A. T. Mahan - The Major Operations of the Navies in the War of American Independence

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[Illustration]

In conduct and courage, Arnold's behavior was excellent throughout.
Without enlarging upon the energy which created the flotilla, and
the breadth of view which suggested preparations that he could not
enforce, admiration is due to his recognition of the fact--implicit
in deed, if unexpressed in word--that the one use of the Navy was to
contest the control of the water; to impose delay, even if it could
not secure ultimate victory. No words could say more clearly than do
his actions that, under the existing conditions, the navy was useless,
except as it contributed to that end; valueless, if buried in port.
Upon this rests the merit of his bold advance into the lower narrows;
upon this his choice of the strong defensive position of Valcour;
upon this his refusal to retreat, as urged by Waterbury, when the full
force of the enemy was disclosed,--a decision justified, or rather,
illustrated, by the advantages which the accidents of the day threw
into his hands. His personal gallantry was conspicuous there as at
all times of his life. "His countrymen," said a generous enemy of that
day, "chiefly gloried in the dangerous attention which he paid to a
nice point of honour, in keeping his flag flying, and not quitting his
galley till she was in flames, lest the enemy should have boarded, and
struck it." It is not the least of the injuries done to his nation in
after years, that he should have silenced this boast and effaced this
glorious record by so black an infamy.

With the destruction of the flotilla ends the naval story of the Lakes
during the War of the American Revolution. Satisfied that it was too
late to proceed against Ticonderoga that year, Carleton withdrew
to St. John's and went into winter-quarters. The following year the
enterprise was resumed under General Burgoyne; but Sir William Howe,
instead of cooeperating by an advance up the Hudson, which was the plan
of 1776, carried his army to Chesapeake Bay, to act thence against
Philadelphia. Burgoyne took Ticonderoga and forced his way as far as
Saratoga, sixty miles from Ticonderoga and thirty from Albany, where
Howe should have met him. There he was brought to a stand by the army
which the Americans had collected, found himself unable to advance or
to retreat, and was forced to lay down his arms on October 17th, 1777.
The garrison left by him at Ticonderoga and Crown Point retired to
Canada, and the posts were re-occupied by the Americans. No further
contest took place on the Lake, though the British vessels remained
in control of it, and showed themselves from time to time up to 1781.
With the outbreak of war between Great Britain and France, in 1778,
the scene of maritime interest shifted to salt water, and there
remained till the end.

[Footnote 1: In customary representation of maps, North is upper,
and movement northward is commonly spoken of as up. It is necessary
therefore to bear in mind that the flow of water from Lake George to
the St. Lawrence, though northward, is _down_.]

[Footnote 2: Afterwards Captain of the Fleet (Chief of Staff) to
Rodney in his great campaign of 1782. _Post_, p. 222. He died a
Rear-Admiral and Baronet in 1789.]

[Footnote 3: Author's italics.]

[Footnote 4: _Remembrancer_, iv. 291.]

[Footnote 5: The radeau had six 24-pounders, six 12's, and two
howitzers; the gondola, seven 9-pounders. The particulars of armament
are from Douglas's letters.]

[Footnote 6: By American reports. Beatson gives the force sent out, in
the spring of 1776, as 13,357. ("Mil. and Nav. Memoirs," vi. 44.)]

[Footnote 7: Douglas's letters.]

[Footnote 8: Douglas thought that the appearance of the _Inflexible_
was a complete surprise; but Arnold had been informed that a third
vessel, larger than the schooners, was being set up. With a man of
his character, it is impossible to be sure, from his letters to his
superior, how much he knew, or what he withheld.]

[Footnote 9: called North Hero.]

[Footnote 10: Douglas's letter. The _Isis_ and the _Blonde_ were
vessels of the British squadron under Douglas, then lying in the St.
Lawrence. The officers named were temporarily on the lake service.]

[Footnote 11: Sandwich, First Lord of the Admiralty, to Pellew.]

[Footnote 12: Beatson, "Nav. and Mil. Memoirs," says two hours.]

[Footnote 13: Douglas's letters. The sentence is awkward, but
carefully compared with the copy in the author's hands. Douglas says,
of the details he gives, that "they have been collected with the most
scrupulous circumspection."]

[Footnote 14: _Post_, p. 205.]

CHAPTER II

NAVAL ACTION AT BOSTON, CHARLESTON, NEW YORK, AND NARRAGANSETT
BAY--ASSOCIATED LAND OPERATIONS UP TO THE BATTLE OF TRENTON

1776

The opening conflict between Great Britain and her North American
Colonies teaches clearly the necessity, too rarely recognised in
practice, that when a State has decided to use force, the force
provided should be adequate from the first. This applies with equal
weight to national policies when it is the intention of the nation to
maintain them at all costs. The Monroe Doctrine for instance is such
a policy; but unless constant adequate preparation is maintained also,
the policy itself is but a vain form of words. It is in preparation
beforehand, chiefly if not uniformly, that the United States has
failed. It is better to be much too strong than a little too weak.
Seeing the evident temper of the Massachusetts Colonists, force would
be needed to execute the Boston Port Bill and its companion measures
of 1774; for the Port Bill especially, naval force. The supplies for
1775 granted only 18,000 seamen,--2000 less than for the previous
year. For 1776, 28,000 seamen were voted, and the total appropriations
rose from L5,556,000 to L10,154,000; but it was then too late. Boston
was evacuated by the British army, 8000 strong on the 17th of March,
1776; but already, for more than half a year, the spreading spirit of
revolt in the thirteen Colonies had been encouraged by the sight
of the British army cooped up in the town, suffering from want
of necessaries, while the colonial army blockading it was able to
maintain its position, because ships laden with stores for the one
were captured, and the cargoes diverted to the use of the other. To
secure free and ample communications for one's self, and to interrupt
those of the opponent, are among the first requirements of war. To
carry out the measures of the British government a naval force
was needed, which not only should protect the approach of its own
transports to Boston Bay, but should prevent access to all coast ports
whence supplies could be carried to the blockading army. So far from
this, the squadron was not equal, in either number or quality, to the
work to be done about Boston; and it was not until October, 1775, that
the Admiral was authorized to capture colonial merchant vessels, which
therefore went and came unmolested, outside of Boston, carrying often
provisions which found their way to Washington's army.

After evacuating Boston, General Howe retired to Halifax, there to
await the coming of reinforcements, both military and naval, and of
his brother, Vice-Admiral Lord Howe, appointed to command the North
American Station. General Howe was commander-in-chief of the forces
throughout the territory extending from Nova Scotia to West Florida;
from Halifax to Pensacola. The first operation of the campaign was to
be the reduction of New York.

The British government, however, had several objects in view, and
permitted itself to be distracted from the single-minded prosecution
of one great undertaking to other subsidiary operations, not always
concentric. Whether the control of the line of the Hudson and Lake
Champlain ought to have been sought through operations beginning at
both ends, is open to argument; the facts that the Americans were back
in Crown Point in the beginning of July, 1776, and that Carleton's
13,000 men got no farther than St. John's that year, suggest that the
greater part of the latter force would have been better employed in
New York and New Jersey than about Champlain. However that may be, the
diversion to the Carolinas of a third body, respectable in point
of numbers, is scarcely to be defended on military grounds. The
government was induced to it by the expectation of local support from
royalists. That there were many of these in both Carolinas is
certain; but while military operations must take account of political
conditions, the latter should not be allowed to overbalance elementary
principles of the military art. It is said that General Howe
disapproved of this ex-centric movement.

The force destined for the Southern coasts assembled at Cork towards
the end of 1775, and sailed thence in January, 1776. The troops were
commanded by Lord Cornwallis, the squadron by Nelson's early patron,
Commodore Sir Peter Parker, whose broad pennant was hoisted on board
the _Bristol_, 50. After a boisterous passage, the expedition arrived
in May off Cape Fear in North Carolina, where it was joined by two
thousand men under Sir Henry Clinton, Cornwallis's senior, whom Howe
by the government's orders had detached to the southward in January.
Upon Clinton's appearance, the royalists in North Carolina had risen,
headed by the husband of Flora Macdonald, whose name thirty years
before had been associated romantically with the escape of the young
Pretender from Scotland. She had afterwards emigrated to America. The
rising, however, had been put down, and Clinton had not thought
it expedient to try a serious invasion, in face of the large force
assembled to resist him. Upon Parker's coming, it was decided to make
an attempt upon Charleston, South Carolina. The fleet therefore
sailed from Cape Fear on the 1st of June, and on the 4th anchored off
Charleston Bar.

Charleston Harbour opens between two of the sea-islands which fringe
the coasts of South Carolina and Georgia. On the north is Sullivan's
Island, on the south James Island. The bar of the main entrance was
not abreast the mouth of the port, but some distance south of it.
Inside the bar, the channel turned to the northward, and thence led
near Sullivan's Island, the southern end of which was therefore chosen
as the site of the rude fort hastily thrown up to meet this attack,
and afterwards called Fort Moultrie, from the name of the commander.
From these conditions, a southerly wind was needed to bring ships
into action. After sounding and buoying the bar, the transports
and frigates crossed on the 7th and anchored inside; but as it was
necessary to remove some of the _Bristol's_ guns, she could not follow
until the 10th. On the 9th Clinton had landed in person with five
hundred men, and by the 15th all the troops had disembarked upon Long
Island, next north of Sullivan's. It was understood that the inlet
between the two was fordable, allowing the troops to cooeperate with
the naval attack, by diversion or otherwise; but this proved to be a
mistake. The passage was seven feet deep at low water, and there were
no means for crossing; consequently a small American detachment in
the scrub wood of the island sufficed to check any movement in that
quarter. The fighting therefore was confined to the cannonading of the
fort by the ships.

Circumstances not fully explained caused the attack to be fixed
for the 23d; an inopportune delay, during which Americans were
strengthening their still very imperfect defences. On the 23d the wind
was unfavourable. On the 25th the _Experiment_, 50, arrived, crossed
the bar, and, after taking in her guns again, was ready to join in
the assault. On the 27th, at 10 A.M., the ships got under way with a
south-east breeze, but this shifted soon afterwards to north-west, and
they had to anchor again, about a mile nearer to Sullivan's Island. On
the following day the wind served, and the attack was made.

In plan, Fort Moultrie was square, with a bastion at each angle. In
construction, the sides were palmetto logs, dovetailed and bolted
together, laid in parallel rows, sixteen feet apart; the interspace
being filled with sand. At the time of the engagement, the south and
west fronts were finished; the other fronts were only seven feet
high, but surmounted by thick planks, to be tenable against escalade.
Thirty-one guns were in place, 18 and 9-pounders, of which twenty-one
were on the south face, commanding the channel. Within was a traverse
running east and west, protecting the gunners from shots from the
rear; but there was no such cover against enfilading fire, in case
an enemy's ship passed the fort and anchored above it. "The general
opinion before the action," Moultrie says, "and especially among
sailors, was that two frigates would be sufficient to knock the town
about our ears, notwithstanding our batteries." Parker may have shared
this impression, and it may account for his leisureliness. When the
action began, the garrison had but twenty-eight rounds for each of
twenty-six cannon, but this deficiency was unknown to the British.

[Illustration]

Parker's plan was that the two 50's, _Bristol_ and _Experiment_, and
two 28-gun frigates, the _Active_ and the _Solebay_, should engage the
main front; while two frigates of the same class, the _Actaeon_ and the
_Syren_, with a 20-gun corvette, the _Sphinx_, should pass the fort,
anchoring to the westward, up-channel, to protect the heavy vessels
against fire-ships, as well as to enfilade the principal American
battery. The main attack was to be further supported by a bomb-vessel,
the _Thunder_, accompanied by the armed transport _Friendship_, which
were to take station to the southeast of the east bastion of the
engaged front of the fort. The order to weigh was given at 10.30
A.M., when the flood-tide had fairly made; and at 11.15 the _Active_,
_Bristol_, _Experiment_, and _Solebay_, anchored in line ahead, in the
order named, the _Active_ to the eastward. These ships seem to have
taken their places skilfully without confusion, and their fire, which
opened at once, was rapid, well-sustained, and well-directed; but
their position suffered under the radical defect that, whether from
actual lack of water, or only from fear of grounding, they were too
far from the works to use grape effectively. The sides of ships being
much weaker than those of shore works, while their guns were much more
numerous, the secret of success was to get near enough to beat down
the hostile fire by a multitude of projectiles. The bomb-vessel
_Thunder_ anchored in the situation assigned her; but her shells,
though well aimed, were ineffective. "Most of them fell within the
fort," Moultrie reported, "but we had a morass in the middle, which
swallowed them instantly, and those that fell in the sand were
immediately buried." During the action the mortar bed broke, disabling
the piece.

Owing to the scarcity of ammunition in the fort, the garrison had
positive orders not to engage at ranges exceeding four hundred yards.
Four or five shots were thrown at the _Active_, while still under
sail, but with this exception the fort kept silence until the ships
anchored, at a distance estimated by the Americans to be three hundred
and fifty yards. The word was then passed along the platform, "Mind
the Commodore; mind the two 50-gun ships,"--an order which was
strictly obeyed, as the losses show. The protection of the work proved
to be almost perfect,--a fact which doubtless contributed to the
coolness and precision of fire vitally essential with such deficient
resources. The texture of the palmetto wood suffered the balls to sink
smoothly into it without splintering, so that the facing of the work
held well. At times, when three or four broadsides struck together,
the merlons shook so that Moultrie feared they would come bodily in;
but they withstood, and the small loss inflicted was chiefly through
the embrasures. The flagstaff being shot away, falling outside into
the ditch, a young sergeant, named Jasper, distinguished himself by
jumping after it, fetching back and rehoisting the colours under a
heavy fire.

In the squadron an equal gallantry was shown under circumstances which
made severe demands upon endurance. Whatever Parker's estimate of
the worth of the defences, no trace of vain-confidence appears in his
dispositions, which were thorough and careful, as the execution of
the main attack was skilful and vigorous; but the ships' companies,
expecting an easy victory, had found themselves confronted with a
resistance and a punishment as severe as were endured by the leading
ships at Trafalgar, and far more prolonged. Such conditions impose
upon men's tenacity the additional test of surprise and discomfiture.
The _Experiment_, though very small for a ship of the line, lost 23
killed and 56 wounded, out of a total probably not much exceeding 300;
while the _Bristol_, having the spring shot away, swung with her head
to the southward and her stern to the fort, undergoing for a long
time a raking fire to which she could make little reply. Three
several attempts to replace the spring were made by Mr. James
Saumarez,--afterwards the distinguished admiral, Lord de Saumarez,
then a midshipman,--before the ship was relieved from this grave
disadvantage. Her loss was 40 killed and 71 wounded; not a man
escaping of those stationed on the quarter-deck at the beginning of
the action. Among the injured was the Commodore himself, whose cool
heroism must have been singularly conspicuous, from the notice it
attracted in a service where such bearing was not rare. At one
time when the quarter-deck was cleared and he stood alone upon the
poop-ladder, Saumarez suggested to him to come down; but he replied,
smiling, "You want to get rid of me, do you?" and refused to move.
The captain of the ship, John Morris, was mortally wounded. With
commendable modesty Parker only reported himself as slightly bruised;
but deserters stated that for some days he needed the assistance of
two men to walk, and that his trousers had been torn off him by shot
or splinters. The loss in the other ships was only one killed, 14
wounded. The Americans had 37 killed and wounded.

The three vessels assigned to enfilade the main front of the fort did
not get into position. They ran on the middle ground, owing, Parker
reported, to the ignorance of the pilots. Two had fouled each other
before striking. Having taken the bottom on a rising tide, two floated
in a few hours, and retreated; but the third, the _Actaeon_, 28,
sticking fast, was set on fire and abandoned by her officers. Before
she blew up, the Americans boarded her, securing her colours, bell,
and some other trophies. "Had these ships effected their purpose,"
Moultrie reported, "they would have driven us from our guns."

The main division held its ground until long after nightfall, firing
much of the time, but stopping at intervals. After two hours it had
been noted that the fort replied very slowly, which was attributed to
its being overborne, instead of to the real cause, the necessity for
sparing ammunition. For the same reason it was entirely silent from
3.30 P.M. to 6, when fire was resumed from only two or three guns,
whence Parker surmised that the rest had been dismounted. The
Americans were restrained throughout the engagement by the fear of
exhausting entirely their scanty store.

"About 9 P.M.," Parker reported, "being very dark, great part of our
ammunition expended, the people fatigued, the tide of ebb almost
done, no prospect from the eastward (that is, from the army), and no
possibility of our being of any further service, I ordered the ships
to withdraw to their former moorings." Besides the casualties among
the crew, and severe damage to the hull, the _Bristol's_ mainmast,
with nine cannon-balls in it, had to be shortened, while the
mizzen-mast was condemned. The injury to the frigates was immaterial,
owing to the garrison's neglecting them.

The fight in Charleston Harbour, the first serious contest in which
ships took part in this war, resembles generically the battle of
Bunker's Hill, with which the regular land warfare had opened a year
before. Both illustrate the difficulty and danger of a front attack,
without cover, upon a fortified position, and the advantage conferred
even upon untrained men, if naturally cool, resolute, and intelligent,
not only by the protection of a work, but also, it may be urged, by
the recognition of a tangible line up to which to hold, and to abandon
which means defeat, dishonour, and disaster. It is much for untried
men to recognise in their surroundings something which gives the unity
of a common purpose, and thus the coherence which discipline imparts.
Although there was in Parker's dispositions nothing open to serious
criticism,--nothing that can be ascribed to undervaluing his
opponent,--and although, also, he had good reason to expect from the
army active cooeperation which he did not get, it is probable that he
was very much surprised, not only at the tenacity of the Americans'
resistance, but at the efficacy of their fire. He felt, doubtless,
the traditional and natural distrust--and, for the most part,
the justified distrust--with which experience and practice regard
inexperience. Some seamen of American birth, who had been serving in
the _Bristol_, deserted after the fight. They reported that her crew
said, "We were told the Yankees would not stand two fires, but we
never saw better fellows;" and when the fire of the fort slackened and
some cried, "They have done fighting," others replied, "By God, we are
glad of it, for we never had such a drubbing in our lives." "All the
common men of the fleet spoke loudly in praise of the garrison,"--a
note of admiration so frequent in generous enemies that we may be
assured that it was echoed on the quarter-deck also. They could afford
it well, for there was no stain upon their own record beyond the
natural mortification of defeat; no flinching under the severity of
their losses, although a number of their men were comparatively raw,
volunteers from the transports, whose crews had come forward almost
as one man when they knew that the complements of the ships were short
through sickness. Edmund Burke, a friend to both sides, was justified
in saying that "never did British valour shine more conspicuously,
nor did our ships in an engagement of the same nature experience
so serious an encounter." There were several death-vacancies for
lieutenants; and, as the battle of Lake Champlain gave Pellew his
first commission, so did that of Charleston Harbour give his to
Saumarez, who was made lieutenant of the _Bristol_ by Parker. Two
years later, when the ship had gone to Jamaica, he was followed on her
quarter-deck by Nelson and Collingwood, who also received promotion in
her from the same hand.

The attack on Fort Moultrie was not resumed. After necessary repairs,
the ships of war with the troops went to New York, where they
arrived on the 4th of August, and took part in the operations for the
reduction of that place under the direction of the two Howes.

* * * * *

The occupation of New York Harbour, and the capture of the city were
the most conspicuous British successes of the summer and fall of 1776.
While Parker and Clinton were meeting with defeat at Charleston, and
Arnold was hurrying the preparation of his flotilla on Champlain, the
two brothers, General Sir William Howe and the Admiral, Lord Howe,
were arriving in New York Bay, invested not only with the powers
proper to the commanders of great fleets and armies, but also with
authority as peace commissioners, to negotiate an amicable arrangement
with the revolted Colonies.

Sir William Howe had awaited for some time at Halifax the arrival of
the expected reinforcements, but wearying at last he sailed thence
on the 10th of June, 1776, with the army then in hand. On the 25th
he himself reached Sandy Hook, the entrance to New York Bay, having
preceded the transports in a frigate. On the 29th, the day after
Parker's repulse at Fort Moultrie, the troops arrived; and on July 3d,
the date on which Arnold, retreating from Canada, reached Crown Point,
the British landed on Staten Island, which is on the west side of the
lower Bay. On the 12th came in the _Eagle_, 64, carrying the flag of
Lord Howe. This officer was much esteemed by the Americans for his own
personal qualities, and for his attitude towards them in the present
dispute, as well as for the memory of his brother, who had endeared
himself greatly to them in the campaign of 1758, when he had fallen
near Lake Champlain; but the decisive step of declaring their
independence had been taken already, on July 4th, eight days before
the Admiral's arrival. A month was spent in fruitless attempts to
negotiate with the new government, without recognising any official
character in its representatives. During that time, however, while
abstaining from decisive operations, cruisers were kept at sea
to intercept American traders, and the Admiral, immediately upon
arriving, sent four vessels of war twenty-five miles up the Hudson
River, as far as Tarrytown. This squadron was commanded by Hyde
Parker, afterwards, in 1801, Nelson's commander-in-chief at
Copenhagen. The service was performed under a tremendous cannonade
from all the batteries on both shores, but the ships could not
be stopped. Towards the middle of August it was evident that the
Americans would not accept any terms in the power of the Howes to
offer, and it became necessary to attempt coercion by arms.

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