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Thomas Aquinas - Summa Theologica, Part I (Prima Pars)

T >> Thomas Aquinas >> Summa Theologica, Part I (Prima Pars)




QUESTION 55

OF THE MEDIUM OF THE ANGELIC KNOWLEDGE
(In Three Articles)

Next in order, the question arises as to the medium of the angelic
knowledge. Under this heading there are three points of inquiry:

(1) Do the angels know everything by their substance, or by some
species?

(2) If by species, is it by connatural species, or is it by such as
they have derived from things?

(3) Do the higher angels know by more universal species than the
lower angels?
_______________________

FIRST ARTICLE [I, Q. 55, Art. 1]

Whether the Angels Know All Things by Their Substance?

Objection 1: It would seem that the angels know all things by their
substance. For Dionysius says (Div. Nom. vii) that "the angels,
according to the proper nature of a mind, know the things which are
happening upon earth." But the angel's nature is his essence.
Therefore the angel knows things by his essence.

Obj. 2: Further, according to the Philosopher (Metaph. xii, text. 51;
_De Anima_ iii, text. 15), "in things which are without matter, the
intellect is the same as the object understood." But the object
understood is the same as the one who understands it, as regards that
whereby it is understood. Therefore in things without matter, such as
the angels, the medium whereby the object is understood is the very
substance of the one understanding it.

Obj. 3: Further, everything which is contained in another is there
according to the mode of the container. But an angel has an
intellectual nature. Therefore whatever is in him is there in an
intelligible mode. But all things are in him: because the lower
orders of beings are essentially in the higher, while the higher are
in the lower participatively: and therefore Dionysius says (Div. Nom.
iv) that God "enfolds the whole in the whole," i.e. all in all.
Therefore the angel knows all things in his substance.

_On the contrary,_ Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv) that "the angels are
enlightened by the forms of things." Therefore they know by the forms
of things, and not by their own substance.

_I answer that,_ The medium through which the intellect understands,
is compared to the intellect understanding it as its form, because it
is by the form that the agent acts. Now in order that the faculty may
be perfectly completed by the form, it is necessary for all things to
which the faculty extends to be contained under the form. Hence it is
that in things which are corruptible, the form does not perfectly
complete the potentiality of the matter: because the potentiality of
the matter extends to more things than are contained under this or
that form. But the intellective power of the angel extends to
understanding all things: because the object of the intellect is
universal being or universal truth. The angel's essence, however,
does not comprise all things in itself, since it is an essence
restricted to a genus and species. This is proper to the Divine
essence, which is infinite, simply and perfectly to comprise all
things in Itself. Therefore God alone knows all things by His
essence. But an angel cannot know all things by his essence; and his
intellect must be perfected by some species in order to know things.

Reply Obj. 1: When it is said that the angel knows things according
to his own nature, the words "according to" do not determine the
medium of such knowledge, since the medium is the similitude of the
thing known; but they denote the knowing power, which belongs to the
angel of his own nature.

Reply Obj. 2: As the sense in act is the sensible in act, as stated
in _De Anima_ ii, text. 53, not so that the sensitive power is the
sensible object's likeness contained in the sense, but because one
thing is made from both as from act and potentiality: so likewise the
intellect in act is said to be the thing understood in act, not that
the substance of the intellect is itself the similitude by which it
understands, but because that similitude is its form. Now, it is
precisely the same thing to say "in things which are without matter,
the intellect is the same thing as the object understood," as to say
that "the intellect in act is the thing understood in act"; for a
thing is actually understood, precisely because it is immaterial.

Reply Obj. 3: The things which are beneath the angel, and those which
are above him, are in a measure in his substance, not indeed
perfectly, nor according to their own proper formality--because the
angel's essence, as being finite, is distinguished by its own
formality from other things--but according to some common formality.
Yet all things are perfectly and according to their own formality in
God's essence, as in the first and universal operative power, from
which proceeds whatever is proper or common to anything. Therefore
God has a proper knowledge of all things by His own essence: and this
the angel has not, but only a common knowledge.
_______________________

SECOND ARTICLE [I, Q. 55, Art. 2]

Whether the Angels Understand by Species Drawn from Things?

Objection 1: It would seem that the angels understand by species drawn
from things. For everything understood is apprehended by some likeness
within him who understands it. But the likeness of the thing existing
in another is there either by way of an exemplar, so that the likeness
is the cause of the thing; or else by way of an image, so that it is
caused by such thing. All knowledge, then, of the person understanding
must either be the cause of the object understood, or else caused by
it. Now the angel's knowledge is not the cause of existing things;
that belongs to the Divine knowledge alone. Therefore it is necessary
for the species, by which the angelic mind understands, to be derived
from things.

Obj. 2: Further, the angelic light is stronger than the light of the
active intellect of the soul. But the light of the active intellect
abstracts intelligible species from phantasms. Therefore the light of
the angelic mind can also abstract species from sensible things. So
there is nothing to hinder us from saying that the angel understands
through species drawn from things.

Obj. 3: Further, the species in the intellect are indifferent to
what is present or distant, except in so far as they are taken from
sensible objects. Therefore, if the angel does not understand by
species drawn from things, his knowledge would be indifferent as to
things present and distant; and so he would be moved locally to no
purpose.

_On the contrary,_ Dionysius says (Div. Nom. vii) that the "angels do
not gather their Divine knowledge from things divisible or sensible."

_I answer that,_ The species whereby the angels understand are not
drawn from things, but are connatural to them. For we must observe that
there is a similarity between the distinction and order of spiritual
substances and the distinction and order of corporeal substances. The
highest bodies have in their nature a potentiality which is fully
perfected by the form; whereas in the lower bodies the potentiality of
matter is not entirely perfected by the form, but receives from some
agent, now one form, now another. In like fashion also the lower
intellectual substances --that is to say, human souls--have a power
of understanding which is not naturally complete, but is successively
completed in them by their drawing intelligible species from things.
But in the higher spiritual substances--that is, the angels--the
power of understanding is naturally complete by intelligible species,
in so far as they have such species connatural to them, so as to
understand all things which they can know naturally.

The same is evident from the manner of existence of such substances.
The lower spiritual substances--that is, souls--have a nature akin to
a body, in so far as they are the forms of bodies: and consequently
from their very mode of existence it behooves them to seek their
intelligible perfection from bodies, and through bodies; otherwise
they would be united with bodies to no purpose. On the other hand,
the higher substances--that is, the angels--are utterly free from
bodies, and subsist immaterially and in their own intelligible
nature; consequently they attain their intelligible perfection
through an intelligible outpouring, whereby they received from God
the species of things known, together with their intellectual nature.
Hence Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. ii, 8): "The other things which
are lower than the angels are so created that they first receive
existence in the knowledge of the rational creature, and then in
their own nature."

Reply Obj. 1: There are images of creatures in the angel's mind, not,
indeed derived from creatures, but from God, Who is the cause of
creatures, and in Whom the likenesses of creatures first exist. Hence
Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. ii, 8) that, "As the type, according to
which the creature is fashioned, is in the Word of God before the
creature which is fashioned, so the knowledge of the same type exists
first in the intellectual creature, and is afterwards the very
fashioning of the creature."

Reply Obj. 2: To go from one extreme to the other it is necessary to
pass through the middle. Now the nature of a form in the imagination,
which form is without matter but not without material conditions,
stands midway between the nature of a form which is in matter, and
the nature of a form which is in the intellect by abstraction from
matter and from material conditions. Consequently, however powerful
the angelic mind might be, it could not reduce material forms to an
intelligible condition, except it were first to reduce them to the
nature of imagined forms; which is impossible, since the angel has no
imagination, as was said above (Q. 54, A. 5). Even granted that he
could abstract intelligible species from material things, yet he
would not do so; because he would not need them, for he has
connatural intelligible species.

Reply Obj. 3: The angel's knowledge is quite indifferent as to what
is near or distant. Nevertheless his local movement is not
purposeless on that account: for he is not moved to a place for the
purpose of acquiring knowledge, but for the purpose of operation.
_______________________

THIRD ARTICLE [I, Q. 55, Art. 3]

Whether the Higher Angels Understand by More Universal Species Than
the Lower Angels?

Objection 1: It would seem that the higher angels do not understand
by more universal species than the lower angels. For the universal,
seemingly, is what is abstracted from particulars. But angels do not
understand by species abstracted from things. Therefore it cannot be
said that the species of the angelic intellect are more or less
universal.

Obj. 2: Further, whatever is known in detail is more perfectly known
than what is known generically; because to know anything generically
is, in a fashion, midway between potentiality and act. If, therefore,
the higher angels know by more universal species than the lower, it
follows that the higher have a more imperfect knowledge than the
lower; which is not befitting.

Obj. 3: Further, the same cannot be the proper type of many. But if
the higher angel knows various things by one universal form, which
the lower angel knows by several special forms, it follows that the
higher angel uses one universal form for knowing various things.
Therefore he will not be able to have a proper knowledge of each;
which seems unbecoming.

_On the contrary,_ Dionysius says (Coel. Hier. xii) that the higher
angels have a more universal knowledge than the lower. And in _De
Causis_ it is said that the higher angels have more universal forms.

_I answer that,_ For this reason are some things of a more exalted
nature, because they are nearer to and more like unto the first, which
is God. Now in God the whole plenitude of intellectual knowledge is
contained in one thing, that is to say, in the Divine essence, by
which God knows all things. This plenitude of knowledge is found in
created intellects in a lower manner, and less simply. Consequently it
is necessary for the lower intelligences to know by many forms what
God knows by one, and by so many forms the more according as the
intellect is lower.

Thus the higher the angel is, by so much the fewer species will he be
able to apprehend the whole mass of intelligible objects. Therefore
his forms must be more universal; each one of them, as it were,
extending to more things. An example of this can in some measure be
observed in ourselves. For some people there are who cannot grasp an
intelligible truth, unless it be explained to them in every part and
detail; this comes of their weakness of intellect: while there are
others of stronger intellect, who can grasp many things from few.

Reply Obj. 1: It is accidental to the universal to be abstracted from
particulars, in so far as the intellect knowing it derives its
knowledge from things. But if there be an intellect which does not
derive its knowledge from things, the universal which it knows will
not be abstracted from things, but in a measure will be pre-existing
to them; either according to the order of causality, as the universal
ideas of things are in the Word of God; or at least in the order of
nature, as the universal ideas of things are in the angelic mind.

Reply Obj. 2: To know anything universally can be taken in two
senses. In one way, on the part of the thing known, namely, that only
the universal nature of the thing is known. To know a thing thus is
something less perfect: for he would have but an imperfect knowledge
of a man who only knew him to be an animal. In another way, on the
part of the medium of such knowledge. In this way it is more perfect
to know a thing in the universal; for the intellect, which by one
universal medium can know each of the things which are properly
contained in it, is more perfect than one which cannot.

Reply Obj. 3: The same cannot be the proper and adequate type of
several things. But if it be eminent, then it can be taken as the
proper type and likeness of many. Just as in man, there is a
universal prudence with respect to all the acts of the virtues; which
can be taken as the proper type and likeness of that prudence which
in the lion leads to acts of magnanimity, and in the fox to acts of
wariness; and so on of the rest. The Divine essence, on account of
Its eminence, is in like fashion taken as the proper type of each
thing contained therein: hence each one is likened to It according to
its proper type. The same applies to the universal form which is in
the mind of the angel, so that, on account of its excellence, many
things can be known through it with a proper knowledge.
_______________________

QUESTION 56

OF THE ANGEL'S KNOWLEDGE OF IMMATERIAL THINGS
(In Three Articles)

We now inquire into the knowledge of the angels with regard to the
objects known by them. We shall treat of their knowledge, first, of
immaterial things, secondly of things material. Under the first
heading there are three points of inquiry:

(1) Does an angel know himself?

(2) Does one angel know another?

(3) Does the angel know God by his own natural principles?
_______________________

FIRST ARTICLE [I, Q. 56, Art 1]

Whether an Angel Knows Himself?

Objection 1: It would seem that an angel does not know himself. For
Dionysius says that "the angels do not know their own powers" (Coel.
Hier. vi). But, when the substance is known, the power is known.
Therefore an angel does not know his own essence.

Obj. 2: Further, an angel is a single substance, otherwise he would
not act, since acts belong to single subsistences. But nothing single
is intelligible. Therefore, since the angel possesses only knowledge
which is intellectual, no angel can know himself.

Obj. 3: Further, the intellect is moved by the intelligible object:
because, as stated in _De Anima_ iii, 4 understanding is a kind of
passion. But nothing is moved by or is passive to itself; as appears
in corporeal things. Therefore the angel cannot understand himself.

_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. ii) that "the angel
knew himself when he was established, that is, enlightened by truth."

_I answer that,_ As is evident from what has been previously said
(Q. 14, A. 2; Q. 54, A. 2), the object is on a different footing in
an immanent, and in a transient, action. In a transient action the
object or matter into which the action passes is something separate
from the agent, as the thing heated is from what gave it heat, and
the building from the builder; whereas in an immanent action, for the
action to proceed, the object must be united with the agent; just as
the sensible object must be in contact with sense, in order that
sense may actually perceive. And the object which is united to a
faculty bears the same relation to actions of this kind as does the
form which is the principle of action in other agents: for, as heat
is the formal principle of heating in the fire, so is the species of
the thing seen the formal principle of sight to the eye.

It must, however, be borne in mind that this image of the object
exists sometimes only potentially in the knowing faculty; and then
there is only knowledge in potentiality; and in order that there may
be actual knowledge, it is required that the faculty of knowledge be
actuated by the species. But if it always actually possesses the
species, it can thereby have actual knowledge without any preceding
change or reception. From this it is evident that it is not of the
nature of knower, as knowing, to be moved by the object, but as
knowing in potentiality. Now, for the form to be the principle of the
action, it makes no difference whether it be inherent in something
else, or self-subsisting; because heat would give forth heat none the
less if it were self-subsisting, than it does by inhering in something
else. So therefore, if in the order of intelligible beings there be
any subsisting intelligible form, it will understand itself. And since
an angel is immaterial, he is a subsisting form; and, consequently, he
is actually intelligible. Hence it follows that he understands himself
by his form, which is his substance.

Reply Obj. 1: That is the text of the old translation, which is
amended in the new one, and runs thus: "furthermore they," that is
to say the angels, "knew their own powers": instead of which the
old translation read--"and furthermore they do not know their own
powers." Although even the letter of the old translation might be
kept in this respect, that the angels do not know their own power
perfectly; according as it proceeds from the order of the Divine
Wisdom, Which to the angels is incomprehensible.

Reply Obj. 2: We have no knowledge of single corporeal things, not
because of their particularity, but on account of the matter, which
is their principle of individuation. Accordingly, if there be any
single things subsisting without matter, as the angels are, there is
nothing to prevent them from being actually intelligible.

Reply Obj. 3: It belongs to the intellect, in so far as it is in
potentiality, to be moved and to be passive. Hence this does not
happen in the angelic intellect, especially as regards the fact that
he understands himself. Besides the action of the intellect is not of
the same nature as the action found in corporeal things, which passes
into some other matter.
_______________________

SECOND ARTICLE [I, Q. 56, Art. 2]

Whether One Angel Knows Another?

Objection 1: It would seem that one angel does not know another. For
the Philosopher says (De Anima iii, text. 4), that if the human
intellect were to have in itself any one of the sensible things, then
such a nature existing within it would prevent it from apprehending
external things; as likewise, if the pupil of the eye were colored
with some particular color, it could not see every color. But as the
human intellect is disposed for understanding corporeal things, so is
the angelic mind for understanding immaterial things. Therefore, since
the angelic intellect has within itself some one determinate nature
from the number of such natures, it would seem that it cannot
understand other natures.

Obj. 2: Further, it is stated in _De Causis_ that "every intelligence
knows what is above it, in so far as it is caused by it; and what is
beneath it, in so far as it is its cause." But one angel is not the
cause of another. Therefore one angel does not know another.

Obj. 3: Further, one angel cannot be known to another angel by the
essence of the one knowing; because all knowledge is effected by way
of a likeness. But the essence of the angel knowing is not like the
essence of the angel known, except generically; as is clear from what
has been said before (Q. 50, A. 4; Q. 55, A. 1, ad 3). Hence, it
follows that one angel would not have a particular knowledge of
another, but only a general knowledge. In like manner it cannot be
said that one angel knows another by the essence of the angel known;
because that whereby the intellect understands is something within
the intellect; whereas the Trinity alone can penetrate the mind.
Again, it cannot be said that one angel knows the other by a species;
because that species would not differ from the angel understood,
since each is immaterial. Therefore in no way does it appear that one
angel can understand another.

Obj. 4: Further, if one angel did understand another, this would be
either by an innate species; and so it would follow that, if God were
now to create another angel, such an angel could not be known by the
existing angels; or else he would have to be known by a species drawn
from things; and so it would follow that the higher angels could not
know the lower, from whom they receive nothing. Therefore in no way
does it seem that one angel knows another.

_On the contrary,_ We read in _De Causis_ that "every intelligence
knows the things which are not corrupted."

_I answer that,_ As Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. lit. ii), such things
as pre-existed from eternity in the Word of God, came forth from Him
in two ways: first, into the angelic mind; and secondly, so as to
subsist in their own natures. They proceeded into the angelic mind in
such a way, that God impressed upon the angelic mind the images of the
things which He produced in their own natural being. Now in the Word
of God from eternity there existed not only the forms of corporeal
things, but likewise the forms of all spiritual creatures. So in every
one of these spiritual creatures, the forms of all things, both
corporeal and spiritual, were impressed by the Word of God; yet so
that in every angel there was impressed the form of his own species
according to both its natural and its intelligible condition, so that
he should subsist in the nature of his species, and understand himself
by it; while the forms of other spiritual and corporeal natures were
impressed in him only according to their intelligible natures, so that
by such impressed species he might know corporeal and spiritual
creatures.

Reply Obj. 1: The spiritual natures of the angels are distinguished
from one another in a certain order, as was already observed (Q. 50,
A. 4, ad 1, 2). So the nature of an angel does not hinder him from
knowing the other angelic natures, since both the higher and lower
bear affinity to his nature, the only difference being according to
their various degrees of perfection.

Reply Obj. 2: The nature of cause and effect does not lead one angel
to know another, except on account of likeness, so far as cause and
effect are alike. Therefore if likeness without causality be admitted
in the angels, this will suffice for one to know another.

Reply Obj. 3: One angel knows another by the species of such angel
existing in his intellect, which differs from the angel whose image
it is, not according to material and immaterial nature, but according
to natural and intentional existence. The angel is himself a
subsisting form in his natural being; but his species in the
intellect of another angel is not so, for there it possesses only
an intelligible existence. As the form of color on the wall has a
natural existence; but, in the deferent medium, it has only
intentional existence.

Reply Obj. 4: God made every creature proportionate to the universe
which He determined to make. Therefore had God resolved to make more
angels or more natures of things, He would have impressed more
intelligible species in the angelic minds; as a builder who, if he
had intended to build a larger house, would have made larger
foundations. Hence, for God to add a new creature to the universe,
means that He would add a new intelligible species to an angel.
_______________________

THIRD ARTICLE [I, Q. 56, Art. 3]

Whether an Angel Knows God by His Own Natural Principles?

Objection 1: It would seem that the angels cannot know God by their
natural principles. For Dionysius says (Div. Nom. i) that God "by His
incomprehensible might is placed above all heavenly minds." Afterwards
he adds that, "since He is above all substances, He is remote from all
knowledge."

Obj. 2: Further, God is infinitely above the intellect of an angel.
But what is infinitely beyond cannot be reached. Therefore it appears
that an angel cannot know God by his natural principles.

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