George Stuart Fullerton - An Introduction to Philosophy

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We may fairly consider the three leaders of the pragmatic movement to
be Professor William James, Dr. F. C. S. Schiller, and Professor John
Dewey. The first has developed his doctrine at length in his volume
entitled "Pragmatism" (London, 1907); the second, who calls his
doctrine "Humanism," but declares himself a pragmatist, and in
essential agreement with Professor James, has published two volumes of
philosophical essays entitled "Humanism" (London, 1903) and "Studies in
Humanism" (London, 1907); the third has developed his position in the
first four chapters of the "Studies in Logical Theory" (Chicago, 1903).

Professor James, in his "Pragmatism" (Lecture II), says that
pragmatism, at the outset, at least, stands for no particular results.
It has no dogmas, and no doctrines save its method. This method means:

"The attitude of looking away from first things, principles,
'categories,' supposed necessities; and of looking towards last things,
fruits, consequences, facts." He remarks further, however, that
pragmatism has come to be used also in a wider sense, as signifying a
certain theory of truth (pp. 54-55). This theory is brought forward in
Lecture VI.

The theory maintains that: "True ideas are those that we can
assimilate, validate, corroborate, and verify. False ideas are those
that we can not" (p. 201). This sounds as though Professor James
abandoned his doctrine touching the Turk and the Christian mentioned in
section 64.

But what do the words "verification" and "validation" pragmatically
mean? We are told that they signify certain practical consequences of
the verified and validated idea. Our ideas may be said to "agree" with
reality when they lead us, through acts and other ideas which they
instigate, up to or towards other parts of experience with which we
feel that the original ideas remain in agreement. "The connections and
transitions come to us from point to point as being progressive,
harmonious, satisfactory. This function of agreeable leading is what
we mean by an idea's verification" (p. 202).

Thus, we do not seem to be concerned with verification in the sense in
which the word has usually been employed heretofore. The tendency to
take as true what is useful or serviceable has not been abandoned.
That Professor James does not really leave his Turk in the lurch
becomes clear to any one who will read his book attentively and note
his reasons for taking the various pragmatic attitudes which he does
take. See, for example, his pragmatic argument for "free-will." The
doctrine is simply assumed as a doctrine of "relief" (pp. 110-121).

Briefly stated, Dr. Schiller's doctrine is that truths are man-made,
and that it is right for man to consult his desires in making them. It
is in substantial harmony with the pragmatism of Professor James, and I
shall not dwell upon it. Dr. Schiller's essays are very entertainingly
written.

Professor Dewey's pragmatism seems to me sufficiently different from
the above to merit another title. In the "Journal of Philosophy,
Psychology, and Scientific Methods," Volume IV, No. 4, Professor Dewey
brings out the distinction between his own position and that of
Professor James.

To the periodical literature on pragmatism I cannot refer in detail.
Professor James defends his position against misconceptions in the
"Philosophical Review," Volume XVII, No. 1. See, on the other side,
Professor Perry, in the "Journal of Philosophy, Psychology, and
Scientific Methods," Volume IV, pp. 365 and 421; Professor Hibben,
"Philosophical Review," XVII, 4; and Dr. Carus, "The Monist," July,
1908.

CHAPTER XVI, sections 65-68. To see how the logicians have regarded
their science and its relation to philosophy, see; Keynes's "Formal
Logic" (London, 1894), Introduction; Hobhouse's "Theory of Knowledge"
(London, 1896), Introduction; Aikins's "The Principles of Logic" (N.Y.,
1902), Introduction; and Creighton's "Introductory Logic" (N.Y., 1898),
Preface.

Professor Aikins writes: "Thus, in so far as logic tries to make us
reason correctly by giving us correct conceptions of things and the way
in which their relations involve each other, it is a kind of simple
metaphysics studied for a practical end."

Professor Creighton says, "Although in treating the syllogistic logic I
have followed to a large extent the ordinary mode of presentation, I
have both here, and when dealing with the inductive methods, endeavored
to interpret the traditional doctrines in a philosophical way, and to
prepare for the theoretical discussions of the third part of the book."

John Stuart Mill tried not to be metaphysical; but let the reader
examine, say, his third chapter, "Of the Things denoted by Names," or
look over Book VI, in his "System of Logic."

Professor Sigwart's great work, "Logik" (Freiburg, 2d edition, Volume
I, 1889, Volume II, 1893), may almost be called a philosophy of logic.

CHAPTER XVII, section 69. Compare with Professor James's account of
the scope of psychology the following from Professor Baldwin: "The
question of the relation of psychology to metaphysics, over which a
fierce warfare has been waged in recent years, is now fairly settled by
the adjustment of mutual claims. . . . The terms of the adjustment of
which I speak are briefly these: on the one hand, empirical
investigation must precede rational interpretation, and this empirical
investigation must be absolutely unhampered by fetters of dogmatism and
preconception; on the other hand, rational interpretation must be
equally free in its own province, since progress from the individual to
the general, from the detached fact to its universal meaning, can be
secured only by the judicious use of hypotheses, both metaphysical and
speculative. Starting from the empirical we run out at every step into
the metempirical." "Handbook of Psychology," Preface, pp. iii and iv.

CHAPTER XVIII, section 71. The teacher might very profitably take
extracts from the two chapters of Whewell's "Elements of Morality"
referred to in the text, and read them with the class. It is
significant of the weakness of Whewell's position that he can give us
advice as long as we do not need it, but, when we come to the
cross-roads, he is compelled to leave the matter to the individual
conscience, and gives us no hint of a general principle that may guide
us.

Section 72. Wundt, in his volume "The Facts of the Moral Life" (N.Y.,
1897), tries to develop an empirical science of ethics independent of
metaphysics; see the Preface.

Compare with this: Martineau's "Types of Ethical Theory" (London,
1885), Preface; T. H. Green's "Prolegomena to Ethics," Introduction;
Muirhead's "The Elements of Ethics" (N.Y., 1892); Mackenzie's "A Manual
of Ethics" (London, 1893); Jodl's "Gesduchte der Ethik" (Stuttgart,
1882), Preface. I give but a few references, but they will serve to
illustrate how close, in the opinion of ethical writers, is the
relation between ethics and philosophy.

CHAPTER XIX, section 74. The student who turns over the pages of
several works on metaphysics may be misled by a certain superficial
similarity that is apt to obtain among them. One sees the field mapped
out into Ontology (the science of Being or Reality), Rational
Cosmology, and Rational Psychology. These titles are mediaeval
landmarks which have been left standing. I may as well warn the reader
that two men who discourse of Ontology may not be talking about the
same thing at all. Bear in mind what was said in section 57 of the
different ways of conceiving the "One Substance"; and bear in mind also
what was said in Chapter V of the proper meaning of the word "reality."

I have discarded the above titles in my "System of Metaphysics,"
because I think it is better and less misleading to use plain and
unambiguous language.

Section 75. See the note to Chapter XVI.

CHAPTER XX, sections 76-77. One can get an idea of the problems with
which the philosophy of religion has to deal by turning to my "System
of Metaphysics" and reading the two chapters entitled "Of God," at the
close of the book. It would be interesting to read and criticise in
class some of the theistic arguments that philosophers have brought
forward. Quotations and references are given in Chapter XXXIV.

CHAPTER XXI, sections 78-79. What is said of the science of logic, in
Chapter XVI, has, of course, a bearing upon these sections. I suggest
that the student examine a few chapters of "The Grammar of Science";
the book is very readable.

CHAPTER XXII, sections 80-82. The reader will find in lectures I and
II in Sir William Hamilton's "Lectures on Metaphysics" a discussion of
the utility of philosophy. It has a pleasant, old-fashioned flavor,
and contains some good thoughts. What is said in Chapters XVI-XXI of
the present volume has a good deal of bearing upon the subject. See
especially what is said in the chapters on logic, ethics, and the
philosophy of religion.

CHAPTER XXIII, sections 83-87. There is a rather brief but good and
thoughtful discussion of the importance of historical study to the
comprehension of philosophical doctrines in Falckenberg's "History of
Modern Philosophy" (English translation, N.Y., 1893); see the
Introduction.

We have a good illustration of the fact that there may be parallel
streams of philosophic thought (section 87) when we turn to the Stoics
and the Epicureans. Zeno and Epicurus were contemporaries, but they
were men of very dissimilar character, and the schools they founded
differed widely in spirit. Zeno went back for his view of the physical
world to Heraclitus, and for his ethics to the Cynics. Epicurus
borrowed his fundamental thoughts from Democritus.

On the other hand, philosophers may sometimes be regarded as links in
the one chain. Witness the series of German thinkers: Kant, Fichte,
Schelling, Hegel, Schopenhauer; or the series of British thinkers:
Locke, Berkeley, Hume, Mill. Herbert Spencer represents a confluence
of the streams. The spirit of his doctrine is predominantly British;
but he got his "Unknowable" from Kant, through Hamilton and Mansel.

At any point in a given stream there may be a division. Thus, Kant was
awakened to his creative effort by Hume. But Mill is also the
successor of Hume, and more truly the successor, for he carries on the
traditional way of approaching philosophical problems, while Kant
rebels against it, and heads a new line.

CHAPTER XXIV, sections 88-93. I hardly think it is necessary for me to
comment upon this chapter. The recommendations amount to this: that a
man should be fair-minded and reasonable, free from partisanship,
cautious, and able to suspend judgment where the evidence is not clear;
also that where the light of reason does not seem to him to shine
brightly and to illumine his path as he could wish, he should be
influenced in his actions by the reflection that he has his place in
the social order, and must meet the obligations laid upon him by this
fact. When the pragmatist emphasizes the necessity of accepting ideals
and living by them, he is doing us a service. But we must see to it
that he does not lead us into making arbitrary decisions and feeling
that we are released from the duty of seeking for evidence. Read
together sections 64, 91, and 93.

INDEX

Absolute, The: Spencer's doctrine of, 70;
Bradley's, 191-192;
meanings of the word, 201;
reference, 312.
Activity and Passivity: meaning of, 159-161;
confused with cause and effect, 159-161;
activity of mind, 162-163.
Aesthetics: a philosophical discipline, 242-243.
Agnosticism: 202.
Aikins: 314.
Albert the Great: scope of his labors, 9.
Analytical Judgments: defined, 178.
Anaxagoras: his doctrine, 4; on the soul, 101.
Anaximander: his doctrine, 3.
Anaximenes: his doctrine, 3; on the soul, 101.
Appearances: doubt of their objectivity, 35;
realities and, 59 ff.;
apparent and real space, 80-87;
apparent and real time, 93-99;
apparent and real extension, 113;
measurement of apparent time, 128;
appearance and reality, Bradley's doctrine, 191-192.
Aristotle: reference to Thales, 3;
scope of his philosophy, 7;
authority in the Middle Ages, 9;
on the soul, 102-103.
Arithmetic: compared with logic, 225-226.
Atoms: nature of our knowledge of, 22-23; also, 65-67;
doctrine of Democritus, 194-195.
Augustine: on time as past, present, and future, 90 ff.;
on soul and body, 104;
as scientist and as philosopher, 278.
Authority: in philosophy, 291-296.
Automatism: the automaton theory, 129-130;
animal automatism, 141-142;
activity of mind and automatism, 162;
references, 308-309.
Automaton: see Automatism.

Bacon, Francis: his conception of philosophy, 10.
Baldwin: on psychology and metaphysics, 314.
Berkeley: referred to, 56;
on appearance and reality, 61-63;
his idealism, 168-170;
his theism, 190-191;
references to his works, 310.
Body and Mind: see Mind and Body.
Bosanquet: his logic, 235.
Bradley: his "Absolute," 191-192; reference given, 311.
Breath: mind conceived to be, 101.

Cassiodorus: on soul and body, 103-104.
Cause and Effect; meaning of words, 118-120;
relation of mental and material not causal, 121-126;
see also, 132;
cause and effect, activity and passivity, 159 ff.
Child: its knowledge of the world, 18-19.
Cicero: Pythagoras' use of word "philosopher," 2; on immortality, 32.
Clifford, W. K.: on infinite divisibility of space, 79-80;
on other minds, 135;
on mind-stuff, 144-146;
his panpsychism, 197-198;
his parallelism, 308-309;
references on mind-stuff, 309.
Common Sense: notions of mind and body, 106 ff.;
Reid's doctrine, 171-174;
common sense ethics, 236-240.
Common Thought: what it is, 18-20.
Concomitance: see Mind and Body.
Copernican System: 282.
Cornelius: on metaphysics, 249.
Creighton: 314.
Critical Empiricism: the doctrine, 218-219.
Critical Philosophy: outlined, 175-180;
criticised, 211-218;
references, 311.
Croesus: 1.

Democritus: doctrine referred to, 4;
his place in the history of philosophy, 5;
on the soul, 101-102;
his materialism examined, 194-195.
Descartes: conception of philosophy, 10;
on mind and body, 105-106; also, 119;
on animal automatism, 141-142;
on the external world, 163-168;
on substance, 198;
his rationalism, 206-209;
the "natural light," 208;
his attempt at a critical philosophy, 214;
his rules of method, 214;
provisional rules of life, 301-302;
reference given, 306;
reference to his automatism, 308;
references to the "Meditations," 312.
Determinism: 155-159; references, 309-310.
Dewey, John: 312-314.
Dogmatism: Kant's use of term, 211-212.
Dualism: what, 193;
varieties of, 202-204;
the present volume dualistic, 204;
Hamilton's, 312.

Eleatics: their doctrine, 4.
Empedocles: his doctrine, 4; a pluralist, 205.
Empiricism: the doctrine, 209-211;
Kant on, 212;
critical empiricism, 218-219.
Energy: conservation of, 151-154.
Epicureans: their view of philosophy, 7-8; their materialism, 102.
Epiphenomenon: the mind as, 162.
Epistemology: its place among the philosophical sciences, 247-249.
Ethics: and the mechanism of nature, 159-164;
common sense ethics, 236-240;
Whewell criticised, 238-240;
philosophy and, 240-242;
utility of, 265-267;
references, 315.
Evidence: in philosophy, 296-298.
Existence: of material things, 56-58; also, 165-192.
Experience: suggestions of the word, 58;
Hume's doctrine of what it yields, 170-171;
Descartes and Locke, 178;
Kant's view of, 179;
empiricism, 209-211;
critical empiricism, 218-219.
Experimental Psychology: its scope, 234-235.
Explanation: of relation of mind and body, 125-126.
External World: its existence, 32 ff.;
plain man's knowledge of, 32-36;
psychologist's attitude, 36-38;
the "telephone exchange," 38-44;
what the external world is, 45-58;
its existence discussed, 56-58;
a mechanism, 147-150;
knowledge of, theories, 165-180;
Descartes on, 207-208;
psychologist's attitude discussed, 230-234.
Falckenberg: 311, 316.
Fate: 158; literature on fatalism, 309-310.
Fichte: on philosophic method, 10; solipsistic utterances, 133.
Final Cause: what, 161.
"Form" and "Matter": the distinction between, 82-83;
space as "form," 82-84;
time as "form," 94;
Kant's doctrine of "forms," 179;
the same criticised, 216-217.
Free-will: and the order of nature, 154-159;
determinism and "free-will-ism," 155-159;
literature referred to, 309-310.

God: revealed in the world, 163-164;
Berkeley on argument for, 190-191;
Spinoza on God or substance, 199;
Descartes' argument for, 208;
influence of belief on ethics, 241;
conceptions of, 252-253;
relation to the world, 253-254;
monistic conception of, 312;
references, 314.
Greek Philosophy: Pre-Socratic characterized, 2-5;
conception of philosophy from Sophists to Aristotle, 5-7;
the Stoics, Epicureans, and Skeptics, 7-8.
Green, T. H.: 218, 315.

Hamilton, Sir W.: on space, 76;
on the external world, 174; also, 182;
reference, 311;
his dualism, 312;
on utility of philosophy, 316.
Hegel: his conception of philosophy, 11;
an objective idealist, 190.
Heraclitus: his doctrine, 4; on the soul, 101.
Herodotus: 1-2.
History of Philosophy: much studied, 273-274;
its importance, 274-281;
how to read it, 281-287;
references, 316.
Hobhouse: on theory of knowledge, 248; reference, 312.
Hoeffding: his monism, 200-201; his history of philosophy, 311.
Howison: on pluralism, 205.
Humanism: 312-313.
Hume: his doctrine, 170-171;
use of word "impression," 177;
influence on Kant, 177-178.
Huxley: on other minds, 135, 138; on automatism, 308.
Hypothetical Realism: see Realism.

Idealism: in Berkeley and Hume, 168-171;
general discussion of the varieties of, 187-192;
proper attitude toward, 289-291.
Ideas: distinguished from things, 33-36;
in psychology, 36-38;
Berkeley's use of the word, 168-170;
Hume's use of the word, 177.
Imagination: contrasted with sense, 45-49;
extension of imagined things, 113.
Immateriality: of mind, see Plotinus, and Mind.
Impression: Hume's use of word, 177.
Infinity: infinity and infinite divisibility of space, 73-80;
of time, 88-90; also, 95-97;
mathematics and, 226.
Inside: meaning of word, 55.
Interactionism: see Mind and Body.
Intuitionalists; defined, 240.
Ionian School: 3.

James, W.: on pragmatism, 220-222 and 312-313;
on psychology and metaphysics, 230-231;
on interactionism, reference, 308;
on "free-will," 309-310.
Jevons: his logic, 224; on study of scientific method, 256.
Jodl: 315.

Kant: on space, 75;
his critical philosophy, 175-180;
his philosophy criticised, 211-218;
references to, 307, 311.
Keynes: 314.

Localisation: of sensations, what, 127.
Locke, John: on doubt of external world, 32;
on substance, 108;
on perception of external world, 166-168;
his empiricism, 209-210;
his attempt at a critical philosophy, 215-216;
on innate moral principles, 240;
reference to "Essay," 310;
his hypothetical realism, 311;
treatment of substance, references, 312.
Logic; the traditional, 224;
"modern" logic, 224-225;
Jevons and Bosanquet referred to, 224-225;
philosophy and, 225-229;
compared with arithmetic, 225-227;
deeper problems of, 227;
Spencer cited, 228;
utility of, 264-265;
references, 314.
Lucretius: his materialistic psychology, 102.

Mach: 14.
Mackenzie: 315.
Malebranche: referred to, 142.
Martineau: 315.
Materialism: primitive man's notion of mind, 100-101;
materialism in the Greek philosophy, 101-102;
refutation of, 111-132;
general account of, 194-197.
Mathematics: nature of mathematical knowledge, 23-25;
arithmetic compared with logic, 225-226;
mathematical relations and cause and effect, 257;
mathematical methods, 256-257.
Matter: what is meant by material things, 51-58;
the material world a mechanism, 147-150.
"Matter" and "Form": see "Form" and "Matter."
McCosh: on mind and body, 120.
Mechanism: the material world a, 147-150;
objections to the doctrine, 148-150;
mind and mechanism, 151-154;
mechanism and morals, 159-164;
mechanism and teleology, reference, 310.
Metaphysician: on the mind, 111 ff.
Metaphysics: psychology and, 230-234;
distinguished from philosophy, 244-245;
uncertainty of, 247;
utility of, 269-272;
traditional divisions of, 315.
Method: scientific method, 256-259.
Middle Ages: view of philosophy in, 8-9.
Mill, J. S.: the argument for other minds, 136-138;
on permanent possibilities of sensation, 289;
his logic, 314.
Mind: the child's notion of, 100;
regarded as breath, 101;
suggestions of Latin, Greek, and Hebrew words for mind or
soul, 101;
materialistic views of, in Greek philosophy, 101-102;
Plato and Aristotle on nature of, 102-103;
doctrine of Plotinus, 103;
of Cassiodorus, 103;
of Augustine, 104;
of Descartes, 105-106;
modern common sense notions of mind, 106-110;
mind as substance, Locke quoted, 108-109;
psychologist's notion of, 110-111;
what the mind is, 111-114;
place of mind in nature, 151-154;
minds active, 162-163;
see also, Mind and Body, and Other Minds.
Mind and Body: is the mind in the body, 115-117;
plain man's notion of, 116;
interactionism, 117-121;
doctrine of Descartes and his successors, 119-120;
plain man as interactionist, 120;
McCosh quoted, 120-121;
objection to interactionism, 121;
parallelism, 121-126;
its foundation in experience, 123-124;
meaning of word "concomitance," 123-125;
time and place of mental phenomena, 126-129;
objections to parallelism, 129-132;
Clifford's parallelism criticised, 130;
mental phenomena and causality, 129;
double sense of word "concomitance," 131-132;
mind and the mechanism of the world, 151-154;
mechanism and morals, 159-164;
"concomitant phenomena" and attainment of ends, 162;
references given on other minds and mind-stuff, 309;
see also, Other Minds.
Mind-stuff: see Other Minds.
Minima Sensibilia: 87.
Modern Philosophy: conception of philosophy in, 9-12.
Monism: what, 193-194;
varieties of, 194-202;
narrower sense of word, 198-202.
Moral Distinctions: their foundation, 159-164.
Muirhead: 315.

Naive Realism: 181.
"Natural Light": term used by Descartes, 208.
Natural Realism: see Realism.
Nature: place of mind in, 151-154;
order of nature and "free-will," 154-159.
Neo-Platonism: referred to, 8; on the soul as immaterial, 103.
Nihilism: word used by Hamilton, 186.
Noumena: see Phenomena.

Objective Idealism: 189-190; reference to Royce, 311.
Objective Order: contrasted with the subjective, 55.
Ontology: what, 315.
Orders of Experience: the subjective and the objective, 55;
see also, 114.
Other Minds: their existence, 133-136;
Fichte referred to, 133;
Richter quoted, 133;
Huxley and Clifford on proof of, 135;
the argument for, 136-140;
Mill quoted, 136-138;
Huxley criticised, 138-140;
what minds are there? 140-144;
Descartes quoted, 141-142;
Malebranche, 142;
the limits of psychic life, 142-144;
mind-stuff, 144-146;
proper attitude toward solipsism, 291.
Outside: meaning of word, 55.

Panpsychism: the doctrine, 198; references given, 311.
Pantheism: 202.
Parallelism: see Mind and Body.
Paulsen: on nature of philosophy, 305.
Pearson: the "telephone exchange," 38 ff.;
on scientific principles and method, 258-259;
reference given, 306.
Peirce, C. S.: on pragmatism, 219-220.
Perception: see Representative Perception.
Phenomena and Noumena: Kant's distinction between, 176-180.
Philosophical Sciences: enumerated, 13;
why grouped together, 13-17;
examined in detail, 223-259.
Philosophy: meaning of word, and history of its use, 1 ff.;
what the word now covers, 12-17;
problems of, 32-164;
historical background of modern philosophy, 165-180;
types of, 181-222;
logic and, 225-229;
psychology and, 230-234;
ethics and, 240-242;
aesthetics and, 242-243;
metaphysics distinguished from, 244-245;
religion and, 250-254;
the non-philosophical sciences and, 255-259;
utility of, 263-272;
history of, 273-287;
verification in, 276-277;
as poetry and as science, 281-283;
how systems arise, 283-287;
practical admonitions, 288-303;
authority in, 291-296;
ordinary rules of evidence in, 296-298.
Physiological Psychology: what it is, 234.
Pineal Gland; as seat of the soul, 105.
Place: of mental phenomena, see Space.
Plain Man: his knowledge of the world, 19-20; also, 32-36;
his knowledge of space, 73;
on mind and body, 106-110;
his interactionism, 120.
Plants: psychic life in, 143.
Plato: use of word "philosopher," 2;
scope of his philosophy, 6-7;
on the soul, 102-103.
Plotinus: the soul as immaterial, 103.
Pluralism and Singularism: described, 204-205.
Poetry and Philosophy: 281-283.
Poincare: referred to, 258.
Pragmatism: the doctrine, 219-222;
see also, 296-298, 300-303, and 312-314;
will to believe, references, 310, 312.
Present: meaning of "the present," 97-99.
Psychology: psychological knowledge characterized, 25-28;
attitude of psychologist toward external world, 36-38;
toward mind, 110-111;
philosophy and, 230-234;
double affiliation of, 234-235;
utility of, 268-269;
metaphysics and, 313;
"rational," 315.
Ptolemaic System; 282.
Pythagoras: the word "philosopher," 2.
Pythagoreans: their doctrine, 4.

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