A. T. (Alfred Thayer) Mahan - The Life of Nelson, Vol. I (of 2)

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Nevertheless, although Nelson's perceptions and reasoning were
accurate as far as they went, they erred in leaving out of the
calculation a most important consideration,--the maintenance of the
communications with England, which had assumed vital importance since
the general defection of the Italian States, caused by Bonaparte's
successes and his imperious demands. It would be more true to say that
he underestimated this factor than that he overlooked it; for he had
himself observed, six weeks earlier, when the approach of a Spanish
war first became certain: "I really think they would do us more damage
by getting off Cape Finisterre;[40] it is there I fear them," and the
reason for that fear is shown by his reproach against Man, already
quoted, for his neglect of the convoy. The position of the Spanish
Navy in its home ports was in fact intermediate--interior--as
regarded the British fleet and the source of its most essential
supplies. So long as its future direction remained uncertain, it lay
upon the flank of the principal British line of communications. Nelson
did not use, perhaps did not know, the now familiar terms of the
military art; and, with all his insight and comprehensive sagacity, he
suffered from the want of proper tools with which to transmute his
acute intuitions into precise thought, as well as of clearly
enunciated principles, which serve to guide a man's conclusions, and
would assuredly have qualified his in the present instance. Upon the
supposition that the Spanish Navy, practically in its entirety,
entered the Mediterranean and appeared off Corsica,--as it
did,--Nelson's reasoning was correct, and his chagrin at a retreat
justified; but, as he himself had wisely remarked to Beaulieu, it is
not safe to count upon your enemy pursuing the course you wish. Had
the Spanish Government chosen the other alternative open to it, and
struck at the communications, such a blow, or even such a threat, must
have compelled the withdrawal of the fleet, unless some other base of
supplies could be found. The straitness of the situation is shown by
the fact that Jervis, after he had held on to the last moment in San
Fiorenzo Bay, sailed for Gibraltar with such scanty provisions that
the crews' daily rations were reduced to one-third the ordinary
amount; in fact, as early as the first of October they had been cut
down to two-thirds. Whether, therefore, the Government was right in
ordering the withdrawal, or Nelson in his condemnation of it, may be
left to the decision of those fortunate persons who can be cocksure of
the true solution of other people's perplexities.

In evacuating the Mediterranean, Jervis determined, upon his own
responsibility, to retain Elba, if the troops, which were not under
his command, would remain there. This was accordingly done; a strong
garrison, adequately provisioned, thus keeping for Great Britain a
foothold within the sea, at a time when she had lost Minorca and did
not yet possess Malta. Nelson hoped that this step would encourage the
Two Sicilies to stand firm against the French; but, however valuable
Elba would be to the fleet as a base, if held until its return, it was
useless to protect Naples in the absence of the fleet, and upon the
news of the latter's proposed retirement that Kingdom at once made
peace.

After the receipt of his orders for the evacuation of Bastia, and
pending the assembling of the transports, Nelson was despatched by the
admiral to Genoa, to present reclamations for injuries alleged to have
been done to Great Britain, and to propose terms of accommodation. The
little Republic, however, under the coercive influence of Bonaparte's
continued success, was no longer in doubt as to the side which policy
dictated her to take, between the two belligerents who vexed her
borders. During this visit of Nelson's, on the 9th of October, she
signed a treaty with France, stipulating, besides the closure of the
ports against Great Britain, the payment of a sum of money, and free
passage to troops and supplies for the army of Italy. Thus was Genoa
converted formally, as she for some time had been actually, into a
French base of operations. Returning from this fruitless mission,
Nelson rejoined the commander-in-chief on the 13th of October, at San
Fiorenzo, and the same afternoon left again for Bastia, where he
arrived the following day.

During the fortnight intervening since he left the place, the fact
that the Spanish fleet was on its way to Corsica had become known, and
the French partisans in the island were proportionately active. It was
impossible for the British to go into the interior; their friends, if
not in a minority, were effectually awed by the preponderance of their
enemies, on land and sea. Nelson, wishing to cross overland to San
Fiorenzo to visit Jervis, was assured he could not do so with safety.
In Bastia itself the municipality had wrested the authority from the
Viceroy, and consigned the administration to a Committee of Thirty.
The ships of war and transports being blown to sea, the inhabitants
became still more aggressive; for, foreseeing the return of the
French, they were naturally eager to propitiate their future masters
by a display of zeal. British property was sequestered, and shipping
not permitted to leave the mole.

Nelson was persuaded that only the arrival of the ships accompanying
him saved the place. Except a guard at the Viceroy's house, the
British troops had been withdrawn to the citadel. Even there, at the
gates of the citadel, and within it, Corsican guards were present in
numbers equal to the British, while the posts in the towns were all
held by them. Arriving at early dawn of the 14th, Nelson at once
visited the general and the Viceroy. The former saw no hope, under the
conditions, of saving either stores, cannon, or provisions. "The
Army," said Nelson in a private letter to Jervis, with something of
the prejudiced chaff of a seaman of that day, "is, as usual, well
dressed and powdered. I hope the general will join me cordially, but,
as you well know, great exertions belong exclusively to the Navy."
After the evacuation, however, he admitted handsomely that it was
impossible to "do justice to the good dispositions of the general."

Between the heads of the two services such arrangements were perfected
as enabled almost everything in the way of British property--public
and private--to be brought away. By midday the ships, of which three
were of the line, were anchored close to the mole-head, abreast the
town, and the municipality was notified that any opposition to the
removal of the vessels and stores would be followed by instant
bombardment. Everything yielded to the threat, made by a man whose
determined character left no doubt that it would be carried into
execution. "Nothing shall be left undone that ought to be done," he
wrote to Jervis, "even should it be necessary to knock down Bastia."
From time to time interference was attempted, but the demand for
immediate desistence, made, watch in hand, by the naval officer on the
spot, enforced submission. "The firm tone held by Commodore Nelson,"
wrote Jervis to the Admiralty, "soon reduced these gentlemen to order,
and quiet submission to the embarkation." Owing to the anarchy
prevailing, the Viceroy was persuaded to go on board before nightfall,
he being too valuable as a hostage to be exposed to possible
kidnappers.

On the 18th of October a large number of armed French landed at Cape
Corso, and approached the town. On the 19th they sent to the
municipality a demand that the British should not be permitted to
embark. Under these circumstances even Nelson felt that nothing more
could be saved. The work of removal was continued actively until
sunset, by which time two hundred thousand pounds worth of cannon,
stores, and provisions had been taken on board. At midnight the troops
evacuated the citadel, and marched to the north end of the town, where
they embarked--twenty-four hours ahead of the time upon which Nelson
had reckoned four days before. It was then blowing a strong gale of
wind. Last of all, about six o'clock on the morning of the 20th,
Nelson and the general entered a barge, every other man being by that
time afloat, and were pulled off to the ships, taking with them two
field-guns, until then kept ashore to repel a possible attack at the
last moment. The French, who "were in one end of Bastia before we
quitted the other," had occupied the citadel since one in the morning,
and the Spanish fleet, of over twenty sail-of-the-line, which had
already arrived, was even then off Cape Corso, about sixty miles
distant; but the little British squadron, sailing promptly with a fair
wind, in a few hours reached Elba, where every vessel was safely at
anchor before night. On the 24th Nelson joined the commander-in-chief
in Martello Bay, the outer anchorage of San Fiorenzo. Everything was
then afloat, and ready for a start as soon as the transports, still at
Elba, should arrive. The evacuation of Corsica was complete, though
the ships remained another week in its waters.

The Spanish fleet continued cruising to the northward of the island,
and was every day sighted by the British lookout frigates. Jervis held
grimly on, expecting the appearance of the seven ships of Admiral Man,
who had been ordered to rejoin him. That officer, however, acting on
his own responsibility, weakly buttressed by the opinion of a council
of his captains, had returned to England contrary to his instructions.
The commander-in-chief, ignorant of this step, was left in the sorely
perplexing situation of having his fleet divided into two parts, each
distinctly inferior to the Spanish force alone, of twenty-six ships,
not to speak of the French in Toulon. Under the conditions, the only
thing that could be done was to await his subordinate, in the
appointed spot, until the last moment. By the 2d of November further
delay had become impossible, from the approaching failure of
provisions. On that day, therefore, the fleet weighed, and after a
tedious passage anchored on the first of December at Gibraltar. There
Nelson remained until the 10th of the month, when he temporarily
quitted the "Captain," hoisted his broad pendant on board the frigate
"Minerve," and, taking with him one frigate besides, returned into the
Mediterranean upon a detached mission of importance.

Nelson's last services in Corsica were associated with the momentary
general collapse of the British operations and influence in the
Mediterranean; and his final duty, by a curious coincidence, was to
abandon the position which he more than any other man had been
instrumental in securing. Yet, amid these discouraging circumstances,
his renown had been steadily growing throughout the year 1796, which
may justly be looked upon as closing the first stage in the history
of British Sea Power during the wars of the French Revolution, and as
clearing the way for his own great career, which in the repossession
of the Mediterranean reached its highest plane, and there continued in
unabated glory till the hour of his death. It was not merely the
exceptional brilliancy of his deeds at Cape St. Vincent, now soon to
follow, great and distinguished as those were, which designated him to
men in power as beyond dispute the coming chief of the British Navy;
it was the long antecedent period of unswerving continuance in
strenuous action, allowing no flagging of earnestness for a moment to
appear, no chance for service, however small or distant, to pass
unimproved. It was the same unremitting pressing forward, which had
brought him so vividly to the front in the abortive fleet actions of
the previous year,--an impulse born, partly, of native eagerness for
fame, partly of zeal for the interests of his country and his
profession. "Mine is all honour; so much for the Navy!" as he wrote,
somewhat incoherently, to his brother, alluding to a disappointment
about prize money.

Nelson himself had an abundant, but not an exaggerated, consciousness
of this increase of reputation; and he knew, too, that he was but
reaping as he had diligently sowed. "If credit and honour in the
service are desirable," he tells his brother, "I have my full share. I
have never lost an opportunity of distinguishing myself, not only as a
gallant man, but as having a head; for, of the numerous plans I have
laid, not one has failed." "You will be informed from my late
letters," he writes to his wife, "that Sir John Jervis has such an
opinion of my conduct, that he is using every influence, both public
and private, with Lord Spencer, for my continuance on this station;
and I am certain you must feel the superior pleasure of knowing, that
my integrity and plainness of conduct are the cause of my being kept
from you, to the receiving me as a person whom no commander-in-chief
would wish to keep under his flag. Sir John was a perfect stranger to
me, therefore I feel the more flattered; and when I reflect that I
have had the unbounded confidence of three commanders-in-chief, I
cannot but feel a conscious pride, and that I possess abilities." "If
my character is known," he writes to the Genoese Government, which
knew it well, "it will be credited that this blockade [of Leghorn]
will be attended to with a degree of rigour unexampled in the present
war." "It has pleased God this war," he tells the Duke of Clarence,
"not only to give me frequent opportunities of showing myself an
officer worthy of trust, but also to prosper all my undertakings in
the highest degree. I have had the extreme good fortune, not only to
be noticed in my immediate line of duty, but also to obtain the
repeated approbation of His Majesty's Ministers at Turin, Genoa, and
Naples, as well as of the Viceroy of Corsica, for my conduct in the
various opinions I have been called upon to give; and my judgment
being formed from common sense, I have never yet been mistaken."

Already at times his consciousness of distinction among men betrays
something of that childlike, delighted vanity, half unwitting, which
was afterward forced into exuberant growth and distasteful prominence,
by the tawdry flatteries of Lady Hamilton and the Court of Naples.
Now, expressed to one who had a right to all his confidence and to
share all his honors, it challenges rather the sympathy than the
criticism of the reader. "I will relate another anecdote, all vanity
to myself, but you will partake of it: A person sent me a letter, and
directed as follows, 'Horatio Nelson, Genoa.' On being asked how he
could direct in such a manner, his answer, in a large party, was,
'Sir, there is but one Horatio Nelson in the world.' I am known
throughout Italy," he continues; "not a Kingdom, or State, where my
name will be forgotten. This is my Gazette. Probably my services may
be forgotten by the great, by the time I get home; but my mind will
not forget, nor cease to feel, a degree of consolation and of applause
superior to undeserved rewards. Wherever there is anything to be done,
there Providence is sure to direct my steps. Credit must be given me
in spite of envy. Had all my actions been gazetted, not one fortnight
would have passed during the whole war without a letter from me. Even
the French respect me." After the conclusion of the campaign, when on
the way to Gibraltar, he tells her again: "Do not flatter yourself
that I shall be rewarded; I expect nothing, and therefore shall not be
disappointed: the pleasure of my own mind will be my reward. I am more
interested, and feel a greater satisfaction, in obtaining yours and my
father's applause than that of all the world besides." The wholesome
balance between self-respect and a laudable desire for the esteem of
men was plainly unimpaired.

Though devoid of conspicuous events, the year 1796, from the opening
of the campaign, early in April, up to the evacuation of the
Mediterranean, had been to Nelson one of constant and engrossing
occupation. There is therefore little mention by him of his private
affairs and feelings. In the home correspondence there is no
diminution in the calm tenderness of affection always shown by him
towards his wife and father, who continued to live together; rather,
perhaps, the expressions to Mrs. Nelson are more demonstrative than
before, possibly because letters were less frequent. But there is
nothing thrilling in the "assurance of my unabated and steady
affection, which, if possible, is increasing by that propriety of
conduct which you pursue." He is clearly satisfied to remain away; the
path of honor has no rival in his heart; there is no suggestion of an
inward struggle between two masters, no feeling of aloneness, no
petulant discontent with uneasy surroundings, or longing for the
presence of an absent mistress. The quiet English home, the "little
but neat cottage," attracts, indeed, with its sense of repose,--"I
shall not be very sorry to see England again. I am grown old and
battered to pieces, and require some repairs "--but the magnet fails
to deflect the needle; not even a perceptible vibration of the will is
produced.

Yet, while thus engrossed in the war, eager for personal distinction
and for the military honor of his country, he apparently sees in it
little object beyond a mere struggle for superiority, and has no
conception of the broader and deeper issues at stake, the recognition
of which intensified and sustained the resolution of the peace-loving
minister, who then directed the policy of Great Britain. Of this he
himself gives the proof in a curious anecdote. An Algerine official
visiting the "Captain" off Leghorn, Nelson asked him why the Dey would
not make peace with the Genoese and Neapolitans, for they would pay
well for immunity, as the Americans at that period always did. His
answer was: "If we make peace with every one, what is the Dey to do
with his ships?" "What a reason for carrying on a naval war!" said
Nelson, when writing the story to Jervis; "but has our minister a
better one for the present?" Jervis, a traditional Whig, and opposed
in Parliament to the war, probably sympathized with this view, and in
any case the incident shows the close confidence existing between the
two officers; but it also indicates how narrowly Nelson's genius and
unquestionable acuteness cL intellect confined themselves, at that
time, to the sphere in which he was visibly acting. In this he
presents a marked contrast to Bonaparte, whose restless intelligence
and impetuous imagination reached out in many directions, and surveyed
from a lofty height the bearing of all things, far and near, upon the
destinies of France.

FOOTNOTES:

[35] This indicates no opinion as to the fortune of the military operations
in England, a landing once effected. It has, however, seemed to the author
singular that men fail to consider that Napoleon would not have hesitated
to abandon an army in England, as he did in Egypt and in Russia. A few
hours' fog or calm, and a quick-pulling boat, would have landed himself
again in France; while the loss of 150,000 men, if it came to that, would
have been cheaply bought with the damage such an organized force could have
done London and the dockyards, not to speak of the moral effect.

[36] Naval Chronicle, vol. xxi. p. 60.

[37] An account of this disaster, said to be that of an eye-witness, is to
be found in Colburn's United Service Journal, 1846, part i.

[38] This motto was subsequently adopted by Nelson, when arms were assigned
to him as a Knight of the Bath, in May, 1797.

[39] That is, apparently, from detached service, and ordered to the main
fleet.

[40] On the northwest coast of Spain, at the entrance of the Bay of Biscay,
and therefore right in the track of vessels from the Channel to the Straits
of Gibraltar.

CHAPTER VIII.

THE EVACUATION OF ELBA.--NIGHT COMBAT WITH TWO SPANISH
FRIGATES.--BATTLE OF CAPE ST. VINCENT.--NELSON PROMOTED TO
REAR-ADMIRAL.--SERVICES BEFORE CADIZ.

DECEMBER, 1796-JUNE, 1797. AGE, 38.

"When we quitted Toulon," wrote Nelson to his old captain, Locker,
while on the passage to Gibraltar, "I remember we endeavoured to
reconcile ourselves to Corsica; now we are content with Elba--such
things are." Even this small foothold was next to be resigned. Upon
reaching Gibraltar, Jervis received orders from the Admiralty to
evacuate the island.

This was the duty upon which Nelson was so soon despatched again to
the Mediterranean. Though "most important," wrote he to his wife, "it
is not a fighting mission, therefore be not uneasy." The assurance was
doubtless honestly given, but scarcely to be implicitly accepted in
view of his past career. Leaving the admiral on the evening of
December 14, with the frigates "Blanche" and "Minerve," his
commodore's pendant flying in the latter, the two vessels, about 11
p.m. of the 19th, encountered two Spanish frigates close to Cartagena.
The enemies pairing off, a double action ensued, which, in the case of
the "Minerve," ended in the surrender of her opponent, "La Sabina," at
half-past one in the morning. Throwing a prize-crew on board, the
British ship took her late antagonist in tow and stood away to the
southeast. At half-past three another Spanish frigate came up, and, in
order to meet this fresh enemy on fairly equal terms, the "Minerve"
had to drop her prize. The second fight began at 4.30, and lasted
half an hour, when the Spaniard hauled off. With daylight appeared
also two hostile ships-of-the-line, which had been chasing towards the
sound of the guns. These had already been seen by the "Blanche," which
was by them prevented from taking possession of her antagonist, after
the latter struck. The pursuit lasted through the day, the "Minerve"
being hard pressed in consequence of the injuries received by all her
masts during the engagement; but both British frigates succeeded in
shaking off their pursuers. "La Sabina" was recaptured; she had
already lost one mast, and the remaining two were seen to go over the
side as she was bringing-to, when the enemy overtook her. It is
interesting to note that her captain, Don Jacobo Stuart, was descended
from the British royal house of Stuart. He, with many of his crew, had
been transferred to the "Minerve," and remained prisoners.

Nelson reached Porto Ferrajo a week later, on the 26th of December.
"On my arrival here," wrote he to his brother, "it was a ball night,
and being attended by the captains, I was received in due form by the
General, and one particular tune was played:[41] the second was 'Rule
Britannia.' From Italy I am loaded with compliments." Having regard to
comparative strength, the action was in all respects most creditable,
but it received additional lustre from being fought close to the
enemy's coast, and in full view of a force so superior as that from
which escape had been handsomely made, under conditions requiring both
steadiness and skill. Though on a small scale, no such fair stand-up
fight had been won in the Mediterranean during the war, and the
resultant exultation was heightened by its contrast with the general
depression then weighing upon the British cause. Especially keen and
warmly expressed was the satisfaction of the veteran
commander-in-chief at Lisbon, who first learned the success of his
valued subordinate through Spanish sources. "I cannot express to you,
and Captain Cockburn, the feelings I underwent on the receipt of the
enclosed bulletin, the truth of which I cannot doubt, as far as
relates to your glorious achievement in the capture of the Sabina, and
dignified retreat from the line-of-battle ship, which deprived you of
your well-earned trophy; your laurels were not then within their
grasp, and can never fade."

General De Burgh, who commanded the troops in Elba, had received no
instructions to quit the island, and felt uncertain about his course,
in view of the navy's approaching departure. Nelson's orders were
perfectly clear, but applied only to the naval establishment. He
recognized the general's difficulty, though he seems to have thought
that, under all the circumstances, he might very well have acted upon
his own expressed opinion, that "the signing of a Neapolitan peace
with France ought to be our signal for departure." "The army," wrote
Nelson to the First Lord of the Admiralty, "are not so often called
upon to exercise their judgment in political measures as we are;
therefore the general feels a certain diffidence." He told De Burgh
that, the King of Naples having made peace, Jervis considered his
business with the courts of Italy as terminated; that the Admiralty's
orders were to concentrate the effort of the fleet upon preventing the
allied fleets from quitting the Mediterranean, and upon the defence of
Portugal, invaluable to the British as a base of naval operations. For
these reasons, even if he had to leave the land forces in Elba, he
should have no hesitation in following his instructions, which were to
withdraw all naval belongings. "I have sent to collect my squadron,
and as soon as they arrive, I shall offer myself for embarking the
troops, stores, &c.; and should you decline quitting this post, I
shall proceed down the Mediterranean with such ships of war as are not
absolutely wanted for keeping open the communication of Elba with the
Continent."

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