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Thomas Aquinas - Summa Theologica, Part I (Prima Pars)

T >> Thomas Aquinas >> Summa Theologica, Part I (Prima Pars)




Reply Obj. 3: Evil has a deficient cause in voluntary things
otherwise than in natural things. For the natural agent produces the
same kind of effect as it is itself, unless it is impeded by some
exterior thing; and this amounts to some defect belonging to it.
Hence evil never follows in the effect, unless some other evil
pre-exists in the agent or in the matter, as was said above. But in
voluntary things the defect of the action comes from the will
actually deficient, inasmuch as it does not actually subject itself
to its proper rule. This defect, however, is not a fault, but fault
follows upon it from the fact that the will acts with this defect.

Reply Obj. 4: Evil has no direct cause, but only an accidental cause,
as was said above.
_______________________

SECOND ARTICLE [I, Q. 49, Art. 2]

Whether the Supreme Good, God, Is the Cause of Evil?

Objection 1: It would seem that the supreme good, God, is the cause of
evil. For it is said (Isa. 45:5,7): "I am the Lord, and there is no
other God, forming the light, and creating darkness, making peace, and
creating evil." And Amos 3:6, "Shall there be evil in a city, which
the Lord hath not done?"

Obj. 2: Further, the effect of the secondary cause is reduced to the
first cause. But good is the cause of evil, as was said above (A. 1).
Therefore, since God is the cause of every good, as was shown above
(Q. 2, A. 3; Q. 6, AA. 1, 4), it follows that also every evil is from
God.

Obj. 3: Further, as is said by the Philosopher (Phys. ii, text 30),
the cause of both safety and danger of the ship is the same. But God
is the cause of the safety of all things. Therefore He is the cause
of all perdition and of all evil.

_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (QQ. 83, qu. 21), that, "God is not
the author of evil because He is not the cause of tending to
not-being."

_I answer that,_ As appears from what was said (A. 1), the evil which
consists in the defect of action is always caused by the defect of
the agent. But in God there is no defect, but the highest perfection,
as was shown above (Q. 4, A. 1). Hence, the evil which consists in
defect of action, or which is caused by defect of the agent, is not
reduced to God as to its cause.

But the evil which consists in the corruption of some things is
reduced to God as the cause. And this appears as regards both natural
things and voluntary things. For it was said (A. 1) that some agent
inasmuch as it produces by its power a form to which follows
corruption and defect, causes by its power that corruption and
defect. But it is manifest that the form which God chiefly intends in
things created is the good of the order of the universe. Now, the
order of the universe requires, as was said above (Q. 22, A. 2, ad 2;
Q. 48, A. 2), that there should be some things that can, and do
sometimes, fail. And thus God, by causing in things the good of the
order of the universe, consequently and as it were by accident,
causes the corruptions of things, according to 1 Kings 2:6: "The Lord
killeth and maketh alive." But when we read that "God hath not made
death" (Wis. 1:13), the sense is that God does not will death for its
own sake. Nevertheless the order of justice belongs to the order of
the universe; and this requires that penalty should be dealt out to
sinners. And so God is the author of the evil which is penalty, but
not of the evil which is fault, by reason of what is said above.

Reply Obj. 1: These passages refer to the evil of penalty, and not to
the evil of fault.

Reply Obj. 2: The effect of the deficient secondary cause is reduced
to the first non-deficient cause as regards what it has of being and
perfection, but not as regards what it has of defect; just as
whatever there is of motion in the act of limping is caused by the
motive power, whereas what there is of obliqueness in it does not
come from the motive power, but from the curvature of the leg. And,
likewise, whatever there is of being and action in a bad action, is
reduced to God as the cause; whereas whatever defect is in it is not
caused by God, but by the deficient secondary cause.

Reply Obj. 3: The sinking of a ship is attributed to the sailor as
the cause, from the fact that he does not fulfil what the safety of
the ship requires; but God does not fail in doing what is necessary
for the safety of all. Hence there is no parity.
_______________________

THIRD ARTICLE [I, Q. 49, Art. 3]

Whether There Be One Supreme Evil Which Is the Cause of Every Evil?

Objection 1: It would seem that there is one supreme evil which is
the cause of every evil. For contrary effects have contrary causes.
But contrariety is found in things, according to Ecclus. 33:15: "Good
is set against evil, and life against death; so also is the sinner
against a just man." Therefore there are many contrary principles,
one of good, the other of evil.

Obj. 2: Further, if one contrary is in nature, so is the other. But
the supreme good is in nature, and is the cause of every good, as was
shown above (Q. 2, A. 3; Q. 6, AA. 2, 4). Therefore, also, there is a
supreme evil opposed to it as the cause of every evil.

Obj. 3: Further, as we find good and better things, so we find evil
and worse. But good and better are so considered in relation to what
is best. Therefore evil and worse are so considered in relation to
some supreme evil.

Obj. 4: Further, everything participated is reduced to what is
essential. But things which are evil among us are evil not
essentially, but by participation. Therefore we must seek for
some supreme essential evil, which is the cause of every evil.

Obj. 5: Further, whatever is accidental is reduced to that which is
_per se._ But good is the accidental cause of evil. Therefore, we
must suppose some supreme evil which is the _per se_ cause of evils.
Nor can it be said that evil has no _per se_ cause, but only an
accidental cause; for it would then follow that evil would not exist
in the many, but only in the few.

Obj. 6: Further, the evil of the effect is reduced to the evil of the
cause; because the deficient effect comes from the deficient cause,
as was said above (AA. 1, 2). But we cannot proceed to infinity in
this matter. Therefore, we must suppose one first evil as the cause
of every evil.

_On the contrary,_ The supreme good is the cause of every being, as
was shown above (Q. 2, A. 3; Q. 6, A. 4). Therefore there cannot be
any principle opposed to it as the cause of evils.

_I answer that,_ It appears from what precedes that there is no one
first principle of evil, as there is one first principle of good.

First, indeed, because the first principle of good is essentially
good, as was shown above (Q. 6, AA. 3, 4). But nothing can be
essentially bad. For it was shown above that every being, as such,
is good (Q. 5, A. 3); and that evil can exist only in good as in
its subject (Q. 48, A. 3).

Secondly, because the first principle of good is the highest and
perfect good which pre-contains in itself all goodness, as shown above
(Q. 6, A. 2). But there cannot be a supreme evil; because, as was
shown above (Q. 48, A. 4), although evil always lessens good, yet
it never wholly consumes it; and thus, while good ever remains,
nothing can be wholly and perfectly bad. Therefore, the Philosopher
says (Ethic. iv, 5) that "if the wholly evil could be, it would
destroy itself"; because all good being destroyed (which it need be
for something to be wholly evil), evil itself would be taken away,
since its subject is good.

Thirdly, because the very nature of evil is against the idea of a
first principle; both because every evil is caused by good, as was
shown above (A. 1), and because evil can be only an accidental
cause, and thus it cannot be the first cause, for the accidental
cause is subsequent to the direct cause.

Those, however, who upheld two first principles, one good and the
other evil, fell into this error from the same cause, whence also
arose other strange notions of the ancients; namely, because they
failed to consider the universal cause of all being, and considered
only the particular causes of particular effects. For on that account,
if they found a thing hurtful to something by the power of its own
nature, they thought that the very nature of that thing was evil; as,
for instance, if one should say that the nature of fire was evil
because it burnt the house of a poor man. The judgment, however, of
the goodness of anything does not depend upon its order to any
particular thing, but rather upon what it is in itself, and on its
order to the whole universe, wherein every part has its own perfectly
ordered place, as was said above (Q. 47, A. 2, ad 1).

Likewise, because they found two contrary particular causes of two
contrary particular effects, they did not know how to reduce these
contrary particular causes to the universal common cause; and
therefore they extended the contrariety of causes even to the first
principles. But since all contraries agree in something common, it
is necessary to search for one common cause for them above their own
contrary proper causes; as above the contrary qualities of the
elements exists the power of a heavenly body; and above all things
that exist, no matter how, there exists one first principle of being,
as was shown above (Q. 2, A. 3).

Reply Obj. 1: Contraries agree in one genus, and they also agree
in the nature of being; and therefore, although they have contrary
particular causes, nevertheless we must come at last to one first
common cause.

Reply Obj. 2: Privation and habit belong naturally to the same
subject. Now the subject of privation is a being in potentiality, as
was said above (Q. 48, A. 3). Hence, since evil is privation of good,
as appears from what was said above (Q. 48, AA. 1, 2, 3), it is
opposed to that good which has some potentiality, but not to the
supreme good, who is pure act.

Reply Obj. 3: Increase in intensity is in proportion to the nature
of a thing. And as the form is a perfection, so privation removes a
perfection. Hence every form, perfection, and good is intensified by
approach to the perfect term; but privation and evil by receding from
that term. Hence a thing is not said to be evil and worse, by reason
of access to the supreme evil, in the same way as it is said to be
good and better, by reason of access to the supreme good.

Reply Obj. 4: No being is called evil by participation, but by
privation of participation. Hence it is not necessary to reduce it
to any essential evil.

Reply Obj. 5: Evil can only have an accidental cause, as was shown
above (A. 1). Hence reduction to any 'per se' cause of evil is
impossible. And to say that evil is in the greater number is simply
false. For things which are generated and corrupted, in which alone
can there be natural evil, are the smaller part of the whole
universe. And again, in every species the defect of nature is in the
smaller number. In man alone does evil appear as in the greater
number; because the good of man as regards the senses is not the good
of man as man--that is, in regard to reason; and more men seek good
in regard to the senses than good according to reason.

Reply Obj. 6: In the causes of evil we do not proceed to infinity,
but reduce all evils to some good cause, whence evil follows
accidentally.
_______________________

TREATISE ON THE ANGELS (QQ. 50-64)
_______________________

QUESTION 50

OF THE SUBSTANCE OF THE ANGELS ABSOLUTELY CONSIDERED
(In Five Articles)

Now we consider the distinction of corporeal and spiritual creatures:
firstly, the purely spiritual creature which in Holy Scripture is
called angel; secondly, the creature wholly corporeal; thirdly, the
composite creature, corporeal and spiritual, which is man.

Concerning the angels, we consider first what belongs to their
substance; secondly, what belongs to their intellect; thirdly, what
belongs to their will; fourthly, what belongs to their creation.

Their substance we consider absolutely and in relation to corporeal
things.

Concerning their substance absolutely considered, there are five
points of inquiry:

(1) Whether there is any entirely spiritual creature, altogether
incorporeal?

(2) Supposing that an angel is such, we ask whether it is composed
of matter and form?

(3) We ask concerning their number.

(4) Of their difference from each other.

(5) Of their immortality or incorruptibility.
_______________________

FIRST ARTICLE [I, Q. 50, Art. 1]

Whether an Angel Is Altogether Incorporeal?

Objection 1: It would seem that an angel is not entirely incorporeal.
For what is incorporeal only as regards ourselves, and not in relation
to God, is not absolutely incorporeal. But Damascene says (De Fide
Orth. ii) that "an angel is said to be incorporeal and immaterial as
regards us; but compared to God it is corporeal and material.
Therefore he is not simply incorporeal."

Obj. 2: Further, nothing is moved except a body, as the Philosopher
says (Phys. vi, text 32). But Damascene says (De Fide Orth. ii) that
"an angel is an ever movable intellectual substance." Therefore an
angel is a corporeal substance.

Obj. 3: Further, Ambrose says (De Spir. Sanct. i, 7): "Every creature
is limited within its own nature." But to be limited belongs to
bodies. Therefore, every creature is corporeal. Now angels are God's
creatures, as appears from Ps. 148:2: "Praise ye" the Lord, "all His
angels"; and, farther on (verse 4), "For He spoke, and they were
made; He commanded, and they were created." Therefore angels are
corporeal.

_On the contrary,_ It is said (Ps. 103:4): "Who makes His angels
spirits."

_I answer that,_ There must be some incorporeal creatures. For what
is principally intended by God in creatures is good, and this
consists in assimilation to God Himself. And the perfect assimilation
of an effect to a cause is accomplished when the effect imitates the
cause according to that whereby the cause produces the effect; as
heat makes heat. Now, God produces the creature by His intellect and
will (Q. 14, A. 8; Q. 19, A. 4). Hence the perfection of the universe
requires that there should be intellectual creatures. Now
intelligence cannot be the action of a body, nor of any corporeal
faculty; for every body is limited to "here" and "now." Hence the
perfection of the universe requires the existence of an incorporeal
creature.

The ancients, however, not properly realizing the force of
intelligence, and failing to make a proper distinction between sense
and intellect, thought that nothing existed in the world but what
could be apprehended by sense and imagination. And because bodies
alone fall under imagination, they supposed that no being existed
except bodies, as the Philosopher observes (Phys. iv, text 52,57).
Thence came the error of the Sadducees, who said there was no spirit
(Acts 23:8).

But the very fact that intellect is above sense is a reasonable proof
that there are some incorporeal things comprehensible by the intellect
alone.

Reply Obj. 1: Incorporeal substances rank between God and corporeal
creatures. Now the medium compared to one extreme appears to be the
other extreme, as what is tepid compared to heat seems to be cold;
and thus it is said that angels, compared to God, are material and
corporeal, not, however, as if anything corporeal existed in them.

Reply Obj. 2: Movement is there taken in the sense in which it is
applied to intelligence and will. Therefore an angel is called an
ever mobile substance, because he is ever actually intelligent, and
not as if he were sometimes actually and sometimes potentially, as we
are. Hence it is clear that the objection rests on an equivocation.

Reply Obj. 3: To be circumscribed by local limits belongs to bodies
only; whereas to be circumscribed by essential limits belongs to all
creatures, both corporeal and spiritual. Hence Ambrose says (De Spir.
Sanct. i, 7) that "although some things are not contained in
corporeal place, still they are none the less circumscribed by their
substance."
_______________________

SECOND ARTICLE [I, Q. 50, Art. 2]

Whether an Angel Is Composed of Matter and Form?

Objection 1: It would seem that an angel is composed of matter and
form. For everything which is contained under any genus is composed of
the genus, and of the difference which added to the genus makes the
species. But the genus comes from the matter, and the difference from
the form (Metaph. xiii, text 6). Therefore everything which is in a
genus is composed of matter and form. But an angel is in the genus of
substance. Therefore he is composed of matter and form.

Obj. 2: Further, wherever the properties of matter exist, there is
matter. Now the properties of matter are to receive and to substand;
whence Boethius says (De Trin.) that "a simple form cannot be a
subject": and the above properties are found in the angel. Therefore
an angel is composed of matter and form.

Obj. 3: Further, form is act. So what is form only is pure act. But
an angel is not pure act, for this belongs to God alone. Therefore an
angel is not form only, but has a form in matter.

Obj. 4: Further, form is properly limited and perfected by matter. So
the form which is not in matter is an infinite form. But the form of
an angel is not infinite, for every creature is finite. Therefore the
form of an angel is in matter.

_On the contrary,_ Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv): "The first
creatures are understood to be as immaterial as they are incorporeal."

_I answer that,_ Some assert that the angels are composed of matter
and form; which opinion Avicebron endeavored to establish in his book
of the _Fount of Life._ For he supposes that whatever things are
distinguished by the intellect are really distinct. Now as regards
incorporeal substance, the intellect apprehends that which
distinguishes it from corporeal substance, and that which it has in
common with it. Hence he concludes that what distinguishes
incorporeal from corporeal substance is a kind of form to it, and
whatever is subject to this distinguishing form, as it were something
common, is its matter. Therefore, he asserts the universal matter of
spiritual and corporeal things is the same; so that it must be
understood that the form of incorporeal substance is impressed in the
matter of spiritual things, in the same way as the form of quantity
is impressed in the matter of corporeal things.

But one glance is enough to show that there cannot be one matter of
spiritual and of corporeal things. For it is not possible that a
spiritual and a corporeal form should be received into the same part
of matter, otherwise one and the same thing would be corporeal and
spiritual. Hence it would follow that one part of matter receives the
corporeal form, and another receives the spiritual form. Matter,
however, is not divisible into parts except as regarded under
quantity; and without quantity substance is indivisible, as Aristotle
says (Phys. i, text 15). Therefore it would follow that the matter of
spiritual things is subject to quantity; which cannot be. Therefore it
is impossible that corporeal and spiritual things should have the same
matter.

It is, further, impossible for an intellectual substance to have any
kind of matter. For the operation belonging to anything is according
to the mode of its substance. Now to understand is an altogether
immaterial operation, as appears from its object, whence any act
receives its species and nature. For a thing is understood according
to its degree of immateriality; because forms that exist in matter are
individual forms which the intellect cannot apprehend as such. Hence
it must be that every individual substance is altogether immaterial.

But things distinguished by the intellect are not necessarily
distinguished in reality; because the intellect does not apprehend
things according to their mode, but according to its own mode. Hence
material things which are below our intellect exist in our intellect
in a simpler mode than they exist in themselves. Angelic substances,
on the other hand, are above our intellect; and hence our intellect
cannot attain to apprehend them, as they are in themselves, but by its
own mode, according as it apprehends composite things; and in this way
also it apprehends God (Q. 3).

Reply Obj. 1: It is difference which constitutes the species. Now
everything is constituted in a species according as it is determined
to some special grade of being because "the species of things are
like numbers," which differ by addition and subtraction of unity, as
the Philosopher says (Metaph. viii, text 10). But in material things
there is one thing which determines to a special grade, and that is
the form; and another thing which is determined, and this is the
matter; and hence from the latter the genus is derived, and from
the former the "difference." Whereas in immaterial things there is
no separate determinator and thing determined; each thing by its
own self holds a determinate grade in being; and therefore in them
genus and "difference" are not derived from different things, but
from one and the same. Nevertheless, this differs in our mode of
conception; for, inasmuch as our intellect considers it as
indeterminate, it derives the idea of their genus; and inasmuch
as it considers it determinately, it derives the idea of their
"difference."

Reply Obj. 2: This reason is given in the book on the _Fount of
Life,_ and it would be cogent, supposing that the receptive mode of
the intellect and of matter were the same. But this is clearly false.
For matter receives the form, that thereby it may be constituted in
some species, either of air, or of fire, or of something else. But
the intellect does not receive the form in the same way; otherwise
the opinion of Empedocles (De Anima i, 5, text 26) would be true, to
the effect that we know earth by earth, and fire by fire. But the
intelligible form is in the intellect according to the very nature of
a form; for as such is it so known by the intellect. Hence such a way
of receiving is not that of matter, but of an immaterial substance.

Reply Obj. 3: Although there is no composition of matter and form in
an angel, yet there is act and potentiality. And this can be made
evident if we consider the nature of material things which contain a
twofold composition. The first is that of form and matter, whereby
the nature is constituted. Such a composite nature is not its own
existence but existence is its act. Hence the nature itself is
related to its own existence as potentiality to act. Therefore if
there be no matter, and supposing that the form itself subsists
without matter, there nevertheless still remains the relation of the
form to its very existence, as of potentiality to act. And such a
kind of composition is understood to be in the angels; and this is
what some say, that an angel is composed of, "whereby he is," and
"what is," or "existence," and "what is," as Boethius says. For
"what is," is the form itself subsisting; and the existence itself is
whereby the substance is; as the running is whereby the runner runs.
But in God "existence" and "what is" are not different as was
explained above (Q. 3, A. 4). Hence God alone is pure act.

Reply Obj. 4: Every creature is simply finite, inasmuch as its
existence is not absolutely subsisting, but is limited to some nature
to which it belongs. But there is nothing against a creature being
considered relatively infinite. Material creatures are infinite on
the part of matter, but finite in their form, which is limited by the
matter which receives it. But immaterial created substances are
finite in their being; whereas they are infinite in the sense that
their forms are not received in anything else; as if we were to say,
for example, that whiteness existing separate is infinite as regards
the nature of whiteness, forasmuch as it is not contracted to any one
subject; while its "being" is finite as determined to some one
special nature.

Whence it is said (De Causis, prop. 16) that "intelligence is finite
from above," as receiving its being from above itself, and is
"infinite from below," as not received in any matter.
_______________________

THIRD ARTICLE [I, Q. 50, Art. 3]

Whether the Angels Exist in Any Great Number?

Objection 1: It would seem that the angels are not in great numbers.
For number is a species of quantity, and follows the division of a
continuous body. But this cannot be in the angels, since they are
incorporeal, as was shown above (A. 1). Therefore the angels
cannot exist in any great number.

Obj. 2: Further, the more a thing approaches to unity, so much the
less is it multiplied, as is evident in numbers. But among other
created natures the angelic nature approaches nearest to God.
Therefore since God is supremely one, it seems that there is the
least possible number in the angelic nature.

Obj. 3: Further, the proper effect of the separate substances seems
to be the movements of the heavenly bodies. But the movements of the
heavenly bodies fall within some small determined number, which we
can apprehend. Therefore the angels are not in greater number than
the movements of the heavenly bodies.

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