George Stuart Fullerton - An Introduction to Philosophy

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Unhappily, men too often believe that, when they have come into the
possession of a new word or phrase, they have gained a new thought.
The danger is great in proportion to the breadth of the gulf which
separates the new dialect from the old language of common life in which
we are accustomed to estimate things. Many a philosopher would be
bereft, indeed, were he robbed of his vocabulary and compelled to
express his thoughts in ordinary speech. The theories which are
implicit in certain recurring expressions would be forced to come out
into the open, and stand criticism without disguise.

But can one write philosophical books without using words which are not
in common use among the unphilosophic? I doubt it. Some such words it
seems impossible to avoid. However, it does seem possible to bear in
mind the dangers of a special philosophical terminology and to reduce
such words to a minimum.

Finally, we may appeal to the humanity of the philosopher. The path to
reflection is a sufficiently difficult one as it is; why should he roll
rocks upon it and compel those who come after him to climb over them?
If truths are no truer for being expressed in a repellent form, why
should he trick them out in a fantastic garb? What we want is the
naked truth, and we lose time and patience in freeing our mummy from
the wrappings in which learned men have seen fit to encase it.

93. DO NOT HASTILY ACCEPT A DOCTRINE.--This brings me to the last of
the maxims which I urge upon the attention of the reader. All that has
been said so far may be regarded as leading up to it.

The difficulty that confronts us is this: On the one hand, we must
recognize the uncertainty that reigns in this field of investigation.
We must ever weigh probabilities and possibilities; we do not find
ourselves in the presence of indubitable truths which all competent
persons stand ready to admit. This seems to argue that we should learn
to suspend judgment, and should be most wary in our acceptance of one
philosophical doctrine and our rejection of another.

On the other hand, philosophy is not a mere matter of intellectual
curiosity. It has an intimate connection with life. As a man thinks,
so is he, to a great extent, at least. How, then, can one afford to
remain critical and negative? To counsel this seems equivalent to
advising that one abandon the helm and consent to float at the mercy of
wind and tide.

The difficulty is a very real one. It presents itself insistently to
those who have attained to that degree of intellectual development at
which one begins to ask oneself questions and to reflect upon the worth
and meaning of life. An unreflective adherence to tradition no longer
satisfies such persons. They wish to know why they should believe in
this or that doctrine, and why they should rule their lives in harmony
with this or that maxim. Shall we advise them to lay hold without
delay of a set of philosophical tenets, as we might advise a disabled
man to aid himself with any staff that happens to come to hand? Or
shall we urge them to close their eyes to the light, and to go back
again to the old unreflective life?

Neither of these counsels seems satisfactory, for both assume tacitly
that it does not much matter what the _truth_ is, and that we can
afford to disregard it.

Perhaps we may take a suggestion from that prudent man and acute
philosopher, Descartes. Discontented with the teachings of the schools
as they had been presented to him, he resolved to set out upon an
independent voyage of discovery, and to look for a philosophy of his
own. It seemed necessary to him to doubt, provisionally at least, all
that he had received from the past. But in what house should he live
while he was reconstructing his old habitation? Without principles of
some sort he could not live, and without reasonable principles he could
not live well. So he framed a set of provisional rules, which should
guide his life until he had new ground beneath his feet.

When we examine these rules, we find that, on the whole, they are such
as the experience of mankind has found prudent and serviceable. In
other words, we discover that Descartes, until he was in a position to
see clearly for himself, was willing to be led by others. He was a
unit in the social order, and he recognized that truth.

It does not seem out of place to recall this fact to the consciousness
of those who are entering upon the reflective life. Those who are
rather new to reflection upon philosophical matters are apt to seize
single truths, which are too often half-truths, and to deduce their
consequences remorselessly. They do not always realize the extreme
complexity of society, or see the full meaning of the relations in
which they stand to the state and to the church. Breadth of view can
only come with an increase of knowledge and with the exercise of
reflection.

For this reason I advise patience, and a willingness to accept the
established order of things until one is very sure that one has
attained to some truth--some real truth, not a mere truth of
election--which may serve as the basis of a reconstruction. The first
glimpses of truth cannot be depended upon to furnish such a foundation.

Thus, we may suspend judgment, and, nevertheless, be ready to act. But
is not this a mere compromise? Certainly. All life is a compromise;
and in the present instance it means only that we should keep our eyes
open to the light, whatever its source, and yet should nourish that
wholesome self-distrust that prevents a man from being an erratic and
revolutionary creature, unmindful of his own limitations. Prudent men
in all walks in life make this compromise, and the world is the better
for it.

NOTES

CHAPTER I, sections 1-5. If the student will take a good history of
philosophy, and look over the accounts of the different systems
referred to, he will see the justice of the position taken in the text,
namely, that philosophy was formerly synonymous with universal
knowledge. It is not necessary, of course, to read the whole history
of philosophy to attain this end. One may take such a text-book as
Ueberweg's "History of Philosophy," and run over the summaries
contained in the large print. To see how the conception of what
constitutes universal knowledge changed in successive ages, compare
Thales, the Sophists, Aristotle, the Schoolmen, Bacon, and Descartes.
For the ancient philosophy one may consult Windelband's "History of the
Ancient Philosophy," a clear and entertaining little work (English
translation, N.Y., 1899).

In Professor Paulsen's "Introduction to Philosophy" (English
translation, N.Y., 1895), there is an interesting introductory chapter
on "The Nature and Import of Philosophy" (pp. 1-41). The author pleads
for the old notion of philosophy as universal knowledge, though he does
not, of course, mean that the philosopher must be familiar with all the
details of all the sciences.

Section 6. In justification of the meaning given to the word
"philosophy" in this section, I ask the reader to look over the list of
courses in philosophy advertised in the catalogues of our leading
universities at home and abroad. There is a certain consensus of
opinion as to what properly comes under the title, even among those who
differ widely as to what is the proper definition of philosophy.

CHAPTER II, sections 7-10. Read the chapter on "The Mind and the World
in Common Thought and in Science" (Chapter I) in my "System of
Metaphysics," N.Y., 1904.

One can be brought to a vivid realization of the fact that the sciences
proceed upon a basis of assumptions which they do not attempt to
analyze and justify, if one will take some elementary work on
arithmetic or geometry or psychology and examine the first few
chapters, bearing in mind what philosophical problems may be drawn from
the materials there treated. Section 11. The task of reflective
thought and its difficulties are treated in the chapter entitled "How
Things are Given in Consciousness" (Chapter III), in my "System of
Metaphysics."

CHAPTER III, sections 12-13. Read "The Inadequacy of the Psychological
Standpoint," "System of Metaphysics," Chapter II. I call especial
attention to the illustration of "the man in the cell" (pp. 18 ff.).
It would be a good thing to read these pages with the class, and to
impress upon the students the fact that those who have doubted or
denied the existence of the external material world have, if they have
fallen into error, fallen into a very natural error, and are not
without some excuse.

Section 14. See "The Metaphysics of the Telephone Exchange," "System
of Metaphysics," Chapter XXII, where Professor Pearson's doctrine is
examined at length, with quotations and references.

It is interesting to notice that a doubt of the external world has
always rested upon some sort of a "telephone exchange" argument;
naturally, it could not pass by that name before the invention of the
telephone, but the reasoning is the same. It puts the world at one
remove, shutting the mind up to the circle of its ideas; and then it
doubts or denies the world, or, at least, holds that its existence must
be proved in some roundabout way. Compare Descartes, "Of the Existence
of Material Things," "Meditations," VI.

CHAPTER IV, sections 15-18. See Chapters VI and VII, "What we mean by
the External World," and "Sensations and 'Things,'" in my "System of
Metaphysics." In that work the discussion of the distinction between
the objective order of experience and the subjective order is completed
in Chapter XXIII, "The Distinction between the World and the Mind."
This was done that the subjective order might be treated in the part of
the book which discusses the mind and its relation to matter.

As it is possible that the reader may be puzzled by differences of
expression which obtain in the two books, a word of explanation is not
out of place.

In the "Metaphysics," for example, it is said that sensations so
connect themselves together as to form what we call the system of
material things (p. 105). It is intimated in a footnote that this is a
provisional statement and the reader is referred to later chapters.
Now, in the present book (sections 16-17), it is taught that we may not
call material things groups of sensations.

The apparent contradiction is due to the fact that, in this volume, the
full meaning of the word "sensation" is exhibited at the outset, and
sensations, as phenomena of the subjective order, are distinguished
from the phenomena of the objective order which constitute the external
world. In the earlier work the word "sensation" was for a while used
loosely to cover all our experiences that do not belong to the class
called imaginary, and the distinction between the subjective and
objective in this realm was drawn later (Chapter XXIII).

I think the present arrangement is the better one, as it avoids from
the outset the suggestion that the real world is something
subjective--our sensations or ideas--and thus escapes the idealistic
flavor which almost inevitably attaches to the other treatment, until
the discussion is completed, at least.

CHAPTER V, sections 10-21. See Chapters VIII and IX, "System of
Metaphysics," "The Distinction between Appearance and Reality" and "The
Significance of the Distinction."

Section 22. See Chapter XXVI, "The World as Unperceived, and the
'Unknowable,'" where Spencer's doctrine is examined at length, and
references are given. I think it is very important that the student
should realize that the "Unknowable" is a perfectly useless assumption
in philosophy, and can serve no purpose whatever.

CHAPTER VI, sections 23-25. See Chapters X and XI, "System of
Metaphysics," "The Kantian Doctrine of Space" and "Difficulties
connected with the Kantian Doctrine of Space."

It would be an excellent thing for the student, after he has read the
above chapters, to take up Kant's "Critique of Pure Reason," and read
and analyze the argument of Antinomies I and II, with the Observations
appended. One can understand these arguments without being familiar
with the "Critique" as a whole; at any rate, the account of Kant's
philosophy contained in section 51 of this book will serve to explain
his use of certain terms, such as "the laws of our sensibility."

Kant's reasonings are very curious and interesting in this part of his
book. It seems to be proved that the world must be endless in space
and without a beginning or end in time, and just as plausibly proved
that it cannot be either. It seems to be proved that finite spaces and
times are infinitely divisible, and at the same time that they cannot
be infinitely divisible. The situation is an amusing one, and rendered
not the less amusing by the seriousness with which the mutually
destructive arguments are taken.

When the student meets such a tangle in the writings of any
philosopher, I ask him to believe that it is not the human reason that
is at fault--at least, let him not assume that it is. The fault
probably lies with a human reason.

Section 26. See Chapter XII, "The Berkeleian Doctrine of Space," in my
"System of Metaphysics." The argument ought not to be difficult to one
who has mastered Chapter V of this volume.

CHAPTER VII, sections 27-29. Compare Chapter XIII, "System of
Metaphysics," "Of Time."

With the chapters on Space and Time it would be well for the student to
read Chapter XIV, "The Real World in Space and Time," where it is made
clear why we have no hesitation in declaring space and time to be
infinite, although we recognize that it seems to be an assumption of
knowledge to declare the material world infinite.

CHAPTER VIII, sections 30-32. Read, in the "System of Metaphysics,"
Chapters V and XVII, "The Self or Knower" and "The Atomic Self."

Section 33. The suggestions, touching the attitude of the psychologist
toward the mind, contained in the preface to Professor William James's
"Psychology" are very interesting and instructive.

CHAPTER IX, sections 35-36. For a strong argument in favor of
interactionism see James's "Psychology," Chapter V. I wish the student
would, in reading it, bear in mind what is said in my chapter on "The
Atomic Self," above referred to. The subject should be approached with
an open mind, and one should suspend judgment until both sides have
been heard from.

Section 37. Descartes held that the lower animals are automata and
that their actions are not indicative of consciousness; he regarded
their bodies as machines lacking the soul in the "little pineal gland."
Professor Huxley revived the doctrine of animal automatism and extended
it so as to include man. He regarded consciousness as a "collateral
product" of the working of the body, related to it somewhat as is the
steam-whistle of a locomotive engine to the working of the machine. He
made it an effect, but not a cause, of motions. See "System of
Metaphysics," Chapter XVIII, "The Automaton Theory: its Genesis."

We owe the doctrine of parallelism, in its original form, to Spinoza.
It was elaborated by W. K. Clifford, and to him the modern interest in
the subject is largely due. The whole subject is discussed at length
in my "System of Metaphysics," Chapters XIX-XXI. The titles are: "The
Automaton Theory: Parallelism," "What is Parallelism?" and "The Man and
the Candlestick." Clifford's doctrine is presented in a new form in
Professor Strong's recent brilliant work, "Why the Mind has a Body"
N.Y., 1903.

Section 38. See "System of Metaphysics," Chapter XXIV, "The Time and
Place of Sensations and Ideas."

CHAPTER X, sections 40-42. See "System of Metaphysics," Chapters XXVII
and XXVIII, "The Existence of Other Minds," and "The Distribution of
Minds."

Writers seem to be divided into three camps on this question of other
minds.

(1) I have treated our knowledge of other minds as due to an inference.
This is the position usually taken.

(2) We have seen that Huxley and Clifford cast doubts upon the validity
of the inference, but, nevertheless, made it. Professor Strong, in the
work mentioned in the notes to the previous chapter, maintains that it
is not an inference, and that we do not directly perceive other minds,
but that we are assured of their existence just the same. He makes our
knowledge an "intuition" in the old-fashioned sense of the word, a
something to be accepted but not to be accounted for.

(3) Writers who have been influenced more or less by the Neo-Kantian or
Neo-Hegelian doctrine are apt to speak as though we had the same direct
evidence of the existence of other minds that we have of the existence
of our own. I have never seen a systematic and detailed exposition of
this doctrine. It appears rather in the form of hints dropped in
passing. A number of such are to be found in Taylor's "Elements of
Metaphysics."

Section 43. The "Mind-stuff" doctrine is examined at length and its
origin discussed in Chapter XXXI of the "System of Metaphysics,"
"Mental Phenomena and the Causal Nexus." It is well worth while for
the student to read the whole of Clifford's essay "On the Nature of
Things-in-themselves," even if he is pressed for time.

CHAPTER XI, section 44. See "System of Metaphysics," Chapter XV, "The
World as Mechanism."

Section 45. See Chapter XXXI, "The Place of Mind in Nature."

Section 46. For a definition of Fatalism, and a description of its
difference from the scientific doctrine of Determinism, see Chapter
XXXIII, "Fatalism, 'Freewill' and Determinism." For a vigorous defense
of "Freewill" (which is not, in my opinion, free will at all, in the
common acceptation of the word) see Professor James's Essay on "The
Dilemma of the Determinist," in his volume, "The Will to Believe."

Fatalism and Determinism are constantly confused, and much of the
opposition to Determinism is attributable to this confusion.

Section 47. See Chapter XXXII, "Mechanism and Teleology."

CHAPTER XII, section 48. The notes to Chapter III (see above) are in
point here. It is well worth the student's while to read the whole of
Chapter XI, Book IV, of Locke's "Essay." It is entitled "Of our
Knowledge of the Existence of Other Things." Notice the headings of
some of his sections:--

Section 1. "It is to be had only by sensation."

Section 2. "Instance whiteness of this paper."

Section 3. "This, though not so certain as demonstration, yet may be
called 'Knowledge,' and proves the existence of things without us."

Locke's argument proceeds, as we have seen, on the assumption that we
perceive external things directly,--an assumption into which he slips
unawares,--and yet he cannot allow that we really do perceive directly
what is external. This makes him uncomfortably conscious that he has
not absolute proof, after all. The section that closes the discussion
is entitled: "Folly to expect demonstration in everything."

Section 49. I wish that I could believe that every one of my readers
would sometime give himself the pleasure of reading through Berkeley's
"Principles of Human Knowledge" and his "Three Dialogues between Hylas
and Philonous." Clearness of thought, beauty of style, and elevation
of sentiment characterize them throughout.

The "Principles" is a systematic treatise. If one has not time to read
it all, one can get a good idea of the doctrine by running through the
first forty-one sections. For brief readings in class, to illustrate
Berkeley's reasoning, one may take sections 1-3, 14, 18-20, and 38.

The "Dialogues" is a more popular work. As the etymology of the names
in the title suggests, we have in it a dispute between a man who pins
his faith to matter and an idealist. The aim of the book is to confute
skeptics and atheists from the standpoint of idealism.

For Hume's treatment of the external world, see his "Treatise of Human
Nature," Part IV, section 2. For his treatment of the mind, see Part
IV, section 6.

Section 50. Reid repeats himself a great deal, for he gives us
asseveration rather than proof. One can get the gist of his argument
by reading carefully a few of his sections. It would be a good
exercise to read in class, if time permitted, the two sections of his
"Inquiry" entitled "Of Extension" (Chapter V, section 5), and "Of
Perception in General" (Chapter VI, section 20).

Section 51. For an account of the critical Philosophy, see
Falckenberg's "History of Modern Philosophy" (English translation,
N.Y., 1893). Compare with this the accounts in the histories of
philosophy by Ueberweg and Hoeffding (English translation of the latter,
London, 1900). Full bibliographies are to be found especially in
Ueberweg.

It is well to look at the philosophy of Kant through more than one pair
of eyes. Thus, if one reads Morris's "Kant's Critique of Pure Reason"
(Chicago, 1882), one should read also Sidgwick's "Lectures on the
Philosophy of Kant" (N.Y., 1905).

CHAPTER XIII, section 52. It is difficult to see how Hamilton could
regard himself as a "natural" realist (the word is employed by him).
See his "Lectures on Metaphysics," VIII, where he develops his
doctrine. He seems to teach, in spite of himself, that we can know
directly only the impressions that things make on us, and must infer
all else: "Our whole knowledge of mind and matter is, thus, only
relative; of existence, absolutely and in itself, we know nothing."

Whom may we regard as representing the three kinds of "hypothetical
realism" described in the text? Perhaps we may put the plain man, who
has not begun to reflect, in the first class. John Locke is a good
representative of the second; see the "Essay concerning Human
Understanding," Book II, Chapter VIII. Herbert Spencer belonged to the
third while he wrote Chapter V of his "First Principles of Philosophy."

Section 53. I have said enough of the Berkeleian idealism in the notes
on Chapter XII. As a good illustration of objective idealism in one of
its forms I may take the doctrine of Professor Royce; see his address,
"The Conception of God" (N.Y., 1902).

Mr. Bradley's doctrine is criticised in Chapter XXXIV (entitled "Of
God"), "System of Metaphysics."

CHAPTER XIV, section 55. See "System of Metaphysics," Chapter XVI,
"The Insufficiency of Materialism."

Section 56. Professor Strong's volume, "Why the Mind has a Body"
(N.Y., 1903), advocates a panpsychism much like that of Clifford. It
is very clearly written, and with Clifford's essay on "The Nature of
Things-in-themselves," ought to give one a good idea of the
considerations that impel some able men to become panpsychists.

Section 57. The pantheistic monism of Spinoza is of such importance
historically that it is desirable to obtain a clear notion of its
meaning. I have discussed this at length in two earlier works: "The
Philosophy of Spinoza" (N.Y., 1894) and "On Spinozistic Immortality."
The student is referred to the account of Spinoza's "God or Substance"
contained in these. See, especially, the "Introductory Note" in the
back of the first-mentioned volume.

Professor Royce is a good illustration of the idealistic monist; see
the volume referred to in the note above (section 53). His "Absolute,"
or God, is conceived to be an all-inclusive mind of which our finite
minds are parts.

Section 58. Sir William Hamilton's dualism is developed in his
"Lectures on Metaphysics," VIII. He writes: "Mind and matter, as known
or knowable, are only two different series of phenomena or qualities;
as unknown and unknowable, they are the two substances in which these
two different series of phenomena or qualities are supposed to inhere.
The existence of an unknown substance is only an inference we are
compelled to make, from the existence of known phenomena; and the
distinction of two substances is only inferred from the seeming
incompatibility of the two series of phenomena to coinhere in one."

CHAPTER XV, section 60. The reader will find Descartes's path traced
in the "Meditations." In I, we have his sweeping doubt; in II, his
doctrine as to the mind; in III, the existence of God is established;
in VI, he gets around to the existence of the external world. We find
a good deal of the "natural light" in the first part of his "Principles
of Philosophy."

Section 61. We have an excellent illustration of Locke's inconsistency
in violating his own principles and going beyond experience, in his
treatment of "Substance." Read, in his "Essay," Book I, Chapter IV,
section 18, and Book II, Chapter XXIII, section 4. These sections are
not long, and might well be read and analyzed in class.

Section 62. See the note to section 51.

Section 64. I write this note (in 1908) to give the reader some idea
of later developments of the doctrine called pragmatism. There has
been a vast amount printed upon the subject in the last two or three
years, but I am not able to say even yet that we have to do with "a
clear-cut doctrine, the limits and consequences of which have been
worked out in detail." Hence, I prefer to leave section 64 as I first
wrote it, merely supplementing it here.

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