T. G. Steward - The Colored Regulars in the United States Army

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B.

EXTRACT FROM A LETTER FROM A SOLDIER OF THE 10TH CAVALRY, TROOP B,
CONCERNING THE BATTLE OF LAS GUASIMAS:

"... The platoon which escaped this ditch got on the right
of the 1st Cavalry on the firing line, and pushed steadily
forward under First Sergeant Buck, being then in two
squads--one under Sergeant Thompson. On account of the
nature of the ground and other natural obstacles, there were
men not connected with any squads, but who advanced with the
line.

Both squads fired by volley and at will, at the command of
the sergeants named; and their shots reached the enemy and
were effective, as it is generally believed.

Private W.M. Bunn, of Sergeant Thompson's squad, is reported
to have shot a sharpshooter from a tree just in front of the
enemy's work. Private Wheeler was shot twice in the advance.
Sergeant Thompson's squad was once stopped from firing by
General Wheeler's adjutant-general for fear of hitting the
Rough Riders.

It seems that two distinct battles were fought that day.
Colonel Wood's command struck the enemy at about the tame
time, or probably a Little before, ours did, and all unknown
to the men in our ranks; and got themselves into a pretty
tight squeeze. About the same time our force engaged the
enemy and drew part of the attention they were giving the
Rough Riders. This, the latter claimed, enabled them to
continue the movement on the enemy's works.

But as our command had an equal number of 1st and 10th
Cavalrymen, I am of the opinion that the story of our saving
the Rough Riders arose from the fact that as soon as the
fight was over, the 1st Regular Cavalry was opening its arms
to us, declaring that we, especially B Troop, had saved
them; for the 1st Regular Cavalry was first in the attack in
General Young's command; and when the enemy began to make it
pretty warm, he ordered B and I Troops of the 10th forward
on the right. Troop B was in the lead; and the alacrity
with which these two troops moved to the front has always
been praised by the 1st Cavalry; and they declare that that
movement helped them wonderfully. In making this movement my
troop had three or four men wounded; and later, when
Sergeant Thompson's squad was fighting far to the front, it
had in it several members of the 1st Cavalry, who are always
glad to praise him.

So, I think that by the Rough Riders first attributing their
success, or their rescue from inevitable defeat, to the
attack made by our command; and by the 1st Regular Cavalry's
very generously, in the heat of success, bestowing upon us
the honors of the day, it finally became a settled thing
that we saved the whole battle.

That evening, after the battle, I was met by Lieutenant
Shipp, later killed at San Juan Hill, who, on inquiring and
being told that I belonged to Troop B, congratulated me on
its conduct, and said it had made a name for the regiment.
Lieutenant Shipp was not in that fight, but had come up
after it was over and had heard of us through the 1st
Cavalry."

C.

Sergeant John Buck was born September 10th, 1861, at Chapel
Hill, Texas; enlisted in 10th Cavalry, November 6, 1880, and
passed over ten years in active Indian service. He is a man
of strong character, an experienced horseman and packer, and
so commanded a portion of the firing line in the battle of
June 24 as to elicit remarks of praise from officers of
other troops "for his gallantry, coolness and good judgment
under fire." Sergeant Thompson's good conduct in the same
battle was noticeable also. Sergeant Buck was made second
lieutenant in the 7th U.S. Volunteer Infantry and
subsequently captain in the 48th United States Volunteers.

FOOTNOTES:

[15] See Note A at the end of this chapter.

[16] THE TWENTY-FIFTH AT EL-CANEY.

American valor never shone with greater luster than when the
Twenty-fifth Infantry swept up the sizzling hill of El-Caney to the
rescue of the rough riders. Two other regiments came into view of the
rough riders. But the bullets were flying like driving hail; the enemy
were in trees and ambushes with smokeless powder, and the rough riders
were biting the dust and were threatened with annihilation.

A rough rider described the feelings of his brigade when they saw the
other regiments appear and retreat. Finally this rough rider, a
Southerner, heard a well-known yell. And out of the distance moved a
regiment as if on dress parade, faces set like steel, keeping step
like a machine, their comrades falling here, there, everywhere, moving
into the storm of invisible death without one faltering step, passing
the rough riders, conquering up the hill, and never stopping until
with the rough riders El-Caney was won. This was the Twenty-fifth
Regiment (colored), United States Infantry, now quartered at Fort
Logan, Denver. We have asked the chaplain, T.G. Steward, to recite the
events at El-Caney. His modesty confines him to the barest recital of
"semi-official" records. But the charge of the Twenty-fifth is
deserving of comparison with that of "the Light Brigade" in the
Crimean War, or of Custer at the massacre of the Big Horn.

(Editorial in religious paper.)

[17] See Note C at the end of this chapter.

CHAPTER VI.

THE BATTLE OF EL CANEY.

The Capture of the Stone Fort by the Twenty-fifth Infantry.

While the battle of Guasimas was going on, in which the Tenth Cavalry
took so conspicuous a part, the Twenty-fourth Infantry still remained
on board the City of Washington awaiting orders to land. During the
night of the 24th such orders were received by the authorities of the
transport, and they were directed to land their troops, but the
General Commanding, Brigadier-General Kent, did not hear of the matter
until some time the next morning. He relates the following
circumstances in his official report of the debarkation:

"At 9 a.m. of the 25th Lieutenant Cardin, of the Revenue Marine, came
aboard with orders for me to proceed to and disembark at Altares
(Siboney). This officer also handed me a letter from the corps
commander expressing his astonishment that I had remained away three
days."

General Kent also states in his report that his travel rations had
been exhausted seven days before and that but one meal of field
rations remained, and that the ship's supply both of water and
provisions was running low, and that in consequence of these facts as
well as for higher considerations he was very anxious to get on shore.
The debarkation followed as rapidly as possible, and that afternoon
General Kent reported in person to Major-General Wheeler, the troops
bivouacking for the night near the landing. The next day Colonel
Pearson, who commanded the Second Brigade of Kent's division, took
the Second Infantry and reconnoitred along the railroad toward the
Morro, going a distance of about six miles and returning in the
evening, having found no enemy in that vicinity, although evidences
were found that a force had recently retreated from a blockhouse
situated on the railroad about two miles from Aguadores.

On the day following, June 27th, the entire division moved out on the
road toward Santiago and encamped on the same ground that Lawton had
occupied the night previous. The Second Brigade took its place near
Savilla, while the Third Brigade, which included the Twenty-fourth
Infantry, went into camp at Las Guasimas, where the affair of the 24th
had occurred. The order of march had now partially fallen back to the
original plan: Lawton in advance, with whom was the Twenty-Fifth
Infantry; Wheeler next, with whom was the Ninth and Tenth Cavalry, and
Kent in the rear, who had, as we have just related, the Twenty-fourth
Infantry in his Third Brigade. In this order the army moved, so far as
it moved at all, until the morning of the 30th, when dispositions for
the general attack began.

The story of the great battle, or as it turned out, of the two great
battles, begins on this day, and the careers of the four colored
regiments are to be followed through the divisions of Lawton, Kent and
Wheeler. Let us begin, however, with General Shafter's official report
and his "Story of Santiago," as told in the "Century" of February,
1899.

From these sources it is learned that on June 30th General Shafter
reconnoitered the country about Santiago and determined upon a plan of
attack. Ascending a hill from which he could obtain a good view of the
city, and could also see San Juan Hill and the country about El Caney,
he observed afresh what had impressed itself upon all immediately
upon landing, to wit: That in all this country there were no good
roads along which to move troops or transport supplies. The General
says: "I had never seen a good road in a Spanish country, and Santiago
did not disappoint my expectations." The roads as he saw them from the
summit of the hill on June 30th were very poor, and indeed, little
better than bridle paths, except between El Caney and San Juan River
and the city. Within this region, a distance of from four to four and
a half miles, the roads were passable. El Caney lay about four miles
northeast of Santiago, and was strongly fortified, and, as events
proved, strongly garrisoned. This position was of great importance to
the enemy, because from it a force might come to attack the right
flank and rear of the American Army as it should make its attempt on
San Juan Hill. El Caney held the road from Guantanamo, at which point
an important Spanish force was posted. While General Shafter was
surveying the country from the hill at El Pozo and making what special
examination he could of the country toward San Juan Hills, Generals
Lawton and Chaffee were making a reconnoisance around El Caney. From
General Lawton's report it would appear that the work of
reconnoitering around El Caney was done chiefly by General Chaffee. He
says: "To General Adna R. Chaffee I am indebted for a thorough and
intelligent reconnoissance of the town of El Caney and vicinity prior
to the battle and the submission of a plan of attack which was
adopted. I consider General Chaffee one of the best practical soldiers
in the army and recommend him for special distinction for successfully
charging the stone fort mentioned in this report, the capture of which
practically closed the battle."

The general plan of attack as explained by General Shafter himself in
his "Century" article was "to put a brigade on the road between
Santiago and El Caney, to keep the Spaniards at the latter place from
retreating on the city, and then with the rest of Lawton's division
and the divisions of Wheeler and Kent, and Bates' brigade to attack
the Spanish position in front of Santiago." Before that he had said
that he wished to put a division in on the right of El Caney and
assault the town on that road. To Admiral Sampson on June 26th he
said: "I shall, if I can, put a large force in Caney, and one perhaps
still farther west, near the pipe-line conveying water to the city,
making my main attack from the northeast and east." His desire at this
time was to "get the enemy in my front and the city at my back." On
June 30th he had modified this plan so as to decide to place one
brigade on the road between El Caney and Santiago, with a view merely
to keeping the El Caney garrison from retreating into Santiago.

As he was explaining his plan to the division officers and others on
the afternoon of the 30th at his own headquarters, Lawton and Chaffee
were of the opinion that they could dispose of the Spaniards at El
Caney in two hours time. "Therefore," says the General, "I modified my
plan, assigning Lawton's whole division for the attack of El Caney and
directed Bates' independent brigade to his support." This last
modification of General Shafter's plan was made in deference to the
opinion of subordinates, and was based upon observations made
especially by General Chaffee.

The force assigned for the reduction of El Caney was to begin its work
early in the morning, and by ten or eleven o'clock at the outside it
was expected that the task would be accomplished and Lawton would join
Kent and Sumner in the assault upon San Juan. Early on the morning of
July 1st Capron's battery was got into position on a line running
directly north from Marianage on a hill about five hundred yards east
of Las Guasimas Creek. Lawton's division began its move on the
afternoon of the 30th, as did in fact the whole army, and bivouacked
that night near El Pozo. The Twenty-fifth Infantry, which belonged to
the Second Brigade, commanded by Colonel Miles, a former Major of the
Twenty-fifth, left El Pozo at daylight by way of the road leading
almost due north, and marched about one mile to the little town of
Marianage. Here a halt was made for an hour, from 6.30 to 7.30, during
which time reconnoitering parties were sent out to examine the ground
toward the Ducoureau House, which lay about one mile to the northward
of Marianage, and which had been designated by General Lawton as a
general rendezvous after the engagement should terminate.
Reconnoissance was made also to the front for the purpose of
discovering the enemy, and to ascertain the left of Ludlow's brigade.
This was the first brigade of Lawton's division and consisted of the
Eighth and Twenty-second Infantry and the Second Massachusetts, the
last named regiment being on the right. The Second Brigade was to
connect with this on its right and succeeded in finding the position
of the Second Massachusetts during this halt. At 11.30 Miles' brigade
was ordered to take position on the right of Ludlow's brigade, which
it did in the following order: The Fourth Infantry on the left,
joining with the Second Massachusetts on Ludlow's right; the
Twenty-fifth on the right, with its left joining on the Fourth
Infantry.

We must now review the progress of the battle so far as it is possible
to do so, from the firing of the first shot by Capron's battery up to
11.30, an hour long after the time at which it had been supposed that
El Caney would fall. Capron's reports are very brief. He says: "July
1--Fired shell and shrappnel into El Caney (ranged 2,400) 6.15 a.m. to
11.30 a.m." In another report he says: "Opened fire July 1, with shell
and shrappnel at 6.15 on Caney; range, 2,400 yards; continued until
11.30 a.m." He says that the battery "continued its fire against
specified objectives intermittently throughout the day under the
personal direction of the division commander." The forces we have so
far considered, consisting of Ludlow's and Miles' brigades, and of
Capron's battery, lay to the south of Caney, between it and Santiago,
Ludlow's brigade having been placed there to "cut off the retreat of
the garrison should it attempt to escape." Up to 11.30 there had been
no call for employing it for that purpose. The garrison had made no
attempt to escape. We must now go around to the east and north of
Caney. Here the Third Brigade, consisting of the Seventh, Twelfth and
Seventeenth Infantry, was posted, and early in the morning joined in
the attack, the brigade getting under fire before eight o'clock.
Colonel Carpenter, of the Seventh Regiment, says that one company of
his regiment, by General Chaffee's direction, was detached and sent
forward to reduce a blockhouse, well up on the hill, which commanded
the approach of his regiment to the field of action. After several
ineffectual attempts by the company, the Captain (Van Orsdale) was
directed to abandon the undertaking and rejoin the regiment, which
then took up a position on the crest of a hill running nearly parallel
with the Spanish lines. From this position the men crawled forward
about fifty yards and opened a deliberate fire upon the enemy, keeping
it up for about an hour, but as the losses of the regiment at this
time were considerable and the fire seemed to be without material
effect, the command was withdrawn to its position on the hill where
it found protection in a sunken road. In this condition this regiment
lay when Capron's battery made its lull at 11.30. The fearful fire
this regiment met can be estimated by the losses it sustained, which
during the day were as follows: Killed, 1 officer and 33 enlisted men;
wounded, 4 officers and 95 enlisted men; missing, 3 enlisted men. The
Seventeenth Regiment went into action on the right of the Seventh,
doing but little firing, as their orders were not to open fire unless
they could make the fire effective. Companies C and G fired a few
volleys; the remainder of the regiment did not fire at all. Four
enlisted men were killed and two officers severely wounded, one,
Lieutenant Dickinson, dying from his wounds within a few hours.
Several enlisted men were also wounded. At 11.30 this regiment was
lying on the right of the Seventh. The Twelfth Regiment began firing
between 6 and 7 in the morning and advanced to take its position on
the left of the Seventh Infantry. This regiment early reached a
position within 350 yards of the enemy, in which it found shelter in
the sunken road, "free from the enemy's fire." The regiment remained
in this position until about 4 o'clock in the afternoon, and, hence,
was there at 11.30 a.m. The losses of this regiment during the day
were, killed, 7 enlisted men; wounded, 2 officers and 31 enlisted men.
From these brief sketches the reader will now be able to grasp the
position of Lawton's entire division. Beginning on the south, from the
west, with Ludlow's brigade, consisting of the Twenty-second, Eighth
and Second Massachusetts, the line was continued by Miles' brigade of
the Fourth and Twenty-fifth Infantry; then passing over a considerable
space, we strike Chaffee's brigade, posted as has just been described.
General Bates' brigade probably arrived upon the field about noon.
This brigade consisted of the Third and Twentieth Infantry, and is
known as "Bates' Independent Brigade." The brigade is reported as
going into action about 1 o'clock and continuing in action until 4
o'clock. It took a position on the right, partially filling up the gap
between Miles and Chaffee. The first battalion of the Twentieth
Infantry went into action on the left of the Twenty-fifth Infantry's
firing line, and one company, A, took part in the latter part of the
charge by which the stone house was taken. Between 11.30, when
Capron's firing stopped, and when Miles' brigade was moved forward to
join the right of Ludlow's, and 12.20, when the battery recommenced,
the troops, including Bates' brigade, were either in the positions
described above or were moving to them. Noon had arrived and El Caney
is not taken; the garrison has not attempted to escape, but is sending
out upon its assailants a continuous and deadly fire. "Throughout the
heaviest din of our fire," says Colonel Carpenter, "could be heard the
peculiar high-keyed ring of the defiant enemy's shots."

Twelve o'clock on July 1st, 1898, was a most anxious hour for our army
in Cuba. The battle at El Caney was at a standstill and the divisions
of Kent and Sumner were in a most perilous situation. Bonsal's
description of the state of the battle at that time is pathetic.
Speaking of the artillery at El Caney--Capron's battery--he says it
was now apparent that this artillery, firing from its position of
twenty-four hundred yards, could do very little damage to the great
stone fort and earthworks north of the village. The shots were too few
and the metal used too light to be effectual. Three hours of the
morning had worn away and the advance of our men had been slowly made
and at great cost; all the approaches were commanded by Spanish
entrenchments and the fighting was very unequal. A soldier of the
Twenty-fifth says that when he came in sight of the battle at El
Caney, "the Americans were gaining no ground, and the flashes of the
Spanish mausers told us that the forces engaged were unequally
matched, the difference of position favoring the Spaniards." This view
was had about noon, or soon after. At that time "a succession of aides
and staff officers came galloping from headquarters with messages
which plainly showed that confusion, if not disaster, had befallen the
two divisions which, by the heavy firing, we had learned to our great
surprise, had become warmly engaged in the centre. The orders to
General Lawton from headquarters were at first peremptory in
character--he was to pull out of his fight and to move his division to
the support of the centre" (Bonsal). This call for Lawton arose from
the fact that about noon General Shafter received several dispatches
from Sumner, of the Cavalry Division, requiring assistance. General
Sumner felt the need of the assistance of every available man in the
centre of the line where he was carrying on his fight with the
Spaniards on Blue House Hill. This situation so impressed the General,
Shafter, that he finally wrote to Lawton, "You must proceed with the
remainder of your force and join on immediately upon Sumner's right.
If you do not the battle is lost." Shafter's idea then was to fall
back to his original plan of just leaving enough troops at El Caney to
prevent the garrison from going to the assistance of any other part of
the line. Shafter himself says: "As the fight progressed I was
impressed with the fact that we were meeting with a very stubborn
resistance at El Caney and I began to fear that I had made a mistake
in making two fights in one day, and sent Major Noble with orders to
Lawton to hasten with his troops along the Caney road, placing himself
on the right of Wheeler" (Sumner). Lawton now made a general advance,
and it is important to see just what troops did advance. The Seventh
Infantry did not move, for Lieutenant-Colonel Carpenter says that
after withdrawing "to the partial cover furnished by the road, the
regiment occupied this position from 8 o'clock a.m. until about 4.30
p.m." The Seventeenth did not move, for Captain O'Brien, commanding,
says the regiment took a position joining "its left with the right of
the Seventh Infantry" and that the regiment "remained in this position
until the battle was over." The Twelfth Infantry remained in its
shelter within 350 yards of the stone fort until about 4 p.m. Then we
have Chaffee's brigade on the north of the fort remaining stationary
and by their own reports doing but little firing. The Seventeenth
fired "for about fifty minutes" about noon, with remarkable precision,
but "it seemingly had no effect upon reducing the Spanish fire
delivered in our (their) front." The Seventh did not fire to any
extent. The Twelfth Infantry lay in its refuge "free from the enemy's
fire" and may have kept up an irregular fire.

About this time Bates' brigade entered the field and one battalion of
the Twentieth Infantry is reported to have joined the left of the
firing line of the Twenty-fifth. General Ludlow says there was a lull
from 12 to 1 p.m., "when the action again became violent, and at 3
p.m. the Third Brigade captured the stone fort with a rush and hoisted
the American flag." From Ludlow's brigade, Captain Van Horne,
commanding the Twenty-second Infantry, after the wounding of
Lieutenant-Colonel Patterson, says that the First Battalion of his
regiment took a position about 800 yards from the town and kept up
firing until the place surrendered. He does not say positively that
the firing was upon the town, but he had said just before that the
Second Battalion slowly moved forward, firing into the town from the
left, so that we may readily conclude from the context as well as from
the position that the First Battalion fired into the town also. Hence
it seems fair to exclude from the fort all of Ludlow's brigade, and it
is observable that Ludlow himself claims no part in the capture of
that stronghold.

General Bates says his brigade took position to the right of Colonel
Miles' brigade and pushed rapidly to the front. He then says that
after remaining sometime in the crossroad to the right of Miles'
brigade, under a heavy fire from the enemy, the brigade moved farther
"to the right to the assault of a small hill, occupied upon the top by
a stone fort and well protected by rifle pits. General Chaffee's
brigade charged them from the right, and the two brigades joining upon
the crest, opened fire from this point of vantage, lately occupied by
the Spanish, upon the village of El Caney." General Chaffee says it
was in consequence of the fire of General Bates' troops upon the fort
that the assault by the Twelfth Infantry was postponed.

In General Chaffee's report this statement occurs: "The action lasted
nearly throughout the day, terminating at about 4.30 p.m., at which
time the stone blockhouse was assaulted by Captain Haskell's battalion
of the Twelfth Infantry, under the personal direction of
Lieutenant-Colonel Comba, commanding the regiment. The resistance at
this point had been greatly affected by the fire of Capron's battery.
A few moments after the seizure of this point--the key to the
situation--my left was joined by General Bates with a portion of his
command." It is to be noted in connection with all of the above
statements that Major McCaskey, who commanded the Twentieth Infantry
(Bates brigade), says: "The First Battalion was moved to the right and
put into action on the left of the Twenty-fifth Infantry's firing
line, and one company, A, took part in the latter part of the charge
by which the stone house was taken." The two points to be noted here
are (1) that this battalion was on the left of the Twenty-fifth's
firing line, and (2) that one company took part in the charge upon the
stone house. When Chaffee's brigade charged the stone house from the
right some of Bates' troops, at least this Company A, from the
battalion near the firing line of the Twenty-fifth Infantry, took part
in the latter part of the charge. The two brigades, Bates' and
Chaffee's, joined immediately after the capture of the stone fort and
opened fire upon the town.

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