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Thomas Aquinas - Summa Theologica, Part I (Prima Pars)

T >> Thomas Aquinas >> Summa Theologica, Part I (Prima Pars)




Obj. 4: Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv) that "all intelligible and
intellectual substances subsist because of the rays of the divine
goodness." But a ray is only multiplied according to the different
things that receive it. Now it cannot be said that their matter is
receptive of an intelligible ray, since intellectual substances are
immaterial, as was shown above (A. 2). Therefore it seems that the
multiplication of intellectual substances can only be according to
the requirements of the first bodies--that is, of the heavenly ones,
so that in some way the shedding form of the aforesaid rays may be
terminated in them; and hence the same conclusion is to be drawn as
before.

_On the contrary,_ It is said (Dan. 7:10): "Thousands of thousands
ministered to Him, and ten thousands times a hundred thousand stood
before Him."

_I answer that,_ There have been various opinions with regard to the
number of the separate substances. Plato contended that the separate
substances are the species of sensible things; as if we were to
maintain that human nature is a separate substance of itself: and
according to this view it would have to be maintained that the number
of the separate substances is the number of the species of sensible
things. Aristotle, however, rejects this view (Metaph. i, text 31)
because matter is of the very nature of the species of sensible
things. Consequently the separate substances cannot be the exemplar
species of these sensible things; but have their own fixed natures,
which are higher than the natures of sensible things. Nevertheless
Aristotle held (Metaph. xi, text 43) that those more perfect natures
bear relation to these sensible things, as that of mover and end; and
therefore he strove to find out the number of the separate substances
according to the number of the first movements.

But since this appears to militate against the teachings of Sacred
Scripture, Rabbi Moses the Jew, wishing to bring both into harmony,
held that the angels, in so far as they are styled immaterial
substances, are multiplied according to the number of heavenly
movements or bodies, as Aristotle held (Metaph. xi, text 43); while he
contended that in the Scriptures even men bearing a divine message are
styled angels; and again, even the powers of natural things, which
manifest God's almighty power. It is, however, quite foreign to the
custom of the Scriptures for the powers of irrational things to be
designated as angels.

Hence it must be said that the angels, even inasmuch as they are
immaterial substances, exist in exceeding great number, far beyond all
material multitude. This is what Dionysius says (Coel. Hier. xiv):
"There are many blessed armies of the heavenly intelligences,
surpassing the weak and limited reckoning of our material numbers."
The reason whereof is this, because, since it is the perfection of the
universe that God chiefly intends in the creation of things, the more
perfect some things are, in so much greater an excess are they created
by God. Now, as in bodies such excess is observed in regard to their
magnitude, so in things incorporeal is it observed in regard to their
multitude. We see, in fact, that incorruptible bodies, exceed
corruptible bodies almost incomparably in magnitude; for the entire
sphere of things active and passive is something very small in
comparison with the heavenly bodies. Hence it is reasonable to
conclude that the immaterial substances as it were incomparably
exceed material substances as to multitude.

Reply Obj. 1: In the angels number is not that of discrete
quantity, brought about by division of what is continuous, but that
which is caused by distinction of forms; according as multitude is
reckoned among the transcendentals, as was said above (Q. 30, A. 3; Q. 11).

Reply Obj. 2: From the angelic nature being the nighest unto
God, it must needs have least of multitude in its composition, but not
so as to be found in few subjects.

Reply Obj. 3: This is Aristotle's argument (Metaph. xii, text
44), and it would conclude necessarily if the separate substances were
made for corporeal substances. For thus the immaterial substances
would exist to no purpose, unless some movement from them were to
appear in corporeal things. But it is not true that the immaterial
substances exist on account of the corporeal, because the end is
nobler than the means to the end. Hence Aristotle says (Metaph. xii,
text 44) that this is not a necessary argument, but a probable one. He
was forced to make use of this argument, since only through sensible
things can we come to know intelligible ones.

Reply Obj. 4: This argument comes from the opinion of such as
hold that matter is the cause of the distinction of things; but this
was refuted above (Q. 47, A. 1). Accordingly, the multiplication
of the angels is not to be taken according to matter, nor according to
bodies, but according to the divine wisdom devising the various orders
of immaterial substances.
_______________________

FOURTH ARTICLE [I, Q. 50, Art. 4]

Whether the Angels Differ in Species?

Objection 1: It would seem that the angels do not differ in species.
For since the "difference" is nobler than the 'genus,' all things
which agree in what is noblest in them, agree likewise in their
ultimate constitutive difference; and so they are the same according
to species. But all angels agree in what is noblest in them--that is
to say, in intellectuality. Therefore all the angels are of one
species.

Obj. 2: Further, more and less do not change a species. But the
angels seem to differ only from one another according to more and
less--namely, as one is simpler than another, and of keener
intellect. Therefore the angels do not differ specifically.

Obj. 3: Further, soul and angel are contra-distinguished mutually
from each other. But all souls are of the one species. So therefore
are the angels.

Obj. 4: Further, the more perfect a thing is in nature, the more
ought it to be multiplied. But this would not be so if there were but
one individual under one species. Therefore there are many angels of
one species.

_On the contrary,_ In things of one species there is no such thing as
"first" and "second" [prius et posterius], as the Philosopher says
(Metaph. iii, text 2). But in the angels even of the one order there
are first, middle, and last, as Dionysius says (Hier. Ang. x).
Therefore the angels are not of the same species.

_I answer that,_ Some have said that all spiritual substances, even
souls, are of the one species. Others, again, that all the angels are
of the one species, but not souls; while others allege that all the
angels of one hierarchy, or even of one order, are of the one species.

But this is impossible. For such things as agree in species but differ
in number, agree in form, but are distinguished materially. If,
therefore, the angels be not composed of matter and form, as was said
above (A. 2), it follows that it is impossible for two angels to
be of one species; just as it would be impossible for there to be
several whitenesses apart, or several humanities, since whitenesses
are not several, except in so far as they are in several substances.
And if the angels had matter, not even then could there be several
angels of one species. For it would be necessary for matter to be the
principle of distinction of one from the other, not, indeed, according
to the division of quantity, since they are incorporeal, but according
to the diversity of their powers; and such diversity of matter causes
diversity not merely of species, but of genus.

Reply Obj. 1: "Difference" is nobler than genus, as the determined
is more noble than the undetermined, and the proper than the common,
but not as one nature is nobler than another; otherwise it would be
necessary that all irrational animals be of the same species; or that
there should be in them some form which is higher than the sensible
soul. Therefore irrational animals differ in species according to the
various determined degrees of sensitive nature; and in like manner
all the angels differ in species according to the diverse degrees of
intellectual nature.

Reply Obj. 2: More and less change the species, not according as they
are caused by the intensity or remissness of one form, but according
as they are caused by forms of diverse degrees; for instance, if we
say that fire is more perfect than air: and in this way the angels
are diversified according to more or less.

Reply Obj. 3: The good of the species preponderates over the good
of the individual. Hence it is much better for the species to be
multiplied in the angels than for individuals to be multiplied in
the one species.

Reply Obj. 4: Numerical multiplication, since it can be drawn out
infinitely, is not intended by the agent, but only specific
multiplication, as was said above (Q. 47, A. 3). Hence the perfection
of the angelic nature calls for the multiplying of species, but not
for the multiplying of individuals in one species.
_______________________

FIFTH ARTICLE [I, Q. 50, Art. 5]

Whether the Angels Are Incorruptible?

Objection 1: It would seem that the angels are not incorruptible; for
Damascene, speaking of the angel, says (De Fide Orth. ii, 3) that he
is "an intellectual substance, partaking of immortality by favor, and
not by nature."

Obj. 2: Further, Plato says in the Timaeus: "O gods of gods, whose
maker and father am I: You are indeed my works, dissoluble by nature,
yet indissoluble because I so will it." But gods such as these can
only be understood to be the angels. Therefore the angels are
corruptible by their nature

Obj. 3: Further, according to Gregory (Moral. xvi), "all things would
tend towards nothing, unless the hand of the Almighty preserved
them." But what can be brought to nothing is corruptible. Therefore,
since the angels were made by God, it would appear that they are
corruptible of their own nature.

_On the contrary,_ Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv) that the
intellectual substances "have unfailing life, being free from all
corruption, death, matter, and generation."

_I answer that,_ It must necessarily be maintained that the angels
are incorruptible of their own nature. The reason for this is, that
nothing is corrupted except by its form being separated from the
matter. Hence, since an angel is a subsisting form, as is clear from
what was said above (A. 2), it is impossible for its substance to
be corruptible. For what belongs to anything considered in itself can
never be separated from it; but what belongs to a thing, considered in
relation to something else, can be separated, when that something else
is taken away, in view of which it belonged to it. Roundness can never
be taken from the circle, because it belongs to it of itself; but a
bronze circle can lose roundness, if the bronze be deprived of its
circular shape. Now to be belongs to a form considered in itself; for
everything is an actual being according to its form: whereas matter is
an actual being by the form. Consequently a subject composed of matter
and form ceases to be actually when the form is separated from the
matter. But if the form subsists in its own being, as happens in the
angels, as was said above (A. 2), it cannot lose its being.
Therefore, the angel's immateriality is the cause why it is
incorruptible by its own nature.

A token of this incorruptibility can be gathered from its intellectual
operation; for since everything acts according as it is actual, the
operation of a thing indicates its mode of being. Now the species and
nature of the operation is understood from the object. But an
intelligible object, being above time, is everlasting. Hence every
intellectual substance is incorruptible of its own nature.

Reply Obj. 1: Damascene is dealing with perfect immortality, which
includes complete immutability; since "every change is a kind of
death," as Augustine says (Contra Maxim. iii). The angels obtain
perfect immutability only by favor, as will appear later (Q. 62).

Reply Obj. 2: By the expression 'gods' Plato understands the heavenly
bodies, which he supposed to be made up of elements, and therefore
dissoluble of their own nature; yet they are for ever preserved in
existence by the Divine will.

Reply Obj. 3: As was observed above (Q. 44, A. 1) there is a kind of
necessary thing which has a cause of its necessity. Hence it is not
repugnant to a necessary or incorruptible being to depend for its
existence on another as its cause. Therefore, when it is said that
all things, even the angels, would lapse into nothing, unless
preserved by God, it is not to be gathered therefrom that there is
any principle of corruption in the angels; but that the nature of the
angels is dependent upon God as its cause. For a thing is said to be
corruptible not merely because God can reduce it to non-existence, by
withdrawing His act of preservation; but also because it has some
principle of corruption within itself, or some contrariety, or at
least the potentiality of matter.
_______________________

QUESTION 51

OF THE ANGELS IN COMPARISON WITH BODIES
(In Three Articles)

We next inquire about the angels in comparison with corporeal things;
and in the first place about their comparison with bodies; secondly,
of the angels in comparison with corporeal places; and, thirdly, of
their comparison with local movement.

Under the first heading there are three points of inquiry:

(1) Whether angels have bodies naturally united to them?

(2) Whether they assume bodies?

(3) Whether they exercise functions of life in the bodies assumed?
_______________________

FIRST ARTICLE [I, Q. 51, Art. 1]

Whether the Angels Have Bodies Naturally United to Them?

Objection 1: It would seem that angels have bodies naturally united
to them. For Origen says (Peri Archon i): "It is God's attribute
alone--that is, it belongs to the Father, the Son, and the Holy
Ghost, as a property of nature, that He is understood to exist
without any material substance and without any companionship of
corporeal addition." Bernard likewise says (Hom. vi. super Cant.):
"Let us assign incorporeity to God alone even as we do immortality,
whose nature alone, neither for its own sake nor on account of
anything else, needs the help of any corporeal organ. But it is clear
that every created spirit needs corporeal substance." Augustine also
says (Gen. ad lit. iii): "The demons are called animals of the
atmosphere because their nature is akin to that of aerial bodies."
But the nature of demons and angels is the same. Therefore angels
have bodies naturally united to them.

Obj. 2: Further, Gregory (Hom. x in Ev.) calls an angel a rational
animal. But every animal is composed of body and soul. Therefore
angels have bodies naturally united to them.

Obj. 3: Further, life is more perfect in the angels than in souls.
But the soul not only lives, but gives life to the body. Therefore
the angels animate bodies which are naturally united to them.

_On the contrary,_ Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv) that "the angels
are understood to be incorporeal."

_I answer that,_ The angels have not bodies naturally united to
them. For whatever belongs to any nature as an accident is not found
universally in that nature; thus, for instance, to have wings,
because it is not of the essence of an animal, does not belong to
every animal. Now since to understand is not the act of a body, nor
of any corporeal energy, as will be shown later (Q. 75, A. 2), it
follows that to have a body united to it is not of the nature of an
intellectual substance, as such; but it is accidental to some
intellectual substance on account of something else. Even so it
belongs to the human soul to be united to a body, because it is
imperfect and exists potentially in the genus of intellectual
substances, not having the fulness of knowledge in its own nature,
but acquiring it from sensible things through the bodily senses, as
will be explained later on (Q. 84, A. 6; Q. 89, A. 1). Now whenever
we find something imperfect in any genus we must presuppose something
perfect in that genus. Therefore in the intellectual nature there are
some perfectly intellectual substances, which do not need to acquire
knowledge from sensible things. Consequently not all intellectual
substances are united to bodies; but some are quite separated from
bodies, and these we call angels.

Reply Obj. 1: As was said above (Q. 50, A. 1) it was the opinion of
some that every being is a body; and consequently some seem to have
thought that there were no incorporeal substances existing except as
united to bodies; so much so that some even held that God was the
soul of the world, as Augustine tells us (De Civ. Dei vii). As this
is contrary to Catholic Faith, which asserts that God is exalted
above all things, according to Ps. 8:2: "Thy magnificence is exalted
beyond the heavens"; Origen, while refusing to say such a thing of
God, followed the above opinion of others regarding the other
substances; being deceived here as he was also in many other points,
by following the opinions of the ancient philosophers. Bernard's
expression can be explained, that the created spirit needs some
bodily instrument, which is not naturally united to it, but assumed
for some purpose, as will be explained (A. 2). Augustine speaks,
not as asserting the fact, but merely using the opinion of the
Platonists, who maintained that there are some aerial animals,
which they termed demons.

Reply Obj. 2: Gregory calls the angel a rational animal
metaphorically, on account of the likeness to the rational nature.

Reply Obj. 3: To give life effectively is a perfection simply
speaking; hence it belongs to God, as is said (1 Kings 2:6): "The
Lord killeth, and maketh alive." But to give life formally belongs to
a substance which is part of some nature, and which has not within
itself the full nature of the species. Hence an intellectual
substance which is not united to a body is more perfect than one
which is united to a body.
_______________________

SECOND ARTICLE [I, Q. 51, Art. 2]

Whether Angels Assume Bodies?

Objection 1: It would seem that angels do not assume bodies. For there
is nothing superfluous in the work of an angel, as there is nothing of
the kind in the work of nature. But it would be superfluous for the
angels to assume bodies, because an angel has no need for a body,
since his own power exceeds all bodily power. Therefore an angel does
not assume a body.

Obj. 2: Further, every assumption is terminated in some union;
because to assume implies a taking to oneself [ad se sumere]. But a
body is not united to an angel as to a form, as stated (A. 1); while
in so far as it is united to the angel as to a mover, it is not said
to be assumed, otherwise it would follow that all bodies moved by the
angels are assumed by them. Therefore the angels do not assume bodies.

Obj. 3: Further, angels do not assume bodies from the earth or water,
or they could not suddenly disappear; nor again from fire, otherwise
they would burn whatever things they touched; nor again from air,
because air is without shape or color. Therefore the angels do not
assume bodies.

_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xvi) that angels
appeared to Abraham under assumed bodies.

_I answer that,_ Some have maintained that the angels never assume
bodies, but that all that we read in Scripture of apparitions of
angels happened in prophetic vision--that is, according to
imagination. But this is contrary to the intent of Scripture; for
whatever is beheld in imaginary vision is only in the beholder's
imagination, and consequently is not seen by everybody. Yet Divine
Scripture from time to time introduces angels so apparent as to be
seen commonly by all; just as the angels who appeared to Abraham were
seen by him and by his whole family, by Lot, and by the citizens of
Sodom; in like manner the angel who appeared to Tobias was seen by all
present. From all this it is clearly shown that such apparitions were
beheld by bodily vision, whereby the object seen exists outside the
person beholding it, and can accordingly be seen by all. Now by such a
vision only a body can be beheld. Consequently, since the angels are
not bodies, nor have they bodies naturally united with them, as is
clear from what has been said (A. 1; Q. 50, A. 1), it follows that
they sometimes assume bodies.

Reply Obj. 1: Angels need an assumed body, not for themselves, but on
our account; that by conversing familiarly with men they may give
evidence of that intellectual companionship which men expect to have
with them in the life to come. Moreover that angels assumed bodies
under the Old Law was a figurative indication that the Word of God
would take a human body; because all the apparitions in the Old
Testament were ordained to that one whereby the Son of God appeared
in the flesh.

Reply Obj. 2: The body assumed is united to the angel not as its
form, nor merely as its mover, but as its mover represented by the
assumed movable body. For as in the Sacred Scripture the properties
of intelligible things are set forth by the likenesses of things
sensible, in the same way by Divine power sensible bodies are so
fashioned by angels as fittingly to represent the intelligible
properties of an angel. And this is what we mean by an angel
assuming a body.

Reply Obj. 3: Although air as long as it is in a state of rarefaction
has neither shape nor color, yet when condensed it can both be shaped
and colored as appears in the clouds. Even so the angels assume
bodies of air, condensing it by the Divine power in so far as is
needful for forming the assumed body.
_______________________

THIRD ARTICLE [I, Q. 51, Art. 3]

Whether the Angels Exercise Functions of Life in the Bodies Assumed?

Objection 1: It would seem that the angels exercise functions of life
in assumed bodies. For pretence is unbecoming in angels of truth. But
it would be pretence if the body assumed by them, which seems to live
and to exercise vital functions, did not possess these functions.
Therefore the angels exercise functions of life in the assumed body.

Obj. 2: Further, in the works of the angels there is nothing without
a purpose. But eyes, nostrils, and the other instruments of the
senses, would be fashioned without a purpose in the body assumed by
the angel, if he perceived nothing by their means. Consequently, the
angel perceives by the assumed body; and this is the most special
function of life.

Obj. 3: Further, to move hither and thither is one of the functions
of life, as the Philosopher says (De Anima ii). But the angels are
manifestly seen to move in their assumed bodies. For it was said
(Gen. 18:16) that "Abraham walked with" the angels, who had appeared
to him, "bringing them on the way"; and when Tobias said to the angel
(Tob. 5:7, 8): "Knowest thou the way that leadeth to the city of
Medes?" he answered: "I know it; and I have often walked through all
the ways thereof." Therefore the angels often exercise functions of
life in assumed bodies.

Obj. 4: Further, speech is the function of a living subject, for it
is produced by the voice, while the voice itself is a sound conveyed
from the mouth. But it is evident from many passages of Sacred
Scripture that angels spoke in assumed bodies. Therefore in their
assumed bodies they exercise functions of life.

Obj. 5: Further, eating is a purely animal function. Hence the Lord
after His Resurrection ate with His disciples in proof of having
resumed life (Luke 24). Now when angels appeared in their assumed
bodies they ate, and Abraham offered them food, after having
previously adored them as God (Gen. 18). Therefore the angels
exercise functions of life in assumed bodies.

Obj. 6: Further, to beget offspring is a vital act. But this has
befallen the angels in their assumed bodies; for it is related:
"After the sons of God went in to the daughters of men, and they
brought forth children, these are the mighty men of old, men of
renown" (Gen. 6:4). Consequently the angels exercised vital
functions in their assumed bodies.

_On the contrary,_ The bodies assumed by angels have no life, as was
stated in the previous article (ad 3). Therefore they cannot exercise
functions of life through assumed bodies.

_I answer that,_ Some functions of living subjects have something in
common with other operations; just as speech, which is the function of
a living creature, agrees with other sounds of inanimate things, in so
far as it is sound; and walking agrees with other movements, in so far
as it is movement. Consequently vital functions can be performed in
assumed bodies by the angels, as to that which is common in such
operations; but not as to that which is special to living subjects;
because, according to the Philosopher (De Somn. et Vig. i), "that
which has the faculty has the action." Hence nothing can have a
function of life except what has life, which is the potential
principle of such action.

Reply Obj. 1: As it is in no wise contrary to truth for intelligible
things to be set forth in Scripture under sensible figures, since it
is not said for the purpose of maintaining that intelligible things
are sensible, but in order that properties of intelligible things may
be understood according to similitude through sensible figures; so it
is not contrary to the truth of the holy angels that through their
assumed bodies they appear to be living men, although they are really
not. For the bodies are assumed merely for this purpose, that the
spiritual properties and works of the angels may be manifested by the
properties of man and of his works. This could not so fittingly be
done if they were to assume true men; because the properties of such
men would lead us to men, and not to angels.

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