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Thomas Aquinas - Summa Theologica, Part I (Prima Pars)

T >> Thomas Aquinas >> Summa Theologica, Part I (Prima Pars)




Reply Obj. 1: Joy and sorrow about the same thing are opposites, but
not about different things. Hence there is nothing to hinder a man
from being sorry for one thing, and joyful for another; especially so
far as sorrow and joy imply simple acts of the will; because, not
merely in different things, but even in one and the same thing, there
can be something that we will, and something that we will not.

Reply Obj. 2: As there is sorrow in the demons over present evil, so
also there is fear of future evil. Now when it is said, "He was made
to fear no one," this is to be understood of the fear of God which
restrains from sin. For it is written elsewhere that "the devils
believe and tremble" (James 2:19).

Reply Obj. 3: To be sorry for the evil of sin on account of the sin
bears witness to the goodness of the will, to which the evil of sin
is opposed. But to be sorry for the evil of punishment, or for the
evil of sin on account of the punishment, bears witness to the
goodness of nature, to which the evil of punishment is opposed. Hence
Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xix, 13), that "sorrow for good lost by
punishment, is the witness to a good nature." Consequently, since the
demon has a perverse and obstinate will, he is not sorry for the evil
of sin.
_______________________

FOURTH ARTICLE [I, Q. 64, Art. 4]

Whether Our Atmosphere Is the Demons' Place of Punishment?

Objection 1: It would seem that this atmosphere is not the demons'
place of punishment. For a demon is a spiritual nature. But a
spiritual nature is not affected by place. Therefore there is no
place of punishment for demons.

Obj. 2: Further, man's sin is not graver than the demons'. But
man's place of punishment is hell. Much more, therefore, is it the
demons' place of punishment; and consequently not the darksome
atmosphere.

Obj. 3: Further, the demons are punished with the pain of fire.
But there is no fire in the darksome atmosphere. Therefore the
darksome atmosphere is not the place of punishment for the demons.

_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. iii, 10), that "the
darksome atmosphere is as a prison to the demons until the judgment
day."

_I answer that,_ The angels in their own nature stand midway between
God and men. Now the order of Divine providence so disposes, that it
procures the welfare of the inferior orders through the superior. But
man's welfare is disposed by Divine providence in two ways: first of
all, directly, when a man is brought unto good and withheld from evil;
and this is fittingly done through the good angels. In another way,
indirectly, as when anyone assailed is exercised by fighting against
opposition. It was fitting for this procuring of man's welfare to be
brought about through the wicked spirits, lest they should cease to be
of service in the natural order. Consequently a twofold place of
punishment is due to the demons: one, by reason of their sin, and this
is hell; and another, in order that they may tempt men, and thus the
darksome atmosphere is their due place of punishment.

Now the procuring of men's salvation is prolonged even to the judgment
day: consequently, the ministry of the angels and wrestling with
demons endure until then. Hence until then the good angels are sent to
us here; and the demons are in this dark atmosphere for our trial:
although some of them are even now in hell, to torment those whom they
have led astray; just as some of the good angels are with the holy
souls in heaven. But after the judgment day all the wicked, both men
and angels, will be in hell, and the good in heaven.

Reply Obj. 1: A place is not penal to angel or soul as if affecting
the nature by changing it, but as affecting the will by saddening it:
because the angel or the soul apprehends that it is in a place not
agreeable to its will.

Reply Obj. 2: One soul is not set over another in the order of
nature, as the demons are over men in the order of nature;
consequently there is no parallel.

Reply Obj. 3: Some have maintained that the pain of sense for demons
and souls is postponed until the judgment day: and that the beatitude
of the saints is likewise postponed until the judgment day. But this
is erroneous, and contrary to the teaching of the Apostle (2 Cor.
5:1): "If our earthly house of this habitation be dissolved, we have
a house in heaven." Others, again, while not admitting the same of
souls, admit it as to demons. But it is better to say that the same
judgment is passed upon wicked souls and wicked angels, even as on
good souls and good angels.

Consequently, it must be said that, although a heavenly place belongs
to the glory of the angels, yet their glory is not lessened by their
coming to us, for they consider that place to be their own; in the
same way as we say that the bishop's honor is not lessened while he is
not actually sitting on his throne. In like manner it must be said,
that although the demons are not actually bound within the fire of
hell while they are in this dark atmosphere, nevertheless their
punishment is none the less; because they know that such confinement
is their due. Hence it is said in a gloss upon James 3:6: "They carry
fire of hell with them wherever they go." Nor is this contrary to what
is said (Luke 8:31), "They besought the Lord not to cast them into the
abyss"; for they asked for this, deeming it to be a punishment for
them to be cast out of a place where they could injure men. Hence it
is stated, "They [Vulg. 'He'] besought Him that He would not expel
them [Vulg. 'him'] out of the country" (Mark 5:10).
_______________________

TREATISE ON THE WORK OF THE SIX DAYS (QQ. 65-74)
_______________________

QUESTION 65

THE WORK OF CREATION OF CORPOREAL CREATURES
(In Four Articles)

From the consideration of spiritual creatures we proceed to that of
corporeal creatures, in the production of which, as Holy Scripture
makes mention, three works are found, namely, the work of creation, as
given in the words, "In the beginning God created heaven and earth";
the work of distinction as given in the words, "He divided the light
from the darkness, and the waters that are above the firmament from
the waters that are under the firmament"; and the work of adornment,
expressed thus, "Let there be lights in the firmament."

First, then, we must consider the work of creation; secondly, the
work of distinction; and thirdly, the work of adornment. Under the
first head there are four points of inquiry:

(1) Whether corporeal creatures are from God?

(2) Whether they were created on account of God's goodness?

(3) Whether they were created by God through the medium of the
angels?

(4) Whether the forms of bodies are from the angels or immediately
from God.
_______________________

FIRST ARTICLE [I, Q. 65, Art. 1]

Whether Corporeal Creatures Are from God?

Objection 1: It would seem that corporeal creatures are not from God.
For it is said (Eccles. 3:14): "I have learned that all the works
which God hath made, continue for ever." But visible bodies do not
continue for ever, for it is said (2 Cor. 4:18): "The things which are
seen are temporal, but the things which are not seen are eternal."
Therefore God did not make visible bodies.

Obj. 2: Further, it is said (Gen. 1:31): "God saw all things that
He had made, and they were very good." But corporeal creatures are
evil, since we find them harmful in many ways; as may be seen in
serpents, in the sun's heat, and other things. Now a thing is called
evil, in so far as it is harmful. Corporeal creatures, therefore,
are not from God.

Obj. 3: Further, what is from God does not withdraw us from God,
but leads us to Him. But corporeal creatures withdraw us from God.
Hence the Apostle (2 Cor. 4:18): "While we look not at the things
which are seen." Corporeal creatures, therefore, are not from God.

_On the contrary,_ It is said (Ps. 145:6): "Who made heaven and
earth, the sea, and all things that are in them."

_I answer that,_ Certain heretics maintain that visible things are not
created by the good God, but by an evil principle, and allege in proof
of their error the words of the Apostle (2 Cor. 4:4), "The god of this
world hath blinded the minds of unbelievers." But this position is
altogether untenable. For, if things that differ agree in some point,
there must be some cause for that agreement, since things diverse in
nature cannot be united of themselves. Hence whenever in different
things some one thing common to all is found, it must be that these
different things receive that one thing from some one cause, as
different bodies that are hot receive their heat from fire. But being
is found to be common to all things, however otherwise different.
There must, therefore, be one principle of being from which all things
in whatever way existing have their being, whether they are invisible
and spiritual, or visible and corporeal. But the devil is called the
god of this world, not as having created it, but because worldlings
serve him, of whom also the Apostle says, speaking in the same sense,
"Whose god is their belly" (Phil. 3:19).

Reply Obj. 1: All the creatures of God in some respects continue for
ever, at least as to matter, since what is created will never be
annihilated, even though it be corruptible. And the nearer a creature
approaches God, Who is immovable, the more it also is immovable. For
corruptible creatures endure for ever as regards their matter, though
they change as regards their substantial form. But incorruptible
creatures endure with respect to their substance, though they are
mutable in other respects, such as place, for instance, the heavenly
bodies; or the affections, as spiritual creatures. But the Apostle's
words, "The things which are seen are temporal," though true even as
regards such things considered in themselves (in so far as every
visible creature is subject to time, either as to being or as to
movement), are intended to apply to visible things in so far as they
are offered to man as rewards. For such rewards, as consist in these
visible things, are temporal; while those that are invisible endure
for ever. Hence he said before (2 Cor. 4:17): "It worketh for us . .
. an eternal weight of glory."

Reply Obj. 2: Corporeal creatures according to their nature are good,
though this good is not universal, but partial and limited, the
consequence of which is a certain opposition of contrary qualities,
though each quality is good in itself. To those, however, who
estimate things, not by the nature thereof, but by the good they
themselves can derive therefrom, everything which is harmful to
themselves seems simply evil. For they do not reflect that what is in
some way injurious to one person, to another is beneficial, and that
even to themselves the same thing may be evil in some respects, but
good in others. And this could not be, if bodies were essentially
evil and harmful.

Reply Obj. 3: Creatures of themselves do not withdraw us from God,
but lead us to Him; for "the invisible things of God are clearly
seen, being understood by the things that are made" (Rom. 1:20). If,
then, they withdraw men from God, it is the fault of those who use
them foolishly. Thus it is said (Wis. 14:11): "Creatures are turned
into a snare to the feet of the unwise." And the very fact that they
can thus withdraw us from God proves that they came from Him, for
they cannot lead the foolish away from God except by the allurements
of some good that they have from Him.
_______________________

SECOND ARTICLE [I, Q. 65, Art. 2]

Whether Corporeal Things Were Made on Account of God's Goodness?

Objection 1: It would seem that corporeal creatures were not made
on account of God's goodness. For it is said (Wis. 1:14) that God
"created all things that they might be." Therefore all things were
created for their own being's sake, and not on account of God's
goodness.

Obj. 2: Further, good has the nature of an end; therefore the
greater good in things is the end of the lesser good. But spiritual
creatures are related to corporeal creatures, as the greater good to
the lesser. Corporeal creatures, therefore, are created for the sake
of spiritual creatures, and not on account of God's goodness.

Obj. 3: Further, justice does not give unequal things except to the
unequal. Now God is just: therefore inequality not created by God
must precede all inequality created by Him. But an inequality not
created by God can only arise from free-will, and consequently all
inequality results from the different movements of free-will. Now,
corporeal creatures are unequal to spiritual creatures. Therefore the
former were made on account of movements of free-will, and not on
account of God's goodness.

_On the contrary,_ It is said (Prov. 16:4): "The Lord hath made all
things for Himself."

_I answer that,_ Origen laid down [*Peri Archon ii.] that corporeal
creatures were not made according to God's original purpose, but in
punishment of the sin of spiritual creatures. For he maintained that
God in the beginning made spiritual creatures only, and all of equal
nature; but that of these by the use of free-will some turned to God,
and, according to the measure of their conversion, were given a
higher or a lower rank, retaining their simplicity; while others
turned from God, and became bound to different kinds of bodies
according to the degree of their turning away. But this position is
erroneous. In the first place, because it is contrary to Scripture,
which, after narrating the production of each kind of corporeal
creatures, subjoins, "God saw that it was good" (Gen. 1), as if to
say that everything was brought into being for the reason that it was
good for it to be. But according to Origen's opinion, the corporeal
creature was made, not because it was good that it should be, but
that the evil in another might be punished. Secondly, because it
would follow that the arrangement, which now exists, of the corporeal
world would arise from mere chance. For it the sun's body was made
what it is, that it might serve for a punishment suitable to some sin
of a spiritual creature, it would follow, if other spiritual
creatures had sinned in the same way as the one to punish whom the
sun had been created, that many suns would exist in the world; and so
of other things. But such a consequence is altogether inadmissible.
Hence we must set aside this theory as false, and consider that the
entire universe is constituted by all creatures, as a whole consists
of its parts.

Now if we wish to assign an end to any whole, and to the parts of that
whole, we shall find, first, that each and every part exists for the
sake of its proper act, as the eye for the act of seeing; secondly,
that less honorable parts exist for the more honorable, as the senses
for the intellect, the lungs for the heart; and, thirdly, that all
parts are for the perfection of the whole, as the matter for the form,
since the parts are, as it were, the matter of the whole. Furthermore,
the whole man is on account of an extrinsic end, that end being the
fruition of God. So, therefore, in the parts of the universe also
every creature exists for its own proper act and perfection, and the
less noble for the nobler, as those creatures that are less noble than
man exist for the sake of man, whilst each and every creature exists
for the perfection of the entire universe. Furthermore, the entire
universe, with all its parts, is ordained towards God as its end,
inasmuch as it imitates, as it were, and shows forth the Divine
goodness, to the glory of God. Reasonable creatures, however, have in
some special and higher manner God as their end, since they can attain
to Him by their own operations, by knowing and loving Him. Thus it is
plain that the Divine goodness is the end of all corporeal things.

Reply Obj. 1: In the very fact of any creature possessing being, it
represents the Divine being and Its goodness. And, therefore, that
God created all things, that they might have being, does not exclude
that He created them for His own goodness.

Reply Obj. 2: The proximate end does not exclude the ultimate end.
Therefore that corporeal creatures were, in a manner, made for the
sake of the spiritual, does not prevent their being made on account
of God's goodness.

Reply Obj. 3: Equality of justice has its place in retribution, since
equal rewards or punishments are due to equal merit or demerit. But
this does not apply to things as at first instituted. For just as an
architect, without injustice, places stones of the same kind in
different parts of a building, not on account of any antecedent
difference in the stones, but with a view to securing that perfection
of the entire building, which could not be obtained except by the
different positions of the stones; even so, God from the beginning,
to secure perfection in the universe, has set therein creatures of
various and unequal natures, according to His wisdom, and without
injustice, since no diversity of merit is presupposed.
_______________________

THIRD ARTICLE [I, Q. 65, Art. 3]

Whether Corporeal Creatures Were Produced by God Through the Medium
of the Angels?

Objection 1: It would seem that corporeal creatures were produced by
God through the medium of the angels. For, as all things are governed
by the Divine wisdom, so by it were all things made, according to Ps.
103:24: "Thou hast made all things in wisdom." But "it belongs to
wisdom to ordain," as stated in the beginning of the _Metaphysics_
(i, 2). Hence in the government of things the lower is ruled by the
higher in a certain fitting order, as Augustine says (De Trin. iii,
4). Therefore in the production of things it was ordained that the
corporeal should be produced by the spiritual, as the lower by the
higher.

Obj. 2: Further, diversity of effects shows diversity of causes,
since like always produces like. If then all creatures, both
spiritual and corporeal, were produced immediately by God, there
would be no diversity in creatures, for one would not be further
removed from God than another. But this is clearly false; for the
Philosopher says that some things are corruptible because they are
far removed from God (De Gen. et Corrup. ii, text. 59).

Obj. 3: Further, infinite power is not required to produce a finite
effect. But every corporeal thing is finite. Therefore, it could be,
and was, produced by the finite power of spiritual creatures: for in
suchlike beings there is no distinction between what is and what is
possible: especially as no dignity befitting a nature is denied to
that nature, unless it be in punishment of a fault.

_On the contrary,_ It is said (Gen. 1:1): "In the beginning God
created heaven and earth"; by which are understood corporeal
creatures. These, therefore, were produced immediately by God.

_I answer that,_ Some have maintained that creatures proceeded from
God by degrees, in such a way that the first creature proceeded from
Him immediately, and in its turn produced another, and so on until
the production of corporeal creatures. But this position is
untenable, since the first production of corporeal creatures is by
creation, by which matter itself is produced: for in the act of
coming into being the imperfect must be made before the perfect: and
it is impossible that anything should be created, save by God alone.

In proof whereof it must be borne in mind that the higher the cause,
the more numerous the objects to which its causation extends. Now the
underlying principle in things is always more universal than that
which informs and restricts it; thus, being is more universal than
living, living than understanding, matter than form. The more widely,
then, one thing underlies others, the more directly does that thing
proceed from a higher cause. Thus the thing that underlies primarily
all things, belongs properly to the causality of the supreme cause.
Therefore no secondary cause can produce anything, unless there is
presupposed in the thing produced something that is caused by a
higher cause. But creation is the production of a thing in its entire
substance, nothing being presupposed either uncreated or created.
Hence it remains that nothing can create except God alone, Who is the
first cause. Therefore, in order to show that all bodies were created
immediately by God, Moses said: "In the beginning God created heaven
and earth."

Reply Obj. 1: In the production of things an order exists, but not
such that one creature is created by another, for that is impossible;
but rather such that by the Divine wisdom diverse grades are
constituted in creatures.

Reply Obj. 2: God Himself, though one, has knowledge of many and
different things without detriment to the simplicity of His nature,
as has been shown above (Q. 15, A. 2); so that by His wisdom He is
the cause of diverse things as known by Him, even as an artificer,
by apprehending diverse forms, produces diverse works of art.

Reply Obj. 3: The amount of the power of an agent is measured not
only by the thing made, but also by the manner of making it; for one
and the same thing is made in one way by a higher power, in another
by a lower. But the production of finite things, where nothing is
presupposed as existing, is the work of infinite power, and, as
such, can belong to no creature.
_______________________

FOURTH ARTICLE [I, Q. 65, Art. 4]

Whether the Forms of Bodies Are from the Angels?

Objection 1: It would seem that the forms of bodies come from the
angels. For Boethius says (De Trin. i): "From forms that are without
matter come the forms that are in matter." But forms that are without
matter are spiritual substances, and forms that are in matter are the
forms of bodies. Therefore, the forms of bodies are from spiritual
substances.

Obj. 2: Further, all that is such by participation is reduced to that
which is such by its essence. But spiritual substances are forms
essentially, whereas corporeal creatures have forms by participation.
Therefore the forms of corporeal things are derived from spiritual
substances.

Obj. 3: Further, spiritual substances have more power of causation
than the heavenly bodies. But the heavenly bodies give form to things
here below, for which reason they are said to cause generation and
corruption. Much more, therefore, are material forms derived from
spiritual substances.

_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (De Trin. iii, 8): "We must not
suppose that this corporeal matter serves the angels at their nod,
but rather that it obeys God thus." But corporeal matter may be said
thus to serve that from which it receives its form. Corporeal forms,
then, are not from the angels, but from God.

_I answer that,_ It was the opinion of some that all corporeal forms
are derived from spiritual substances, which we call the angels. And
there are two ways in which this has been stated. For Plato held that
the forms of corporeal matter are derived from, and formed by, forms
immaterially subsisting, by a kind of participation. Thus he held
that there exists an immaterial man, and an immaterial horse, and so
forth, and that from such the individual sensible things that we see
are constituted, in so far as in corporeal matter there abides the
impression received from these separate forms, by a kind of
assimilation, or as he calls it, "participation" (Phaedo xlix). And,
according to the Platonists, the order of forms corresponds to the
order of those separate substances; for example, that there is a
single separate substance, which is horse and the cause of all
horses, whilst above this is separate life, or _per se_ life, as they
term it, which is the cause of all life, and that above this again is
that which they call being itself, which is the cause of all being.
Avicenna, however, and certain others, have maintained that the forms
of corporeal things do not subsist _per se_ in matter, but in the
intellect only. Thus they say that from forms existing in the
intellect of spiritual creatures (called "intelligences" by them, but
"angels" by us) proceed all the forms of corporeal matter, as the
form of his handiwork proceeds from the forms in the mind of the
craftsman. This theory seems to be the same as that of certain
heretics of modern times, who say that God indeed created all things,
but that the devil formed corporeal matter, and differentiated it
into species.

But all these opinions seem to have a common origin; they all, in
fact, sought for a cause of forms as though the form were of itself
brought into being. Whereas, as Aristotle (Metaph. vii, text. 26, 27,
28), proves, what is, properly speaking, made, is the "composite."
Now, such are the forms of corruptible things that at one time they
exist and at another exist not, without being themselves generated or
corrupted, but by reason of the generation or corruption of the
"composite"; since even forms have not being, but composites have
being through forms: for, according to a thing's mode of being, is
the mode in which it is brought into being. Since, then, like is
produced from like, we must not look for the cause of corporeal forms
in any immaterial form, but in something that is composite, as this
fire is generated by that fire. Corporeal forms, therefore, are
caused, not as emanations from some immaterial form, but by matter
being brought from potentiality into act by some composite agent. But
since the composite agent, which is a body, is moved by a created
spiritual substance, as Augustine says (De Trin. iii, 4, 5), it
follows further that even corporeal forms are derived from spiritual
substances, not emanating from them, but as the term of their
movement. And, further still, the species of the angelic intellect,
which are, as it were, the seminal types of corporeal forms, must be
referred to God as the first cause. But in the first production of
corporeal creatures no transmutation from potentiality to act can
have taken place, and accordingly, the corporeal forms that bodies
had when first produced came immediately form God, whose bidding
alone matter obeys, as its own proper cause. To signify this, Moses
prefaces each work with the words, "God said, Let this thing be," or
"that," to denote the formation of all things by the Word of God,
from Whom, according to Augustine [*Tract. i. in Joan. and Gen. ad
lit. i. 4], is "all form and fitness and concord of parts."

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