Julian S. Corbett - Fighting Instructions, 1530 1816

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This form of the signification shows that the intention of the signal
was something different from what is usually understood in naval
literature by 'breaking the line.' By that we generally understand the
manoeuvre practised by Lord Rodney in 1782, a manoeuvre which was
founded on the conception of 'leading through' the enemy's line in
line ahead, and all the ships indicated passing through in succession
at the same point. Whereas in Lord Howe's signal the tactical idea is
wholly different. In his manoeuvre the conception is of an attack by
bearing down all together in line abreast or line of bearing, and each
ship passing through the enemy's line at any interval it found
practicable; and this was actually the method of attack which he
adopted on June 1, 1794. In intention the two signals are as wide as
the poles asunder. In Rodney's case the idea was to sever the enemy's
line and cut off part of it from the rest. In Howe's case the idea of
severing the line is subordinate to the intention of securing an
advantage by engaging on the opposite side from which the attack is
made. The whole of the attacking fleet might in principle pass through
the intervals in the enemy's line without cutting off any part of
it. In principle, moreover, the new attack was a parallel attack in
line abreast or in line of bearing, whereas the old attack was a
perpendicular or oblique attack in line ahead.

Nothing perhaps in naval literature is more remarkable than the fact
that this fundamental difference is never insisted on, or even, it may
be said, so much as recognised. Whenever we read of a movement for
breaking the line in this period it is almost always accompanied with
remarks which assume that Rodney's manoeuvre is intended and not
Howe's. Probably it is Nelson who is to blame. At Trafalgar, after
carefully elaborating an attack based on Howe's method of line
abreast, he delivered it in line ahead, as though he had intended to
use Rodney's method. His reasons were sound enough, as will be seen
later. But as a piece of scientific tactics it was as though an
engineer besieging a fortress, instead of drawing his lines of
approach diagonally, were to make them at right angles to the
ditch. When the greatest of the admirals apparently (but only
apparently) confused the two antagonistic conceptions of breaking the
line, there is much excuse for civilian writers being confused in
fact.

The real interest of the matter, however, is to inquire, firstly, by
what process of thought Howe in his second code discarded Rodney's
manoeuvre as the primary meaning of his signal after having adopted it
in his first, and, secondly, how and to what end did he arrive at his
own method.

On the first point there can be little doubt. Sir Charles H. Knowles
gives us to understand that Howe still had Hoste's Treatise at his
elbow, and with Hoste for his mentor we may be sure that, in common
with other tactical students of his time, he soon convinced himself
that Rodney's manoeuvre was usually dangerous and always
imperfect. Knowles himself in his old age, though a devout admirer of
Rodney, denounced it in language of characteristic violence, and
maintained to the last that Rodney never intended it, as every one now
agrees was the truth. Nelson presumably also approved Howe's cardinal
improvement, or even in his most impulsive mood he would hardly have
called him 'the first and greatest sea officer the world has ever
produced.'[5]

As to the second point--the fundamental intention of the new
manoeuvre--we get again a valuable hint from Knowles. Upon his second
visit to the admiralty, after Howe had succeeded Keppel at the end of
1783, Knowles brought with him by request a tactical treatise written
by his father, as well as certain of his own tactical studies, and
discussed with Howe a certain manoeuvre which he believed the French
employed for avoiding decisive actions. He showed that when engaged to
leeward they fell off by alternate ships as soon as they were hard
pressed, and kept reforming their line to leeward, so that the British
had continually to bear up, and expose themselves to be raked aloft in
order to close again. In this way, as he pointed out, the French were
always able to clip the British wings without receiving any decisive
injury themselves. In a MS. note to his 'Fighting and Sailing
Instructions,' he puts the matter quite clearly. 'In the battle off
Granada,' he says, 'in the year 1779 the French ships partially
executed this manoeuvre, and Sir Charles [H.] Knowles (then 5th
lieutenant of the Prince of Wales of 74 guns, the flagship of the
Hon. Admiral Barrington) drew this manoeuvre, and which he showed
Admiral Lord Howe, when first lord of the admiralty, during the
peace. His lordship established a signal to break through the enemy's
line and engage on the other side to leeward, and which he executed
himself in the battle of the 1st of June, 1794.' The note adds that
before Knowles drew Howe's attention to the supposed French manoeuvre
he had been content with his original Article XIV., modifying Article
XXI. of the old Fighting Instructions as already explained. Whether
therefore Knowles's account is precisely accurate or not, we may take
it as certain that it was to baffle the French practice of avoiding
close action by falling away to leeward that Howe hit on his brilliant
conception of breaking through their line in all parts.

No finer manoeuvre was ever designed. In the first place it developed
the utmost fire-face by bringing both broadsides into play. Secondly,
by breaking up the enemy's line into fragments it deprived their
admiral of any shadow of control over the part attacked. Thirdly, by
seizing the leeward position (the essential postulate of the French
method of fighting) it prevented individual captains making good their
escape independently to leeward and ensured a decisive _melee_,
such as Nelson aimed at. And, fourthly, it permitted a concentration
on any part of the enemy's line, since it actually severed it at any
desired point quite as effectually as did Rodney's method. Whether
Howe ever appreciated the importance of concentration to the extent it
was felt by Nelson, Hood and Rodney is doubtful. Yet his invention
did provide the best possible form of concentrated attack. It had over
Rodney's imperfect manoeuvre this inestimable advantage, that by the
very act of breaking the line you threw upon the severed portion an
overwhelming attack of the most violent kind, and with the utmost
development of fire-surface. Finally it could not be parried as
Rodney's usually could in Hoste's orthodox way by the enemy's standing
away together upon the same tack. By superior gunnery Howe's attack
might be _stopped_, but by no possibility could it be _avoided_
except by flight. It was no wonder then that Howe's invention was
received with enthusiasm by such men as Nelson.

Still it is clear that in certain cases, and especially in making an
attack from the leeward, as Clerk of Eldin had pointed out, and where
it was desirable to preserve your own line intact, Rodney's manoeuvre
might still be the best. Howe's manoeuvre moreover supplied its chief
imperfection, for it provided a method of dealing drastically with the
portion of the enemy's line that had been cut off. Thus, although it
is not traceable in the Signal Book, it was really reintroduced in
Howe's third code. This is clear from the last article of the
Explanatory Instructions of 1799 which distinguishes between the two
manoeuvres; but whether or not this article was in the Instructions of
1790 we cannot tell. The probability is that it was not, for in the
Signal Book of 1790 there is no reference to a modifying instruction.
Further, we know that in the code proposed by Sir Charles H. Knowles
the only signal for breaking the line was word for word the same as
Howe's. This code he drew up in its final form in 1794, but it was not
printed till 1798. The presumption is therefore that until the code of
1799 was issued Howe's method of breaking the line was the only one
recognised. In that code the primary intention of Signal 27 'for
breaking through the enemy's line in all parts' is still for Howe's
manoeuvre, but the instruction provides that it could be modified by a
red pennant over, and in that case it meant 'that the fleet is to
preserve the line of battle as it passes through the enemy's line, and
to preserve it in very close order, that such of the enemy's ships as
are cut off may not find an opportunity of passing through it to
rejoin their fleet.' This was precisely Rodney's manoeuvre with the
proviso for close order introduced by Pigot. The instruction also
provided for the combining of a numeral to indicate at which number in
the enemy's line the attempt was to be made. No doubt the distinction
between manoeuvres so essentially different might have been more
logically made by entirely different signals.[6] But in practice it
was all that was wanted. It is only posterity that suffers, for in
studying the actions of that time it is generally impossible to tell
from the signal logs or the tactical memoranda which movement the
admiral had in mind. Not only do we never find it specified whether
the signal was made simply or with the pennant over, but admirals seem
to have used the expressions 'breaking' and 'cutting' the line, and
'breaking through,' 'cutting through,' 'passing through,' and 'leading
through,' as well as others, quite indiscriminately of both forms of
the manoeuvre. Thus in Nelson's first, or Toulon, memorandum he speaks
of 'passing through the line' from to-windward, meaning presumably
Howe's manoeuvre, and of 'cutting through' their fleet from to-leeward
when presumably he means Rodney's. In the Trafalgar memorandum he
speaks of 'leading through' and 'cutting' the line from to-leeward,
and of 'cutting through' from to-windward, when he certainly meant to
perform Howe's manoeuvre. Whereas Howe, in his Instruction XXXI. of
1799, uses 'breaking the line' and 'passing through it' indifferently
of both forms.

All we can do is generally to assume that when the attack was to be
made from to-windward Howe's manoeuvre was intended, and Rodney's when
it was made from to-leeward. Yet this is far from being safe
ground. For the signification of the plain signal without the red
pennant over--_i.e._ 'to break through ... and engage on the other
side'--seems to contemplate Howe's manoeuvre being made both from
to-leeward and from to-windward.

The only notable disappearances in Howe's second code (1790) are the
signals for 'doubling,' probably as a corollary of the new
manoeuvre. For, until this device was hit upon, Rodney's method of
breaking the line apparently could only be made effective as a means
of concentration by doubling on the part cut off in accordance with
Hoste's method. This at least is what Clerk of Eldin seems to imply
in some of his diagrams, in so far as he suggests any method of
dealing with the part cut off. Yet in spite of this disappearance
Nelson certainly doubled at the Nile, and according to Captain Edward
Berry, who was captain of his flagship, he did it deliberately. 'It is
almost unnecessary,' he wrote in his narrative, 'to explain his
projected mode of attack at anchor, as that was minutely and precisely
executed in the action.... These plans however were formed two months
before, ... and the advantage now was that they were familiar to the
understanding of every captain in the fleet.' Nelson probably felt
that the dangers attending doubling in an action under sail are
scarcely appreciable in an action at anchor with captains whose
steadiness he could trust. Still Saumarez, his second in command,
regarded it as a mistake, and there was a good deal of complaint of
our ships having suffered from each other's fire.[7]

Amongst the more important retentions of tactical signals we find that
for Hoste's method of giving battle to a numerically superior force by
leaving gaps in your own line between van, centre and rear. The
wording however is changed. It is no longer enjoined as a means of
avoiding being doubled. As Howe inserted it in MS. the signification
now ran 'for the van or particular divisions to engage the headmost of
the enemy's van, the rear the sternmost of the enemy's rear, and the
centre the centre of the enemy. But with exception of the flag
officers of the fleet who should engage those of the enemy
respectively in preference.'[8] This signification again is
considerably modified by the Explanatory Instructions. Article XXIV.,
it will be seen, says nothing of engaging the centre or of leaving
regular gaps. The leading ship is to engage the enemy's leading ship,
and the rearmost the rearmost, while the rest are to select the
largest ships they can get at, and leave the weaker ones alone till
the stronger are disabled. It was in effect the adoption of Hoste's
fifth rule for engaging a numerically superior fleet instead of his
first, and it is a plan which he condemns except in the case of your
being individually superior to your enemy, as indeed the English
gunnery usually made them.

The curious signal No. 218 of 1782 for attacking the enemy's rear in
succession by 'defiling' on the Elizabethan plan was also retained. In
the Signal Book of 1799 it ran, 'to fire in succession upon the
sternmost ships of the enemy, then tack or wear and take station in
rear of the squadron or division specified (if a part of the fleet is
so appointed) until otherwise directed.'

It has been already said that the alterations in the edition of 1799
were not of great importance, but one or two additions must be
noticed. The most noteworthy is a new signal for carrying out the
important rule of Article IX. of the Instructions of 1782 (Article
X. of 1799), providing for the formation of a _corps de reserve_
when you are numerically superior to the enemy, as was done by
Villeneuve on Gravina's advice in 1805, although fortunately for
Nelson it was not put in practice at Trafalgar.

The other addition appears in MS. at the end of the printed signals.
It runs as follows: 'When at anchor in line of battle to let go a
bower anchor under foot, and pass a stout hawser from one ship to
another, beginning at the weathermost ship,' an addition which would
seem to have been suggested by what had recently occurred at the Nile.
Nelson's own order was as follows: '_General Memorandum_.--As the
wind will probably blow along shore, when it is deemed necessary to
anchor and engage the enemy at their anchorage it is recommended to
each line-of-battle ship of the squadron to prepare to anchor with the
sheet cable in abaft and springs, &c.'[9] Another copy of the signal
book has a similar MS. addition to the signal 'Prepare for battle and
for anchoring with springs, &c.'[10] It runs thus: 'A bower is to be
unbent, and passed through the stern port and bent to the anchor,
leaving that anchor hanging by the stopper only.--Lord Nelson, St.
George, 26 March, 1801. If with a red pennant over with a spring
only.--Commander-in-chiefs Order Book, 27 March, 1801.' These
therefore were additions made immediately before the attack on the
Danish fleet at Copenhagen.

No other change was made, and it may be said that Howe's new method of
breaking the line was the last word on the form of attack for a
sailing fleet. How far its full intention and possibilities were
understood at first is doubtful. The accounts of the naval actions
that followed show no lively appreciation on the part of the bulk of
British captains. On the First of June the new signal for breaking
through the line at all points was the first Howe made, and it was
followed as soon as the moment for action arrived by that 'for each
ship to steer for, independently of each other, and engage
respectively the ship opposed in situation to them in the enemy's
line.' The result was an action along the whole line, during which
Howe himself at the earliest opportunity passed through the enemy's
line and engaged on the other side, though as a whole the fleet
neglected to follow either his signal or his example.

In the next great action, that of St. Vincent, the circumstances were
not suitable for the new manoeuvre, seeing that the Spaniards had not
formed line. Jervis had surprised the enemy in disorder on a hazy
morning after a change of wind, and this was precisely the 'not very
probable case' which Clerk of Eldin had instanced as justifying a
perpendicular attack. Whether or not Jervis had Clerk's instance in
his mind, he certainly did deliver a perpendicular attack. The signal
with which he opened, according to the signification as given in the
flagship's log, was 'The admiral intends to pass through the enemy's
line.'[11] There is nothing to show whether this meant Howe's
manoeuvre or Rodney's, for we do not know whether at this time the
instruction existed which enabled the two movements to be
distinguished by a pennant over.

What followed however was that the fleet passed between the two
separated Spanish squadrons in line ahead as Clerk advised. The next
thing to do, according to Clerk, was for the British fleet to wear or
tack together, but instead of doing so Jervis signalled to tack in
succession, and then repeated the signal to pass through the enemy's
line although it was still unformed. It was at this moment that Nelson
made his famous independent movement that saved the situation, and
what he did was in effect as though Jervis had made the signal to tack
together as Clerk enjoined. Thereupon Jervis, with the intention
apparently of annulling his last order to pass through the line, made
the signal, which seems to have been the only one which the captains
of those days believed in--viz. to take suitable stations for mutual
support and engage the enemy on arriving up with them in
succession. In practice it was little more than a frank relapse to the
methods of the early Commonwealth, and it was this signal and not that
for breaking the line which made the action general.

Again, at the battle of Camperdown, Duncan, while trying to form
single line from two columns of sailing, began with the signal for
each ship to steer independently for her opponent. This was
followed--the fleet having failed to form line parallel to the enemy,
and being still in two disordered columns--by signals for the lee or
van division to engage the enemy's rear, and as some thought the
weather division his centre; and ten minutes later came the new signal
for passing through the line. The result was an action almost exactly
like that of Nelson at Trafalgar--that is, though the leading ships
duly acted on the combination of the two signals for engaging their
opposites and for breaking the line, each at its opposite interval,
the rest was a _melee_; for, since what was fundamentally a
parallel attack was attempted as a perpendicular one, it could be
nothing but a scramble for the rear ships.

In none of these actions therefore is there any evidence that Howe's
attempt to impress the service with a serious scientific view of
tactics had been successful, and the impression which they made upon
our enemies suggests that the real spirit that inspired British
officers at this time was something very different from that which
Howe had tried to instil. Writing of the battle of St. Vincent, Don
Domingo Perez de Grandallana, whose masterly studies of the French and
English naval systems and tactics raised him to the highest offices of
state, has the following passage: 'An Englishman enters a naval action
with the firm conviction that his duty is to hurt his enemies and help
his friends and allies without looking out for directions in the midst
of the fight; and while he thus clears his mind of all subsidiary
distractions, he rests in confidence on the certainty that his
comrades, actuated by the same principles as himself, will be bound by
the sacred and priceless law of mutual support. Accordingly, both he
and all his fellows fix their minds on acting with zeal and judgment
upon the spur of the moment, and with the certainty that they will not
be deserted. Experience shows, on the contrary, that a Frenchman or a
Spaniard, working under a system which leans to formality and strict
order being maintained in battle, has no feeling for mutual support,
and goes into action with hesitation, preoccupied with the anxiety of
seeing or hearing the commander-in-chief's signals for such and such
manoeuvres.... Thus they can never make up their minds to seize any
favourable opportunity that may present itself. They are fettered by
the strict rule to keep station, which is enforced upon them in both
navies, and the usual result is that in one place ten of their ships
may be firing on four, while in another four of their comrades may be
receiving the fire of ten of the enemy. Worst, of all, they are denied
the confidence inspired by mutual support, which is as surely
maintained by the English as it is neglected by us, who will not learn
from them.'[12]

This was probably the broad truth of the matter; it is summed up in
the golden signal which was the panacea of British admirals when in
doubt: 'Ships to take station for mutual support and engage as they
come up;' and it fully explains why, with all the scientific
appreciation of tactics that existed in the leading admirals of this
time, their battles were usually so confused and haphazard. The truth
is that in the British service formal tactics had come to be regarded
as a means of getting at your enemy, and not as a substitute for
initiative in fighting him.

FOOTNOTES:

[1] _Dictionary of National Biography, sub voce_ 'Howe,' p. 97.

[2] A copy of this is in the Admiralty Library issued to 'Thomas Lenox
Frederick esq., Rear-Admiral of the Blue,' and attested by the
autographs of Vice-Admiral James Gambier, Vice-Admiral James Young, and
another lord of the admiralty, and countersigned by William Marsden, the
famous numismatist and Oriental scholar, who was 'second secretary' from
1795 to 1804. Another copy, also in the Admiralty Library, is attested
by Gambier, Sir John Colpoys and Admiral Philip Patton, and
countersigned by the new second secretary, John Barrow, all of whom came
to the admiralty under Lord Melville on Pitt's return to office in 1804.
Two other copies are in the United Service Institution.

[3] Sir Home Popham's code had been in use for many years for
'telegraphing.' It was by this code Nelson's famous signal was made at
Trafalgar.

[4] In one of the United Service Institution copies the signal has
been added in MS. and the note is on a slip pasted in. In the other both
signal and note are printed with blanks in which the distinguishing
pennants have been written in.

[5] Nelson to Howe, January 8, 1799. _Nicolas_, iii. 230.

[6] Sir Charles H. Knowles did modify his code in this way some time
after 1798. For his original signal he substituted two in MS. with the
following neatly worded significations: 'No. 32. To break through the
enemy's line together and engage on the opposite side. No. 33. To break
through the enemy's line in succession and engage on the other side.'
Had these two lucid significations been adopted by Howe there would have
been no possible ambiguity as to what was meant.

[7] Laughton, _Nelson's Letters and Despatches_, p. 151. Ross, _Memoir
of Lord de Saumarez_, vol. i.

[8] This last mediaeval proviso was omitted in the later editions. It
is not found in Hoste.

[9] Ross, _Memoir of Saumarez_, i. 212. Nelson refers to 'Signal 54,
Art. XXXVII. of the Instructions,' which must have been a special and
amplified set issued by Jervis. There is no Art. XXXVII. in Howe's set.

[10] In the United Service Institution.

[11] _Logs of the Great Sea Fights_, i. 210. The log probably only
gives an abbreviation of the signification. Unless Jervis had changed
it, its exact wording was 'The admiral means to pass between the ships
of their line for engaging them to leeward,' &c. See _supra_, p. 255.

[12] Fernandez Duro, _Armada Espanola_, viii. 111.

_LORD HOWE'S EXPLANATORY INSTRUCTIONS_.

[+Signal Book, 1799+.[1]]

_Instructions for the conduct of the fleet preparatory to their
engaging, and when engaged, with an enemy_.

I. When the signal is made for the fleet to form the line of battle,
each flag officer and captain is to get into his station as
expeditiously as possible, and to keep in close order, if not
otherwise directed, and under a proportion of sail suited to that
carried by the admiral, or by the senior flag officer remaining in the
line when the admiral has signified his intention to quit it.

II. The chief purposes for which a fleet is formed in line of battle
are: that the ships may be able to assist and support each other in
action; that they may not be exposed to the fire of the enemy's ships
greater in number than themselves; and that every ship may be able to
fire on the enemy without risk of firing into the ships of her own
fleet.

III. If, after having made a signal to prepare to form the line of
battle on either line of bearing, the admiral, keeping the preparative
flag flying, should make several signals in succession, to point out
the manner in which the line is to be formed, those signals are to be
carefully written down, that they may be carried into execution, when
the signal for the line is hoisted again; they are to be executed in
the order in which they were made, excepting such as the admiral may
annul previously to his hoisting again the signal for the line.

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