have
happened."

But if he himself were disappointed, and foreboded the discontent of
others, the greatness of what he had done was quickly apparent, and
received due recognition from thoughtful men. "Either the distances
between the different quarters of the globe are diminished," wrote Mr.
Elliot from Naples, "or you have extended the powers of human action.
After an unremitting cruise of two long years in the stormy Gulf of
Lyons, to have proceeded without going into port to Alexandria, from
Alexandria to the West Indies, from the West Indies back again to
Gibraltar; to have kept your ships afloat, your rigging standing, and
your crews in health and spirits--is an effort such as never was
realised in former times, nor, I doubt, will ever again be repeated by
any other admiral. You have protected us for two long years, and you
saved the West Indies by only a few days." Thus truly summarized, such
achievements are seen to possess claims to admiration, not to be
exceeded even by the glory of Trafalgar.

Although no French fleet was visible, as Nelson approached the
Straits, there were a half-dozen British ships-of-the-line, under the
command of his old friend Collingwood, blockading Cadiz. When Orde was
driven off that station by Villeneuve on the 9th of April, and retired
upon Brest, he had already sent in an application to be relieved from
a duty which he himself had sought, and had held for so short a time;
alleging a bundle of grievances which show clearly enough the
impracticable touchiness of the man. His request was at once granted.
Early in May, Collingwood was sent from England with eight
sail-of-the-line for the West Indies; but learning on the way that
Nelson had gone thither, he detached to him two of his swiftest
seventy-fours, and, with great good judgment, himself took position
off Cadiz, where he covered the entrance of the Mediterranean, and
effectually prevented any ships from either Cartagena or Ferrol
concentrating in the neighborhood of the Straits.

Nelson received word from some of his lookouts appointed to meet him
here, that nothing had been heard of the allied squadrons. The anxiety
which had never ceased to attend him was increased by this prolonged
silence. He had no certainty that the enemy might not have doubled
back, and gone to Jamaica. He would not stop now to exchange with
Collingwood speculations about the enemy's course. "My dear
Collingwood, I am, as you may suppose, miserable at not having fallen
in with the enemy's fleet; and I am almost increased in sorrow by not
finding them [here]. The name of General Brereton will not soon be
forgot. I must now only hope that the enemy have not tricked me, and
gone to Jamaica; but if the account,[107] of which I send you a copy,
is correct, it is more than probable that they are either gone to the
northward, or, if bound to the Mediterranean, not yet arrived." His
surmise remains accurate. He then continues, with that delicate and
respectful recognition of the position and ability of others, which
won him so much love: "The moment the fleet is watered, and got some
refreshments, of which we are in great want, I shall come out and make
you a visit; not, my dear friend, to take your command from you, (for
I may probably add mine to you,) but to consult how we can best serve
our Country, by detaching a part of this large force." Circumstances
prevented his neighborly intention from taking effect. A week later
Nelson returned north with his squadron, and the friends did not meet
until shortly before Trafalgar.

In reply to Nelson's letter, Collingwood summed up his view of the
situation as so far developed. "I have always had an idea that Ireland
alone was the object they had in view, and still believe that to be
their ultimate destination--that they will now liberate the Ferrol
squadron from Calder, make the round of the Bay,[108] and, taking the
Rochefort people with them, appear off Ushant--perhaps with
thirty-four sail, there to be joined by twenty more. Admiral
Cornwallis collecting his out squadrons may have thirty and upwards.
This appears to be a probable plan; for unless it is to bring their
great fleets and armies to some point of service--some rash attempt at
conquest--they have been only subjecting them to chance of loss, which
I do not believe the Corsican would do, without the hope of an
adequate reward."

It is upon this letter, the sagacious and well-ordered inferences of
which must be candidly admitted, that a claim for superiority of
discernment over Nelson has been made for its writer. It must be
remembered, however, not as a matter of invidious detraction from one
man, but in simple justice to the other, whose insight and belief had
taken form in such wonderful work, that Nelson also had fully believed
that the enemy, if they left the Mediterranean, would proceed to
Ireland; and further, and yet more particularly, Collingwood's views
had been confirmed to him by the fact, as yet unknown to Nelson, that
the Rochefort squadron, which sailed at the time Villeneuve first
escaped in January, had since returned to Europe on the 26th of May.
"The flight to the West Indies," Collingwood said, in a letter dated
the day after the one just quoted, "was to take off our naval force,
which is the great impediment to their undertaking. The Rochefort
Squadron's return confirmed me." "I well know what your lordship's
disappointment is," he wrote, with generous sympathy; "and I share the
mortification of it. It would have been a happy day for England, could
you have met them; small as your force was, I trust it would have been
found enough. This summer is big with events. Sincerely I wish your
Lordship strength of body to go through--_and to all others, your
strength of mind_." Testy even to petulance as these two great seamen
were at times in small matters, when overwrought with their manifold
anxieties, they nowhere betray any egotistic concern as to the value
attached by others to their respective speculations, the uncertainties
of which none knew better than they, who had to act upon their
conclusions.

Meantime, at the very moment they were exchanging letters, pregnant
movements were taking place, unknown to either. The brig "Curieux,"
despatched to England by Nelson the night before he left Antigua, had
fallen in with the allied squadrons, nine hundred miles
north-northeast from Antigua, on the 19th of June--just a week after
she sailed. Keeping company with them long enough to ascertain their
course and approximate numbers, the captain then hastened on,
anchoring in Plymouth on the 7th of July. "I am sorry," wrote Nelson
when he heard of this meeting, "that Captain Bettesworth did not stand
back and try to find us out;" but grateful as the word would have been
to him, the captain was better advised to make for a fixed and certain
destination. At daylight of the 9th the news was in the hands of the
First Lord, who issued instant orders for the blockading squadrons off
Rochefort and Ferrol to unite, and to take post one hundred miles west
of Cape Finisterre. On the 19th of July Admiral Calder was in this
position, with fifteen ships-of-the-line, and received through Lisbon
the information of the French movements, which Nelson had forwarded
thither an exact month before. On the 20th Nelson's fleet anchored at
Gibraltar, and he went ashore, "for the first time since the 16th of
June, 1803." On the 22d Calder and Villeneuve met and fought. Two
Spanish ships-of-the-line were captured, but the battle was otherwise
indecisive. Calder hesitated to attack again, and on the 26th lost
sight of the enemy, who, on the 28th, put into Vigo Bay; whence, by a
lucky slant of wind, they reached Ferrol on the first of August with
fifteen ships, having left three in Vigo. Calder sent five of his
fleet to resume the blockade of Rochefort, and himself with nine
joined Cornwallis off Brest, raising the force there to twenty-six.
This junction was made August 14th. The next day appeared there the
indefatigable Nelson, with his unwearied and ever ready squadron of
eleven ships--veterans in the highest sense of the word, in
organization, practice, and endurance; alert, and solid as men of
iron.

This important and most opportune arrival came about as follows.
Anchoring on the 19th of July at Gibraltar, Nelson found everything
ready for the re-equipment of his ships, owing to his foresight in
directing it. All set to work at once to prepare for immediate
departure. When I have "completed the fleet to four months'
provisions, and with stores for Channel service," he wrote to the
Admiralty, "I shall get outside the Mediterranean, leaving a
sufficient force to watch Carthagena, and proceed as upon a due
consideration, (on reading Vice-Admiral Collingwood's orders, and
those which Rear-Admiral Sir Richard Bickerton may have received
during my absence,) may suggest to be most proper. Should I hear that
the enemy are gone to some of the ports in the Bay, I shall join the
squadron off Ferrol, or off Ushant, as I think the case requires."
There will be observed here the same striking combination of rapidity,
circumspection, and purpose prepared by reflection for instant action
in emergencies, that characterized him usually, and especially in
these four months of chase. "The squadron is in the most perfect
health," he continues, "except some symptoms of scurvy, which I hope
to eradicate by bullocks and refreshments from Tetuan, to which I will
proceed to-morrow." The getting fresh beef at Tetuan, it will be
remembered, had been stopped by a fair wind on the 5th of May. Since
then, and in fact since a month earlier, no opportunity of obtaining
fresh provisions had offered during his rapid movements. "The fleet
received not the smallest refreshment, not even a cup of water in the
West Indies," he told the Queen of Naples. The admiral himself got
only a few sheep, in the nine days' round.

Even now, the intention to go to Tetuan, advisable as the step was,
was contingent upon the opportunity offering of reaching a position
whence he could move with facility. Nelson did not mean to be
back-strapped again within the Mediterranean, with a west wind, and a
current setting to leeward, if the enemy turned up in the Atlantic.
"If the wind is westerly," he wrote on the early morning of the 22d,
"I shall go to Tetuan: if easterly, out of the straits." At half-past
nine that day the fleet weighed, and at half-past seven in the evening
anchored at Tetuan, whither orders had already gone to prepare
bullocks and fresh vegetables for delivery. At noon of the 23d the
ships again lifted their anchors, and started. "The fleet is
complete," he wrote the First Lord that day, "and the first easterly
wind, I shall pass the Straits." Fortune apparently had made up her
mind now to balk him no more. Thirty-six hours later, at 3.30 A.M. of
July 25th, being then off Tarifa, a little west of Gibraltar, the
sloop-of-war "Termagant," one of his own Mediterranean cruisers, came
alongside, and brought him a newspaper, received from Lisbon,
containing an account of the report carried to England by the
"Curieux." "I know it's true," he wrote to the Admiralty, "from my
words being repeated, therefore I shall not lose a moment, after I
have communicated with Admiral Collingwood, in getting to the
northward to either Ferrol, Ireland, or Ushant; as information or
circumstances may point out to be proper." In his haste to proceed,
and wishing to summon the "Amazon" frigate to rejoin him, he sent the
"Termagant" at once to Gibraltar, without understanding that she was
just from there and had on board his clothes left for washing; in
consequence of which precipitancy she "carried all my things, even to
my last shirt, back again." "As I fancied he came from Lisbon," he
explained, "I would not allow him to stop." "My dear Parker," he wrote
the frigate-captain, "make haste and join me. If all places fail you
will find me at Spithead." Parker, who was a favorite of the
admiral's, followed out the careful detailed instructions which
accompanied this note, but could not overtake the fleet, and from
incidents of the service never met Nelson again.

With a fresh easterly gale the squadron pressed again into the
Atlantic. As it went on for Cape St. Vincent, Collingwood's division
was seen some distance to leeward, but, as not infrequently happens in
and near the Mediterranean, the wind with it came from the opposite
quarter to that which Nelson had. The latter, therefore, would not
stop, nor lose a mile of the ground over which his fair breeze was
carrying him. "My dear Collingwood," he wrote, "We are in a fresh
Levanter. You have a westerly wind, therefore I must forego the
pleasure of taking you by the hand until October next, when, if I am
well enough, I shall (if the Admiralty please) resume the command. I
am very far from well; but I am anxious that not a moment of the
services of this fleet should be lost." Matters therefore were left
standing much as they were when he passed in a week before. He had
taken upon himself, however, with a discretion he could now assume
freely, to change the Admiralty's orders, issued during his absence,
withdrawing most of the small cruisers from about Malta, to reinforce
Collingwood's division. When he first learned of this step, he said it
was a mistake, for double the number he had left there were needed;
"but the orders of the Admiralty must be obeyed. I only hope officers
will not be blamed for the events which it is not difficult to foresee
will happen." With the crowd of enemy's privateers in those waters,
Malta, he was assured, would be cut off from all communication. He
soon made up his mind that he would use his own discretion and modify
the dispositions taken. "Malta cannot more than exist, and our troops
would be placed in a position of great distress," he told the
Admiralty. "I transmit a statement of the force I think necessary to
the eastward of Carthagena for performing the services intrusted to my
care, and when I get the lists I shall apportion them as far as their
number will allow, and my judgment will admit." "I hope the Board will
consider this as not wishing to alter any arrangement of theirs, but
as a measure absolutely necessary." Within his own field Nelson was
now, by proved professional genius, above the restraint of Boards; and
when he reached England the new First Lord had the wisdom to admit it,
in this supreme crisis, by giving him full control, within the
resources of the country, over the constitution of the fleet with
which he fought Trafalgar.

Letters left for Bickerton and Collingwood placed them in possession
of his ideas, including the revocation of the Admiralty's order; and,
in an official letter, he earnestly recommended the latter officer to
adhere to his arrangements. Word was also sent forward to Cornwallis,
and to the commander-in-chief at Cork, as well as to the Admiralty, to
notify them of his approach. To the northward of Cape St. Vincent he
met the northerly winds that prevail on the Portuguese coast. Delayed
by these, he was three full weeks making the passage from Gibraltar to
the Channel Fleet, which he joined at 3 P.M. of August 15th,
twenty-five miles west of Ushant. To this point his movements were
finally determined by a frigate, which was spoken on the 12th of
August, and informed him that up to three days before no intelligence
had been received of the enemy's arrival in the Bay of Biscay, or on
the Irish coast. Cornwallis excused him from the customary personal
visit, and authorized him to proceed at once to Portsmouth with the
"Victory," in pursuance of the Admiralty's leave which he so long had
had in his hands. On the morning of August 18th, the long and
fruitless chase of the allied fleet was brought to an end by the
dropping of the "Victory's" anchor at Spithead. To Davison Nelson
summed up his disappointment in the exasperated expression, "--n
General Brereton."[109]

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