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T. G. Steward - The Colored Regulars in the United States Army

T >> T. G. Steward >> The Colored Regulars in the United States Army




Thus prepared, both on board the ships and on shore, the morning of
the 22nd dawned to witness the beginning of mighty operations. The war
vessels, drawn up in proper order, early began to hurl shot and shell
upon the towns, forts, blockhouses and clumps of trees that could be
discovered along the shore. The cannonading lasted between two and
three hours and was furious throughout. Meanwhile General Lawton's
Division began the work of going ashore. The sea was rough and the
passage to the shore was made in small boats furnished from the
transports and from the naval vessels, towed by steam launches
belonging to the navy. The larger of the boats were capable of
carrying ten or twelve men each, while the smaller ones could carry
but six or seven. During the passage to the shore several of the men
who had escaped thus far, were taken with seasickness, greatly to the
amusement of their more hardy companions. The landing was made at a
pier which had been used formerly as a railroad pier, but was now
abandoned and somewhat dilapidated. To get from the boats to the pier
in this rough sea was the most perilous part of the whole trip from
Tampa to Cuba. As the boats would rise on the waves almost level with
the landing place it was necessary to leap quickly from the boat to
the shore. In this way two cavalrymen of the Tenth lost their lives,
falling into the sea with their equipments on and sinking before help
could reach them. Some of the boats were rowed ashore and made a
landing on the beach some distance from the pier. By this method some
men of the Twenty-fifth tried to be the first to land, but failed,
that regiment landing, however, in the first body of troops to go
ashore, and being the second in order, in the invasion of the island.
By night of the 22nd more than one-third of the troops were on shore,
and by the evening of the 24th the whole army was disembarked
according to the program announced at the beginning, the squadron of
cavalry coming in at the close of the march to the shore.

The only national movement on our part deserving to be brought into
comparison with the expedition against the Spanish power in Cuba, is
that of fifty years earlier, when General Scott sailed at the head of
the army of invasion against Mexico. Some of the occurrences of that
expedition, especially connected with its landing, should be carefully
studied, and if the reports which have reached the public concerning
it are truthful, we would do well to consider how far the methods then
in use could be applied now. Scribner's recent history, published just
before the outbreak of the Spanish War, tells the story of that
expedition, so far as it tells it at all, in the following sentence:
"On the 7th of March, the fleet with Scott's army came to anchor a few
miles south of Vera Cruz, and two days later he landed his whole
force--nearly twelve thousand men--by means of surf-boats." A writer
in a recent number of _The Army and Navy Journal_ says General Worth's
Division of 4,500 men were landed in one hour, and the whole force was
landed in six hours, without accident or confusion. In the prosecution
of that unholy war, which lasted about a year, nearly three thousand
men were lost in battle and about as many more by disease, peace being
finally made by the cession of territory on the part of Mexico, the
United States paying in return much more than the territory was
worth. The twenty millions paid to Texas probably in great part went
into the coffers of the patriots who occupied that region, some of
whom had not been known as desirable citizens in the parts from which
they came, and had manifested their patriotism by leaving their
country for their country's good. The fifteen millions handed over to
Mexico looks like a contribution to a conscience fund, and an
atonement offered for an assault without provocation. The country
gained Arizona, New Mexico, California and finally Texas, but it lost
six thousand good men, the cost of the war, and all told, in
negotiations, about thirty million dollars, besides. However, it is
not always profitable to look up the harvests of war. There are always
two--the harvest of gain, and the harvest of loss. Death and debt are
reapers, as well as are honor and extent of territory.

The feelings of the six thousand American troops who landed on Cuban
soil on June 22nd, 1898, may well be imagined. Although they felt the
effects of the confinement to which they had been subjected while on
shipboard, there was very little sickness among them. Again possessed
of the free use of their limbs they swarmed the beach and open space
near the landing, making themselves at home, and confronting the
difficulties and perils that lay before them with a courage born of
national pride. Before them were the mountains with their almost
impassable roads, the jungles filled with poisonous plants and the
terrible prickly underbrush and pointed grass, in which skulked the
land crab and various reptiles whose bite or sting was dangerous;
twenty miles of this inhospitable country lay between them and
Santiago, their true objective. And somewhere on the road to that city
they knew they were destined to meet a well-trained foe, skilled in
all the arts of modern warfare, who would contest their advance. The
prospect, however, did not unnerve them, although they could well
conjecture that all who landed would not re-embark. Some in that six
thousand were destined never again to set foot on shipboard. Out of
the Twenty-fifth Infantry and the Tenth Cavalry men were to fall both
before Spanish bullets and disease ere these organizations should
assemble to return to their native shores. These thoughts did not
prevent the men from taking advantage of what nature had to offer
them.

"We landed in rowboats, amid, and after the cessation of the
bombardment of the little hamlet and coast by the men-of-war and
battle-ships," writes a brave soldier of the Twenty-fifth Infantry,
and adds immediately: "We then helped ourselves to cocoanuts which we
found in abundance near the landing." Ordinarily this statement, so
trivial and apparently unimportant, would not merit repetition, but in
its connection here it is significant as showing the immediate
tendency of the men to resort to the fruits of the country, despite
all warnings to the contrary. The two weeks' experience on board the
transports had made the finding of cocoanuts an event to be noted, and
the dry pulp and strongly flavored milk of this tropical fruit became
extremely grateful to the palate, even if not altogether safe for the
stomach. If ripe, however, the cocoanut could scarcely be more
ungenial to many, than the raw, canned tomatoes upon which they had in
part subsisted during the voyage. It is to be added that this report
of the finding of the cocoanuts is not the report of an old soldier,
but of a young and intelligent, first enlistment man.

Lawton's Division soon after landing, was ordered to move forward in
the direction of Santiago, on the road leading past Siboney. A staff
officer, writing of that movement, says: "General Lawton, with his
Division, in obedience to this order, pushed forward from Daiquiri
about five miles, when night overtook him and he bivouacked on the
road." An old soldier of the Twenty-fifth, writing me from the
hospital in Tampa, Florida, July 22nd, says of the same event: "After
the regiment landed we marched about four and a half miles through the
mountains; then we made camp." The old soldier says nothing of
cocoanuts, but makes his statement with as much accuracy as possible,
and with no waste of words. The novice describing the same thing says:
"A short distance ahead (from the shore) we bivouacked for the night.
We were soon lying in dreamland, so far from friends and home, indeed,
on a distant, distant shore." These two extracts show at once the
difference between the soldier produced by years of trial and training
on our plains, and the soldier who but yesterday was a civilian. With
the one the march is a short distance; with the other it is about four
and a half miles; one reports that they "made camp," the other talks
of dreamland, friend, home and distant shore; one expresses his
feelings, the other shows control of feeling and reserve in
expression.

That first night on Cuban soil, the night following June 22nd, was one
without events, but one of great concern to the commanders on shore
and on the fleet. The work of disembarking had gone on successfully,
and already about six thousand men were on shore. Nearly the whole of
Lawton's Division, with Bates' independent brigade, were bivouacked,
as we have seen, about five miles from Daiquiri, exactly where the
railroad crosses the wagon road leading to Siboney. General Wheeler's
troops--one brigade--were encamped on the open ground near the
landing, the remainder of his division being still on the transports.
The Twenty-fifth Infantry was with Lawton; the Tenth Cavalry was
ashore with Wheeler's troops. A detachment of the Twenty-fifth was put
on outpost duty on that night of their landing, and five miles within
Cuban territory they tramped their solitary beats, establishing and
guarding the majestic authority of the United States.

Lawton's orders were to seize and hold the town of Siboney at which
place Kent's Division, containing the Twenty-fourth, was to land. It
was then intended that the whole army should advance as rapidly as
would be consistent with supplying the men with rations toward
Santiago. Siboney was to be the base of supplies, and from this point
ammunition and food were to be conveyed to the front by wagons and
pack trains. General Shafter also intended that Lawton with his
division should lead the advance upon Santiago, but circumstances
beyond his control brought about a different result. On the morning of
the 23rd Lawton's division was in motion early, and before half-past
ten o'clock he was able to report that the Spaniards had evacuated
Siboney and were in full retreat, pursued by a body of Cubans under
direction of General Castillo; that the town was in his hands, and he
had also captured one locomotive and nearly one hundred cars loaded
with coal.

General Young's brigade of General Wheeler's cavalry division, got on
shore on the afternoon of the 23rd and after landing received verbal
orders to move out with three days' rations "to a good camping place
between Juraguacito and Siboney, on the road leading to Santiago de
Cuba." In obedience to these orders, at 4.30 in the afternoon Young
with the Rough Riders and a squadron from each of the First and Tenth
Regular Cavalry moved from the bivouack near the landing and arrived
at Siboney at about 7 o'clock. When General Young arrived at Siboney
he had with him the Rough Riders, the other troops having been delayed
by the crowded condition of the trail and the difficulty of following
after nightfall. Although these troops are always spoken of as
cavalry, the reader must not forget that they were dismounted and in
marching and fighting were the same as infantry.

General Young on arriving at Siboney reported to General Wheeler, who
had preceded him to the same place. The statements of the several
commanders here appear somewhat conflicting, although not
inexplicable. General Lawton says: "Yesterday afternoon, late, General
Wheeler and staff arrived and established his headquarters within the
limits of my command. Saw him after dark. Late last night Colonel
Wood's regiment of dismounted cavalry (Rough Riders) passed through my
camp at Division Headquarters, and later General Young, with some of
the dismounted Cavalry, and early this morning others of the
dismounted cavalry." Wheeler says that "in obedience to instructions
from the Major-General Commanding," given to him in person, he
proceeded, on June 23rd, to Siboney, but does not say at what hour. He
says he "rode out to the front and found that the enemy had halted and
established themselves at a point about three miles from Siboney." He
then informs us that "at 8 o'clock on that evening of the 23rd General
Young reached Siboney with eight troops of Colonel Wood's regiment (A,
B, D, E, F, G, K and L), 500 strong; Troops A, B, G and K, of the
First Cavalry, in all 244, and Troops A, B, E and I, of the Tenth
Cavalry, in all 220 men, making a total force of 964 men, which
included nearly all of my command which had disembarked. These troops
had marched from Daiquiri, 11 miles. With the assistance of General
Castillo a rough map of the country was prepared and the position of
the enemy fully explained, and I determined to make an attack."
Lieutenant Miley says that the whole brigade of Wheeler's troops
arrived in Siboney about dark and were occupying the same ground as
General Lawton ("In Cuba With Shafter," p. 76.) General Young says
that after reporting to General Wheeler he "asked and obtained from
General Wheeler authority to make a reconnoisance in force" for the
purpose of obtaining "positive information * * * as to the position
and movements of the enemy in front."

The distance from Daiquiri to Siboney was but eleven miles, and as the
troops left the former place at 4.30 it is probable that they were all
bivouacked near Siboney before 9 o'clock, as they were all together,
according to General Wheeler's report, at 5.45 on the morning of the
24th. General Young having discovered that there were two roads or
trails leading from Siboney northward toward the town of Sevilla
determined to make his reconnoisance by both these trails. He directed
Colonel Wood to move by the western trail and to keep a careful
lookout and to attack any Spaniards he might encounter, being careful
to join his right in the event of an engagement, with the left of the
column advancing by the eastern trail. Colonel Wood's column was the
left column and was composed of the Rough Riders only. The column
marching by the eastern trail was composed of the First and Tenth
Cavalry (regulars) and was under the command of General Young. It was
the intention of General Young by this column to gain the enemy's
left, and thus attack in front and left. As early as 7.20 a.m. Captain
Mills discovered the enemy exactly as had been described by General
Castillo. When this was done word was sent to Colonel Wood, who was
making his way to the front over a more difficult route than the one
by which General Young's column had marched. A delay was therefore
made on the part of General Young in order that the attack should
begin on both flanks at the same time. During this delay General
Wheeler arrived and was informed of the plans and dispositions for the
attack, and after examining the position gave his approval of what
had been done, whereupon General Young ordered the attack. General
Wheeler in speaking of the same event says: "General Young and myself
examined the position of the enemy. The lines were deployed and I
directed him to open fire with the Hotchkiss gun. The enemy replied
and the firing immediately became general." There can be no question
as to the planning of this fight nor as to the direction of the
American force in the fight so far as any general direction was
possible. Colonel Wood directed one column and General Young another,
while the plan of the attack undoubtedly originated with General
Young. General Wheeler conveys as much when he says: "General Young
deserves special commendation for his cool deliberate and skillful
management." General Young, if only the commander of the right column
consisting of two squadrons of regular cavalry, had not as large a
command, nor as difficult and important a one as had Colonel Wood, and
hence is not deserving of special commendation except upon the general
ground that he had supervision over the whole battle. This position is
taken by General Shafter in his report, who though admitting the
presence of the Division Commander, credits the battle to General
Young, the commander of the brigade. The reconnoissance in force for
which Young had obtained authority from General Wheeler on the night
of the 23rd had developed into a battle, and the plan had evolved
itself from the facts discovered. This plan General Wheeler approved,
but in no such way as to take the credit from its originator; and it
is doubtless with reference both to the plan and the execution that he
bestows on General Young the mead of praise. This statement of fact
does not in the least detract from either the importance or the
praiseworthiness of the part played by Colonel Wood. Both he and the
officers and men commanded by him received both from General Young
and from the division commander the most generous praise. The advance
of Wood's column was made with great difficulty owing to the nature of
the ground, and according to General Young's belief, he was in the
rear when at 7.20 in the morning Captain Mills discovered the enemy,
and a Cuban guide was dispatched to warn Wood, and a delay made to
allow time for him to come up. Colonel Wood, on the other hand, claims
to have discovered the enemy at 7.10 and to have begun action almost
immediately, so that it turned out as Young had planned, and "the
attack of both wings was simultaneous." The Spaniards were posted on a
range of high hills in the form of a "V," the opening being toward
Siboney, from which direction the attack came.

From Colonel Wood's report it appears that soon after the firing began
he found it necessary to deploy five troops to the right, and left,
leaving three troops in reserve. The enemy's lines being still beyond
his, both on the right and on the left, he hastily deployed two more
troops, which made the lines now about equal in length. The firing was
now "exceedingly heavy," and much of it at short range, but on account
of the thick underbrush it was not very effective; "comparatively few
of our men were injured." Captain Capron at this time received his
mortal wound and the firing became so terrific that the last remaining
troop of the reserve was absorbed by the firing line, and the whole
regiment ordered to advance very slowly. The Spanish line yielded and
the advance soon showed that in falling back the enemy had taken a new
position, about three hundred yards in front of the advancing
regiment. Their lines extended from 800 to 1,000 yards, and the firing
from their front was "exceedingly heavy" and effective. A "good many
men" were wounded, "and several officers," says Colonel Wood's
report. Still the advance was kept up, and the Spanish line was
steadily forced back. "We now began," says Colonel Wood, "to get a
heavy fire from a ridge on our right, which enfiladed our line." The
reader can at once see that although the Rough Riders were advancing
heroically, they were now in a very serious situation, with an
exceedingly heavy and effective fire striking them in front, and a
heavy, enfilading fire raking them from the right. Their whole
strength was on the line, and these two fires must have reduced their
effectiveness with great rapidity had it kept up, the Spaniards having
their range and firing by well-directed volleys. It was for the
regiment a moment of the utmost peril. Had they been alone they must
have perished.

It was from this perilous situation of Colonel Wood's command that one
of the most popular stories of the war originated, a story that
contained some truth, but which was often told in such a way as to
cause irritation, and in some instances it was so exaggerated or
mutilated in the telling as to be simply ridiculous. On the day after
the battle the story was told in Lawton's camp according to the
testimony of an intelligent soldier of the Twenty-fifth Infantry. His
words are: "The next day about noon we heard that the Tenth Cavalry
had met the enemy and that the Tenth Cavalry had rescued the Rough
Riders. We congratulated ourselves that although not of the same
branch of service, we were of the same color, and that to the eye of
the enemy we, troopers and footmen, all looked alike." According to
artists and cheap newspaper stories this rescuing occurred again and
again. A picture is extensively advertized as "an actual and
authoritative presentation of this regiment (the Tenth Cavalry) as it
participated in that great struggle, and their heroic rescue of the
Rough Riders on that memorable _July_ day." This especial rescuing
took place on _San Juan Hill_. The editor of a religious paper
declares that it was the _Twenty-fifth Infantry_ that rescued the
Rough Riders and that it was done at _El Caney_![16]

Before we go any farther let us see just what the Tenth Cavalry did do
in this fight. That their action was highly meritorious admits of no
doubt, and the laurels they won were never allowed to fade during the
whole campaign. General Wheeler speaks of them with the First Cavalry.
He says: "I was immediately with the troops of the First and Tenth
Regular Cavalry, dismounted, and personally noticed their brave and
good conduct." There were four troops of the Tenth engaged, composing
the First Squadron of that regiment, under command of Major Norval.
Troop A was commanded by Captain W.H. Beck, who was specially
commended by General Wheeler for good conduct. Second Lieutenant F.R.
McCoy was Captain Beck's assistant. This troop moved over to the left,
receiving the fire of the enemy, but making no response, the distance
being too great for effective carbine firing. This troop reached
Colonel Wood's right and made the line continuous so that there was
now a force in front of that ridge where the Spaniards were securely
entrenched and from which they were pouring their enfilading fire upon
Colonel Wood's line. Troop A, although coming into the line, did not
fire. Their presence, however, gave the Rough Riders the assurance
that their flank was saved. Troop E was commanded by Captain C.G.
Ayres with Second Lieutenant George Vidmar. This troop was placed by
General Young in support of Captain Watson's two Hotchkiss guns, and
also of the troops in their front. The troop was under fire one hour
and a quarter, during which they were in plain view of the Spaniards,
who also had their exact range. One man was killed and one wounded.
Their courage, coolness and discipline in this trying hour and a
quarter were of the very highest order. The troop commander says:
"Their coolness and fine discipline were superb." This troop did not
fire a shot. Thus one-half of the squadron moved to its positions and
held them without being able to do any damage to the enemy, as they
were carrying out to the letter their instructions, which were to fire
only when they could see the enemy. Troop B was commanded by Captain
J.W. Watson with H.O. Willard as Second Lieutenant. A detachment of
this troop was placed in charge of four Hotchkiss mountain guns. This
detachment opened fire upon the enemy, using the ammunition sparingly,
as they had but fifty rounds with them. Twenty-two shots were fired,
apparently with effect. The remainder of the troop under Lieutenant
Williard was ordered to move out to the extreme right, which would
place it beyond the line of the First Cavalry, thus bringing that
regiment between Troop A of the Tenth, which connected it with the
Rough Riders and Troop B, which was to be on its extreme right.
Lieutenant Williard's report of this movement is as follows:

"I ordered the troop forward at once, telling them to take
advantage of all cover available. In the meantime the
volleys from the Spanish were coming in quite frequently and
striking the ground on all sides near where we were. I found
it very difficult to move the men forward after having found
cover, and ran back to a portion of the troop near an old
brick wall, and ordered them forward at once. They then made
a dash forward, and in doing so three or four men were
wounded, Private Russell severely. Who the others were I do
not know. We encountered a severe fire directly after this
move forward; and Private Wheeler was wounded in the left
leg. There was a wire fence on our right, and such thick
underbrush that we were unable to get through right there,
so had to follow along the fence for some distance before
being able to penetrate. Finally, was able to get the
greater proportion of my men through, and about this time I
met Lieutenants Fleming and Miller, Tenth Cavalry, moving
through the thicket at my left. I there heard the order
passed on 'not to fire ahead,' as there was danger of firing
into our own forces. In the meantime there was shouting from
the First Cavalry in our front, 'Don't fire on us in rear.'
My troop had not fired a shot to my knowledge, nor the
knowledge of any non-commissioned officers in the troop.
About this time I found I was unable to keep the troop
deployed, as they would huddle up behind one rock or tree,
so I gave all sergeants orders to move out on the extreme
right and to keep in touch with those on their left. Then,
with a squad of about five men, I moved to the right front,
and was unfortunate enough to lose the troop, i.e., I could
see nothing of them except the men with me.

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