T. G. Steward - The Colored Regulars in the United States Army

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"But as I had given explicit instructions to my sergeant, in
case I was lost from them, to continue to advance until
halted by some one in authority, I moved ahead myself,
hoping to find them later on. In making a rush forward three
men of my squad were lost from me in some way. I still had
two men with me, Privates Combs and Jackson, and in the next
advance made I picked up a First Cavalry sergeant who had
fallen out from exhaustion. After a terrific climb up the
ridge in front of me, and a very regular though ineffective
fire from the enemy kept up until we were about sixty yards
from the summit of hill, we reached the advance line of the
First United States Cavalry, under command of Captain
Wainwright. I then reported to him for orders, and moved
forward when he next advanced. The firing had ceased, and no
more shots were fired, to my knowledge, after this time.
With the First Cavalry, Troop G, we followed along the right
of the ridge and came down to the right front, encountering
no opposition or fire from the enemy, but finding the
enemy's breastworks in confusion, ammunition and articles of
clothing scattered around; also one dead Spaniard and two
Mauser rifles. At the foot of the ridge we met some of the
First Volunteer Cavalry, and being utterly exhausted, I was
obliged to lie down. Soon after, Captain Mills,
adjutant-general of Second Brigade, Cavalry Division, came
up to where I was and placed me in command of Troop K, First
United States Cavalry, whose officers were wounded. I then
marched them forward on the road to where General Wheeler
was sitting, and received orders from Colonel Wood, First
Volunteer Cavalry, to remain until further orders and make
no further advance. Directly afterwards, learning the action
was over, I reported back to General Young, and received
orders to remain camped with the First Cavalry Squadron,
where the action had closed. In the meantime, I should have
stated that I found the principal part of my troop and
collected them and left them under the first sergeant, when
I went back to receive orders. So far as I know, and to the
best of my knowledge, the men of my troop acted with the
greatest bravery, advancing on an enemy who could not be
seen, and subjected to a severe and heavy fire at each step,
which was only rendered ineffective to a great degree by the
poor marksmanship of the enemy, as many times we were in
sight of them (I discovered this by observation after the
engagement) while we could see nothing. We were also
subjected to a severe reverse fire from the hills in our
right rear, several men being wounded by this fire.
Throughout the fight the men acted with exceptional
coolness, in my judgment. The casualties were: Privates
Russell, Braxton and Morris, severely wounded; Privates F.A.
Miller, Grice, Wheeler and Gaines, slightly wounded, i.e.,
less severely. None killed.

Very respectfully,

HENRY O. WILLIARD.
June 24, 1898.
Troop B, Tenth Cavalry, during action near La Guasima,
Second Lieutenant, Tenth United States Cavalry, Commanding.

Troop I of the Tenth Cavalry was commanded by First Lieutenant R.J.
Fleming with Second Lieutenant A.M. Miller. This troop moved to the
right and wedged in between B Troop and the right of the First
Cavalry. Lieutenant Fleming discovered the enemy posted on the high
ridge immediately in front of his troop, and also extending to his
right, in front of B Troop. Moving his troop a little to the right so
as to secure room to advance without coming in contact with the First
Cavalry, he then directed his course straight toward the hill on which
he had located the enemy. The advance was made with great caution, the
men seeking cover wherever possible, and dashing across the open
spaces at full run. Thus they moved until the base of the steep part
of the hill was reached. This was found very difficult of ascent, not
only because of the rugged steepness, but also on account of the
underbrush, and the sharp-leaved grass, the cacti and Spanish bayonet,
that grow on all these hillsides. Paths had to be cut through these
prickly obstructions with knives and sabres. Consequently the advance
up that hill, though free from peril, was very slow and trying. Twice
during the advance the men obtained a view of their enemies and were
permitted to fire. The instructions were rigidly adhered to: No firing
only at the visible foe. Lieutenant Fleming says: "Owing to the
underbrush it was impossible for me to see but a very few men at a
time, but as they all arrived on the crest about the time I did, or
shortly after, they certainly advanced steadily." He says: "The entire
troop behaved with great coolness and obeyed every order." Farrier
Sherman Harris, Wagoner John Boland and Private Elsie Jones especially
distinguished themselves for coolness and gallantry. The aggressive
work of the Tenth Cavalry, therefore, appears to have been done by
Troops B and I, a detachment of the former troop serving the Hotchkiss
gun battery. Troop I was commanded by Lieutenant Fleming and by him
conducted to the front, although he admits that in their advance up
the slope of the hill he could see but very few of the men at a time,
and declares that their advance was certainly steady, because all
arrived at the crest of the hill simultaneously or nearly so.

Lieutenant Fleming does not show that his troop of excellent men were
in any sense _peculiarly_ dependent upon their white officers as some
have asserted. They advanced steadily, just as the regulars always do,
advanced noiselessly and without any reckless firing, and reached the
crest of the hill in order, although he could not see them as they
were making their advance. They kept their line despite all the
obstructions. Lieutenant Fleming also says that in moving to his
position he passed Troop B, which then "inclined to the right, and
during the remainder of the action was on my right." Troop B,
therefore, went through about the same experience as Troop I, and
being on the extreme right of the line may have been more directly in
front of that foe which Fleming says was in his front and to the
right. Why did not the officer who directed or led B Troop in its
advance upon the enemy report the action of his troop as vividly and
generously as did Lieutenant Fleming the men of Troop I? With not the
slightest reflection upon the gallant officer, he himself has the
manliness to say he was so unfortunate as to lose the troop. The
troop, however, did not become demoralized, but went into action under
command of its First Sergeant, _John Buck,[17] and remained on
Lieutenant Fleming's right during the action_. It has been proven more
than once that should the commissioned officers of a company or troop
of colored regulars be killed or incapacitated, the non-commissioned
officers can carry on the fight. Speaking of this same regiment it is
equally true that at San Juan the officers of Troops D and G were all
shot and the commands of these troops fell to their First Sergeants,
the first to Sergeant William H. Given, the second to Sergeant Saint
Foster, and it is generally understood that these two men were
appointed Lieutenants of Volunteers because of their success in
handling their troops in battle.

The entire attacking force at this end of the line, if we count only
those engaged in actual firing, consisted of two troops of the Tenth
Cavalry and two of the First Cavalry--four troops--while to the left
the entire eight troops were on the firing line. The action of the
troops of the First Cavalry was quite similar to that of the troops of
the Tenth Cavalry, and equally deserving of commendation. Of them all
General Young says:

"The ground over which the right column advanced was a mass
of jungle growth, with wire fences, not to be seen until
encountered, and precipitous heights as the ridge was
approached. It was impossible for the troops to keep in
touch along the front, and they could only judge of the
enemy from the sound and direction of his fire. However, had
it not been for this dense jungle, the attack would not have
been made against an overwhelming force in such a position.
Headway was so difficult that advance and support became
merged and moved forward under a continuous volley firing,
supplemented by that of two rapid-fire guns. Return firing
by my force was only made as here and there a small clear
spot gave a sight of the enemy. The fire discipline of these
particular troops was almost perfect. The ammunition
expended by the two squadrons engaged in an incessant
advance for one hour and fifteen minutes averaged less than
ten rounds per man. The fine quality of these troops is also
shown by the fact that there was not a single straggler, and
in not one instance was an attempt made by any soldier to
fall out in the advance to assist the wounded or carry back
the dead. The fighting on the left flank was equally
creditable and was remarkable, and I believe unprecedented,
in volunter troops so quickly raised, armed and equipped."

The five hundred men of Colonel Wood's regiment were stretched over a
space of 800 to 1,000 yards, and were entirely without support or
reserve, and appear to have advanced to a point where this very strong
force on the right swept a good part of their line both with rifle
fire and the fire of their two machine guns. Men and officers were
falling under both the front and flank fire of the enemy, and had not
the squadrons of the First and Tenth made their successful assault
upon that ridge, which, according to General Wood's report, was "very
strongly held," the situation of the Rough Riders would have been
extreme. Because this successful assault was participated in by the
Tenth Cavalry the story arose that the Rough Riders were rescued by
that regiment. The fair statement would be: That the Regular Cavalry,
consisting of a squadron of the First and a squadron of the Tenth,
made their advance on the right at the precise moment to deliver the
Rough Riders from a fire that threatened their annihilation. The
marksmanship and coolness of the men of the Tenth have been specially
commented upon and their fire was described as very effective, but the
same remarks could be made of the men of the First, who fought side by
side with them. It is probable that the volunteers advanced more
rapidly than did the regulars, using more ammunition, and manifesting
a very high degree of courage and enthusiasm as well as deliberation;
but the regulars reached their objective at the proper time to turn
the battle's tide. Each advancing column was worthy to be companion to
the other.

General Wheeler said the fire was very hot for about an hour, and "at
8.30 sent a courier to General Lawton informing him that he was
engaged with a larger force of the enemy than was anticipated, and
asked that his force be sent forward on the Sevilla road as quickly as
possible." ("In Cuba With Shafter," p. 83.) General Lawton, however,
with the true instinct of a soldier had already sent orders to General
Chaffee to move forward with the First Brigade. The Second Brigade was
also in readiness to move and the men of the Twenty-fifth were
expecting to go forward to take a position on the right and if
possible a little to the rear of the Spanish entrenchments in order to
cut off their retreat. The rapid movements of the cavalry division,
however, rendered this unnecessary, and the routing of the foe gave to
the Americans an open country and cleared the field for the advance on
Santiago. The first battle had been fought, and the Americans had been
victorious, but not without cost. Sixteen men had been killed and
fifty-two wounded. In Colonel Wood's regiment eight had been killed
and thirty-four wounded; in the First Cavalry, seven killed and eight
wounded; in the Tenth Cavalry, one killed and ten wounded. The
percentage of losses to the whole strength of the several
organizations engaged was as follows: Rough Riders, over 8 per cent.;
First Cavalry, over 6 per cent.; Tenth Cavalry, 5 per cent. But if we
take those on the firing line as the base the rate per cent. of losses
among the regulars would be doubled, while that of the volunteers
would remain the same.

The strength of the enemy in this battle is given in the Spanish
official reports, according to Lieutenant Miley, at about five
hundred, and their losses are put at nine killed and twenty-seven
wounded. At the time of the fight it was supposed to be much larger.
General Young's report places the estimates at 2,000, and adds "that
it has since been learned from Spanish sources to have been 2,500. The
Cuban military authorities claim the Spanish strength was 4,000."
These figures are doubtless too high. The force overtaken at Las
Guasimas was the same force that evacuated Siboney at the approach of
Lawton and the force with which the Cubans had fought on the morning
of the 23rd. It may have consisted solely of the garrison from
Siboney, although it is more probable that it included also those from
Daiquiri and Jutici, as it is quite certain that all these troops
proceeded toward Santiago over the same road. The force at Siboney had
been given by the Cubans at 600, at Daiquiri at 300, and at Jutici at
150. If these had concentrated and the figures were correct, the
Spanish force at Guasimas was upwards of 1,000. If, however, it was
the force from Siboney alone, it was about as the Spanish official
report gives it. On this latter basis, however, the losses are out of
proportion, for while the attacking party lost a little less than 7
per cent. of its entire strength in killed and wounded, the losses of
the entrenched, defending party, were even a little greater, or over 7
per cent. of its strength. It is, therefore, probable that the Spanish
force was greater than officially reported and included the troops
from the other posts as well as those from Siboney. The engagement was
classed by General Shafter as unimportant, although its effect upon
our army was inspiring. It did not cut off the retreat of the Spanish
force, and the men who faced our army at Guasimas met them again in
the trenches before Santiago. General Shafter desired to advance with
his whole force, and cautioned strongly against any further forward
movement until the troops were well in hand. The two battles between
the Cubans and Spaniards, fought on the 23rd, in which the Cubans had
sixteen men wounded and two killed, were engagements of some
consequence, although we have no reports of them. There is no evidence
that the Cubans took part in the battle of Guasimas, although they
arrived on the grounds immediately after the firing ceased.

The story thus far told is, as the reader cannot fail to see,
directly from official records, and the conclusions arrived at are
those which result naturally from the facts as therein detailed. Not
one word is quoted from any but military men--actors in the affair. We
may now go briefly over the same ground, giving the views and
conclusions of able civilian correspondents who followed the army to
see what was done, and who were trained observers and skilled writers.
How have these able war journalists told the story of Las Guasimas?

To quote from Stephen Bonsal in substance, not in words, is to
contradict what General Shafter says officially in one particular, but
in no such way as to discredit the General, or to weaken Bonsal. It is
not a case of bringing two universal, antagonistic propositions face
to face, but a case where two men of different training look upon an
action from different standpoints and through different field-glasses.
General Shafter says of the collision of the Rough Riders with the
Spanish force: "There was no ambush as reported." As a military man,
he says there was no more concealment on the part of the Spanish force
than what an attacking party should expect, no more than what is usual
in modern warfare, hence he does not regard it as an ambush, and does
not officially take notice of any surprise or unexpected encounter on
the part of his force. To do so would be to reflect, however slightly,
upon the professional skill of the commander of the left column.
General Shafter thus says officially in a manly way: "There was no
ambush." Beyond this his duty does not call him to go, and he halts
his expressions exactly at this line, maintaining in his attitude all
the attributes of the true soldier, placing himself beyond criticism
by thus securing from attack the character of his subordinate.

Mr. Bonsal is a writer and author, accustomed to view actions in the
broader light of popular judgment, entirely free from professional
bias, and having no class-feeling or obligations to serve. His pen is
not official; his statements are not from the military standpoint; not
influenced in any way by considerations of personal weal or woe with
respect to others or himself. He says that one troop of the Rough
Riders, Troop L, commanded by Captain Capron, was leading the advance
of the regiment, and was in solid formation and within twenty-five
yards of its scouting line when it received the enemy's fire. This
troop was so far in the advance that it took the other troops of the
regiment more than a half hour to get up to it. The writer speaks of
the advance of that troop as having been made "in the fool-hardy
formation of a solid column along a narrow trail, which brought them,
in the way I have described, within point-blank range of the Spanish
rifles, and within the unobstructed sweep of their machine guns." He
sums up as follows: "And if it is to be ambushed when you receive the
enemy's fire perhaps a quarter of an hour before it was expected, and
when the troop was in a formation, and the only one in which, in view
of the nature of the ground it was possible to advance quickly, then
most certainly L Troop of the Rough Riders was ambushed by the
Spaniards on the morning of June 24th."

Mr. Bonsal also brings into clear view the part taken in this battle
by Lawton's Infantry. He shows by means of a simple map the trail by
which Miles' brigade, in which was the Twenty-fifth Infantry, moved in
order to flank the Spanish position, while Chaffee's brigade was
hurrying forward on the Royal Road to reinforce the line in front. A
letter from a soldier of the Twenty-fifth written soon after these
events fully confirms Mr. Bonsal in what he says concerning the
movement of Miles' brigade. The soldier says: "On the morning of the
24th the Rough Riders, Tenth and First Cavalry were to make an attack
on a little place where the Spanish were fortified. The Second Brigade
was to come on the right flank of these troops and a little in rear of
the fortifications; but by some misunderstanding, the former troops,
led by the Rough Riders, made an attack before we got our position,
and the result was a great many lives lost in the First Cavalry and
Rough Riders--only one in Tenth Cavalry, but many wounded. They
captured the fortification." This letter by a humble soldier, written
with no thought of its importance, shows how gallantly Lawton had
sprung to the rescue of Wheeler's division. According to Bonsal, who
says he obtained his information from Spanish officers who were
present in this fight, it was the information of the approach of this
brigade and of Chaffee's up the main road that caused the Spaniards to
withdraw rapidly from the position. The whole force was in imminent
danger of being captured. Another soldier of the Twenty-fifth wrote:
"The report came that the Twenty-fifth Infantry was to cut off the
Spanish retreat from a stronghold, toward Santiago." These glimpses
from soldiers' letters illustrate how clearly they comprehended the
work upon which they were sent, and show also how hearty and cordial
was the support which the infantry at that time was hurrying forward
to the advancing cavalry.

The official reports show that the strength of the Spanish position
was before the right of our line. Mr. Bonsal says: "Directly in front
of the Tenth Cavalry rose undoubtedly the strongest point in the
Spanish position--two lines of shallow trenches, strengthened by heavy
stone parapets." We must remember that so far as we can get the
disposition of these troops from official records, Troop A connected
the Rough Riders with the First Cavalry, and Troops I and B were on
the right of the First Cavalry. Troop A did not fire a shot; the
fighting, therefore, was done by Troops I and B on the extreme right
of the line, and it was on their front that "undoubtedly the strongest
point in the Spanish position" lay--nor should the reader forget that
at this very important moment Troop B was commanded by its First
Sergeant, Buck, Lieutenant Williard having by his own report been
"unfortunate enough to lose the troop." This is said with no
disparagement to Lieutenant Williard. It was merely one of the
accidents of battle.

Says Mr. Bonsal: "The moment the advance was ordered the black
troopers of the Tenth Cavalry forged ahead. They were no braver
certainly than any other men in the line, but their better training
enabled them to render more valuable services than the other troops
engaged. They had with them and ready for action their machine guns,
and shoved them right up to the front on the firing line, from where
they poured very effective fire into the Spanish trenches, which not
only did considerable execution, but was particularly effective in
keeping down the return fire of the Spaniards. The machine guns of the
Rough Riders were mislaid, or the mules upon which they had been
loaded could not be found at this juncture. It was said they had
bolted. It is certain, however, that the guns were not brought into
action, and consequently the Spaniards suffered less, and the Rough
Riders more, in the gallant charge they made up the hill in front of
them, after the Tenth Cavalry had advanced and driven the Spaniards
from their position on the right."

Corporal W.F. Johnson, B Troop, was the non-commissioned officer in
charge of the machine guns during the brief fight at Las Guasimas, and
his action was such as to call forth from the troop commander special
mention "for his efficiency and perfect coolness under fire." Here I
may be pardoned for calling attention to a notion too prevalent
concerning the Negro soldier in time of battle. He is too often
represented as going into action singing like a zany or yelling like a
demon, rather than as a man calculating the chances for life and
victory. The official reports from the Black Regulars in Cuba ought to
correct this notion. Every troop and company commander, who has
reported upon colored soldiers in that war, speaks of the coolness of
the men of his command. Captain Beck, of Troop A, Tenth Cavalry, in
the Guasimas fight, says: "I will add that the enlisted men of Troop
A, Tenth Cavalry, behaved well, silently and alertly obeying orders,
and without becoming excited when the fire of the enemy reached them."
The yell, in the charge of the regulars, is a part of the action, and
is no more peculiar to Negro troops than to the whites, only as they
may differ in the general timbre of voice. Black American soldiers
when not on duty may sing more than white troops, but in quite a long
experience among them I have not found the difference so very
noticeable. In all garrisons one will find some men more musically
inclined than others; some who love to sing and some who do not; some
who have voices adapted to the production of musical tones, and some
who have not, and it is doubtless owing to these constitutional
differences that we find differences in habits and expressions.

Lieutenant Miley, of General Shafter's staff, in his description of
the departure of General Shatter from General Garcia's tent, gives us
a glimpse of the character of the men that composed the Cuban army in
that vicinity.

"While the interview was going on, the troops were being
assembled to do honor to the General on his departure.
Several companies were drawn up in front of the tent to
present arms as he came out, and a regiment escorted him to
the beach down the winding path, which was now lined on both
sides by Cuban soldiers standing about a yard apart and
presenting arms. The scene made a strong impression on all
in the party, there seemed to be such an earnestness and
fixedness of purpose displayed that all felt these soldiers
to be a power. About fifty per cent. were blacks, and the
rest mulattoes, with a small number of whites. They were
very poorly clad, many without shirts or shoes, but every
man had his gun and a belt full of ammunition."

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