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A. T. (Alfred Thayer) Mahan - The Life of Nelson, Vol. II. (of 2)

A >> A. T. (Alfred Thayer) Mahan >> The Life of Nelson, Vol. II. (of 2)




If the Enemy are running away, then the only signals necessary
will be, to engage the Enemy as arriving up with them; and the
other ships to pass on for the second, third, &c., giving, if
possible, a close fire into the Enemy in passing, taking care to
give our Ships engaged notice of your intention.


MEMORANDUM.

(Secret)

Victory, off CADIZ, 9th October, 1805.

[Sidenote: General Considerations.] Thinking it almost
impossible to bring a Fleet of forty Sail of the Line into a
Line of Battle in variable winds, thick weather, and other
circumstances which must occur, without such a loss of time that
the opportunity would probably be lost of bringing the Enemy to
Battle in such a manner as to make the business decisive, I have
therefore made up my mind to keep the Fleet in that position of
sailing (with the exception of the First and Second in Command)
that the Order of Sailing is to be the Order of Battle, placing
the Fleet in two Lines of sixteen Ships each, with an Advanced
Squadron of eight of the fastest sailing Two-decked Ships, which
will always make, if wanted, a Line of twenty-four Sail, on
whichever Line the Commander-in-Chief may direct.

[Sidenote: Powers of Second in Command.] The Second in Command
will, after my intentions are made known to him, have the entire
direction of his Line to make the attack upon the Enemy, and to
follow up the blow until they are captured or destroyed.

[Sidenote: The Attack from to Leeward.] If the Enemy's Fleet
should be seen to windward in Line of Battle, and that the two
Lines and the Advanced Squadron can fetch them, they will
probably be so extended that their Van could not succour their
Rear.

I should therefore probably make the Second in Command's signal
to lead through, about their twelfth Ship from their Rear, (or
wherever he could fetch, if not able to get so far advanced); my
Line would lead through about their Centre, and the Advanced
Squadron to cut two or three or four Ships a-head of their
Centre, so as to ensure getting at their Commander-in-Chief, on
whom every effort must be made to capture.

[Sidenote: The General Controlling Idea, under all Conditions.]
The whole impression of the British Fleet must be to overpower
from two or three Ships a-head of their Commander-in-Chief
supposed to be in the Centre, to the Rear of their Fleet. I will
suppose twenty Sail of the Enemy's Line to be untouched, it must
be some time before they could perform a manoeuvre to bring
their force compact to attack any part of the British Fleet
engaged, or to succour their own Ships, which indeed would be
impossible without mixing with the Ships engaged.

Something must be left to chance; nothing is sure in a Sea Fight
beyond all others. Shot will carry away the masts and yards of
friends as well as foes; but I look with confidence to a Victory
before the Van of the Enemy could succour their Rear, and then
that the British Fleet would most of them be ready to receive
their twenty Sail of the Line, or to pursue them, should they
endeavour to make off.

If the Van of the Enemy tacks, the Captured Ships must run to
leeward of the British Fleet; if the Enemy wears, the British
must place themselves between the Enemy and the Captured, and
disabled British Ships; and should the Enemy close, I have no
fears as to the result.

[Sidenote: Duties of Subordinate.] The Second in Command will in
all possible things direct the movements of his Line, by keeping
them as compact as the nature of the circumstances will admit.
Captains are to look to their particular Line as their rallying
point. But, in case Signals can neither be seen or perfectly
understood, no Captain can do very wrong if he places his Ship
alongside that of an Enemy.

Of the intended attack from to windward, the Enemy in Line of
Battle ready to receive an attack,

[Illustration][123]

[Sidenote: The Attack from to Windward.] The divisions of the
British Fleet will be brought nearly within gun shot of the
Enemy's Centre. The signal will most probably then be made for
the Lee Line to bear up together, to set all their sails, even
steering sails, in order to get as quickly as possible to the
Enemy's Line, and to cut through, beginning from the 12 Ship
from the Enemy's Rear. Some Ships may not get through their
exact place, but they will always be at hand to assist their
friends; and if any are thrown round the Rear of the Enemy, they
will effectually complete the business of twelve Sail of the
Enemy.

Should the Enemy wear together, or bear up and sail large, still
the twelve Ships composing, in the first position, the Enemy's
Rear, are to be the object of attack of the Lee Line, unless
otherwise directed from the Commander-in-Chief, which is
scarcely to be expected, as the entire management of the Lee
Line, after the intentions of the Commander-in-Chief, is
signified, is intended to be left to the judgment of the Admiral
commanding that Line.

[Sidenote: Special Charge of the Commander-in-Chief.] The
remainder of the Enemy's Fleet, 34 Sail, are to be left to the
management of the Commander-in-Chief, who will endeavour to take
care that the movements of the Second in Command are as little
interrupted as is possible.

NELSON AND BRONTE.

It will be borne in mind that the first of these instructions was
issued for the handling of a small body of ships--ten--expecting to
meet fifteen to eighteen enemies; whereas the second contemplated the
wielding of a great mass of vessels, as many as forty British,
directed against a possible combination of forty-six French and
Spanish. In the former case, however, although the aggregate numbers
were smaller, the disproportion of force was much greater, even after
allowance made for the British three-deckers; and we know, from other
contemporary remarks of Nelson, that his object here was not so much a
crushing defeat of the enemy--"only numbers can annihilate"--as the
disorganization and neutralization of a particular detachment, as the
result of which the greater combination of the enemy would fall to
pieces. "After they have beaten our fleet soundly, they will do us no
more harm this summer."[124] Consequently, he relies much upon the
confusion introduced into the enemy's movements by an attack, which,
though of much inferior force, should be sudden in character,
developing only at the last moment, into which the enemy should be
precipitated unawares, while the British should encounter it, or
rather should enter it, with minds fully prepared,--not only for the
immediate manoeuvre, but for all probable consequences.

In accordance with the same general object--confusion--he directs his
assault upon the van, instead of, as at Trafalgar, upon the rear;
according to his saying in the Baltic, recorded by Stewart,[125]
"Close with a Frenchman, but out-manoeuvre a Russian," for which
purpose he would throw his own force, preferably, upon the van of the
latter. The reason is obvious, upon reflection; for in attacking and
cutting off the head--van and centre--of a column of ships, the rear,
coming up under full way, has _immediate_ action forced upon it. There
is no time for deliberation. The van is already engaged, and access to
it more or less impeded, by the hostile dispositions. The decision
must be instant--to the right hand, or to the left, to windward, or to
leeward--and there is at least an even chance that the wrong thing
will be done, as well as a probability, falling little short of
certainty, that all the ships of the rear will _not_ do the same
thing; that is, they will be thrown into confusion with all its dire
train of evils, doubt, hesitancy, faltering, and inconsequent action.
It is hard work to knit again a shattered line under the unremittent
assault of hardened veterans, such as Nelson's Mediterranean ships.

The method employed in the second of these instructions, the
celebrated Memorandum, differs essentially from that of the Plan of
Attack, though both are simply developments of the one idea of
concentration. It is unfortunate for us that Nelson, like most men of
action, reveals his reasoning processes, not in ordered discussion,
but by stray gleams of expression, too often unrecorded, from which we
can infer only the general tenor of his thought. It is in the chance
phrase, transmitted by Stewart, coupled with the change of object, so
definitely announced in the second instance,--the crushing, namely, of
the enemy's great fleet, and not the mere crippling of a detachment
such as went to the West Indies,--that the author thinks to find the
clew to the difference of dispositions, in the first case, from those
prescribed and followed for Trafalgar--the "Nelson touch" that
thrilled the captains. There is again, indeed, in the latter, the
distinct reliance upon confusion, for the line of the foe is to be
broken in two places; but now the confusion introduced is in the part
of the enemy that is assailed, not, as before, in that which is left
out of action. Confusion, in short, is now imposed by external force,
rather than induced by internal perplexity,--a condition surer, and
therefore more liable to result in a crushing victory, for it depends
upon the vigor of the offensive, and not on the weakness of the
defensive, which may prove a deceitful reliance. Moreover, effectual
crushing requires time, even when, as in the final memorandum, a great
concentration of superiority is intended on part of an enemy's order.
Now, when the van and centre are attacked, the rear is pointed fair,
and, if it does not lose its head, comes quickly up to the rescue; but
when, in the contrary case, the centre and rear receive the assault,
the van, being left out of action, not only has to turn round, but
naturally stands away, for an interval dependent upon the initiative
of its immediate commander, as occurred to an extreme degree at
Trafalgar. Thus time, the invaluable five minutes or half hour, is
gained for the offensive to bring its first concentration to a
successful issue, as well as to prepare to repel the van of the
defensive, if it countermarches, as it should. "I look with confidence
to a victory before the van of the enemy could succour their rear, and
then that the British fleet would most of them be ready to receive
their twenty sail of the line, or to pursue them, should they
endeavour to make off."

The organization of a distinct body of eight fast-sailing
ships-of-the-line, to be carried to such part of the field as might
appear necessary to the commander-in-chief in a particular emergency,
resulted inevitably, perhaps, from the considerations presented by
Nelson in the opening sentences of the Memorandum, and from the great
number of ships he then hoped to have. There were precedents for such
a formation, in the practice of the day; but, as far as recalled by
the author, they were the advanced guards, the skirmish line, of the
fleet, not, as in this case, essentially a reserve. In Nelson's
present thought, the employment of this force would be, not antecedent
to, but consequent upon, the particular indications of the day.
Probably they would not be held back as long--for as distinct
indications--as in the case of an army's reserve; but nevertheless,
the chief object of their separate organization was to redress, at the
moment, the unforeseen developments of a battle, whether at the
instant of engagement or during its subsequent progress. The
unfortunate Villeneuve, who commanded the allies, an accomplished
though irresolute seaman, had adopted a similar arrangement, placing
twelve detached ships under his colleague Gravina; but, with sailing
vessels, the effective use of such a force depended largely upon the
windward position, which the allies did not have. If placed to leeward
of a lee line, it was in the power of the assailant to throw them out
of action altogether; if to windward, to attack them separately;
therefore at Trafalgar Villeneuve ordered them back into the line.
Nelson likewise then embodied his reserve in the two columns of
attack, because he had fewer vessels than he expected, and because the
light wind forbade the wasting of time in evolutionary refinements.
The incident of the simultaneous adoption of the same provision by the
two opposing admirals, however, is interesting as indicative of the
progress of naval thought, though still hampered by the uncertainties
of the motive power.

The second of these Orders, that of October 9, is memorable, not only
for the sagacity and comprehensiveness of its general dispositions,
but even more for the magnanimous confidence with which the details of
execution were freely intrusted to those upon whom they had to fall.
It was evidently drawn up in the first instance for Collingwood only;
the word "your" in the original draught having been struck out, and
"second in command" substituted. The comparison already made between
it and its predecessor of May, may not uninstructively be followed by
a study of the difference in details between itself and the execution
it actually received at the Battle of Trafalgar. To aid this purpose
the author has traced, in marginal notes, the succession of the
leading ideas.

After a statement of General Considerations, and a frank attribution
of full powers to the second in command for carrying out his part,
Nelson lays down the manner of Attack from to Leeward. This condition
not obtaining at Trafalgar, the plan cannot be contrasted with the
performance of that day. Upon this follows a luminous enunciation of
the general idea, namely, Collingwood's engaging the twelve rear
ships, which underlies the method prescribed for each attack--from to
leeward and to windward. Of the latter Nelson fortunately gives an
outline diagram, which illustrates the picture before his own mind,
facilitating our comprehension of his probable expectations, and
allowing a comparison between them and the event as it actually
occurred. It is not to the discredit, but greatly to the credit, of
his conception, that it was susceptible of large modification in
practice while retaining its characteristic idea.

Looking at his diagram,[126] and following his words, it will be seen
that the British lines are not formed perpendicularly to that of the
enemy (as they were at Trafalgar), but parallel to it. Starting from
this disposition, near the enemy and abreast his centre, the lee line
of sixteen ships was to bear up _together_, and advance in line, not
in column (as happened at Trafalgar); their object being the twelve
rear ships of the enemy. This first move stands by itself; the action
of the weather line, and of the reserve squadron still farther to
windward, are held in suspense under the eye of the
commander-in-chief, to take the direction which the latter shall
prescribe as the struggle develops. The mere menace of such a force,
just out of gunshot to windward, would be sufficient to prevent any
extensive manoeuvre of the unengaged enemies. Nelson doubtless had in
mind the dispositions, more than a century old, of Tourville and De
Ruyter, by which a few ships, spaced to windward of an enemy's van,
could check its tacking, because of the raking fire to which they
would subject it. Unquestionably, he would not have kept long in idle
expectancy twenty-four ships, the number he had in mind; but clearly
also he proposed to hold them until he saw how things went with
Collingwood. Thus much time would allow, granting the position he
assumed and a reasonable breeze. His twenty-four to windward held an
absolute check over the supposed thirty-four unengaged, of the enemy.

The attack as planned, therefore, differed from that executed (1) in
that the lee line was not to advance in column, but in line, thereby
dispersing the enemy's fire, and avoiding the terrific concentration
which crushed the leaders at Trafalgar; and (2) in that the weather
squadrons were not to attack simultaneously with the lee, but after it
had engaged, in order to permit the remedying of any mishap that might
arise in delivering the crucial blow. In both these matters of detail
the plan was better than the modification; but the latter was forced
upon Nelson by conditions beyond his control.

It will be observed that, when considering attacking from to leeward,
he orders a simultaneous movement of the three British
divisions,--lee, weather, and reserve; for the obvious reason that if
he held his own divisions in reserve to leeward he could not at all
count upon bringing them into action at will; and, moreover, such an
attack would probably have to be in columns, and, if simultaneous,
would be less liable to disaster than in succession, mutual support
diverting the enemies' fire. In fact, the highest order of offensive
combination was only possible when having the advantage of the
wind--fair, and enough of it.

The plan upon which Trafalgar was to be fought, as above described and
analyzed, was formed some time before leaving England, and it is not
unreasonable to suppose that it was in fact a modification of the
earlier idea, laid down during the chase to the West Indies. On the
10th of September, three days only before quitting Merton, Nelson
called upon his old friend, Lord Sidmouth,[127] who until recently had
been Prime Minister. In the course of the interview he explained his
intentions as regards the attack. "Rodney," he said, "broke the
enemy's line in one place,[128] I will break it in two;" and with his
finger he indicated upon a table the general character of the assault,
to be made in two lines, led by himself and Collingwood. He felt
confident, according to Sidmouth's narration, that he should capture
either their van and centre or their centre and rear. It was of course
out of his power to prevent the enemy inverting their order, by the
simultaneous turning round of every ship, at the time of engagement,
so that the attack intended for the rear should fall upon it become
the van. Against this contingency he provided by the words, "should
the enemy wear together, still the twelve ships composing, _in the
first position_, the enemy's rear, are to be the object of attack of
the lee line." Sidmouth did not commit his recollection of this
incident to writing until many years later, and, not being a seaman,
very likely failed to comprehend some of the details--there seems to
the author to be in the story a confusion of what Nelson planned with
what Nelson did; but a great conception is largely independent of
details, and the essential features of Trafalgar are in Sidmouth's
account. The idea was doubtless imparted also to the family circle at
Merton, where probably the expression, "Nelson touch," originated. It
occurs chiefly, if not wholly, in his letters to Lady Hamilton, to
whom, some days before reaching the fleet, he wrote, "I am anxious to
join, for it would add to my grief if any other man was to give them
the Nelson touch, which WE say is warranted never to fail;" but there
may be a quaint allusion to it in the motto he told Rose he had
adopted: "Touch and Take."

When Nelson left England, he was intrusted by the First Lord with the
delicate and unpleasant mission of communicating to Sir Robert Calder
the dissatisfaction of the Government with his conduct, in the
encounter with the allied fleets the previous July; especially for
failing to keep touch with them and bring them again to action. The
national outcry was too strong to be disregarded, nor is it probable
that the Admiralty took a more lenient view of the matter. At all
events, an inquiry was inevitable, and the authorities seem to have
felt that it was a favor to Calder to permit him to ask for the Court
which in any case must be ordered. "I did not fail," wrote Nelson to
Barham, "immediately on my arrival, to deliver your message to Sir
Robert Calder; and it will give your Lordship pleasure to find, as it
has me, that an inquiry is what the Vice-Admiral wishes, and that he
had written to you by the Nautilus, which I detained, to say so. Sir
Robert thinks that he can clearly prove, that it was not in his power
to bring the combined squadrons again to battle."

Nelson felt a profound sympathy for the unfortunate officer, pursued
by the undiscriminating and ignorant fury of popular clamor, the
extent and intensity of which he had had opportunity to realize when
in England. While he probably did not look for so tragic an issue, the
execution of Byng under a similar odium and a similar charge, although
expressly cleared of cowardice and disaffection, was still fresh in
the naval mind. "Sir Robert has an ordeal to pass through," he wrote
Collingwood, "which he little expects." His own opinion upon the case
seems to have undergone some modification, since the generous outburst
with which he at first deprecated the prejudgment of a disappointed
and frightened people; nor could it well fail, as details became known
to him, that he should pass a silent censure upon proceedings, which
contravened alike his inward professional convictions, and his
expressed purposes of action for a similar contingency. "I have had,
as you will believe, a very distressing scene with poor Sir Robert
Calder," he told Lady Hamilton. "He has wrote home to beg an inquiry,
feeling confident that he can fully justify himself. I sincerely hope
he may, but--I have given him the advice as to my dearest friend. He
is in adversity, and if he ever has been my enemy, he now feels the
pang of it, and finds me one of his best friends." "Sir Robert
Calder," he wrote to another correspondent, "has just left us to stand
his trial, which I think of a very serious nature." Nelson was obliged
to detain him until reinforcements arrived from England, because
Calder was unwilling to undergo the apparent humiliation of leaving
his flagship under charges, and she could not yet be spared. It was
not the least of this unlucky man's misfortunes that he left the fleet
just a week before the battle, where his conduct would undoubtedly
have redeemed whatever of errors he may have committed. One of the
last remarks Nelson made before the action began, was, "Hardy, what
would poor Sir Robert Calder give to be with us now!"

Calder's reluctance to quit his flagship, and the keen sensitiveness
with which he expressed his feelings, drew from Nelson a concession he
knew to be wrong, but which is too characteristic, both in the act
itself and in his own account of it, to be omitted. "Sir Robert felt
so much," he wrote to the First Lord, "even at the idea of being
removed from his own ship which he commanded, in the face of the
fleet, that I much fear I shall incur the censure of the Board of
Admiralty, without your Lordship's influence with the members of it. I
may be thought wrong, as an officer, to disobey the orders of the
Admiralty, by not insisting on Sir Robert Calder's quitting the Prince
of Wales for the Dreadnought, and for parting with a 90-gun ship,
before the force arrives which their Lordships have judged necessary;
but I trust that I shall be considered to have done right as a man,
and to a brother officer in affliction--my heart could not stand it,
and so the thing must rest. I shall submit to the wisdom of the Board
to censure me or not, as to them may seem best for the Service; I
shall bow with all due respect to their decision."

From the military point of view this step was indefensible, but it is
in singular keeping with Nelson's kindness of heart, his generosity of
temper, and with a certain recklessness of consequences,--when
supported by inward conviction of right, or swayed by natural
impulses,--which formed no small part of his greatness as a warrior.
"Numbers only can annihilate;" yet to spare the feelings of an unhappy
man, whom he believed to have been his enemy, he parted with one of
the best units from his numbers, although, even with her present, he
was inferior to the allies. He felt keenly, however, the
responsibility he assumed, not only towards the Admiralty, but towards
his own success and reputation. At one time he seems, with unusual
vacillation, even to have returned upon his decision, and to have
notified Calder that the ship could not be spared; for on the 12th of
October the latter wrote him: "The contents of your Lordship's letter
have cut me to the soul. If I am to be turned out of my ship, after
all that has passed, I have only to request I may be allowed to take
my Captain, and such officers as I find necessary for the
justification of my conduct as an officer, and that I may be permitted
to go without a moment's further loss of time. My heart is broken."
This appeal broke down all Nelson's power of resistance. He deprived
himself on the eve of battle of a first-rate ship, taking only the
precaution of sending his entire correspondence with Calder, public
and private, to explain his course, though scarcely to justify it. The
significance of this act is enhanced by the known importance which he
himself attached to the presence or absence of even a third-rate
ship-of-the-line. When the expedition to the Baltic was on the eve of
starting, a seventy-four went aground, in leaving the Downs.
Lieutenant Layman having been conspicuously instrumental in getting
her off, Nelson told him that he had in consequence written in his
favor to the Admiralty; and upon Layman's remarking that what he had
done scarcely deserved so much, the admiral replied, "I think
differently, the loss of one line-of-battle ship might be the loss of
a victory."

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