Thomas Aquinas - Summa Theologica, Part I (Prima Pars)

T >> Thomas Aquinas >> Summa Theologica, Part I (Prima Pars)

Pages:
1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | 8 | 9 | 10 | 11 | 12 | 13 | 14 | 15 | 16 | 17 | 18 | 19 | 20 | 21 | 22 | 23 | 24 | 25 | 26 | 27 | 28 | 29 | 30 | 31 | 32 | 33 | 34 | 35 | 36 | 37 | 38 | 39 | 40 | 41 | 42 | 43 | 44 | 45 | 46 | 47 | 48 | 49 | 50 | 51 | 52 | 53 | 54 | 55 | 56 | 57 | 58 | 59 | 60 | 61 | 62 | 63 | 64 | 65 | 66 | 67 | 68 | 69 | 70 | 71 | 72 | 73 | 74 | 75 | 76 | 77 | 78 | 79 | 80 | 81 | 82 | 83 | 84 | 85 | 86 | 87 | 88 | 89 | 90 | 91 | 92 | 93 | 94 | 95 | 96 | 97 | 98 | 99 | 100 | 101 | 102 | 103 | 104 | 105 | 106 | 107 | 108 | 109 | 110 | 111 | 112

Reply Obj. 3: The virtue which is called "truth" is not truth in
general, but a certain kind of truth according to which man shows
himself in deed and word as he really is. But truth as applied to
"life" is used in a particular sense, inasmuch as a man fulfills in
his life that to which he is ordained by the divine intellect, as it
has been said that truth exists in other things (A. 1). Whereas the
truth of "justice" is found in man as he fulfills his duty to his
neighbor, as ordained by law. Hence we cannot argue from these
particular truths to truth in general.
_______________________

FIFTH ARTICLE [I, Q. 16, Art. 5]

Whether God Is Truth?

Objection 1: It seems that God is not truth. For truth consists in the
intellect composing and dividing. But in God there is not composition
and division. Therefore in Him there is not truth.

Obj. 2: Further, truth, according to Augustine (De Vera Relig. xxxvi)
is a "likeness to the principle." But in God there is no likeness to
a principle. Therefore in God there is not truth.

Obj. 3: Further, whatever is said of God, is said of Him as of the
first cause of all things; thus the being of God is the cause of all
being; and His goodness the cause of all good. If therefore there is
truth in God, all truth will be from Him. But it is true that someone
sins. Therefore this will be from God; which is evidently false.

_On the contrary,_ Our Lord says, "I am the Way, the Truth, and the
Life" (John 14:6).

_I answer that,_ As said above (A. 1), truth is found in the
intellect according as it apprehends a thing as it is; and in things
according as they have being conformable to an intellect. This is to
the greatest degree found in God. For His being is not only conformed
to His intellect, but it is the very act of His intellect; and His act
of understanding is the measure and cause of every other being and of
every other intellect, and He Himself is His own existence and act of
understanding. Whence it follows not only that truth is in Him, but
that He is truth itself, and the sovereign and first truth.

Reply Obj. 1: Although in the divine intellect there is neither
composition nor division, yet in His simple act of intelligence He
judges of all things and knows all things complex; and thus there is
truth in His intellect.

Reply Obj. 2: The truth of our intellect is according to its
conformity with its principle, that is to say, to the things from
which it receives knowledge. The truth also of things is according to
their conformity with their principle, namely, the divine intellect.
Now this cannot be said, properly speaking, of divine truth; unless
perhaps in so far as truth is appropriated to the Son, Who has a
principle. But if we speak of divine truth in its essence, we cannot
understand this unless the affirmative must be resolved into the
negative, as when one says: "the Father is of Himself, because He is
not from another." Similarly, the divine truth can be called a
"likeness to the principle," inasmuch as His existence is not
dissimilar to His intellect.

Reply Obj. 3: Not-being and privation have no truth of themselves,
but only in the apprehension of the intellect. Now all apprehension
of the intellect is from God. Hence all the truth that exists in the
statement--"that a person commits fornication is true"--is entirely
from God. But to argue, "Therefore that this person fornicates is
from God", is a fallacy of Accident.
_______________________

SIXTH ARTICLE [I, Q. 16, Art. 6]

Whether There Is Only One Truth, According to Which All Things Are True?

Objection 1: It seems that there is only one truth, according to which
all things are true. For according to Augustine (De Trin. xv, 1),
"nothing is greater than the mind of man, except God." Now truth is
greater than the mind of man; otherwise the mind would be the judge of
truth: whereas in fact it judges all things according to truth, and
not according to its own measure. Therefore God alone is truth.
Therefore there is no other truth but God.

Obj. 2: Further, Anselm says (De Verit. xiv), that, "as is the
relation of time to temporal things, so is that of truth to true
things." But there is only one time for all temporal things.
Therefore there is only one truth, by which all things are true.

_On the contrary,_ it is written (Ps. 11:2), "Truths are decayed from
among the children of men."

_I answer that,_ In one sense truth, whereby all things are true, is
one, and in another sense it is not. In proof of which we must
consider that when anything is predicated of many things univocally,
it is found in each of them according to its proper nature; as animal
is found in each species of animal. But when anything is predicated of
many things analogically, it is found in only one of them according to
its proper nature, and from this one the rest are denominated. So
healthiness is predicated of animal, of urine, and of medicine, not
that health is only in the animal; but from the health of the animal,
medicine is called healthy, in so far as it is the cause of health,
and urine is called healthy, in so far as it indicates health. And
although health is neither in medicine nor in urine, yet in either
there is something whereby the one causes, and the other indicates
health. Now we have said (A. 1) that truth resides primarily in
the intellect; and secondarily in things, according as they are
related to the divine intellect. If therefore we speak of truth, as it
exists in the intellect, according to its proper nature, then are
there many truths in many created intellects; and even in one and the
same intellect, according to the number of things known. Whence a
gloss on Ps. 11:2, "Truths are decayed from among the children of
men," says: "As from one man's face many likenesses are reflected in a
mirror, so many truths are reflected from the one divine truth." But
if we speak of truth as it is in things, then all things are true by
one primary truth; to which each one is assimilated according to its
own entity. And thus, although the essences or forms of things are
many, yet the truth of the divine intellect is one, in conformity to
which all things are said to be true.

Reply Obj. 1: The soul does not judge of things according to any kind
of truth, but according to the primary truth, inasmuch as it is
reflected in the soul, as in a mirror, by reason of the first
principles of the understanding. It follows, therefore, that the
primary truth is greater than the soul. And yet, even created truth,
which resides in our intellect, is greater than the soul, not simply,
but in a certain degree, in so far as it is its perfection; even as
science may be said to be greater than the soul. Yet it is true that
nothing subsisting is greater than the rational soul, except God.

Reply Obj. 2: The saying of Anselm is correct in so far as things are
said to be true by their relation to the divine intellect.
_______________________

SEVENTH ARTICLE [I, Q. 16, Art. 7]

Whether Created Truth Is Eternal?

Objection 1: It seems that created truth is eternal. For Augustine
says (De Lib. Arbit. ii, 8) "Nothing is more eternal than the nature
of a circle, and that two added to three make five." But the truth of
these is a created truth. Therefore created truth is eternal.

Obj. 2: Further, that which is always, is eternal. But universals
are always and everywhere; therefore they are eternal. So therefore
is truth, which is the most universal.

Obj. 3: Further, it was always true that what is true in the present
was to be in the future. But as the truth of a proposition regarding
the present is a created truth, so is that of a proposition regarding
the future. Therefore some created truth is eternal.

Obj. 4: Further, all that is without beginning and end is eternal.
But the truth of enunciables is without beginning and end; for if
their truth had a beginning, since it was not before, it was true
that truth was not, and true, of course, by reason of truth; so that
truth was before it began to be. Similarly, if it be asserted that
truth has an end, it follows that it is after it has ceased to be,
for it will still be true that truth is not. Therefore truth is
eternal.

_On the contrary,_ God alone is eternal, as laid down before
(Q. 10, Art. 3).

_I answer that,_ The truth of enunciations is no other than the truth of
the intellect. For an enunciation resides in the intellect, and in
speech. Now according as it is in the intellect it has truth of
itself: but according as it is in speech, it is called enunciable
truth, according as it signifies some truth of the intellect, not on
account of any truth residing in the enunciation, as though in a
subject. Thus urine is called healthy, not from any health within it
but from the health of an animal which it indicates. In like manner it
has been already said that things are called true from the truth of
the intellect. Hence, if no intellect were eternal, no truth would be
eternal. Now because only the divine intellect is eternal, in it alone
truth has eternity. Nor does it follow from this that anything else
but God is eternal; since the truth of the divine intellect is God
Himself, as shown already (A. 5).

Reply Obj. 1: The nature of a circle, and the fact that two and three
make five, have eternity in the mind of God.

Reply Obj. 2: That something is always and everywhere, can be
understood in two ways. In one way, as having in itself the power of
extension to all time and to all places, as it belongs to God to be
everywhere and always. In the other way as not having in itself
determination to any place or time, as primary matter is said to be
one, not because it has one form, but by the absence of all
distinguishing form. In this manner all universals are said to be
everywhere and always, in so far as universals are independent of
place and time. It does not, however, follow from this that they are
eternal, except in an intellect, if one exists that is eternal.

Reply Obj. 3: That which now is, was future, before it (actually)
was; because it was in its cause that it would be. Hence, if the
cause were removed, that thing's coming to be was not future. But the
first cause is alone eternal. Hence it does not follow that it was
always true that what now is would be, except in so far as its future
being was in the sempiternal cause; and God alone is such a cause.

Reply Obj. 4: Because our intellect is not eternal, neither is the
truth of enunciable propositions which are formed by us, eternal, but
it had a beginning in time. Now before such truth existed, it was not
true to say that such a truth did exist, except by reason of the
divine intellect, wherein alone truth is eternal. But it is true now
to say that that truth did not then exist: and this is true only by
reason of the truth that is now in our intellect; and not by reason
of any truth in the things. For this is truth concerning not-being;
and not-being has not truth of itself, but only so far as our
intellect apprehends it. Hence it is true to say that truth did not
exist, in so far as we apprehend its not-being as preceding its being.
_______________________

EIGHTH ARTICLE [I, Q. 16, Art. 8]

Whether Truth Is Immutable?

Objection 1: It seems that truth is immutable. For Augustine says (De
Lib. Arbit. ii, 12), that "Truth and mind do not rank as equals,
otherwise truth would be mutable, as the mind is."

Obj. 2: Further, what remains after every change is immutable; as
primary matter is unbegotten and incorruptible, since it remains after
all generation and corruption. But truth remains after all change; for
after every change it is true to say that a thing is, or is not.
Therefore truth is immutable.

Obj. 3: Further, if the truth of an enunciation changes, it changes
mostly with the changing of the thing. But it does not thus change.
For truth, according to Anselm (De Verit. viii), "is a certain
rightness" in so far as a thing answers to that which is in the
divine mind concerning it. But this proposition that "Socrates sits",
receives from the divine mind the signification that Socrates does
sit; and it has the same signification even though he does not sit.
Therefore the truth of the proposition in no way changes.

Obj. 4: Further, where there is the same cause, there is the same
effect. But the same thing is the cause of the truth of the three
propositions, "Socrates sits, will sit, sat." Therefore the truth of
each is the same. But one or other of these must be the true one.
Therefore the truth of these propositions remains immutable; and for
the same reason that of any other.

_On the contrary,_ It is written (Ps. 11:2), "Truths are decayed from
among the children of men."

_I answer that,_ Truth, properly speaking, resides only in the
intellect, as said before (A. 1); but things are called true in
virtue of the truth residing in an intellect. Hence the mutability of
truth must be regarded from the point of view of the intellect, the
truth of which consists in its conformity to the thing understood. Now
this conformity may vary in two ways, even as any other likeness,
through change in one of the two extremes. Hence in one way truth
varies on the part of the intellect, from the fact that a change of
opinion occurs about a thing which in itself has not changed, and in
another way, when the thing is changed, but not the opinion; and in
either way there can be a change from true to false. If, then, there
is an intellect wherein there can be no alternation of opinions, and
the knowledge of which nothing can escape, in this is immutable truth.
Now such is the divine intellect, as is clear from what has been said
before (Q. 14, A. 15). Hence the truth of the divine intellect is
immutable. But the truth of our intellect is mutable; not because it
is itself the subject of change, but in so far as our intellect
changes from truth to falsity, for thus forms may be called mutable.
Whereas the truth of the divine intellect is that according to which
natural things are said to be true, and this is altogether immutable.

Reply Obj. 1: Augustine is speaking of divine truth.

Reply Obj. 2: The true and being are convertible terms. Hence just as
being is not generated nor corrupted of itself, but accidentally, in
so far as this being or that is corrupted or generated, as is said in
_Phys._ i, so does truth change, not so as that no truth remains, but
because that truth does not remain which was before.

Reply Obj. 3: A proposition not only has truth, as other things are
said to have it, in so far, that is, as they correspond to that which
is the design of the divine intellect concerning them; but it is said
to have truth in a special way, in so far as it indicates the truth
of the intellect, which consists in the conformity of the intellect
with a thing. When this disappears, the truth of an opinion changes,
and consequently the truth of the proposition. So therefore this
proposition, "Socrates sits," is true, as long as he is sitting, both
with the truth of the thing, in so far as the expression is
significative, and with the truth of signification, in so far as it
signifies a true opinion. When Socrates rises, the first truth
remains, but the second is changed.

Reply Obj. 4: The sitting of Socrates, which is the cause of the
truth of the proposition, "Socrates sits," has not the same meaning
when Socrates sits, after he sits, and before he sits. Hence the
truth which results, varies, and is variously signified by these
propositions concerning present, past, or future. Thus it does not
follow, though one of the three propositions is true, that the same
truth remains invariable.
_______________________

QUESTION 17

CONCERNING FALSITY
(In Four Articles)

We next consider falsity. About this four points of inquiry arise:

(1) Whether falsity exists in things?

(2) Whether it exists in the sense?

(3) Whether it exists in the intellect?

(4) Concerning the opposition of the true and the false.
_______________________

FIRST ARTICLE [I, Q. 17, Art. 1]

Whether Falsity Exists in Things?

Objection 1: It appears that falsity does not exist in things. For
Augustine says (Soliloq. ii, 8), "If the true is that which is, it
will be concluded that the false exists nowhere; whatever reason may
appear to the contrary."

Obj. 2: Further, false is derived from _fallere_ (to deceive). But
things do not deceive; for, as Augustine says (De Vera Relig. 33),
they show nothing but their own species. Therefore the false is not
found in things.

Obj. 3: Further, the true is said to exist in things by conformity to
the divine intellect, as stated above (Q. 16). But everything, in so
far as it exists, imitates God. Therefore everything is true without
admixture of falsity; and thus nothing is false.

_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (De Vera Relig. 34): "Every body is a
true body and a false unity: for it imitates unity without being
unity." But everything imitates the divine unity yet falls short of
it. Therefore in all things falsity exists.

_I answer that,_ Since true and false are opposed, and since opposites
stand in relation to the same thing, we must needs seek falsity, where
primarily we find truth; that is to say, in the intellect. Now, in
things, neither truth nor falsity exists, except in relation to the
intellect. And since every thing is denominated simply by what belongs
to it _per se,_ but is denominated relatively by what belongs to it
accidentally; a thing indeed may be called false simply when compared
with the intellect on which it depends, and to which it is compared
_per se_ but may be called false relatively as directed to another
intellect, to which it is compared accidentally. Now natural things
depend on the divine intellect, as artificial things on the human.
Wherefore artificial things are said to be false simply and in
themselves, in so far as they fall short of the form of the art;
whence a craftsman is said to produce a false work, if it falls short
of the proper operation of his art.

In things that depend on God, falseness cannot be found, in so far as
they are compared with the divine intellect; since whatever takes
place in things proceeds from the ordinance of that intellect, unless
perhaps in the case of voluntary agents only, who have it in their
power to withdraw themselves from what is so ordained; wherein
consists the evil of sin. Thus sins themselves are called untruths and
lies in the Scriptures, according to the words of the text, "Why do
you love vanity, and seek after lying?" (Ps. 4:3): as on the other
hand virtuous deeds are called the "truth of life" as being obedient
to the order of the divine intellect. Thus it is said, "He that doth
truth, cometh to the light" (John 3:21).

But in relation to our intellect, natural things which are compared
thereto accidentally, can be called false; not simply, but relatively;
and that in two ways. In one way according to the thing signified, and
thus a thing is said to be false as being signified or represented by
word or thought that is false. In this respect anything can be said to
be false as regards any quality not possessed by it; as if we should
say that a diameter is a false commensurable thing, as the Philosopher
says (Metaph. v, 34). So, too, Augustine says (Soliloq. ii, 10): "The
true tragedian is a false Hector": even as, on the contrary, anything
can be called true, in regard to that which is becoming to it. In
another way a thing can be called false, by way of cause--and thus a
thing is said to be false that naturally begets a false opinion. And
whereas it is innate in us to judge things by external appearances,
since our knowledge takes its rise from sense, which principally and
naturally deals with external accidents, therefore those external
accidents, which resemble things other than themselves, are said to be
false with respect to those things; thus gall is falsely honey; and
tin, false gold. Regarding this, Augustine says (Soliloq. ii, 6): "We
call those things false that appear to our apprehension like the
true:" and the Philosopher says (Metaph. v, 34): "Things are called
false that are naturally apt to appear such as they are not, or what
they are not." In this way a man is called false as delighting in
false opinions or words, and not because he can invent them; for in
this way many wise and learned persons might be called false, as
stated in _Metaph._ v, 34.

Reply Obj. 1: A thing compared with the intellect is said to be true
in respect to what it is; and false in respect to what it is not.
Hence, "The true tragedian is a false Hector," as stated in Soliloq.
ii, 6. As, therefore, in things that are is found a certain
non-being, so in things that are is found a degree of falseness.

Reply Obj. 2: Things do not deceive by their own nature, but by
accident. For they give occasion to falsity, by the likeness they
bear to things which they actually are not.

Reply Obj. 3: Things are said to be false, not as compared with the
divine intellect, in which case they would be false simply, but as
compared with our intellect; and thus they are false only relatively.

To the argument which is urged on the contrary, likeness or defective
representation does not involve the idea of falsity except in so far
as it gives occasion to false opinion. Hence a thing is not always
said to be false, because it resembles another thing; but only when
the resemblance is such as naturally to produce a false opinion, not
in any one case, but in the majority of instances.
_______________________

SECOND ARTICLE [I, Q. 17, Art. 2]

Whether There Is Falsity in the Senses?

Objection 1: It seems that falsity is not in the senses. For Augustine
says (De Vera Relig. 33): "If all the bodily senses report as they are
affected, I do not know what more we can require from them." Thus it
seems that we are not deceived by the senses; and therefore that
falsity is not in them.

Obj. 2: Further, the Philosopher says (Metaph. iv, 24) that falsity
is not proper to the senses, but to the imagination.

Obj. 3: Further, in non-complex things there is neither true nor
false, but in complex things only. But affirmation and negation do
not belong to the senses. Therefore in the senses there is no falsity.

_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (Soliloq. ii, 6), "It appears that the
senses entrap us into error by their deceptive similitudes."

_I answer that,_ Falsity is not to be sought in the senses except as
truth is in them. Now truth is not in them in such a way as that the
senses know truth, but in so far as they apprehend sensible things
truly, as said above (Q. 16, A. 2), and this takes place through
the senses apprehending things as they are, and hence it happens that
falsity exists in the senses through their apprehending or judging
things to be otherwise than they really are.

The knowledge of things by the senses is in proportion to the
existence of their likeness in the senses; and the likeness of a thing
can exist in the senses in three ways. In the first way, primarily and
of its own nature, as in sight there is the likeness of colors, and of
other sensible objects proper to it. Secondly, of its own nature,
though not primarily; as in sight there is the likeness of shape,
size, and of other sensible objects common to more than one sense.
Thirdly, neither primarily nor of its own nature, but accidentally, as
in sight, there is the likeness of a man, not as man, but in so far as
it is accidental to the colored object to be a man.

Sense, then, has no false knowledge about its proper objects, except
accidentally and rarely, and then, because of the unsound organ it
does not receive the sensible form rightly; just as other passive
subjects because of their indisposition receive defectively the
impressions of the agent. Hence, for instance, it happens that on
account of an unhealthy tongue sweet seems bitter to a sick person.
But as to common objects of sense, and accidental objects, even a
rightly disposed sense may have a false judgment, because it is
referred to them not directly, but accidentally, or as a consequence
of being directed to other things.

Reply Obj. 1: The affection of sense is its sensation itself. Hence,
from the fact that sense reports as it is affected, it follows that
we are not deceived in the judgment by which we judge that we
experience sensation. Since, however, sense is sometimes affected
erroneously of that object, it follows that it sometimes reports
erroneously of that object; and thus we are deceived by sense about
the object, but not about the fact of sensation.

Reply Obj. 2: Falsity is said not to be proper to sense, since sense
is not deceived as to its proper object. Hence in another translation
it is said more plainly, "Sense, about its proper object, is never
false." Falsity is attributed to the imagination, as it represents
the likeness of something even in its absence. Hence, when anyone
perceives the likeness of a thing as if it were the thing itself,
falsity results from such an apprehension; and for this reason the
Philosopher says (Metaph. v, 34) that shadows, pictures, and dreams
are said to be false inasmuch as they convey the likeness of things
that are not present in substance.