Mary Mills Patrick - Sextus Empiricus and Greek Scepticism

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It is interesting to note that Sextus, in his refutation of the
position that the Academy is the same as Pyrrhonism, takes up
the entire development of Academic thought from the time of
Plato till that of Antiochus, and does not limit the argument to
Scepticism under Arcesilaus. The claim made by some that the two
schools were the same, is stated by him,[4] and the word 'some'
probably refers to members of both schools at different periods
of their history. Sextus recognises three Academies, although he
remarks that some make even a further division, calling that of
Philo and Charmides, the fourth, and that of Antiochus and his
followers, the fifth.

[1] _Hyp._ I. 234.

[2] Diog. IV. 6, 33.

[3] _Hyp._ I. 234.

[4] _Hyp._ I. 220.

That many in the Academy, and even outside of it, regarded Plato
as a Sceptic, and an authority for subsequent Scepticism, we
find both from Sextus and Diogenes.[1] As Lewes justly remarks,
one could well find authority for Scepticism in the works of
Plato, as indeed the Academicians did, but not when the sum
total of his teachings was considered. The spirit of Plato's
teachings was dogmatic, as Sextus most decidedly recognises, and
as Aenesidemus and Menodotus[2] recognised before him.[3] Sextus
himself shows us that Plato's idealism and ethical teachings can
have nothing in common with Scepticism, for if he accepts the
desirability of the virtuous life, and the existence of
Providence, he dogmatises; and if he even regards them as
probable, he gives preference to one set of ideas over another,
and departs from the sceptical character. Sextus characterises
the sceptical side of Plato's writings as mental gymnastics,[4]
which do not authorise his being called a Sceptic, and affirms
that Plato is not a Sceptic, since he prefers some unknown
things to others in trustworthiness. The ethical difference
underlying the teachings of the Academy and Pyrrhonism, Sextus
was very quick to see, and although it is very probable that the
part of the _Hypotyposes_ which defines the difference between
the Academy and Pyrrhonism may be largely quoted from the
introduction to Aenesidemus' works, yet Sextus certainly gives
these statements the strong stamp of his approval. He condemns
the Academy because of the theory that good and evil exist, or
if this cannot be decidedly proved, yet that it is more probable
that what is called good exists than the contrary.[5]

[1] _Hyp._ I. 221; Diog. IX. 11, 72.

[2] Bekker's edition of _Hyp._ I. 222.

[3] _Hyp._ I. 222.

[4] _Hyp._ I. 223.

[5] _Hyp_. I. 226.

The whole Academic teaching of probabilities contradicted the
standpoint of the Sceptics--that our ideas are equal as regards
trustworthiness and untrustworthiness,[1] for the Academicians
declared that some ideas are probable and some improbable, and
they make a difference even in those ideas that they call
probable.

Sextus claims that there are three fundamental grounds of
difference between Pyrrhonism and the Academy. The first is the
doctrine of probability which the Academicians accept in regard
to the superior trustworthiness of some ideas over others.[2]
The second is the different way in which the two schools follow
their teachers. The Pyrrhoneans follow without striving or
strong effort, or even strong inclination, as a child follows
his teacher, while the Academicians follow with sympathy and
assent, as Carneades and Clitomachus affirm.[3] The third
difference is in the aim, for the Academicians follow what is
probable in life. The Sceptics follow nothing, but live
according to laws, customs, and natural feelings
undogmatically.[4]

The difference between the later teaching of the Academy and
Pyrrhonism is evident, and Sextus treats of it briefly, as not
requiring discussion,[5] as Philo taught that the nature of
facts is incomprehensible, and Antiochus transferred the Stoa to
the Academy. It is therefore evident, from the comparison which
we have made, that we do not find in the Academy, with which
Scepticism after the death of Timon was so long united, the
exact continuance of Pyrrhonism. The philosophical enmity of the
two contemporaries, Timon and Arcesilaus, the Academician who
had most in common with Pyrrhonism, is an expression of the
fundamental incompatibility between the two schools.

[1] _Hyp_. I. 227.

[2] _Hyp_. I. 229.

[3] _Hyp_. I. 230.

[4] _Hyp_. I. 231.

[5] _Hyp_. I. 235.

During all the chequered history of the Academy the dormant
idealism was there, underlying the outward development. Although
during the time of Arcesilaus and Carneades the difference was
so slight as to seem a mere matter of form of expression, yet
the different foundations on which the two schools stood was
always recognisable. On the one hand there was the germ of
idealism which was destined to awake to a new life, and on the
other, the attempt at absolute negation which was to result in
the final extinction of Pyrrhonism. We find in both, it is true,
especially in the time of Arcesilaus, the aim of [Greek:
epoche].[1] Both placed great weight on [Greek: isostheneia], or
the equal value of opposing arguments.[2] The foundation of the
[Greek: epoche] was, however, different in the two cases.
Arcesilaus founded his on dialectic, while Pyrrho's was
empirical.

[1] _Hyp._ I. 232.

[2] Diog. IX. 73; _Hyp._ II. 130; III. 65.

The Pyrrhonean believed that ideas give us no knowledge of the
outer world; the Academic Sceptic believed that we cannot
distinguish between true and false ideas, so such knowledge is
impossible. The Pyrrhonean denied that truth could exist in
ideas because of their contradictory nature, and consequently
the existence of all truth, [Greek: meden einai te aletheia epi
panton].[1] The Academic Sceptic granted that the truth was
possibly contained in ideas, but affirmed that it could never be
known to us. The Pyrrhoneans prided themselves on still being
seekers, for although ordinary ideas are too contradictory to
give knowledge of the outer world, they did not deny that such
knowledge might be possible, but simply suspended the judgment
regarding it. To the Pyrrhonean the result corresponded to the
method. All ideas thus far known revealed nothing of the truth,
therefore he still sought. The Academician tried logically to
prove that the truth is impossible to find. It is the relation
of the dialectician to the empiricist, and the two varieties of
Scepticism are explained by their difference in origin. In
Pyrrhonism there was no constructive element. In the Academic
Scepsis such an element was found throughout all its history in
the theory of Probability. Arcesilaus himself laid great stress
upon this doctrine, which Sextus carefully shows us[2] is
utterly inconsistent with Pyrrhonism. Arcesilaus plainly teaches
that, having suspended one's judgment in regard to matters of
knowledge, one should control his choices, his refusals, and his
actions by the probable.[3]

[1] Diog. IX. 11, 61.

[2] _Hyp._ I. 229.

[3] Compare Maccoll _Op. cit._ 39.

After Antiochus introduced Eclecticism into the Academy,
Pyrrhonism was the only representative of Greek Scepticism, and
it flourished for over two centuries after our era, and then
also disappeared, no more to exist as a regular philosophical
school.

Having considered at length the essence of Pyrrhonism as
presented by Sextus Empiricus, it now remains to briefly note
the characteristics that formed its strength and weakness, and
the causes of its final downfall. Herbart says that every
philosopher is a Sceptic in the beginning, but every Sceptic
remains always in the beginning. This remark may well be applied
to Pyrrhonism. We find in its teachings many fundamental
philosophical truths which might have formed the beginning of
great philosophical progress, but which were never developed to
any positive results. The teachings of Pyrrhonism were some of
them well fitted to prepare the way to idealism. The great idea
of the relativity of _Vorstellungen_ is made very prominent by
the ten Tropes of [Greek: epoche]. Aenesidemus, in his eight
Tropes against aetiology, shows the absurdity of the doctrine of
causality when upheld on materialistic grounds. That was to him
final, [Greek: epei ouk estai aition.] He could not divine that
although the result which he presented was logical, it only led
to a higher truth. It was reserved for the greatest of modern
philosophers to reveal to the world that causality is a
condition, and a necessary condition, of thought. When
Aenesidemus proved by his seventh Trope that causality is
subjective, he regarded it as fatal to the doctrine; yet this
conclusion was a marked step in advance in critical philosophy,
although Aenesidemus could not himself see it in all its
bearings. The great difference between Aenesidemus and Kant is
the difference between the materialist and the believer in
subjective reality. Both agreed in the unknown nature of the
_Ding an sich_, but this was to the Pyrrhonist the end of all
his philosophy; to Kant, however, the beginning.

Pyrrhonism has rendered, notwithstanding its points of fatal
weakness, marked service to the world in science, philosophy,
ethics, and religion. It quickened scientific thought by
emphasising empirical methods of investigation, and by
criticising all results founded without sufficient data upon
false hypotheses. If, instead of denying the possibility of all
science because of the want of a criterion of the truth of
phenomena, the Pyrrhonists had comprehended the possibility of a
science of phenomena, they might have led the world in
scientific progress.[1] Their service to philosophy lay in the
stimulus to thought that their frequent attacks on dogmatic
beliefs occasioned. Pyrrhonism brought together all the most
prominent theories of the old schools of philosophy to test
their weakness and expose their contradictions, and this very
process of criticism often demonstrated the power of the truth
which they contained.

Sextus Empiricus was often charged by the Church Fathers with
corrupting religious belief, and yet the greatest service which
Pyrrhonism has rendered the world was in religious and ethical
lines. This service did not, naturally, consist in destroying
belief in absolute truth, as the Sceptic professed to do, but in
preparing the way to find it. The bold attacks of Scepticism on
all truth led men to investigate ethical and religious
teachings, to examine the grounds of their belief, and to put in
practical use the right of reason and free discussion.

Scepticism was the antecedent of freedom of conscience and
rational criticism,[2] and the absolute right of scientific
thought. The Sceptics, however, reaped none of the benefits of
their own system. They remained, as it were, always on the
threshold of possible progress. With the keys to great
discoveries in their hands, the doors of philosophical and
scientific advancement were for ever closed to them by the
limitations of their own system. The inherent weakness of
Pyrrhonism lay in its psychological inconsistency and in its
negative character. I think that we may safely say that
Pyrrhonism was the most consistent system of Scepticism ever
offered to the world, and yet it proves most decidedly that
complete Scepticism is psychologically impossible. A man may
give up his belief in one set of ideas, and, if they are ideas
that are popularly accepted, he will be called a Sceptic, as was
the case with Hume. He must, however, replace these ideas by
others equally positive, and then he is no longer a Sceptic, but
a Dogmatic, for he believes in something.

[1] Compare Lewes _Op. cit._ p. 463.

[2] Compare Chaignet _Op. cit._ p. 460.

We have shown that the greatest thinkers of Pyrrhonism, Pyrrho,
Aenesidemus, and Agrippa, were not examples of absolute
Scepticism, and although Sextus Empiricus realised what
consistency demanded in this respect, and affirmed on almost
every page that he was asserting nothing, yet there is not a
paragraph of his books in which he does not, after all,
dogmatise on some subject. Complete Scepticism is contrary to
the fundamental laws of language, as all use of verbs involves
some affirmation. The Pyrrhonists realised this, and therefore
some of them wrote nothing, like Pyrrho, their leader, and
others advocated [Greek: aphasia][1] as one of the doctrines of
their system.

[1] _Hyp._ I. 192.

The very aim of Pyrrhonism was an inconsistent one. [Greek:
Ataraxia] was only another name for happiness, and in one
instance, even, is given as [Greek: hedone], and thus, in spite
of themselves, the Sceptics introduced a theory of happiness.
Pyrrho, like others of his time, sought the highest good, and
thought that he had found it in [Greek: ataraxia], the peace of
mind that appears in other systems of philosophy in other forms.
The difference of aim between the Pyrrhonists, Stoics, and
Epicureans was more apparent than real. To them all philosophy
was a path to lead to happiness. The method of Pyrrhonism was,
however, negative. Its strength consisted in its attacks on
Dogmatism, and not in any positive aim of its own, for its
positive side could not be recognised according to its own
doctrines. Therefore there was no real development in
Pyrrhonism, for a negative thought cannot be developed.

We find, accordingly, from the time of Pyrrho to Sextus, no
growth in breadth of philosophical outlook, only improvement in
methods. Philosophical activity can never have doubt as its aim,
as that would form, as we have shown, a psychological
contradiction. The true essence of Pyrrhonism was passivity, but
passivity can never lead to progress. Much of the polemical work
of Pyrrhonism prepared the way for scientific progress by
providing a vast store of scientific data, but progress was to
the Pyrrhonists impossible. They sounded their own scientific
death-knell by declaring the impossibility of science, and
putting an end to all theories.

The life of all scientific and philosophic progress is in the
attempt to find the hidden truth. To the Sceptic there was no
truth, and there could be no progress. As progress is a law in
the evolution of the human race, so Scepticism as a philosophy
could never be a permanent growth, any more than asceticism in
religion can be a lasting influence. Both of them are only
outgrowths. As the foundation principles of Scepticism were
opposed to anything like real growth, it was a system that could
never originate anything. Pyrrho taught from the beginning that
the Sceptic must live according to law and custom; not, however,
because one law or custom is better than another in itself, but
simply for the sake of peace. This basis of action was itself a
death-blow to all reform in social or political life. It was a
selfish, negative way of seeking what was, after all, a positive
thing, the [Greek: ataraxia] that the Sceptic desired. Life with
the Pyrrhonist was phenomenal, and not phenomenal simply in
regard to the outer world, but also subjectively, and no
absolute knowledge of the subjective life or of personal
existence was possible.

The cause of the downfall of Pyrrhonism lay in the fact that it
had nothing to offer to humanity in the place of what it had
destroyed. It made no appeal to human sympathies, and ignored
all the highest motives to human action. The especial
materialistic standpoint from which Pyrrhonism judged all that
pertains to knowledge and life shut out the ideal, and all
possibility of absolute truth. It was an expression of the
philosophic decadence of the age when it flourished, and
although it possessed some philosophic worth, yet it bore in
itself the causes of its decay.

PYRRHONIC SKETCHES

BY

SEXTUS EMPIRICUS.

BOOK I.

CHAPTER I.

_The Principal Differences between Philosophers._

It is probable that those who seek after anything whatever, will 1
either find it as they continue the search, will deny that it
can be found and confess it to be out of reach, or will go on
seeking it. Some have said, accordingly, in regard to the things
sought in philosophy, that they have found the truth, while 2
others have declared it impossible to find, and still others
continue to seek it. Those who think that they have found it are
those who are especially called Dogmatics, as for example, the
Schools of Aristotle and Epicurus, the Stoics and some others.
Those who have declared it impossible to find are Clitomachus, 3
Carneades, with their respective followers, and other
Academicians. Those who still seek it are the Sceptics. It
appears therefore, reasonable to conclude that the three 4
principal kinds of philosophy are the Dogmatic, the Academic,
and the Sceptic. Others may suitably treat of the other Schools,
but as for the Sceptical School, we shall now give an outline of
it, remarking in advance that in respect to nothing that will be
said do we speak positively, that it must be absolutely so, but
we shall state each thing historically as it now appears to us.

CHAPTER II.

_Ways of Treating Scepticism._

One way of treating the Sceptical philosophy is called 5
general, and the other special. The general method is that by
which we set forth the character of Scepticism, declaring what
its idea is, what its principles are, its mode of reasoning, its
criterion, and its aim. It presents also, the aspects of doubt,
[Greek: hoi tropoi tes epoches], and the way in which we should
understand the Sceptical formulae, and the distinction between
Scepticism and the related Schools of philosophy. The special
method, on the contrary, is that by which we 6 speak against 6
each part of so-called philosophy. Let us then treat Scepticism
at first in the general way, beginning our delineation with the
nomenclature of the Sceptical School.

CHAPTER III.

_The Nomenclature of Scepticism._

The Sceptical School is also called the "Seeking School," from 7
its spirit of research and examination; the "Suspending School,"
from the condition of mind in which one is left after the
search, in regard to the things that he has examined; and the
"Doubting School," either because, as some say, the Sceptics
doubt and are seeking in regard to everything, or because they
never know whether to deny or affirm. It is also called the
Pyrrhonean School, because Pyrrho appears to us the best
representative of Scepticism, and is more prominent than all who
before him occupied themselves with it.

CHAPTER IV.

_What is Scepticism?_

The [Greek: dynamis] of the Sceptical School is to place the 8
phenomenal in opposition to the intellectual "in any way
whatever," and thus through the equilibrium of the reasons and
things ([Greek: isostheneia ton logon]) opposed to each other,
to reach, first the state of suspension of judgment, [Greek:
epoche] and afterwards that of imperturbability, [Greek:
ataraxia]. We do not use the word [Greek: dynamis] in any 9
unusual sense, but simply, meaning the force of the system. By
the phenomenal, we understand the sensible, hence we place the
intellectual in opposition to it. The phrase "in any way
whatever," may refer to the word [Greek: dynamis] in order that
we may understand that word in a simple sense as we said, or it
may refer to the placing the phenomenal and intellectual in
opposition. For we place these in opposition to each other in a
variety of ways, the phenomenal to the phenomenal, and the
intellectual to the intellectual, or reciprocally, and we say
"in any way whatever," in order that all methods of opposition
may be included. Or "in any way whatever" may refer to the
phenomenal and the intellectual, so that we need not ask how
does the phenomenal appear, or how are the thoughts conceived,
but that we may understand these things in a simple sense. By
"reasons opposed to each other," we do not by any means 10
understand that they deny or affirm anything, but simply that
they offset each other. By equilibrium, we mean equality in
regard to trustworthiness and untrustworthiness, so that of the
reasons that are placed in opposition to each other, one should
not excel another in trustworthiness. [Greek: epoche] is a
holding back of the opinion, in consequence of which we neither
deny nor affirm anything. [Greek: ataraxia] is repose and
tranquillity of soul. We shall explain how [Greek: ataraxia]
accompanies [Greek: epoche] when we speak of the aim.

CHAPTER V.

_The Sceptic._

What is meant by a Pyrrhonean philosopher can be understood from 11
the idea of the Sceptical School. He is a Pyrrhonean, namely,
who identifies himself with this system.

CHAPTER VI.

_The Origin of Scepticism._

Scepticism arose in the beginning from the hope of attaining 12
[Greek: ataraxia]; for men of the greatest talent were perplexed
by the contradiction of things, and being at a loss what to
believe, began to question what things are true, and what false,
hoping to attain [Greek: ataraxia] as a result of the decision.
The fundamental principle of the Sceptical system is especially
this, namely, to oppose every argument by one of equal weight,
for it seems to us that in this way we finally reach the
position where we have no dogmas.

CHAPTER VII.

_Does the Sceptic Dogmatise?_

We say that the Sceptic does not dogmatise. We do not say 13
this, meaning by the word dogma the popular assent to certain
things rather than others (for the Sceptic does assent to
feelings that are a necessary result of sensation, as for
example, when he is warm or cold, he cannot say that he thinks
he is not warm or cold), but we say this, meaning by dogma the
acceptance of any opinion in regard to the unknown things
investigated by science. For the Pyrrhonean assents to nothing
that is unknown. Furthermore, he does not dogmatise even when 14
he utters the Sceptical formulae in regard to things that are
unknown, such as "Nothing more," or "I decide nothing," or any
of the others about which we shall speak later. For the one who
dogmatises regards the thing about which he is said to
dogmatise, as existing in itself; the Sceptic does not however
regard these formulae as having an absolute existence, for he
assumes that the saying "All is false," includes itself with
other things as false, and likewise the saying "Nothing is
true"; in the same way "Nothing more," states that together with
other things it itself is nothing more, and cancels itself
therefore, as well as other things. We say the same also in
regard to the other Sceptical expressions. In short, if he who 15
dogmatises, assumes as existing in itself that about which he
dogmatises, the Sceptic, on the contrary, expresses his sayings
in such a way that they are understood to be themselves
included, and it cannot be said that he dogmatises in saying
these things. The principal thing in uttering these formulae is
that he says what appears to him, and communicates his own
feelings in an unprejudiced way, without asserting anything in
regard to external objects.

CHAPTER VIII.

_Is Scepticism a Sect?_

We respond in a similar way if we are asked whether 16
Scepticism is a sect or not. If the word sect is defined as
meaning a body of persons who hold dogmas which are in
conformity with each other, and also with phenomena, and dogma
means an assent to anything that is unknown, then we reply that
we have no sect. If, however, one means by sect, a school 17
which follows a certain line of reasoning based on phenomena,
and that reasoning shows how it is possible to apparently live
rightly, not understanding "rightly" as referring to virtue
only, but in a broader sense; if, also, it leads one to be able
to suspend the judgment, then we reply that we have a sect. For
we follow a certain kind of reasoning which is based upon
phenomena, and which shows us how to live according to the
habits, laws, and teachings of the fatherland, and our own
feelings.

CHAPTER IX.

_Does the Sceptic Study Natural Science?_

We reply similarly also to the question whether the Sceptic 18
should study natural science. For we do not study natural
science in order to express ourselves with confidence regarding
any of the dogmas that it teaches, but we take it up in order to
be able to meet every argument by one of equal weight, and also
for the sake of [Greek: ataraxia]. In the same way we study the
logical and ethical part of so-called philosophy.

CHAPTER X.

_Do the Sceptics deny Phenomena?_

Those who say that the Sceptics deny phenomena appear to me to 19
be in ignorance of our teachings. For as we said before, we do
not deny the sensations which we think we have, and which lead
us to assent involuntarily to them, and these are the phenomena.
When, however, we ask whether the object is such as it appears
to be, while we concede that it appears so and so, we question,
not the phenomenon, but in regard to that which is asserted of
the phenomenon, and that is different from doubting the
phenomenon itself. For example, it appears to us that honey is
sweet. This we concede, for we experience sweetness through 20
sensation. We doubt, however, whether it is sweet by reason of
its essence, which is not a question of the phenomenon, but of
that which is asserted of the phenomenon. Should we, however,
argue directly against the phenomena, it is not with the
intention of denying their existence, but to show the rashness
of the Dogmatics. For if reasoning is such a deceiver that it
well nigh snatches away the phenomena from before your eyes, how
should we not distrust it in regard to things that are unknown,
so as not to rashly follow it?

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