Julian S. Corbett - Fighting Instructions, 1530 1816

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PUBLICATIONS
OF THE
NAVY RECORDS SOCIETY
VOL. XXIX.

FIGHTING INSTRUCTIONS
1530-1816

EDITED
WITH ELUCIDATIONS FROM CONTEMPORARY AUTHORITIES
BY
JULIAN S. CORBETT, LL.M.

PRINTED FOR THE NAVY RECORDS SOCIETY
MDCCCCV

THE COUNCIL
OF THE
NAVY RECORDS SOCIETY
1904-1905

* * * * *

PATRON
H.R.H. THE PRINCE OF WALES, K.G., K.T., K.P.

PRESIDENT
EARL SPENCER, K.G.

VICE-PRESIDENTS
BRIDGE, ADMIRAL SIR CYPRIAN | PROTHERO, G.W.,
A.G., G.C.B. | LL.D.
HAWKESBURY, LORD. | YORKE, SIR HENRY, K.C.B.

COUNCILLORS

ATKINSON, C.T. | KIPLING, RUDYARD.
BATTENBURG, PRINCE LOUIS OF, | LORAINE, REAR-ADMIRAL SIR
G.C.B. | LAMBTON, BART.
BEAUMONT, VICE-ADMIRAL SIR | LYALL, SIR ALFRED C., G.C.I.E.
LEWIS, K.C.B., K.C.M.G. | MARKHAM, SIR CLEMENTS R.,
CLARKE, COL. SIR GEORGE S., | K.C.B., F.R.S.
K.C.M.G. | MARSDEN, R.G.
CORBETT, JULIAN S. | NEWBOLT, HENRY.
DESART, THE EARL OF, K.C.B. | PARR, REAR-ADMIRAL A.C.
DRURY, VICE-ADMIRAL SIR | SLADE, CAPTAIN EDMOND J.W.,
CHARLES, K.C.S.I. | R.N.
FIRTH, PROFESSOR G.H., LL.D. | TANNER, J.R.
GINSBURG, B.W., LL.D. | THURSFIELD, J.R.
GODLEY, SIR ARTHUR, K.C.B. | TRACEY, ADMIRAL SIR RICHARD,
HAMILTON, ADMIRAL SIR R. | K.C.B.
VESEY, G.C.B. | WATTS, PHILIP, D.SC., F.R.S.

SECRETARY
PROFESSOR J.K. LAUGHTON, D.Litt., King's College, London, W.C.

TREASURER
W. GRAHAM GREENE, C.B., Admiralty, S.W.

The COUNCIL of the NAVY RECORDS SOCIETY wish it to be distinctly
understood that they are not answerable for any opinions or
observations that may appear in the Society's publications; For these
the responsibility rests entirely with the Editors of the several
works.

PREFACE

The inaccessibility of the official Fighting Instructions from time to
time issued to the fleet has long been a recognised stumbling-block to
students of naval history. Only a few copies of them were generally
known to exist; fewer still could readily be consulted by the public,
and of these the best known had been wrongly dated. The discovery
therefore of a number of seventeenth century Instructions amongst the
Earl of Dartmouth's papers, which he had generously placed at the
disposal of the Society, seemed to encourage an attempt to make
something like a complete collection. The result, such as it is, is
now offered to the Society. It is by no means exhaustive. Some sets of
Instructions seem to be lost beyond recall; but, on the other hand, a
good deal of hitherto barren ground has been filled, and it is hoped
that the collection may be of some assistance for a fresh study of the
principles which underlie the development of naval tactics.

It is of course as documents in the history of tactics that the
Fighting Instructions have the greatest practical value, and with this
aspect of them in view I have done my best to illustrate their
genesis, intention, and significance by extracts from contemporary
authorities. Without such illustration the Instructions would be but
barren food, neither nutritive nor easily digested. The embodiment of
this illustrative matter has to some extent involved a departure from
the ordinary form of the Society's publications. Instead of a general
introduction, a series of introductory notes to each group of
Instructions has been adopted, which it is feared will appear to bear
an excessive proportion to the Instructions themselves. There seemed,
however, no other means of dealing with the illustrative matter in a
consecutive way. The extracts from admirals' despatches and
contemporary treatises, and the remarks of officers and officials
concerned with the preparation or the execution of the Instructions,
were for the most part too fragmentary to be treated as separate
documents, or too long or otherwise unsuitable for foot-notes. The
only adequate way therefore was to embody them in Introductory Notes,
and this it is hoped will be found to justify their bulk.

A special apology is, however, due for the Introductory Note on
Nelson's memoranda. For this I can only plead their great importance,
and the amount of illustrative matter that exists from the pens of
Nelson's officers and opponents. For no other naval battle have we so
much invaluable comment from men of the highest capacity who were
present. The living interest of it all is unsurpassed, and I have
therefore been tempted to include all that came to hand, encouraged by
the belief that the fullest material for the study of Nelson's tactics
at the battle of Trafalgar could not be out of place in a volume
issued by the Society in the centenary year.

As to the general results, perhaps the most striking feature which the
collection brings out is that sailing tactics was a purely English
art. The idea that we borrowed originally from the Dutch is no longer
tenable. The Dutch themselves do not even claim the invention of the
line. Indeed in no foreign authority, either Dutch, French or Spanish,
have I been able to discover a claim to the invention of any device in
sailing tactics that had permanent value. Even the famous tactical
school which was established in France at the close of the Seven
Years' War, and by which the French service so brilliantly profited in
the War of American Independence, was worked on the old lines of
Hoste's treatise. Morogues' _Tactique Navale_ was its text-book,
and his own teaching was but a scientific and intelligent elaboration
of a system from which the British service under the impulse of Anson,
Hawke, and Boscawen was already shaking itself free.

Much of the old learning which the volume contains is of course of
little more than antiquarian interest, but the bulk of it in the
opinion of those best able to judge should be found of living value.
All systems of tactics must rest ultimately on the dominant weapon in
use, and throughout the sailing period the dominant weapon was, as
now, the gun. In face of so fundamental a resemblance no tactician
can afford to ignore the sailing system merely because the method of
propulsion and the nature of the material have changed. It is not the
principles of tactics that such changes affect, but merely the method
of applying them.

Of even higher present value is the process of thought, the line of
argument by which the old tacticians arrived at their conclusions good
and bad. In studying the long series of Instructions we are able to
detach certain attitudes of mind which led to the atrophy of
principles essentially good, and others which pushed the system
forward on healthy lines and flung off obsolete restraints. In an art
so shifting and amorphous as naval tactics, the difference between
health and disease must always lie in a certain vitality of mind with
which it must be approached and practised. It is only in the history
of tactics, under all conditions of weapons, movement and material,
that the conditions of that vitality can be studied.

For a civilian to approach the elucidation of such points without
professional assistance would be the height of temerity, and my thanks
therefore are particularly due for advice and encouragement to Admiral
Sir Cyprian Bridge, Vice-Admiral Sir Reginald Custance, Rear-Admiral
H.S.H. Prince Louis of Battenberg, and to Captain Slade, Captain of
the Royal Naval College. To Sir Reginald Custance and Professor
Laughton I am under a special obligation, for not only have they been
kind enough to read the proofs of the work, but they have been
indefatigable in offering suggestions, the one from his high
professional knowledge and the other from his unrivalled learning in
naval history. Any value indeed the work may be found to possess must
in a large measure be attributed to them. Nor can I omit to mention
the valuable assistance which I have received from Mr. Ferdinand Brand
and Captain Garbett, R.N., in unearthing forgotten material in the
Libraries of the Admiralty and the United Service Institution.

I have also the pleasure of expressing my obligations to the Earl of
Dartmouth, the Earl of St. Germans, and Vice-Admiral Sir Charles
Knowles, Bart., for the use of the documents in their possession, as
well as to many others whose benefits to the Society will be found
duly noted in the body of the work.

CONTENTS

PART I.--EARLY TUDOR PERIOD

1. INTRODUCTORY. ALONSO DE CHAVES ON SAILING TACTICS 3
Espejo de Navegantes, _circa_ 1530 6

2. INTRODUCTORY. AUDLEY'S FLEET ORDERS, _circa_ 1530 14
Orders to be used by the King's Majesty's Navy by the Sea 15

3. INTRODUCTORY. THE ADOPTION OF SPANISH TACTICS BY HENRY VIII 18
Lord Lisle, 1545, No. 1 20
" " No. 2 23

PART II.--ELIZABETHAN AND JACOBEAN

INTRODUCTORY. THE ELIZABETHAN ORIGIN OF RALEGH'S INSTRUCTIONS 27
Sir Walter Ralegh, 1617 36

PART III.--CAROLINGIAN

1. INTRODUCTORY. THE ATTEMPT TO APPLY LAND FORMATIONS
TO THE FLEET 49
Lord Wimbledon, 1625. No. 1 52
" " No. 2 61
" " No. 3 63

2. INTRODUCTORY. THE SHIP-MONEY FLEETS, _circa_ 1635 73
The Earl of Lindsey, 1635 77

PART IV.--THE FIRST DUTCH WAR

1. INTRODUCTORY. ENGLISH AND DUTCH ORDERS ON THE
EVE OF THE WAR, 1648-53 81
Parliamentary Orders, 1648 87
Supplementary Instructions, _circa_ 1650 88
Marten Tromp, 1652 91

2. INTRODUCTORY. ORDERS ISSUED DURING THE WAR, 1653 and 1654 92
Commonwealth Orders, 1653 99

PART V.--THE SECOND DUTCH WAR

1. INTRODUCTORY. ORDERS OF THE RESTORATION 107
The Earl of Sandwich, 1665 108

2. INTRODUCTORY. MONCK, PRINCE RUPERT, AND THE DUKE OF YORK 110
The Duke of York, 1665 122
His Additional Instructions, 1665 126
His Supplementary Order 128
Prince Rupert, 1666 129

PART VI.--THE THIRD DUTCH WAR TO THE REVOLUTION

1. INTRODUCTORY. PROGRESS OF TACTICS DURING THE WAR 133
The Duke of York, 1672 146
His Supplementary Orders, 1672 148
The Duke of York, 1672-3 149
Final form of the Duke of York's Orders, 1673, with additions
and observations subsequently made 152

2. INTRODUCTORY. MEDITERRANEAN ORDERS, 1678 164
Sir John Narbrough, 1678 165

3. INTRODUCTORY. THE LAST STUART ORDERS 168
Lord Dartmouth, 1688 170

PART VII.--WILLIAM III. AND ANNE

1. INTRODUCTORY. LORD TORRINGTON, TOURVILLE, AND HOSTE 175
Admiral Edward Russell, 1691 188

2. INTRODUCTORY. THE PERMANENT INSTRUCTIONS, 1703-1783 195
Sir George Rooke, 1703 197

PART VIII.--ADDITIONAL FIGHTING INSTRUCTIONS OF THE EIGHTEENTH CENTURY

INTRODUCTORY, ORIGIN AND GROWTH OF THE ADDITIONAL INSTRUCTIONS 203
Admiral Vernon, _circa_ 1740 214
Lord Anson, _circa_ 1747 216
Sir Edward Hawke, 1756 317
Admiral Boscawen, 1759 219
Sir George Rodney, 1782 225
Lord Hood's Additions, 1783 228

PART IX.--THE LAST PHASE

1. INTRODUCTORY. THE NEW SIGNAL BOOK INSTRUCTIONS 233
Lord Howe, 1782 239

2. INTRODUCTORY. THE SIGNAL BOOKS OF THE GREAT WAR 252
Lord Howe's Explanatory Instructions, 1799 268

3. INTRODUCTORY. NELSON'S TACTICAL MEMORANDA 280
The Toulon Memorandum, 1803 313
The Trafalgar Memorandum, 1805 316

4. INTRODUCTORY. INSTRUCTIONS AFTER TRAFALGAR 321
Admiral Gambier, 1807 327
Lord Collingwood, 1808-1810 328
Sir Alexander Cochrane, 1805-14 330

5. INTRODUCTORY, THE SIGNAL BOOK OF 1816 335
The Instructions of 1816 342

APPENDIX. 'FURTHER PARTICULARS OF THE TRAFALGAR FIGHT' 351

INDEX 359

PART 1

EARLY TUDOR PERIOD

I. ALONSO DE CHAVES, _circa_ 1530

II. SIR THOMAS AUDLEY, 1530

III. LORD LISLE, 1545

ALONSO DE CHAVES ON SAILING TACTICS

INTRODUCTORY

The following extract from the _Espejo de Navegantes_, or
_Seamen's Glass_, of Alonso de Chaves serves to show the
development which naval tactics had reached at the dawn of the sailing
epoch. The treatise was apparently never published. It was discovered
by Captain Fernandez Duro, the well-known historian of the Spanish
navy, amongst the manuscripts in the library of the Academy of History
at Madrid. The exact date of its production is not known; but Alonso
de Chaves was one of a group of naval writers and experts who
flourished at the court of the Emperor Charles V in the first half of
the sixteenth century.[1] He was known to Hakluyt, who mentions him in
connection with his own cherished idea of getting a lectureship in
navigation established in London. 'And that it may appear,' he writes
in dedicating the second edition of his _Voyages_ to the lord
admiral, 'that this is no vain fancy nor device of mine it may please
your lordship to understand that the late Emperor Charles the
Fifth ... established not only a Pilot-Major for the examination of such
as sought to take charge of ships in that voyage' (_i.e._ to the
Indies), 'but also founded a notable lecture of the Art of Navigation
which is read to this day in the Contractation House at Seville. The
Readers of the Lecture have not only carefully taught and instructed
the Spanish mariners by word of mouth, but also have published sundry
exact and worthy treatises concerning marine causes for the direction
and encouragement of posterity. The learned works of three of which
Readers, namely of Alonso de Chaves, of Hieronymus de Chaves, and of
Roderigo Zamorano, came long ago very happily to my hands, together
with the straight and severe examining of all such Masters as desire
to take charge for the West Indies.' Since therefore De Chaves was an
official lecturer to the Contractation House, the Admiralty of the
Indies, we may take it that he speaks with full authority of the
current naval thought of the time. That he represented a somewhat
advanced school seems clear from the pains he takes in his treatise to
defend his opinions against the old idea which still prevailed, that
only galleys and oared craft could be marshalled in regular
order. 'Some may say,' he writes, 'that at sea it is not possible to
order ships and tactics in this way, nor to arrange beforehand so
nicely for coming to the attack or bringing succour just when wanted,
and that therefore there is no need to labour an order of battle since
order cannot be kept. To such I answer that the same objection binds
the enemy, and that with equal arms he who has taken up the best
formation and order will be victor, because it is not possible so to
break up an order with wind and sea as that he who is more without
order shall not be worse broken up and the sooner defeated. For ships
at sea are as war-horses on land, since admitting they are not very
nimble at turning at any pace, nevertheless a regular formation
increases their power. Moreover, at sea, so long as there be no storm,
there will be nothing to hinder the using of any of the orders with
which we have dealt, and if there be a storm the same terror will
strike the one side as the other; for the storm is enough for all to
war with, and in fighting it they will have peace with one another.'

At first sight it would seem that De Chaves in this argument takes no
account of superiority of seamanship--the factor which was destined to
turn the scale against Spain upon the sea. But the following passage
with which he concludes shows that he regarded seamanship as the
controlling factor in every case. 'And if,' he argues, 'they say that
the enemy will take the same thought and care as I, I answer that when
both be equal in numbers and arms, then in such case he who shall be
more dexterous and have more spirit and fortitude he will conquer, the
which he will not do, although he have more and better arms and as
much spirit as he will, if he be wanting in good order and
counsel. Just as happens in fencing, that the weaker man if he be more
dexterous gives more and better hits than the other who does not
understand the beats nor knows them, although he be the stronger. And
the same holds good with any army whatsoever on land, and it has been
seen that the smaller by their good order have defeated the stronger.'

From the work in question Captain Fernandez Duro gives four sections
or chapters in Appendix 12 to the first volume of his history,[2]
namely, 1. 'Of war or battle at sea,' relating to single ship
actions. 2. 'The form of a battle and the method of fighting,'
relating to armament, fire discipline, boarding and the like. 3. 'Of a
battle of one fleet against another.' 4. 'Battle.' In the last two
sections is contained the earliest known attempt to formulate a
definite fighting formation and tactical system for sailing fleets,
and it is from these that the following extracts have been translated.

It will be noted that in the root-idea of coming as quickly as
possible to close quarters, and in relying mainly on end-on fire, the
proposed system is still quite mediaeval and founded mainly upon
galley tactics. But a new and advanced note is struck in the author's
insistence on the captain-general's keeping out of action as long as
possible, instead of leading the attack in the time-honoured way. We
should also remark the differentiation of types, for all of which a
duty was provided in action. This was also a survival of galley
warfare, and rapidly disappeared with the advance of the sailing
man-of-war, never to be revived, unless perhaps it be returning in the
immediate future, and we are to see torpedo craft of the latest
devising taking the place and function of the _barcas_, with
their axes and augers, and armoured cruisers those of the _naos de
succurro_.

_ESPEJO DE NAVEGANTES,
circa_ 1530.

[+Fernandez Duro, Armada Espanola i. App. 12+.]

_Chapter III.--Of a Battle between One Fleet and Another_.

[_Extract_.]

... When the time for battle is at hand the captain-general should
order the whole fleet to come together that he may set them in order,
since a regular order is no less necessary in a fleet of ships for
giving battle to another fleet than it is in an army of soldiers for
giving battle to another army.

Thus, as in an army, the men-at-arms form by themselves in one quarter
to make and meet charges, and the light horse in another quarter to
support, pursue, and harass[3] so in a fleet, the captain-general
ought to order the strongest and largest ships to form in one quarter
to attack, grapple, board and break-up the enemy, and the lesser and
weaker ships in another quarter apart, with their artillery and
munitions to harass, pursue, and give chase to the enemy if he flies,
and to come to the rescue wherever there is most need.

The captain-general should form a detachment of his smaller and
lighter vessels, to the extent of one-fourth part of his whole fleet,
and order them to take station on either side of the main body. I mean
that they should always keep as a separate body on the flanks of the
main body, so that they can see what happens on one side and on the
other.

He should admonish and direct every one of the ships that she shall
endeavour to grapple with the enemy in such a way that she shall not
get between two of them so as to be boarded and engaged on both sides
at once.[4]

* * * * *

Having directed and set in order all the aforesaid matters, the
captain-general should then marshal the other three-quarters of the
fleet that remain in the following manner.

He should consider his position and the direction of the wind, and how
to get the advantage of it with his fleet.

Then he should consider the order in which the enemy is formed,
whether they come in a close body or in line ahead,[5] and whether
they are disposed in square bodies or in a single line,[6] and whether
the great ships are in the centre or on the flanks, and in what
station is the flagship; and all the other considerations which are
essential to the case he should take in hand.

By all means he should do his best that his fleet shall have the
weather-gage; for if there was no other advantage he will always keep
free from being blinded by the smoke of the guns, so as to be able to
see one to another; and for the enemy it will be the contrary, because
the smoke and fire of our fleet and of their own will keep driving
upon them, and blinding them in such a manner that they will not be
able to see one another, and they will fight among themselves from not
being able to recognise each other.

Everything being now ready, if the enemy have made squadrons of their
fleet we should act in the same manner in ours, placing always the
greater ships in one body as a vanguard to grapple first and receive
the first shock; and the captain-general should be stationed in the
centre squadron, so that he may see those which go before and those
which follow.

Each of the squadrons ought to sail in line abreast,[7] so that all
can see the enemy and use their guns without getting in each other's
way, and they must not sail in file one behind the other, because
thence would come great trouble, as only the leading ships could
fight. In any case a ship is not so nimble as a man to be able to face
about and do what is best.[8]

The rearguard should be the ships that I have called the supports,
which are to be the fourth part of the fleet, and the lightest and
best sailers; but they must not move in rear of the fleet, because
they would not see well what is passing so as to give timely succour,
and therefore they ought always to keep an offing on that side or
flank of the fleet where the flagship is, or on both sides if they are
many; and if they are in one body they should work to station
themselves to windward for the reasons aforesaid.

And if the fleet of the enemy shall come on in one body in line
abreast,[9] ours should do the same, placing the largest and strongest
ships in the centre and the lightest on the flanks of the battle,
seeing that those which are in the centre always receive greater
injury because necessarily they have to fight on both sides.

And if the enemy bring their fleet into the form of a lance-head or
triangle, then ours ought to form in two lines [_alas_], keeping
the advanced extremities furthest apart and closing in the rear, so as
to take the enemy between them and engage them on both fronts, placing
the largest ships in the rear and the lightest at the advanced points,
seeing that they can most quickly tack in upon the enemy opposed to
them.

And if the enemy approach formed in two lines [_alas_], ours
ought to do the same, placing always the greatest ships over against
the greatest of the enemy, and being always on the look-out to take
the enemy between them; and on no account must ours penetrate into the
midst of the enemy's formation [_batalla_], because arms and
smoke will envelope them on every side and there will be no way of
relieving them.

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