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Thomas Aquinas - Summa Theologica, Part I (Prima Pars)

T >> Thomas Aquinas >> Summa Theologica, Part I (Prima Pars)




Obj. 5: Further, everything within a determinate number is measured,
for number is a measure. But the divine persons are immense, as we
say in the Creed of Athanasius: "The Father is immense, the Son is
immense, the Holy Ghost is immense." Therefore the persons are not
contained within the number three.

_On the contrary,_ It is said: "There are three who bear witness in
heaven, the Father, the Word, and the Holy Ghost" (1 John 5:7). To
those who ask, "Three what?" we answer, with Augustine (De Trin. vii,
4), "Three persons." Therefore there are but three persons in God.

_I answer that,_ As was explained above, there can be only three
persons in God. For it was shown above that the several persons are
the several subsisting relations really distinct from each other. But
a real distinction between the divine relations can come only from
relative opposition. Therefore two opposite relations must needs
refer to two persons: and if any relations are not opposite they must
needs belong to the same person. Since then paternity and filiation
are opposite relations, they belong necessarily to two persons.
Therefore the subsisting paternity is the person of the Father; and
the subsisting filiation is the person of the Son. The other two
relations are not opposed to each other; therefore these two cannot
belong to one person: hence either one of them must belong to both of
the aforesaid persons; or one must belong to one person, and the
other to the other. Now, procession cannot belong to the Father and
the Son, or to either of them; for thus it would follows that the
procession of the intellect, which in God is generation, wherefrom
paternity and filiation are derived, would issue from the procession
of love, whence spiration and procession are derived, if the person
generating and the person generated proceeded from the person
spirating; and this is against what was laid down above (Q. 27, AA.
3, 4). We must consequently admit that spiration belongs to the
person of the Father, and to the person of the Son, forasmuch as it
has no relative opposition either to paternity or to filiation; and
consequently that procession belongs to the other person who is
called the person of the Holy Ghost, who proceeds by way of love, as
above explained. Therefore only three persons exist in God, the
Father, the Son, and the Holy Ghost.

Reply Obj. 1: Although there are four relations in God, one of them,
spiration, is not separated from the person of the Father and of the
Son, but belongs to both; thus, although it is a relation, it is not
called a property, because it does not belong to only one person; nor
is it a personal relation--i.e. constituting a person. The three
relations--paternity, filiation, and procession--are called personal
properties, constituting as it were the persons; for paternity is the
person of the Father, filiation is the person of the Son, procession
is the person of the Holy Ghost proceeding.

Reply Obj. 2: That which proceeds by way of intelligence, as word,
proceeds according to similitude, as also that which proceeds by way
of nature; thus, as above explained (Q. 27, A. 3), the procession of
the divine Word is the very same as generation by way of nature. But
love, as such, does not proceed as the similitude of that whence it
proceeds; although in God love is co-essential as being divine; and
therefore the procession of love is not called generation in God.

Reply Obj. 3: As man is more perfect than other animals, he has more
intrinsic operations than other animals, because his perfection is
something composite. Hence the angels, who are more perfect and more
simple, have fewer intrinsic operations than man, for they have no
imagination, or feeling, or the like. In God there exists only one
real operation--that is, His essence. How there are in Him two
processions was above explained (Q. 27, AA. 1, 4).

Reply Obj. 4: This argument would prove if the Holy Ghost possessed
another goodness apart from the goodness of the Father; for then if
the Father produced a divine person by His goodness, the Holy Ghost
also would do so. But the Father and the Holy Ghost have one and the
same goodness. Nor is there any distinction between them except by
the personal relations. So goodness belongs to the Holy Ghost, as
derived from another; and it belongs to the Father, as the principle
of its communication to another. The opposition of relation does not
allow the relation of the Holy Ghost to be joined with the relation
of principle of another divine person; because He Himself proceeds
from the other persons who are in God.

Reply Obj. 5: A determinate number, if taken as a simple number,
existing in the mind only, is measured by one. But when we speak of a
number of things as applied to the persons in God, the notion of
measure has no place, because the magnitude of the three persons is
the same (Q. 42, AA. 1, 4), and the same is not measured by the same.
_______________________

THIRD ARTICLE [I, Q. 30, Art. 3]

Whether the Numeral Terms Denote Anything Real in God?

Objection 1: It would seem that the numeral terms denote something
real in God. For the divine unity is the divine essence. But every
number is unity repeated. Therefore every numeral term in God
signifies the essence; and therefore it denotes something real in
God.

Obj. 2: Further, whatever is said of God and of creatures, belongs to
God in a more eminent manner than to creatures. But the numeral terms
denote something real in creatures; therefore much more so in God.

Obj. 3: Further, if the numeral terms do not denote anything real in
God, and are introduced simply in a negative and removing sense, as
plurality is employed to remove unity, and unity to remove plurality;
it follows that a vicious circle results, confusing the mind and
obscuring the truth; and this ought not to be. Therefore it must be
said that the numeral terms denote something real in God.

_On the contrary,_ Hilary says (De Trin. iv): "If we admit
companionship"--that is, plurality--"we exclude the idea of oneness
and of solitude;" and Ambrose says (De Fide i): "When we say one God,
unity excludes plurality of gods, and does not imply quantity in God."
Hence we see that these terms are applied to God in order to remove
something; and not to denote anything positive.

_I answer that,_ The Master (Sent. i, D, 24) considers that the numeral
terms do not denote anything positive in God, but have only a negative
meaning. Others, however, assert the contrary.

In order to resolve this point, we may observe that all plurality is a
consequence of division. Now division is twofold; one is material, and
is division of the continuous; from this results number, which is a
species of quantity. Number in this sense is found only in material
things which have quantity. The other kind of division is called
formal, and is effected by opposite or diverse forms; and this kind of
division results in a multitude, which does not belong to a genus, but
is transcendental in the sense in which being is divided by one and by
many. This kind of multitude is found only in immaterial things.

Some, considering only that multitude which is a species of discrete
quantity, and seeing that such kind of quantity has no place in God,
asserted that the numeral terms do not denote anything real in God,
but remove something from Him. Others, considering the same kind of
multitude, said that as knowledge exists in God according to the
strict sense of the word, but not in the sense of its genus (as in God
there is no such thing as a quality), so number exists in God in the
proper sense of number, but not in the sense of its genus, which is
quantity.

But we say that numeral terms predicated of God are not derived from
number, a species of quantity, for in that sense they could bear only
a metaphorical sense in God, like other corporeal properties, such as
length, breadth, and the like; but that they are taken from multitude
in a transcendent sense. Now multitude so understood has relation to
the many of which it is predicated, as "one" convertible with "being"
is related to being; which kind of oneness does not add anything to
being, except a negation of division, as we saw when treating of the
divine unity (Q. 11, A. 1); for "one" signifies undivided being.
So, of whatever we say "one," we imply its undivided reality: thus,
for instance, "one" applied to man signifies the undivided nature or
substance of a man. In the same way, when we speak of many things,
multitude in this latter sense points to those things as being each
undivided in itself.

But number, if taken as a species of quantity, denotes an accident
added to being; as also does "one" which is the principle of that
number. Therefore the numeral terms in God signify the things of which
they are said, and beyond this they add negation only, as stated
(Sent. i, D, 24); in which respect the Master was right (Sent. i, D,
24). So when we say, the essence is one, the term "one" signifies the
essence undivided; and when we say the person is one, it signifies the
person undivided; and when we say the persons are many, we signify
those persons, and their individual undividedness; for it is of the
very nature of multitude that it should be composed of units.

Reply Obj. 1: One, as it is a transcendental, is wider and more
general than substance and relation. And so likewise is multitude;
hence in God it may mean both substance and relation, according to
the context. Still, the very signification of such names adds a
negation of division, beyond substance and relation; as was explained
above.

Reply Obj. 2: Multitude, which denotes something real in creatures,
is a species of quantity, and cannot be used when speaking of God:
unlike transcendental multitude, which adds only indivision to those
of which it is predicated. Such a kind of multitude is applicable to
God.

Reply Obj. 3: "One" does not exclude multitude, but division, which
logically precedes one or multitude. Multitude does not remove unity,
but division from each of the individuals which compose the
multitude. This was explained when we treated of the divine unity (Q.
11, A. 2).

It must be observed, nevertheless, that the opposite arguments do not
sufficiently prove the point advanced. Although the idea of solitude
is excluded by plurality, and the plurality of gods by unity, it does
not follow that these terms express this signification alone. For
blackness is excluded by whiteness; nevertheless, the term whiteness
does not signify the mere exclusion of blackness.
_______________________

FOURTH ARTICLE [I, Q. 30, Art. 4]

Whether This Term "Person" Can Be Common to the Three Persons?

Objection 1: It would seem that this term "person" cannot be common to
the three persons. For nothing is common to the three persons but the
essence. But this term "person" does not signify the essence directly.
Therefore it is not common to all three.

Obj. 2: Further, the common is the opposite to the incommunicable.
But the very meaning of person is that it is incommunicable; as
appears from the definition given by Richard of St. Victor (Q. 29, A.
3, ad 4). Therefore this term "person" is not common to all the three
persons.

Obj. 3: Further, if the name "person" is common to the three, it is
common either really, or logically. But it is not so really;
otherwise the three persons would be one person; nor again is it so
logically; otherwise person would be a universal. But in God there is
neither universal nor particular; neither genus nor species, as we
proved above (Q. 3, A. 5). Therefore this term 'person' is not common
to the three.

_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (De Trin. vii, 4) that when we ask,
"Three what?" we say, "Three persons," because what a person is, is
common to them.

_I answer that,_ The very mode of expression itself shows that this
term "person" is common to the three when we say "three persons"; for
when we say "three men" we show that "man" is common to the three.
Now it is clear that this is not community of a real thing, as if one
essence were common to the three; otherwise there would be only one
person of the three, as also one essence.

What is meant by such a community has been variously determined by
those who have examined the subject. Some have called it a community
of exclusion, forasmuch as the definition of "person" contains the
word "incommunicable." Others thought it to be a community of
intention, as the definition of person contains the word "individual";
as we say that to be a species is common to horse and ox. Both of
these explanations, however, are excluded by the fact that "person" is
not a name of exclusion nor of intention, but the name of a reality.
We must therefore resolve that even in human affairs this name
"person" is common by a community of idea, not as genus or species,
but as a vague individual thing. The names of genera and species, as
man or animal, are given to signify the common natures themselves, but
not the intentions of those common natures, signified by the terms
genus or species. The vague individual thing, as "some man,"
signifies the common nature with the determinate mode of existence of
singular things--that is, something self-subsisting, as distinct from
others. But the name of a designated singular thing signifies that
which distinguishes the determinate thing; as the name Socrates
signifies this flesh and this bone. But there is this
difference--that the term "some man" signifies the nature, or the
individual on the part of its nature, with the mode of existence of
singular things; while this name "person" is not given to signify the
individual on the part of the nature, but the subsistent reality in
that nature. Now this is common in idea to the divine persons, that
each of them subsists distinctly from the others in the divine nature.
Thus this name "person" is common in idea to the three divine persons.

Reply Obj. 1: This argument is founded on a real community.

Reply Obj. 2: Although person is incommunicable, yet the mode itself
of incommunicable existence can be common to many.

Reply Obj. 3: Although this community is logical and not real, yet it
does not follow that in God there is universal or particular, or
genus, or species; both because neither in human affairs is the
community of person the same as community of genus or species; and
because the divine persons have one being; whereas genus and species
and every other universal are predicated of many which differ in
being.
_______________________

QUESTION 31

OF WHAT BELONGS TO THE UNITY OR PLURALITY IN GOD
(In Four Articles)

We now consider what belongs to the unity or plurality in God; which
gives rise to four points of inquiry:

(1) Concerning the word "Trinity";

(2) Whether we can say that the Son is other than the Father?

(3) Whether an exclusive term, which seems to exclude otherness, can
be joined to an essential name in God?

(4) Whether it can be joined to a personal term?
_______________________

FIRST ARTICLE [I, Q. 31, Art. 1]

Whether There Is Trinity in God?

Objection 1: It would seem there is not trinity in God. For every name
in God signifies substance or relation. But this name "Trinity" does
not signify the substance; otherwise it would be predicated of each
one of the persons: nor does it signify relation; for it does not
express a name that refers to another. Therefore the word "Trinity" is
not to be applied to God.

Obj. 2: Further, this word "trinity" is a collective term, since it
signifies multitude. But such a word does not apply to God; as the
unity of a collective name is the least of unities, whereas in God
there exists the greatest possible unity. Therefore this word
"trinity" does not apply to God.

Obj. 3: Further, every trine is threefold. But in God there is not
triplicity; since triplicity is a kind of inequality. Therefore
neither is there trinity in God.

Obj. 4: Further, all that exists in God exists in the unity of the
divine essence; because God is His own essence. Therefore, if Trinity
exists in God, it exists in the unity of the divine essence; and thus
in God there would be three essential unities; which is heresy.

Obj. 5: Further, in all that is said of God, the concrete is
predicated of the abstract; for Deity is God and paternity is the
Father. But the Trinity cannot be called trine; otherwise there would
be nine realities in God; which, of course, is erroneous. Therefore
the word trinity is not to be applied to God.

_On the contrary,_ Athanasius says: "Unity in Trinity; and Trinity in
Unity is to be revered."

_I answer that,_ The name "Trinity" in God signifies the determinate
number of persons. And so the plurality of persons in God requires
that we should use the word trinity; because what is indeterminately
signified by plurality, is signified by trinity in a determinate
manner.

Reply Obj. 1: In its etymological sense, this word "Trinity" seems to
signify the one essence of the three persons, according as trinity
may mean trine-unity. But in the strict meaning of the term it rather
signifies the number of persons of one essence; and on this account
we cannot say that the Father is the Trinity, as He is not three
persons. Yet it does not mean the relations themselves of the
Persons, but rather the number of persons related to each other; and
hence it is that the word in itself does not express regard to
another.

Reply Obj. 2: Two things are implied in a collective term, plurality
of the _supposita,_ and a unity of some kind of order. For "people"
is a multitude of men comprehended under a certain order. In the
first sense, this word "trinity" is like other collective words; but
in the second sense it differs from them, because in the divine
Trinity not only is there unity of order, but also with this there is
unity of essence.

Reply Obj. 3: "Trinity" is taken in an absolute sense; for it
signifies the threefold number of persons. "Triplicity" signifies a
proportion of inequality; for it is a species of unequal proportion,
according to Boethius (Arithm. i, 23). Therefore in God there is not
triplicity, but Trinity.

Reply Obj. 4: In the divine Trinity is to be understood both number
and the persons numbered. So when we say, "Trinity in Unity," we do
not place number in the unity of the essence, as if we meant three
times one; but we place the Persons numbered in the unity of nature;
as the _supposita_ of a nature are said to exist in that nature. On
the other hand, we say "Unity in Trinity"; meaning that the nature is
in its _supposita._

Reply Obj. 5: When we say, "Trinity is trine," by reason of the
number implied, we signify the multiplication of that number by
itself; since the word trine imports a distinction in the _supposita_
of which it is spoken. Therefore it cannot be said that the Trinity
is trine; otherwise it follows that, if the Trinity be trine, there
would be three _supposita_ of the Trinity; as when we say, "God is
trine," it follows that there are three _supposita_ of the Godhead.
_______________________

SECOND ARTICLE [I, Q. 31, Art. 2]

Whether the Son Is Other Than the Father?

Objection 1: It would seem that the Son is not other than the Father.
For "other" is a relative term implying diversity of substance. If,
then, the Son is other than the Father, He must be different from the
Father; which is contrary to what Augustine says (De Trin. vii), that
when we speak of three persons, "we do not mean to imply diversity."

Obj. 2: Further, whosoever are other from one another, differ in
some way from one another. Therefore, if the Son is other than the
Father, it follows that He differs from the Father; which is against
what Ambrose says (De Fide i), that "the Father and the Son are one
in Godhead; nor is there any difference in substance between them,
nor any diversity."

Obj. 3: Further, the term alien is taken from _alius_ (other).
But the Son is not alien from the Father, for Hilary says (De Trin.
vii) that "in the divine persons there is nothing diverse, nothing
alien, nothing separable." Therefore the Son is not other than the
Father.

Obj. 4: Further, the terms "other person" and "other thing" [alius et
aliud] have the same meaning, differing only in gender. So if the Son
is another person from the Father, it follows that the Son is a thing
apart from the Father.

_On the contrary,_ Augustine [*Fulgentius, De Fide ad Petrum i.] says:
"There is one essence of the Father and Son and Holy Ghost, in which
the Father is not one thing, the Son another, and the Holy Ghost
another; although the Father is one person, the Son another, and the
Holy Ghost another."

_I answer that,_ Since as Jerome remarks [*In substance, Ep. lvii.], a
heresy arises from words wrongly used, when we speak of the Trinity we
must proceed with care and with befitting modesty; because, as
Augustine says (De Trin. i, 3), "nowhere is error more harmful, the
quest more toilsome, the finding more fruitful." Now, in treating of
the Trinity, we must beware of two opposite errors, and proceed
cautiously between them--namely, the error of Arius, who placed a
Trinity of substance with the Trinity of persons; and the error of
Sabellius, who placed unity of person with the unity of essence.

Thus, to avoid the error of Arius we must shun the use of the terms
diversity and difference in God, lest we take away the unity of
essence: we may, however, use the term "distinction" on account of the
relative opposition. Hence whenever we find terms of "diversity" or
"difference" of Persons used in an authentic work, these terms of
"diversity" or "difference" are taken to mean "distinction." But lest
the simplicity and singleness of the divine essence be taken away, the
terms "separation" and "division," which belong to the parts of a
whole, are to be avoided: and lest quality be taken away, we avoid the
use of the term "disparity": and lest we remove similitude, we avoid
the terms "alien" and "discrepant." For Ambrose says (De Fide i) that
"in the Father and the Son there is no discrepancy, but one Godhead":
and according to Hilary, as quoted above, "in God there is nothing
alien, nothing separable."

To avoid the heresy of Sabellius, we must shun the term "singularity,"
lest we take away the communicability of the divine essence. Hence
Hilary says (De Trin. vii): "It is sacrilege to assert that the Father
and the Son are separate in Godhead." We must avoid the adjective
"only" (unici) lest we take away the number of persons. Hence Hilary
says in the same book: "We exclude from God the idea of singularity or
uniqueness." Nevertheless, we say "the only Son," for in God there is
no plurality of Sons. Yet, we do not say "the only God," for the Deity
is common to several. We avoid the word "confused," lest we take away
from the Persons the order of their nature. Hence Ambrose says (De
Fide i): "What is one is not confused; and there is no multiplicity
where there is no difference." The word "solitary" is also to be
avoided, lest we take away the society of the three persons; for, as
Hilary says (De Trin. iv), "We confess neither a solitary nor a
diverse God."

This word "other" [alius], however, in the masculine sense, means only
a distinction of _suppositum_; and hence we can properly say that "the
Son is other than the Father," because He is another _suppositum_ of
the divine nature, as He is another person and another hypostasis.

Reply Obj. 1: "Other," being like the name of a particular thing,
refers to the _suppositum_; and so, there is sufficient reason for
using it, where there is a distinct substance in the sense of
hypostasis or person. But diversity requires a distinct substance in
the sense of essence. Thus we cannot say that the Son is diverse from
the Father, although He is another.

Reply Obj. 2: "Difference" implies distinction of form. There is one
form in God, as appears from the text, "Who, when He was in the form
of God" (Phil. 2:6). Therefore the term "difference" does not
properly apply to God, as appears from the authority quoted. Yet,
Damascene (De Fide Orth. i, 5) employs the term "difference" in the
divine persons, as meaning that the relative property is signified by
way of form. Hence he says that the hypostases do not differ from
each other in substance, but according to determinate properties. But
"difference" is taken for "distinction," as above stated.

Reply Obj. 3: The term "alien" means what is extraneous and
dissimilar; which is not expressed by the term "other" [alius]; and
therefore we say that the Son is "other" than the Father, but not
that He is anything "alien."

Reply Obj. 4: The neuter gender is formless; whereas the masculine is
formed and distinct; and so is the feminine. So the common essence is
properly and aptly expressed by the neuter gender, but by the
masculine and feminine is expressed the determined subject in the
common nature. Hence also in human affairs, if we ask, Who is this
man? we answer, Socrates, which is the name of the _suppositum_;
whereas, if we ask, What is he? we reply, A rational and mortal
animal. So, because in God distinction is by the persons, and not by
the essence, we say that the Father is other than the Son, but not
something else; while conversely we say that they are one thing, but
not one person.
_______________________

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