A. T. Mahan - The Major Operations of the Navies in the War of American Independence

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Rodney and Vaughan moved promptly. Three days after their orders
arrived, they sailed for St. Eustatius. There being in Fort Royal four
French ships of the line, six British were left to check them, and
on the 3d of February the fleet reached its destination. A peremptory
summons from the commander of a dozen ships of the line secured
immediate submission. Over a hundred and fifty merchant ships were
taken; and a convoy of thirty sail, which had left the island two days
before, was pursued and brought back. The merchandise found was valued
at over L3,000,000. The neighbouring islands of St. Martin and Saba
were seized also at this time.

Rodney's imagination, as is shown in his letters, was greatly
impressed by the magnitude of the prize and by the defenceless
condition of his capture. He alleged these as the motives for staying
in person at St. Eustatius, to settle the complicated tangle of
neutral and belligerent rights in the property involved, and to
provide against the enemy's again possessing himself of a place now
so equipped for transactions harmful to Great Britain. The storehouses
and conveniences provided for the particular traffic, if not properly
guarded, were like fortifications insufficiently garrisoned. If they
passed into the hands of the enemy, they became sources of injury.
The illicit trade could start again at once in full force, with means
which elsewhere would have first to be created. There were a mile and
a half of storehouses in the lower town, he said, and these he must
leave at the least roofless, if not wholly demolished.

For such reasons he remained at St. Eustatius throughout February,
March, and April. The amount of money involved, and the arbitrary
methods pursued by him and by Vaughan, gave rise to much scandal,
which was not diminished by the King's relinquishing all the booty
to the captors, nor by the latters' professed disinterestedness. Men
thought they did protest too much. Meanwhile, other matters arose to
claim attention. A week after the capture, a vessel arrived from the
Bay of Biscay announcing that eight or ten French sail of the line,
with a large convoy, had been seen on the 31st of December steering
for the West Indies. Rodney at once detached Sir Samuel Hood with
eleven ships of the line, directing him to take also under his command
the six left before Fort Royal, and to cruise with them to windward
of Martinique, to intercept the force reported. Hood sailed February
12th. The particular intelligence proved afterwards to be false, but
Hood was continued on his duty. A month later he was ordered to move
from the windward to the leeward side of the island, and to blockade
Fort Royal closely. Against this change he remonstrated, and the event
showed him to be right; but Rodney insisted, saying that from his
experience he knew that a fleet could remain off Fort Royal for months
without dropping to leeward, and that there ships detached to Santa
Lucia, for water and refreshments, could rejoin before an enemy's
fleet, discovered to windward, could come up. Hood thought the
Admiral's object was merely to shelter his own doings at St.
Eustatius; and he considered the blockade of Fort Royal to be futile,
if no descent upon the island were intended. "It would doubtless
have been fortunate for the public," he remarked afterwards, "had Sir
George been with his fleet, as I am confident he would have been to
windward instead of to leeward, when de Grasse made his approach."

The preparations of the French in Brest were completed towards the end
of March, and on the 22d of that month Rear-Admiral de Grasse sailed,
having a large convoy under the protection of twenty-six ships of
the line. A week later six of the latter parted company, five under
Suffren for the East Indies and one for North America. The remaining
twenty continued their course for Martinique, which was sighted on the
28th of April. Before sunset, Hood's squadron also was discovered to
leeward of the island, as ordered by Rodney to cruise, and off the
southern point,--Pointe des Salines. De Grasse then hove-to for
the night, but sent an officer ashore both to give and to obtain
intelligence, and to reach an understanding for concerted action next
day.

The French fleet consisted of one ship of 110 guns, three 80's,
fifteen 74's, and one 64, in all 20 of the line, besides three armed
_en flute_,[91] which need not be taken into account, although they
served to cover the convoy. Besides these there were the four in Fort
Royal, one 74 and three 64's, a junction of which with the approaching
enemy it was one of Hood's objects to prevent. The force of the
British was one 90, one 80, twelve 74's, one 70, and two 64's: total,
17. Thus both in numbers and in rates of ships Hood was inferior to
the main body alone of the French; but he had the advantage of ships
all coppered, owing to Rodney's insistence with the Admiralty. He also
had no convoy to worry him; but he was to leeward.

Early in the morning of the 29th, de Grasse advanced to round the
southern point of the island, which was the usual course for sailing
ships. Hood was too far to leeward to intercept this movement, for
which he was blamed by Rodney, who claimed that the night had not been
properly utilised by beating to windward of Pointe des Salines.[92]
Hood, on the other hand, said in a private letter: "I never once lost
sight of getting to windward, but it was totally impossible.... Had I
fortunately been there, I must have brought the enemy to close action
upon more equal terms, or they must have given up their transports,
trade, etc." Hood's subsequent career places it beyond doubt that had
he been to windward there would have been a severe action, whatever
the result; but it is not possible to decide positively between his
statement and Rodney's, as to where the fault of being to leeward lay.
The writer believes that Hood would have been to windward, if in any
way possible. It must be added that the British had no word that so
great a force was coming. On this point Hood and Rodney are agreed.

[Illustration]

Under the conditions, the French passed without difficulty round
Pointe des Salines, the transports hugging the coast, the ships of
war being outside and to leeward of them. Thus they headed up to the
northward for Fort Royal Bay (Cul de Sac Royal), Hood standing to the
southward until after 10, and being joined at 9.20 by a sixty-four
(not reckoned in the list above) from Santa Lucia, making his force
eighteen. At 10.35 the British tacked together to the northward. The
two fleets were now steering the same way, the French van abreast of
the British centre. At 11 the French opened their fire, to which no
reply was made then. At 11.20, the British van being close in with the
shore to the northward of the Bay, Hood tacked again together, and the
enemy, seeing his convoy secure, wore, also together, which brought
the two lines nearer, heading south. At this time the four French
ships in the Bay got under way and easily joined the rear of their
fleet, it having the weather-gage. The French were thus 24 to 18.
As their shot were passing over the British, the latter now began
to reply. At noon Hood, finding that he could not close the enemy,
shortened sail to topsails and hove-to, hoping by this defiance to
bring them down to him. At 12.30 the French admiral was abreast of
the British flagship, and the action became general, but at too long
range. "Never, I believe," wrote Hood, "was more powder and shot
thrown away in one day before." The French continuing to stand on,
Hood filled his sails again at 1 P.M., as their van had stretched
beyond his.

As the leading ships, heading south, opened the channel between Santa
Lucia and Martinique, they got the breeze fresher, which caused them
to draw away from the centre. Hood, therefore, at 1.34 made the signal
for a close order, and immediately afterwards ceased firing, finding
not one in ten of the enemy's shot to reach. The engagement, however,
continued somewhat longer between the southern--van--ships, where, by
the account of Captain Sutherland, who was in that part of the line,
four of the British were attacked very smartly by eight of the French.
The _Centaur_, _Russell_, _Intrepid_, and _Shrewsbury_ appear to have
been the ships that suffered most heavily, either in hull, spars, or
crews. They were all in the van on the southern tack. The _Russell_,
having several shot between wind and water, was with difficulty kept
afloat, the water rising over the platform of the magazine. Hood sent
her off at nightfall to St. Eustatius, where she arrived on the 4th of
May, bringing Rodney the first news of the action, and of the numbers
of the French reinforcement. During the 30th Hood held his ground,
still endeavouring to get to windward of the enemy; but failing
in that attempt, and finding two of his squadron much disabled,
he decided at sunset to bear away to the northward, because to the
southward the westerly currents set so strong that the crippled ships
could not regain Santa Lucia. On the 11th of May, between St. Kitts
and Antigua, he joined Rodney, who, after hurried repairs to the
_Russell_, had left St. Eustatius on the 5th, with that ship, the
_Sandwich_, and the _Triumph_.

It is somewhat difficult to criticise positively the conduct of Hood
and of de Grasse in this affair. It is clear that Hood on the first
day seriously sought action, though his force was but three-fourths
that of his foe. He tried first to take the offensive, and, failing
that, to induce his enemy to attack frankly and decisively. Troude
is doubtless correct in saying that it was optional with de Grasse
to bring on a general engagement; and the writer finds himself in
agreement also with another French authority, Captain Chevalier,
that "Count de Grasse seems to have been too much preoccupied with
the safety of his convoy on the 29th, Admiral Hood having shown
himself much less circumspect on that day than he was on the next.
Notwithstanding our numerical superiority, Count de Grasse kept
near the land until all the convoy were safe." He represents Hood as
fencing cautiously on the following day, keeping on the field, but
avoiding a decisive encounter. This differs somewhat from the version
of Hood himself, who mentions signalling a general chase to windward
at 12.30 P.M. of the 30th. The two statements are not irreconcilable.
Hood having coppered ships, had the speed of the French, whose
vessels, being partly coppered and partly not, sailed unevenly. The
British commander consequently could afford to take risks, and he
therefore played with the enemy, watching for a chance. Hood was
an officer of exceptional capacity, much in advance of his time. He
thoroughly understood a watching game, and that an opportunity might
offer to seize an advantage over part of the enemy, if the eagerness
of pursuit, or any mishap, caused the French to separate. From
any dilemma that ensued, the reserve of speed gave him a power of
withdrawal, in relying upon which he was right. The present writer
adopts here also Chevalier's conclusion: "Admiral Hood evidently had
the very great advantage over his enemy of commanding a squadron of
coppered ships. Nevertheless, homage is due to his skill and to the
confidence shown by him in his captains. If some of his ships had
dropped behind through injuries received, he would have had to
sacrifice them, or to fight a superior force." This means that Hood
for an adequate gain ran a great risk; that he thoroughly understood
both the advantages and the disadvantages of his situation; and that
he acted not only with great skill, but warily and boldly,--a rare
combination. The British loss in this affair was 39 killed, including
Captain Nott, of the _Centaur_, and 162 wounded. The French loss is
given by Chevalier as 18 killed and 56 wounded; by Beatson, as 119
killed and 150 wounded.

Rodney, having collected his fleet, proceeded south, and on the 18th
of May put into Barbados for water. Much anxiety had been felt at
first for Santa Lucia, which Hood's retreat had uncovered. As was
feared, the French had attacked it at once, their fleet, with the
exception of one or two ships, going there, and twelve hundred troops
landing at Gros Ilet Bay; but the batteries on Pigeon Island, which
Rodney had erected and manned, kept them at arms' length. The works
elsewhere being found too strong, the attempt was abandoned.

At the same time, two French ships of the line and thirteen hundred
troops had sailed from Martinique against Tobago. When de Grasse
returned from the failure at Santa Lucia, he learned that the British
were at sea, apparently bound for Barbados. Alarmed for his detachment
before Tobago, he again sailed with the fleet for that island on the
25th of May, accompanied by three thousand more troops. Rodney learned
at Barbados of the attempt on Tobago, and on the 29th dispatched a
squadron of six sail of the line, under Rear-Admiral Francis Samuel
Drake, to support the defence. On the 30th he heard that the French
main fleet had been seen to windward of Santa Lucia, steering south,
evidently for Tobago. On the same day Drake and de Grasse encountered
one another off the latter island, the French being to leeward,
nearest the land. Drake necessarily retired, and on the morning of
June 3d was again off Barbados, whereupon Rodney at once sailed for
Tobago with the whole fleet. On the 4th the island was sighted, and
next morning information was received that it had capitulated on the
2d.

The two fleets returning north were in presence of one another on the
9th; but no engagement took place. Rodney, who was to windward, having
twenty sail to twenty-three,[93] was unwilling to attack unless he
could get a clear sea. The strength of the currents, he said, would
throw his fleet too far to leeward, in case of reverse, into the foul
ground between St. Vincent and Grenada, thus exposing Barbados, which
had not recovered sufficiently from the hurricane to stand alone. He
therefore put into Barbados. De Grasse went to Martinique to prepare
the expedition to the American continent, which resulted in the
surrender of Cornwallis at Yorktown. On the 5th of July he sailed from
Fort Royal taking with him the "trade" for France, and on the 26th
anchored with it at Cap Francois in Haiti, where he found a division
of four ships of the line which had been left the year before by de
Guichen. There also was a frigate, which had left Boston on the 20th
of June, and by which De Grasse received dispatches from Washington,
and from Rochambeau, the general commanding the French troops in
America. These acquainted him with the state of affairs on the
continent, and requested that the fleet should come to either the
Chesapeake or New York, to strike a decisive blow at the British power
in one quarter or the other.

[Footnote 91: This latter is applied to vessels, usually ships of war,
which are used as transports or supply ships, and therefore carry only
a part of their normal battery.]

[Footnote 92: Rodney said that Hood "lay-to" for the night. This is
antecedently incredible of an officer of Hood's character, and is
expressly contradicted by Captain Sutherland of the _Russell_. "At 6
P.M. (of the 28th) our fleet tacked to the north, and _kept moving_
across the bay (Fort Royal) for the right (_sic_), in line of battle."
Ekins, "Naval Battles," p. 136. The word "right" is evidently a
misprint for "night." Rodney's criticisms seem to the author captious
throughout.]

[Footnote 93: One French ship had left the fleet, disabled.]

CHAPTER X

NAVAL OPERATIONS PRECEDING AND DETERMINING THE FALL OF YORKTOWN.
CORNWALLIS SURRENDERS

1781

Having now brought the major naval transactions in the West Indies
to the eve of the great events which determined the independence of
the American States, it is expedient here to resume the thread of
operations, both sea and land, on the American continent, so as to
bring these also up to the same decisive moment, when the military
and naval blended and in mutual support forced the surrender of the
British army at Yorktown under Lord Cornwallis.

It has been said that, to support the operations of Cornwallis in the
Carolinas, Clinton had begun a series of diversions in the valley
of the James River.[94] The first detachment so sent, under General
Leslie, had been transferred speedily to South Carolina, to meet the
exigencies of Cornwallis's campaign. The second, of sixteen hundred
troops under Benedict Arnold, left New York at the end of December,
and began its work on the banks of the James at the end of January,
1781. It advanced to Richmond, nearly a hundred miles from the sea,
wasting the country round about, and finding no opposition adequate to
check its freedom of movement. Returning down stream, on the 20th
it occupied Portsmouth, south of the James River; near the sea, and
valuable as a naval station.

Washington urged Commodore des Touches, who by de Ternay's death had
been left in command of the French squadron at Newport, to interrupt
these proceedings, by dispatching a strong detachment to Chesapeake
Bay; and he asked Rochambeau also to let some troops accompany the
naval division, to support the scanty force which he himself could
spare to Virginia. It happened, however, that a gale of wind just then
had inflicted severe injury upon Arbuthnot's squadron, three of which
had gone to sea from Gardiner's Bay upon a report that three French
ships of the line had left Newport to meet an expected convoy. One
seventy-four, the _Bedford_, was wholly dismasted; another, the
_Culloden_, drove ashore on Long Island and was wrecked. The French
ships had returned to port the day before the gale, but the incident
indisposed des Touches to risk his vessels at sea at that time. He
sent only a sixty-four, with two frigates. These left Newport on
February 9th, and entered the Chesapeake, but were unable to reach
the British vessels, which, being smaller, withdrew up the Elizabeth
River. Arbuthnot, hearing of this expedition, sent orders to some
frigates off Charleston to go to the scene. The French division, when
leaving the Bay, met one of these, the _Romulus_, 44, off the Capes,
captured her, and returned to Newport on February 25th. On the 8th
of March, Arnold reported to Clinton that the Chesapeake was clear of
French vessels.

On the same day Arbuthnot also was writing to Clinton, from Gardiner's
Bay, that the French were evidently preparing to quit Newport. His
utmost diligence had failed as yet to repair entirely the damage done
his squadron by the storm, but on the 9th it was ready for sea. On the
evening of the 8th the French had sailed. On the 10th Arbuthnot knew
it, and, having taken the precaution to move down to the entrance of
the bay, he was able to follow at once. On the 13th he spoke a vessel
which had seen the enemy and gave him their course. Favoured by a
strong north-west wind, and his ships being coppered, he outstripped
the French, only three of which had coppered bottoms. At 6 A.M. of
March 16th a British frigate reported that the enemy were astern--to
the north-east--about a league distant, a thick haze preventing the
squadron from seeing them even at that distance (A, A). Cape Henry,
the southern point of the entrance to the Chesapeake, then bore
southwest by west, distant forty miles. The wind as stated by
Arbuthnot was west; by the French, south-west.

The British admiral at once went about, steering in the direction
reported, and the opposing squadrons soon sighted one another. The
French finding the British between them and their port, hauled to the
wind, which between 8 and 9 shifted to north by west, putting them
to windward. Some preliminary manoeuvres then followed, both parties
seeking the weather-gage. The weather remained thick and squally,
often intercepting the view; and the wind continued to shift until
towards noon, when it settled at north-east. The better sailing, or
the better seamanship, of the British had enabled them to gain so
far upon their opponents that at 1 P.M. they were lying nearly up in
their wake, on the port tack, overhauling them; both squadrons in line
of battle, heading east-south-east, the French bearing from their
pursuers east by south,--one point on the weather bow (B, B). The
wind was rising with squalls, so that the ships lay over well to their
canvas, and the sea was getting big.

As the enemy now was threatening his rear, and had the speed to
overtake, des Touches felt it necessary to resort to the usual parry
to such a thrust, by wearing his squadron and passing on the other
tack. This could be done either together, reversing the order of the
ships, or in succession, preserving the natural order; depending much
upon the distance of the enemy. Having room enough, des Touches
chose the latter, but, as fighting was inevitable, he decided also to
utilise the manoeuvre by surrendering the weather-gage, and passing to
leeward. The advantage of this course was that, with the existing sea
and wind, and the inclination of the ships, the party that had the
opponent on his weather side could open the lower-deck ports and use
those guns. There was thus a great increase of battery power, for the
lower guns were the heaviest. Des Touches accordingly put his helm up,
his line passing in succession to the southward (c) across the head
of the advancing British column, and then hauling up so as to run
parallel to the latter, to leeward, with the wind four points free.

[Illustration]

Arbuthnot accepted the position offered, stood on as he was until
nearly abreast of the French, and at 2 P.M. made the signal to wear.
It does not appear certainly how this was executed; but from the
expression in the official report, "the van of the squadron wore in
the line," and from the fact that the ships which led in the attack
were those which were leading on the port tack,--the tack before
the signal was made,--it seems likely that the movement was made in
succession (a). The whole squadron then stood down into action, but
with the customary result. The ships in the van and centre were all
engaged by 2.30, so Arbuthnot states; but the brunt of the engagement
had already fallen upon the three leading vessels, which got the first
raking fire, and, as is also usual, came to closer action than those
which followed them (C). They therefore not only lost most heavily
in men, but also were so damaged aloft as to be crippled. The British
Vice-Admiral, keeping the signal for the line flying, and not hoisting
that for close action, appears to have caused a movement of indecision
in the squadron,--an evidence again of the hold which the line then
still had upon men's minds. Of this des Touches cleverly availed
himself, by ordering his van ships, which so far had borne the brunt,
to keep away together and haul up on the other tack (e), while the
ships behind them were to wear in succession; that is, in column,
one following the other. The French column then filed by the three
disabled British vessels (d), gave them their broadsides one by one,
and then hauled off to the eastward, quitting the field (D). Arbuthnot
made signal to wear in pursuit, but the _Robust_ and _Prudent_, two
of the van ships, were now wholly unmanageable from the concentration
of fire upon them caused by des Touches's last movement; and the
maintopsail yard of the _London_, the only British three-decker, had
been shot away. The chase therefore was abandoned, and the squadron
put into Chesapeake Bay, for which the wind was fair (D). The French
returned to Newport. The respective losses in men were: British, 30
killed, 73 wounded; French, 72 killed, 112 wounded.

In this encounter, both sides had eight ships in line, besides smaller
craft. The advantage in force was distinctly with the British, who
had one three-decked ship, three 74's, three 64's, and a 50; while
the French had one 84, two 74's, four 64's, and the late British
_Romulus_, 44. Because of this superiority, probably, the action was
considered particularly discreditable by contemporaries; the more
so because several vessels did not engage closely,--a fault laid to
the British admiral's failure to make the signal for close action,
hauling down that for the line. This criticism is interesting, for
it indicates how men's minds were changing; and it shows also that
Arbuthnot had not changed, but still lived in the middle of the
century. The French commodore displayed very considerable tactical
skill; his squadron was handled neatly, quickly, and with precision.
With inferior force he carried off a decided advantage by sheer
intelligence and good management. Unluckily, he failed in resolution
to pursue his advantage. He probably could have controlled the
Chesapeake had he persisted.

His neglect to do so was justified by Commodore de Barras, who on the
10th of May arrived in Newport from France to command the squadron.
This officer, after pointing out the indisputable tactical success,
continued thus:--

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