Martin Farquhar Tupper - Probabilities

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PROBABILITIES;

AN AID TO FAITH.

BY

Martin Farquhar Tupper, A.M., F.R.S.

THE AUTHOR OF

"PROVERBIAL PHILOSOPHY."

"ALMOST THOU PERSUADEST ME TO BE A CHRISTIAN."

HARTFORD:

PUBLISHED BY SILAS ANDRUS & SON.

1851.

PROBABILITIES.

AN AID TO FAITH.

The certainty of those things which most surely are believed among us,
is a matter quite distinct from their antecedent probability or
improbability. We know, and take for facts, that Cromwell and Napoleon
existed, and are persuaded that their characters and lives were such as
history reports them: but it is another thing, and one eminently
calculated to disturb any disbeliever of such history, if a man were
enabled to show, that, from the condition of social anarchy, there was
an antecedent likelihood for the use of military despots; that, from the
condition of a popular puritanism, or a popular infidelity, it was
previously to have been expected that such leaders should have the
several characteristics of a bigoted zeal for religion, or a craving
appetite for worldly glory; that, from the condition liable to
revolutions, it was probable to find such despots arising out of the
middle class; and that, from the condition of reaction incidental to all
human violences, there was a clear expectability that the power of such
military monarchs should not be continued to their natural heirs.

Such a line of argument, although in no measure required for the
corroboration of facts, might have considerable power to persuade _a
priori_ the man, who had not hitherto seen reason to credit such facts
from posterior evidence. It would have rolled away a great stone, which
to such a mind might otherwise have stood as a stumbling-block on the
very threshold of truth. It would have cleared off a heavy mist, which
might prevent him from discerning the real nature of the scene in which
he stood. It would have shown him that, what others know to be fact, is,
even to him who does not know it, become antecedently probable; and that
Reason is not only no enemy to Faith, but is ready and willing to
acknowledge its alliance.

Take a second illustration, by way of preliminary. A woodman, cleaving
an oak, finds an iron ball in its centre; he sees the fact, and of
course believes; some others believing on his testimony. But a certain
village-pundit, habitually sceptical of all marvels, is persuaded that
the wonder has been fabricated by our honest woodman; until the parson,
a good historian, coming round that way, proclaims it a most interesting
circumstance, because it was one naturally to have been expected; for
that, here was the spot where, two hundred years ago, a great battle had
been fought: and it was no improbability at all that a carbine-bullet
should have penetrated a sapling, nor that the tree should thereafter
have grown old with the iron at its heart. How unreasonable then would
appear the pundit's incredulity, if persisted in: how suddenly
enlightened the rational faith of the rustic: how seasonable would be
felt the useful learning of him, whose knowledge well applied can thus
unfetter truth from the bandages of ignorance.

Illustrations, if apt, are so well adapted to persuade towards a
particular line of argument, that, at the risk of diffuseness, and
because minds being various are variously touched, one by one thought
and one by another, I think fit to add yet more of a similar tendency:
in the hope that, by a natural induction, such instances may smoothe our
way.

When an eminent living geologist was prosecuting his researches at
Kirkdale cave, Yorkshire, he had calculated so nicely on the antecedent
probabilities, that his commands to the labourers were substantially
these: "Take your mattocks, and pick up that stone flooring; then take
your basket, and fill it--with the bones of hyaenas and other creatures
which you will find there." We may fancy the ridicule wherewith
ignorance might have greeted science: but lo, the triumph of philosophy,
when its mandate soon assumed a bodily shape in--bushels of bones gnawed
as by wild beasts, and here and there a grinning skull that looked like
a hyaena's! Do we not see how this bears on our coming argument? Such a
deposit was very unlikely to be found there in the eyes of the
unenlightened: but very likely to the wise man's ken. The real
probabilities were in favour of a strange fact, though the seeming
probabilities were against it.

Take another. We are all now convinced of the existence of America; and
so, some three or four hundred years back, was Christopher Columbus--but
nobody else. Alone, he proved that mighty continent so probable, from
geometrical measurements, and the balance of the world, and tides, and
trade-winds, and casual floatsams driven from some land beneath the
setting sun, that he was antecedently convinced of the fact: and it
would have been a shock to his reason, as well as to his faith, had he
found himself able to sail due west from Lisbon to China, without having
struck against his huge probability. I purposely abstain from applying
every illustration, or showing its specific difference regarding our
theme. It is better to lead a mind to think for itself than to endeavour
to forestall every notion.

Another. A Kissoor merchant in Timbuctoo is told of the existence of
water hard and cold as marble. All the experience of his nation is
against it. He disbelieves. However, after no long time, the testimony
of two native princes who have been _feted_ in England, and have seen
ice, shakes his once not unreasonable incredulity: and the additional
idea brought soon to his remembrance, that, as lead cools down from hot
fluidity to a solid lump, so, in the absence of solar heat, in all
probability would water--corroborates and makes acceptable by analogous
likelihood the doctrine simultaneously evidenced by credible witnesses.

Yet one more illustration for the last. Few things in nature appear more
unlikely to the illiterate, than that a living toad should be found
prisoned in a block of limestone; nevertheless, evidence goes to prove
that such cases are not uncommon. Now, if, instead of limestone, which
is a water-product, the creature had been found embedded in granite,
which is a fire-product; although the fact might have been from
eye-sight equally unimpeachable, how much more unlikely such a
circumstance would have appeared in the judgment of science. To the
rustic, the limestone case is as stout a puzzle as the granite one; but
_a priori_, the philosopher--taking into account the aqueous fluidity of
such a matrix at a period when reptiles were abundant, the torpid
qualities of the toad itself, and the fact that time is scarcely an
element in the absence of air--arrives at an antecedent probability,
which comforts his acceptance of the fact. The granite would have
staggered his reason, even though his own experience or the testimony of
others were sufficient, nay, imperative, to assure his faith: but in the
case of limestone, Reason even helps Faith; nay, anticipates and leads
it in, by suggesting the wonder to be previously probable. How truly,
and how strongly this bears upon our theme, let any such philosophizing
mind consider.

But enough of illustrations: although these, multipliable to any amount,
might bring, each in its own case, some specific tendency to throw light
upon the path we mean to tread: it is wiser perhaps, as implying more
confidence in the reader's intellectual powers, to leave other analogous
cases to the suggestion of his own mind; also, not to vex him in every
instance with the intrusive finger of an obvious application.
Meanwhile, it is a just opportunity to clear the way at once of some
obstructions, by disposing of a few matters personal to the writer; and
by touching upon sundry other preliminary considerations.

1. The line of thought proposed is intended to show it probable that any
thing which has been or is, might, viewed antecedently to its existence,
by an exercise of pure reason, have by possibility been guessed: and on
the hypothesis of sufficient keenness and experience, that this idea may
be carried even to the future. Any thing, meaning every thing, is a word
not used unadvisedly; for this is merely a suggestive treatise, starting
a rule capable of infinite application: and, notwithstanding that we
have here and now confined its elucidation to some matters of religious
moment only, as occupying a priority of importance, and at all times
deserving the lead; still, if knowledge availed, and time and space
permitted, I scarcely doubt that a vigorous and illuminated intellect
might so far enlarge on the idea, as to show the antecedent probability
of every event which has happened in the kingdoms of nature, providence,
and grace: nay, of directing his guess at coming matters with no
uncertain aim into the realms of the immediate future. The perception of
cause in operation enables him to calculate the consequence, even
perhaps better than the prophecy of cause could in the prior case enable
him to suspect the consequence. But, in this brief life, and under its
disturbing circumstances, there is little likelihood of accomplishing in
practice all that the swift mind sees it easy to dream in theory: and if
other and wiser pens are at all helped in the good aim to justify the
ways of God with man, and to clear the course of truth, by some of the
notions broadcast in this treatise, its errand will be well fulfilled.

2. Whether or not the leading idea, so propounded, is new, or is new in
its application as an auxiliary to Christian evidences, the writer is
unaware: to his own mind it has occurred quite spontaneously and on a
sudden; neither has he scrupled to place it before others with whatever
ill advantage of celerity, because it seemed to his own musings to shed
a flood of light upon deep truths, which may not prove unwelcome nor
unuseful to the doubting minds of many. It is true that in this, as in
most other human efforts, the realization of idea in concrete falls far
short of its abstract conception in the mind: there, all was clear,
quick, and easy; here, the necessity of words, and the constraints of an
unwilling perseverance, clog alike the wings of fancy and the feet of
sober argument: insomuch that the difference is felt to be quite
humiliating between the thoughts as they were thought, and the thoughts
as they are written. Minerva, springing from the head of Jove, is not
more unlike the heavily-treading Vulcan.

3. Necessarily, that the argument be (so to speak) complete, and on the
wise principle that no fortresses be left untaken in the rear, it must
be the writer's fate to attempt a demonstration of the anterior
probability of truths, which a child of reason can not only now never
doubt as fact, but never could have thought improbable. Instance the
first effort, showing it to have been expectable that there should, in
any conceived beginning, have existed a Something, a Great Spirit, whom
we call God. To have to argue of the mighty Maker, that HE was an
antecedent probability, would appear a most needless attempt; if it did
not occur as the first link in a chain of arguments less open to
objection by the thoughtless. With our little light to try to prove _a
priori_ the dazzling mystery of a Divine Tri-unity, might (unreasonably
viewed) be assailed as a presumptuous and harmful thing; but it is our
wise prerogative, if and when we can, to "Prove all things." Moreover,
we live in a world wherein Truth's greatest enemy is the man who shrinks
from endeavouring at least to clear away the mists and clouds that veil
her precious aspect; and at a time when it behooves the reverent
Christian to put on his panoply of faith and prayer, and meet in
argument, according to the grace and power given to him--not indeed the
blaspheming infidel, for such a foe is unreasonable and unworthy of an
answer, but--the often candid, anxious, and involuntary doubter; the
mind, which, righteously vexed with the thousand corruptions of truth,
and sorely disappointed at the conduct of its herd of false disciples,
from a generous misconception is embracing error: the mind, never enough
tenderly treated, but commonly taunted as a sceptic which yet with a
natural manliness asserts the just prerogative of thinking for itself:
fairly enough requiring, though rarely finding, evidence either to prop
the weakness of a merely educational faith, or to argue away the
objections to Christianity so rife in the clashing doctrines and unholy
lives of its pseudo-sectaries. One of our poets hath said, "He has no
hope who never had a fear:" it is quite as true (and take this saying
for thy comfort, any harassed misbelieving mind), He has no faith, who
never had a doubt. There is hope of a mind which doubts, because it
thinks; because it troubles itself to think about what the mass of
nominal Christians live threescore years and die of very mammonism,
without having had one earnest thought about one difficulty, or one
misgiving: there is hope of a man, who, not licentious nor scornful,
from simple misconception, misbelieves; there is just and reasonable
hope that (the misconception once removed) his faith will shine forth
all the warmer for a temporary state of winter. To such do I address
myself: not presumptuously imagining that I can satisfy by my poor
thoughts all the doubts, cavils and objections of minds so keen and
curious; not affecting to sail well among the shoals of metaphysics, nor
to plumb unerringly the deeper gulphs of reason; but asking them for
awhile to bear with me and hear me to the end patiently; with me,
convinced of what ([Greek: kat' exochen]) is Truth, by far surer and
stronger arguments than any of the less considerations here expounded as
auxiliary thereto; to bear with me, and prove for themselves at this
penning of my thoughts (if haply I am helped in such high enterprise),
whether indeed those doctrines and histories which the Christian world
admit, were antecedently improbable, that is, unreasonable: whether, on
the contrary, there did not exist, prior to any manifestation of such
facts and doctrines, an exceeding likelihood that they would be so and
so developed: and whether on the whole, led by reason to the threshold
of faith, it may be worth while to encounter other arguments, which have
rendered probabilities now certain.

4. It is very material to keep in memory the only scope and object of
this essay. We do not pretend to add one jot of evidence, but only to
prepare the mind to receive evidence: we do not attempt to prove facts,
but only to accelerate their admission by the removal of prejudice. If a
bed-ridden meteorologist is told that it rains, he may or he may not
receive the fact from the force of testimony; but he will certainly be
more predisposed to receive it, if he finds that his weatherglass is
falling rather than rising. The fact remains the same, it rains; but the
mind--precluded by circumstances from positive personal assurance of
such fact, and able only to arrive at truth from exterior evidence--is
in a fitter state for belief of the fact from being already made aware
that it was probable. Let it not then be inferred, somewhat perversely,
that because antecedent probabilities are the staple of our present
argument, the theme itself, Religion, rests upon hypotheses so slender:
it rests not at all upon such straws as probabilities, but on posterior
evidence far more firm. What we now attempt is not to prop the ark, but
favourably to predispose the mind of any reckless Uzzah, who might
otherwise assail it; not to strengthen the weak places of religion, but
to annul such disinclination to receive Truth, as consists in prejudice
and misconception of its likelihood. The goodly ship is built upon the
stocks, the platforms are reared, and the cradle is ready; but mistaken
preconceptions may scatter the incline with gravel-stones rather than
with grease, and thus put a needless hindrance to the launching: whereas
a clear idea that the probabilities are in favour, rather than the
reverse, will make all smooth, lubricate, and easy. If, then, we fail in
this attempt, no disservice whatever is done to Truth itself; no breach
is made in the walls, no mine sprung, no battlement dismantled; all the
evidences remain as they were; we have taken nothing away. Even granting
matters seemed anteriorily improbable, still, if evidence proved them
true, such anterior unlikelihood would entirely be merged in the stoutly
proven facts. Moreover, if we be adjudged to have succeeded, we have
added nothing to Truth itself; no, nor to its outworks. That sacred
temple stands complete, firm and glorious from corner-stone to
top-stone. We do but sweep away the rubbish at its base; the drifting
desert sands that choke its portals. We only serve that cause (a most
high privilege), by enlisting a prejudgment in its favour. We propose
herein an auxiliary to evidence, not evidence itself; a finger-post to
point the way to faith; a little light of reason on its path. The risk
is really nothing; but the advantage, under favour, may be much.

5. It is impossible to elude the discussion of topics, which in their
direct tendencies, or remoter inferences, may, to the author at least,
prove dangerous or disputable ground. If a "great door and effectual" is
opened to him, doubtless he will raise or meet with many adversaries.
Besides mere haters of his creed, despisers of his arguments, and
protestors, loud and fierce against his errors; he may possibly fall
foul of divers unintended heresies; he may stumble unwittingly on the
relics of exploded schisms; he may exhume controversies in metaphysical
or scholastical polemics, long and worthily extinct. If this be so, he
can only plead, _Mea culpa, mea culpa, mea maxima culpa_. But it is
open to him also to protest against the common critical folly of making
an offender for a word: of driving analogies on all four feet, and
straining thoughts beyond their due proportions. Above all, never let a
reader stir one inch beyond, far less against, his own judgment: if
there seem to be sufficient reasons, well: if otherwise, let me walk
uncompanied. The first step especially is felt to be a very difficult
one; perhaps very debatable: for aught I know, it may be merely a vain
insect caught in the cobweb of metaphysics, soon to be destroyed, and
easily to be discussed at leisure by some Aranean logician. However, it
seemed to my midnight musings a probable mode of arriving at truth,
though somewhat unsatisfactorily told from poverty of thought and
language. Moreover, it would have been, in such _a priori_ argument,
ridiculous to have commenced by announcing a posterior conclusion: for
this cause did I do my humble best to work it out anew: and however
supererogatory it may seem at first sight to the majority of readers,
those keener minds whom I mainly address, and whose interests I wish to
serve, will recognise the attempt as at least consistent: and will be
ready to admit that if the arduous effort prove anteriorly a First Great
Cause, and His attributes, be futile (which, however, I do not admit),
it was an attempt unneeded on the score of its own merits; albeit, with
an obvious somewhat of justice, pure reason may desire to begin at the
beginning. No one, who thinks at all upon religion, however
misbelieving, can entertain any mental prejudice against the existence
of a Deity, or against the received character of His attributes. Such a
man would be merely in a savage state, irrational: whilst his own mind,
so speculating, would stand itself proof positive of an Intellectual
Father; either immediately, as in the first man's case, or mediately, as
in our own, it must have sprung out of that Being, who is emphatically
the Good One--God. But if, as is possible, a mind, capable of thinking,
and keen to think on other themes, from any cause, educational or moral,
has neglected this great track of mediation, has "forgotten God," and
"had him _not_ in all his thoughts," such an one I invite to walk with
me; and, in spite of all incompleteness and insufficiency, uncaptious of
much that may haply be fanciful or false, briefly and in outline to test
with me sundry probabilities of the Christian scheme, considered
antecedently to its elucidation.

A GOD: AND HIS ATTRIBUTES.

I will commence with a noble, and, as I believe, an inspired sentence:
than which no truth uttered by philosophers ever was more clearly or
more sublimely expressed. "In the beginning was the Word: and the Word
was with God; and the Word was God." In its due course, we will consider
especially the difference between the Word and God; likewise the seeming
contradiction, but true concord, of being simultaneously God, and with
God. At present, and previously to the true commencement of our _a
priori_ thoughts, let us, by a word or two, paraphrase that brief but
comprehensive sentence, "In the beginning was the Word." Eternity has no
beginning, as it has no end: the clock of Time is futile there: it
might as well attempt to go in vacuo. Nevertheless, in respect to
finite intelligences like ourselves, seeing that eternity is an idea
totally inconceivable, it is wise, nay it is only possible, to be
presented to the mind piecemeal. Even our deepest mathematicians do not
scruple to speak of points "infinitely remote;" as if in that phrase
there existed no contradiction of terms. So, also, we pretend in our
emptiness to talk of eternity past, time present, and eternity to come;
the fact being that, muse as a man may, he can entertain no idea of an
existence which is not measurable by time: any more than he can conceive
of a colour unconnected with the rainbow, or of a musical note beyond
the seven sounds. The plain intention of the words is this: place the
starting-post of human thought as far back into eternity as you will, be
it what man counts a thousand ages, or ten thousand times ten thousand,
or be these myriads multiplied again by millions, still, in any such
Beginning, and in the beginning of all beginnings (for so must creatures
talk)--then was God. He Was: the scholar knows full well the force of
the original term, the philological distinctions between [Greek: eimi]
and [Greek: gignomai]: well pleased, he reads as of the Divinity [Greek:
en], He self-existed; and equally well pleased he reads of the humanity
[Greek: egennethe], he was born. The thought and phrase [Greek: en]
sympathizes, if it has not an identity, with the Hebrew's unutterable
Name. HE then, whose title, amongst all others likewise denoting
excellence supreme and glory underivative, is essentially "I am;" HE
who, relatively to us as to all creation else, has a new name wisely
chosen in "the Word,"--the great expression of the idea of God; this
mighty Intelligence is found in any such beginning self-existent. That
teaching is a mere fact, known posteriorly from the proof of all things
created, as well as by many wonderful signs, and the clear voice of
revelation. We do not attempt to prove it; that were easy and obvious:
but our more difficult endeavour at present is to show how antecedently
probable it was that God should be: and that so being, He should be
invested with the reasonable attributes, wherewithal we know His
glorious Nature to be clothed.

Take then our beginning where we will, there must have existed in that
"originally" either Something, or Nothing. It is a clear matter to
prove, _a posteriori_, that Something did exist; because something
exists now: every matter and every derived spirit must have had a
Father; _ex nihilo nihil fit_, is not more a truth, than that creation
must have had a Creator. However, leaving this plain path (which I only
point at by the way for obvious mental uses), let us now try to get at
the great antecedent probability that in the beginning Something should
have been, rather than Nothing.

The term, Nothing, is a fallacious one: it does not denote an existence,
as Something does, but the end of an existence. It is in fact a
negation, which must presuppose a matter once in being and possible to
be denied; it is an abstraction, which cannot happen unless there be
somewhat to be taken away; the idea of vacuity must be posterior to that
of fullness; the idea of no tree is incompetent to be conceived without
the previous idea of _a_ tree; the idea of nonentity suggests, _ex vi
termini_, a pre-existent entity; the idea of Nothing, of necessity,
presupposes Something. And a Something once having been, it would still
and for ever continue to be, unless sufficient cause be found for its
removal; that cause itself, you will observe, being a Something. The
chances are forcibly in favour of continuance, that is of perpetuity;
and the likelihoods proclaim loudly that there should be an Existence.
It was thus, then, antecedently more probable, than in any imaginable
beginning from which reason can start, Something should be found
existent, rather than Nothing. This is the first probability.

Next; of what nature and extent is this Something, this Being, likely to
be?--There will be either one such being, or many: if many, the many
either sprang from the one, or the mass are all self-existent; in the
former case, there would be a creation and a God: in the latter, there
would be many Gods. Is the latter antecedently more probable?--let us
see. First, it is evident that if many are probable, few are more
probable, and one most probable of all. The more possible gods you take
away, the more do impediments diminish; until, that is to say, you
arrive at that One Being, whom we have already proved probable.
Moreover, many must be absolutely united as one; in which case the many
is a gratuitous difficulty, because they may as well be regarded for all
purposes of worship or argument as one God: or the many must have been
in essence more or less disunited; in which case, as a state of any
thing short of pure concord carries in itself the seeds of dissolution,
needs must that one or other of the many (long before any possible
beginnings, as we count beginnings, looking down the past vista of
eternity), would have taken opportunity by such disturbing causes to
become absolute monarch: whether by peaceful persuasion, or hostile
compulsion, or other mode of absorbing disunions, would be indifferent;
if they were not all improbable, as unworthy of the God. Perpetuity of
discord is a thing impossible; every thing short of unity tends to
decomposition. Any how then, given the element of eternity to work in,
a one great Supreme Being was, in the created beginning, an _a priori_
probability. That all other assumptions than that of His true and
eternal Oneness are as false in themselves as they are derogatory to the
rational views of deity, we all now see and believe; but the direct
proofs of this are more strictly matters of revelation than of reason:
albeit reason too can discern their probabilities. Wise heathens, such
as Socrates and Cicero, who had not our light, arrived nevertheless at
some of this perception; and thus, through conscience and intelligence,
became a law unto themselves: because that, to them, as now to any one
of us who may not yet have seen the light, the anterior likelihood
existed for only one God, rather than more; a likelihood which prepares
the mind to take as a fundamental truth, "The Lord our God is one
Jehovah."

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