A. T. (Alfred Thayer) Mahan - The Life of Nelson, Vol. II. (of 2)

A >> A. T. (Alfred Thayer) Mahan >> The Life of Nelson, Vol. II. (of 2)

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After leaving Cadiz, in order to avoid separations during the night,
or in thick weather, the combined fleets had been disposed in five
columns, a formation whose compactness, though not suited to an
engagement, was less liable to straggling than a single long line, and
brought all parts more directly under the control of the
commander-in-chief at the centre. Of the five, the two to windward, of
six ships each, constituted a reserve, similar to Nelson's proposed
detachment of eight. It was commanded by Admiral Gravina, and was
intended to reinforce such part of the battle as should appear to
require it; an object for which the windward position was of the
utmost moment, as it was for all naval initiative in that day. This
advantage the allies did not have on the morning of Trafalgar. When
Villeneuve, therefore, formed the line of battle, these twelve ships
were at once incorporated with it, taking the lead of their order as
it stood to the southward, with the wind at west-northwest,--a long
column stretching over five miles of sea from end to end.

In a general sense, then, it may be said that, when daylight showed
the enemies to each other, the British fleet was heading to the
northward, and that of the allies to the southward; the latter being
ten or twelve miles east of their opponents. In the far distance, Cape
Trafalgar, from which the battle takes its name, was just visible
against the eastern sky. At twenty minutes before seven Nelson made in
quick succession the signals, "To form the order of sailing,"--which
by his previous instructions was to be the order of battle,--and "To
prepare for battle." Ten minutes later followed the command to "Bear
up," the "Victory" setting the example by at once altering her course
for the enemy. Collingwood did the same, and the ships of the two
divisions fell into the wake of their leaders as best they could, for
the light wind afforded neither the means nor the time for refinements
in manoeuvring. Fourteen ships followed the "Royal Sovereign," which
bore Collingwood's flag, while the remaining twelve gathered in
Nelson's division behind the "Victory."[134] The two columns steered
east, about a mile apart, that of Nelson being to the northward; from
which circumstance, the wind being west-northwest, it has been called
commonly the weather line.

Thus, as Ivanhoe, at the instant of encounter in the lists, shifted
his lance from the shield to the casque of the Templar, Nelson, at the
moment of engaging, changed the details of his plan, and substituted
an attack in two columns, simultaneously made, for the charge of
Collingwood's division, in line and in superior numbers, upon the
enemy's flank; to be followed, more or less quickly, according to
indications, by such movement of his own division as might seem
advisable. It will be observed, however, that the order of sailing
remained the order of battle,--probably, although it is not so stated,
the fleet was already thus disposed when the signal was made, needing
only rectification after the derangements incident to darkness,--and
further, that the general direction of attack continued the same,
Collingwood guiding his column upon the enemy's southern flank, while
Nelson pointed a few ships north of their centre. In this way was
preserved the comprehensive aim which underlay the particular
dispositions of his famous order: "The whole impression of the British
fleet must be to overpower from two or three ships ahead of their
commander-in-chief, supposed to be in the Centre, to the Rear of their
fleet." The northern flank of the allies--ten or a dozen ships--was
consequently left unengaged, unless by their own initiative they came
promptly into action; which, it may be added, they did not do until
after the battle was decided.

When the development of the British movement was recognized by
Villeneuve, he saw that fighting was inevitable; and, wishing to keep
Cadiz, then twenty miles to the northward and eastward, under his lee,
he ordered the combined fleets to wear together.[135] The scanty wind
which embarrassed the British impeded this manoeuvre also, so that it
was not completed till near ten o'clock. Nelson, however, noted its
beginning at seven, and with grave concern; for not only would it put
the allies nearer their port, as it was intended to do, but it would
cause vessels crippled in the action to find to leeward of them,
during the gale which he foresaw, the dangerous shoals off Trafalgar
instead of the open refuge of the Straits. The appreciation of the
peril thus entailed led him to make a signal for all the ships to be
prepared to anchor after the battle, for it was not to be hoped that
the spars of many of them would be in a condition to bear sail. The
result of the allied movement was to invert their order. Their ships,
which had been steering south, now all headed north; the van became
the rear; Gravina, who had been leading the column, was in the rear
ship; and it was upon this rear, but still the southern flank of the
hostile array, that the weight of Collingwood's attack was to fall.

Soon after daylight Nelson, who, according to his custom, was already
up and dressed, had gone on deck. He wore as usual his admiral's frock
coat, on the left breast of which were stitched the stars of four
different Orders that he always bore. It was noticed that he did not
wear his sword at Trafalgar, although it lay ready for him on the
cabin table; and it is supposed he forgot to call for it, as this was
the only instance in which he was known not to carry it when engaged.
At about six o'clock he summoned Captain Blackwood on board the
"Victory." This officer had had a hard fag during the past forty-eight
hours, dogging the enemy's movements through darkness and mist; but
that task was over, and his ambition now was to get command of one of
two seventy-fours, whose captains had gone home with Calder to give
evidence at his trial. "My signal just made on board the Victory," he
wrote to his wife. "I hope to order me to a vacant line-of-battle
ship." Nelson's purpose, however, as far as stated by Blackwood, was
simply to thank him for the successful efforts of the past two days,
and to have him by his side till the flagship came under fire, in
order to receive final and precise instructions, as the situation
developed, for the conduct of the frigates during and after the
battle. To Blackwood's congratulations upon the approach of the moment
that he had, to use his own word, panted for, he replied: "I mean
to-day to bleed the captains of the frigates, as I shall keep you on
board to the very last moment."

Blackwood found him in good but very calm spirits, preoccupied with
the movements of the allies, and the probable results of his own plan
of attack. He frequently asked, "What would you consider a victory?"
Blackwood answered: "Considering the handsome way in which the battle
is offered by the enemy, their apparent determination for a fair trial
of strength, and the proximity of the land, I think if fourteen ships
are captured, it will be a glorious result." Nelson's constant reply
was that he would not be satisfied with anything short of twenty. He
admitted, however, that the nearness of the land might make it
difficult to preserve the prizes, and he was emphatic in directing
that, if the shattered enemies had any chance of returning to Cadiz,
the frigates were to be actively employed in destroying them, and were
not to be diverted from that single aim in order to save either ships
or men. Annihilation, he repeated, was his aim, and nothing short of
it; and he must have regretted the absence of the six of the line in
the Mediterranean, imperative as that had been. Word had been sent for
them to Gibraltar by Blackwood the moment the enemy moved, but they
were still away with the convoy.

Blackwood, being a great personal friend of the admiral, took the
liberty, after exchanging greetings, of submitting to him the
expediency of shifting his flag to the "Euryalus," and conducting the
battle from her. Nelson made no reply, but immediately ordered more
sail to be made upon the "Victory." Finding himself foiled in this,
Blackwood then made a direct request for the command of one of the
two vacant seventy-fours. This would give him a chance to share in
the fight, which in a frigate he probably would not have, but it would
also displace the first lieutenant of the ship from the position to
which he had succeeded temporarily. Nelson replied instantly, "No,
Blackwood, it is those men's birthright, and they shall have it."[136]
The incident shows vividly the lively sympathy and sense of justice
which ever distinguished Nelson; for it must have pained him to deny a
request so consonant to his own temper, coming from one whom he had
long known and valued, both as a friend and as an officer, and of
whose recent service such orders would have been a graceful and
appropriate acknowledgment. It may be desirable to explain to
unprofessional readers what was the claim of the lieutenants which
Nelson refused to ignore. The efficiency of the ships for the coming
day's work was due to them scarcely less than to the absent captains,
and if they survived the battle, having been in command through it,
they would reap not only the honor but also their confirmation in the
rank of post-captain, through having exercised it in actual battle.
This succession the admiral aptly called their birthright.

Nelson availed himself of Blackwood's presence to have him, together
with Hardy, witness his signature to a paper, in which he bequeathed
Lady Hamilton and the child Horatia to the care of the nation, and
which consequently has been styled a Codicil to his Will. Unless
Blackwood's memory a few years later was at fault, in stating that his
signal was made at six o'clock,[137] it is likely enough that this
early summons was for the special purpose of giving formal
completeness, by the attestation of two of his closest friends, to a
private duty which was the last to engage Nelson's attention and
affections; for, in addition to the date, the place and hour of his
writing are fixed by the words, "In sight of the Combined Fleets of
France and Spain, distant about ten miles." This was the common
estimate of the relative positions, made by the British fleet at large
at daybreak, and coincides fairly well with the inferences to be
drawn, from the slow rate of speed at which the wind permitted the
British to advance, and from the hour the conflict began. Nor was
there time, nor convenient room, for further delay. A freshening
breeze might readily have brought the fleet into action in a couple of
hours, and it is the custom in preparing for battle--the signal for
which was made at 6.40--to remove most of the conveniences, and
arrangements for privacy, from the living spaces of the officers;
partly to provide against their destruction, chiefly to clear away all
impediments to fighting the guns, and to moving about the ship. In the
case of the admiral, of course, much might be postponed to the last
moment, but in fact his cabin was cleared of fixtures immediately
after he went on the poop in the early morning; for it is distinctly
mentioned that while there he gave particular directions in the
matter, and enjoined great care in handling the portrait of Lady
Hamilton, saying, "Take care of my guardian angel."

It seems, therefore, probable that this so-called Codicil was written
in the quiet minutes of the morning, while the fleet was forming its
order of sailing and bearing up for the enemy, but before the
admiral's cabin was cleared for battle. In it Nelson first recounted,
briefly but specifically, "the eminent services of Emma Hamilton" to
the state, on two occasions, as believed by himself to have been
rendered. Into the actuality of these services it is not necessary
here to inquire;[138] it is sufficient to say that Nelson's knowledge
of them could not have been at first hand, and that the credence he
unquestionably gave to them must have depended upon the evidence of
others,--probably of Lady Hamilton herself, in whom he felt, and
always expressed, the most unbounded confidence. "Could I have
rewarded these services," the paper concludes, "I would not now call
upon my Country; but as that has not been in my power, I leave Emma
Lady Hamilton, therefore, a legacy to my King and Country, that they
will give her an ample provision to maintain her rank in life. I also
leave to the beneficence of my Country my adopted daughter, Horatia
Nelson Thompson; and I desire she will use in future the name of
Nelson only. These are the only favours I ask of my King and Country
at this moment when I am going to fight their battle. May God bless my
King and Country, and all those who I hold dear. My relations it is
needless to mention: they will of course be amply provided for."

At seven o'clock Nelson had returned from the poop to the cabin, for
at that hour was made in his private journal the last entry of
occurrences,--"At seven the combined fleets wearing in succession."
Here it seems likely that he laid down the pen, for, when he was found
writing again, some hours later, it was to complete the long record of
experiences and of duties, with words that summed up, in fit and most
touching expression, the self-devotion of a life already entering the
shadow of death.

Between eight and nine o'clock the other frigate commanders came on
board the "Victory;" aides-de-camp, as it were, waiting to the last
moment to receive such orders as might require more extensive wording,
or precise explanation, than is supplied by the sententious phrases of
the signal-book. Blackwood himself, a captain of long standing and of
tried ability, was in fact intrusted contingently with no small share
of the power and discretion of the commander-in-chief. "He not only
gave me command of all the frigates, but he also gave me a latitude,
seldom or ever given, that of making any use I pleased of his name, in
ordering any of the sternmost line-of-battle ships to do what struck
me as best." While thus waiting, the captains accompanied the admiral
in an inspection which he made of the decks and batteries of the
flagship. He addressed the crew at their several quarters, cautioned
them against firing a single shot without being sure of their object,
and to the officers he expressed himself as highly satisfied with the
arrangements made.

Meanwhile the two fleets were forming, as best they could with the
scanty breeze, the order in which each meant to meet the shock of
battle. The British could not range themselves in regular columns
without loss of time that was not to be thrown away. They advanced
rather in two elongated groups, all under full sail, even to
studding-sails on both sides, the place of each ship being determined
chiefly by her speed, or, perhaps, by some fortuitous advantage of
position when the movement began. The great point was to get the heads
of the columns into action as soon as possible, to break up the
enemy's order. That done, those which followed could be trusted to
complete the business on the general lines prescribed by Nelson.
Collingwood's ship, the "Royal Sovereign," being but a few days out
from home, and freshly coppered, easily took the lead in her own
division. After her came the "Belleisle," also a recent arrival off
Cadiz, but an old Mediterranean cruiser which had accompanied Nelson
in the recent chase to the West Indies. Upon these two ships, as upon
the heads of all columns, fell the weight of destruction from the
enemy's resistance.

The "Victory," always a fast ship, had likewise little difficulty in
keeping her place at the front. Blackwood, having failed to get Nelson
on board his own frigate, and realizing the exposure inseparable from
the position of leader, ventured, at about half-past nine, when still
six miles from the enemy, to urge that one or two ships should be
permitted to precede the "Victory." Nelson gave a conditional
assent--"Let them go," if they can. The "Temeraire," a three-decker,
being close behind, was hailed to go ahead, and endeavored to do so;
but at the same moment the admiral gave an indication of how little
disposed he was to yield either time or position. The lee lower
studding-sail happening to be badly set, the lieutenant of the
forecastle had it taken in, meaning to reset it; which Nelson
observing, ran forward and rated him severely for delaying the ship's
progress. Anything much less useful than a lee lower studding-sail is
hard to imagine, but by this time the admiral was getting very
restive. "About ten o'clock," says Blackwood, "Lord Nelson's anxiety
to close with the enemy became very apparent: he frequently remarked
that they put a good face upon it; but always quickly added: 'I'll
give them such a dressing as they never had before.'"

Seeing that the "Temeraire" could not pass the "Victory" in time to
lead into the hostile order, unless the flagship gave way, Blackwood,
feeling perhaps that he might wear out his own privilege, told Hardy
he ought to say to the admiral that, unless the "Victory" shortened
sail, the other ships could not get into place; but Hardy naturally
demurred. In any event, it was not just the sort of proposition that
the captain of the ship would wish to make, and it was very doubtful
how Nelson might take it. This the latter soon showed, however; for,
as the "Temeraire" painfully crawled up, and her bows doubled on the
"Victory's" quarter, he hailed her, and speaking as he always did with
a slight nasal intonation, said: "I'll thank you, Captain Harvey, to
keep in your proper station, which is astern of the Victory." The same
concern for the admiral's personal safety led the assembled officers
to comment anxiously upon the conspicuous mark offered by his blaze of
decorations, knowing as they did that the enemy's ships swarmed with
soldiers, that among them were many sharpshooters, and that the action
would be close. None, however, liked to approach him with the
suggestion that he should take any precaution. At length the surgeon,
whose painful duty it was a few hours later to watch over the sad
fulfilment of his apprehensions, said that he would run the risk of
his Lordship's displeasure; but before he could find a fitting
opportunity to speak, a shot flew over the "Victory," and the admiral
directed all not stationed on deck to go to their quarters. No remark
therefore was made; but it is more likely that Nelson would have
resented the warning than that he would have heeded it.

The French and Spanish fleets, being neither a homogeneous nor a
well-exercised mass, experienced even greater difficulty than the
British in forming their array; and the matter was to them of more
consequence, for, as the defensive has an advantage in the careful
preparations he may make, so, if he fail to accomplish them, he has
little to compensate for the loss of the initiative, which he has
yielded his opponent. The formation at which they aimed, the customary
order of battle in that day, was a long, straight, single column,
presenting from end to end an unbroken succession of batteries, close
to one another and clear towards the foe, so that all the ships should
sweep with their guns the sea over which, nearly at right angles, the
hostile columns were advancing. Instead of this, embarrassed by both
lack of wind and lack of skill, their manoeuvres resulted in a curved
line, concave to the enemy's approach; the horns of the crescent thus
formed being nearer to the latter. Collingwood noted that this
disposition facilitated a convergent fire upon the assailants, the
heads of whose columns were bearing down on the allied centre; it does
not seem to have been remarked that the two horns, or wings, being to
windward of the centre, also had it more in their power to support the
latter--a consideration of very great importance. Neither of these
advantages, however, was due to contrivance. The order of the combined
fleets was the result merely of an unsuccessful effort to assume the
usual line of battle. The ships distributed along the crescent lay
irregularly, sometimes two and three abreast, masking each other's
fire. On the other hand, even this irregularity had some
compensations, for a British vessel, attempting to pass through at
such a place, fell at once into a swarm of enemies. From horn to horn
was about five miles. Owing to the lightness of the breeze, the allies
carried a good deal of sail, a departure from the usual battle
practice. This was necessary in order to enable them to keep their
places at all, but it also had the effect of bringing them
continually, though very gradually, nearer to Cadiz. Seeing this,
Nelson signalled to Collingwood, "I intend to pass through the van of
the enemy's line, to prevent him from getting into Cadiz," and the
course of the "Victory," for this purpose, was changed a little to the
northward.

After this, towards eleven o'clock, Nelson went below to the cabin. It
was his habit, when an engagement was expected, to have all the
bulkheads[139] upon the fighting decks taken down, and those of his
own apartments doubtless had been removed at least as soon as the
enemy's sailing was signalled; but it was possible to obtain some
degree of privacy by hanging screens, which could be hurried out of
the way at the last moment. The "Victory" did not come under fire till
12.30, so that at eleven she would yet be three miles or more distant
from the enemy,[140] and screens could still remain. Shortly, after he
entered, the signal-lieutenant, who had been by his side all the
morning, followed him, partly to make an official report, partly to
prefer a personal request. He was the ranking lieutenant on board, but
had not been permitted to exercise the duties of first lieutenant,
because Nelson some time before, to avoid constant changes in that
important station, had ordered that the person then occupying it
should so continue, notwithstanding the seniority of any who might
afterwards join. Now that battle was at hand, the oldest in rank
wished to claim the position, and to gain the reward that it insured
after a victory,--a request natural and not improper, but more suited
for the retirement of the cabin than for the publicity of the deck.

Whatever the original injustice,--or rather hardship,--it is scarcely
likely, remembering the refusal encountered by Blackwood, that Nelson
would have consented now to deprive of his "birthright" the man who so
far had been doing the work; but the petition was never preferred.
Entering the cabin, the officer paused at the threshold, for Nelson
was on his knees writing. The words, the last that he ever penned,
were written in the private diary he habitually kept, in which were
noted observations and reflections upon passing occurrences, mingled
with occasional self-communings. They followed now, without break of
space, or paragraph, upon the last incident recorded--"At seven the
enemy wearing in succession"--and they ran thus:--

"May the Great God, whom I worship, grant to my Country, and for the
benefit of Europe in general, a great and glorious victory; and may no
misconduct in any one tarnish it; and may humanity after victory be
the predominant feature in the British fleet. For myself,
individually, I commit my life to Him who made me, and may His
blessing light upon my endeavours for serving my Country faithfully.
To Him I resign myself and the just cause which is entrusted to me to
defend. Amen. Amen. Amen."

The officer, Lieutenant Pasco, waited quietly till Nelson rose from
his knees, and then made his necessary report; but, although his
future prospects hung upon the wish he had to express, he refrained
with singular delicacy from intruding it upon the preoccupation of
mind evidenced by the attitude in which he had found his commander.
The latter soon afterwards followed him to the poop, where Blackwood
was still awaiting his final instructions. To him Nelson said, "I will
now amuse the fleet with a signal;" and he asked if he did not think
there was one yet wanting. Blackwood replied that the whole fleet
seemed very clearly to understand what they were about, and were vying
with each other to get as near as possible to the leaders of the
columns. Upon this succeeded the celebrated signal, the development of
which to its final wording is a little uncertain. Comparing the
various accounts of witnesses, it seems probably to have been as
follows. Nelson mused for a little while, as one who phrases a thought
in his own mind before uttering it, and then said, "Suppose we
telegraph 'Nelson confides that every man will do his duty.'" In this
form it was the call of the leader to the followers, the personal
appeal of one who trusts to those in whom he trusts, a feeling
particularly characteristic of the speaker, whose strong hold over
others lay above all in the transparent and unswerving faith he showed
in their loyal support; and to arouse it now in full force he used the
watchword "duty," sure that the chord it struck in him would find its
quick response in every man of the same blood. The officer to whom the
remark was made, suggested "England" instead of "Nelson." To the fleet
it could have made no difference,--to them the two names meant the
same thing; but Nelson accepted the change with delight. "Mr. Pasco,"
he called to the signal officer, "I wish to say to the fleet, 'England
confides that every man will do his duty;'" and he added, "You must be
quick, for I have one more to make, which is for close action." This
remark shows that the columns, and particularly Collingwood's ship,
were already nearing the enemy. Pasco answered, "If your Lordship will
permit me to substitute 'expects' for 'confides,' it will be sooner
completed, because 'expects' is in the vocabulary,[141] and 'confides'
must be spelt." Nelson replied hastily, but apparently satisfied,
"That will do, Pasco, make it directly;" but the slightly mandatory
"expects" is less representative of the author of this renowned
sentence than the cordial and sympathetic "confides." It is "Allez,"
rather than "Allons;" yet even so, become now the voice of the distant
motherland, it carries with it the shade of reverence, as well as of
affection, which patriotism exacts.

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