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Thomas Aquinas - Summa Theologica, Part I (Prima Pars)

T >> Thomas Aquinas >> Summa Theologica, Part I (Prima Pars)




Obj. 2: Further, what is not against the nature of anything, can
agree with it. Now to be infinite is not against the nature of
magnitude; but rather both the finite and the infinite seem to be
properties of quantity. Therefore it is not impossible for some
magnitude to be infinite.

Obj. 3: Further, magnitude is infinitely divisible, for the
continuous is defined that which is infinitely divisible, as is clear
from Phys. iii. But contraries are concerned about one and the same
thing. Since therefore addition is opposed to division, and increase
opposed to diminution, it appears that magnitude can be increased to
infinity. Therefore it is possible for magnitude to be infinite.

Obj. 4: Further, movement and time have quantity and continuity
derived from the magnitude over which movement passes, as is said in
Phys. iv. But it is not against the nature of time and movement to be
infinite, since every determinate indivisible in time and circular
movement is both a beginning and an end. Therefore neither is it
against the nature of magnitude to be infinite.

_On the contrary,_ Every body has a surface. But every body which has a
surface is finite; because surface is the term of a finite body.
Therefore all bodies are finite. The same applies both to surface and
to a line. Therefore nothing is infinite in magnitude.

_I answer that,_ It is one thing to be infinite in essence, and another
to be infinite in magnitude. For granted that a body exists infinite
in magnitude, as fire or air, yet this could not be infinite in
essence, because its essence would be terminated in a species by its
form, and confined to individuality by matter. And so assuming from
these premises that no creature is infinite in essence, it still
remains to inquire whether any creature can be infinite in magnitude.

We must therefore observe that a body, which is a complete magnitude,
can be considered in two ways; mathematically, in respect to its
quantity only; and naturally, as regards its matter and form.

Now it is manifest that a natural body cannot be actually infinite.
For every natural body has some determined substantial form. Since
therefore the accidents follow upon the substantial form, it is
necessary that determinate accidents should follow upon a determinate
form; and among these accidents is quantity. So every natural body has
a greater or smaller determinate quantity. Hence it is impossible for
a natural body to be infinite. The same appears from movement; because
every natural body has some natural movement; whereas an infinite body
could not have any natural movement; neither direct, because nothing
moves naturally by a direct movement unless it is out of its place;
and this could not happen to an infinite body, for it would occupy
every place, and thus every place would be indifferently its own
place. Neither could it move circularly; forasmuch as circular motion
requires that one part of the body is necessarily transferred to a
place occupied by another part, and this could not happen as regards
an infinite circular body: for if two lines be drawn from the centre,
the farther they extend from the centre, the farther they are from
each other; therefore, if a body were infinite, the lines would be
infinitely distant from each other; and thus one could never occupy
the place belonging to any other.

The same applies to a mathematical body. For if we imagine a
mathematical body actually existing, we must imagine it under some
form, because nothing is actual except by its form; hence, since the
form of quantity as such is figure, such a body must have some figure,
and so would be finite; for figure is confined by a term or boundary.

Reply Obj. 1: A geometrician does not need to assume a line
actually infinite, but takes some actually finite line, from which he
subtracts whatever he finds necessary; which line he calls infinite.

Reply Obj. 2: Although the infinite is not against the nature
of magnitude in general, still it is against the nature of any species
of it; thus, for instance, it is against the nature of a bicubical or
tricubical magnitude, whether circular or triangular, and so on. Now
what is not possible in any species cannot exist in the genus; hence
there cannot be any infinite magnitude, since no species of magnitude
is infinite.

Reply Obj. 3: The infinite in quantity, as was shown above,
belongs to matter. Now by division of the whole we approach to matter,
forasmuch as parts have the aspect of matter; but by addition we
approach to the whole which has the aspect of a form. Therefore the
infinite is not in the addition of magnitude, but only in division.

Reply Obj. 4: Movement and time are whole, not actually but
successively; hence they have potentiality mixed with actuality. But
magnitude is an actual whole; therefore the infinite in quantity
refers to matter, and does not agree with the totality of magnitude;
yet it agrees with the totality of time and movement: for it is proper
to matter to be in potentiality.
_______________________

FOURTH ARTICLE [I, Q. 7, Art. 4]

Whether an Infinite Multitude Can Exist?

Objection 1: It seems that an actually infinite multitude is possible.
For it is not impossible for a potentiality to be made actual. But
number can be multiplied to infinity. Therefore it is possible for an
infinite multitude actually to exist.

Obj. 2: Further, it is possible for any individual of any species
to be made actual. But the species of figures are infinite. Therefore
an infinite number of actual figures is possible.

Obj. 3: Further, things not opposed to each other do not obstruct
each other. But supposing a multitude of things to exist, there can
still be many others not opposed to them. Therefore it is not
impossible for others also to coexist with them, and so on to
infinitude; therefore an actual infinite number of things is possible.

_On the contrary,_ It is written, "Thou hast ordered all things in
measure, and number, and weight" (Wis. 11:21).

_I answer that,_ A twofold opinion exists on this subject. Some, as
Avicenna and Algazel, said that it was impossible for an actually
infinite multitude to exist absolutely; but that an accidentally
infinite multitude was not impossible. A multitude is said to be
infinite absolutely, when an infinite multitude is necessary that
something may exist. Now this is impossible; because it would entail
something dependent on an infinity for its existence; and hence its
generation could never come to be, because it is impossible to pass
through an infinite medium.

A multitude is said to be accidentally infinite when its existence as
such is not necessary, but accidental. This can be shown, for example,
in the work of a carpenter requiring a certain absolute multitude;
namely, art in the soul, the movement of the hand, and a hammer; and
supposing that such things were infinitely multiplied, the
carpentering work would never be finished, forasmuch as it would
depend on an infinite number of causes. But the multitude of hammers,
inasmuch as one may be broken and another used, is an accidental
multitude; for it happens by accident that many hammers are used, and
it matters little whether one or two, or many are used, or an infinite
number, if the work is carried on for an infinite time. In this way
they said that there can be an accidentally infinite multitude.

This, however, is impossible; since every kind of multitude must
belong to a species of multitude. Now the species of multitude are to
be reckoned by the species of numbers. But no species of number is
infinite; for every number is multitude measured by one. Hence it is
impossible for there to be an actually infinite multitude, either
absolute or accidental. Likewise multitude in nature is created; and
everything created is comprehended under some clear intention of the
Creator; for no agent acts aimlessly. Hence everything created must be
comprehended in a certain number. Therefore it is impossible for an
actually infinite multitude to exist, even accidentally. But a
potentially infinite multitude is possible; because the increase of
multitude follows upon the division of magnitude; since the more a
thing is divided, the greater number of things result. Hence, as the
infinite is to be found potentially in the division of the continuous,
because we thus approach matter, as was shown in the preceding
article, by the same rule, the infinite can be also found potentially
in the addition of multitude.

Reply Obj. 1: Every potentiality is made actual according to
its mode of being; for instance, a day is reduced to act successively,
and not all at once. Likewise the infinite in multitude is reduced to
act successively, and not all at once; because every multitude can be
succeeded by another multitude to infinity.

Reply Obj. 2: Species of figures are infinite by infinitude of
number. Now there are various species of figures, such as trilateral,
quadrilateral and so on; and as an infinitely numerable multitude is
not all at once reduced to act, so neither is the multitude of
figures.

Reply Obj. 3: Although the supposition of some things does not
preclude the supposition of others, still the supposition of an
infinite number is opposed to any single species of multitude. Hence
it is not possible for an actually infinite multitude to exist.
_______________________

QUESTION 8

THE EXISTENCE OF GOD IN THINGS
(In Four Articles)

Since it evidently belongs to the infinite to be present everywhere,
and in all things, we now consider whether this belongs to God; and
concerning this there arise four points of inquiry:

(1) Whether God is in all things?

(2) Whether God is everywhere?

(3) Whether God is everywhere by essence, power, and presence?

(4) Whether to be everywhere belongs to God alone?
_______________________

FIRST ARTICLE [I, Q. 8, Art. 1]

Whether God Is in All Things?

Objection 1: It seems that God is not in all things. For what is above
all things is not in all things. But God is above all, according to
the Psalm (Ps. 112:4), "The Lord is high above all nations," etc.
Therefore God is not in all things.

Obj. 2: Further, what is in anything is thereby contained. Now
God is not contained by things, but rather does He contain them.
Therefore God is not in things but things are rather in Him. Hence
Augustine says (Octog. Tri. Quaest. qu. 20), that "in Him things are,
rather than He is in any place."

Obj. 3: Further, the more powerful an agent is, the more extended
is its action. But God is the most powerful of all agents. Therefore
His action can extend to things which are far removed from Him; nor is
it necessary that He should be in all things.

Obj. 4: Further, the demons are beings. But God is not in the
demons; for there is no fellowship between light and darkness (2 Cor.
6:14). Therefore God is not in all things.

_On the contrary,_ A thing is wherever it operates. But God operates in
all things, according to Isa. 26:12, "Lord . . . Thou hast wrought all
our works in [Vulg.: 'for'] us." Therefore God is in all things.

_I answer that,_ God is in all things; not, indeed, as part of their
essence, nor as an accident, but as an agent is present to that upon
which it works. For an agent must be joined to that wherein it acts
immediately and touch it by its power; hence it is proved in Phys. vii
that the thing moved and the mover must be joined together. Now since
God is very being by His own essence, created being must be His proper
effect; as to ignite is the proper effect of fire. Now God causes this
effect in things not only when they first begin to be, but as long as
they are preserved in being; as light is caused in the air by the sun
as long as the air remains illuminated. Therefore as long as a thing
has being, God must be present to it, according to its mode of being.
But being is innermost in each thing and most fundamentally inherent
in all things since it is formal in respect of everything found in a
thing, as was shown above (Q. 7, A. 1). Hence it must be that God
is in all things, and innermostly.

Reply Obj. 1: God is above all things by the excellence of His
nature; nevertheless, He is in all things as the cause of the being of
all things; as was shown above in this article.

Reply Obj. 2: Although corporeal things are said to be in
another as in that which contains them, nevertheless, spiritual things
contain those things in which they are; as the soul contains the body.
Hence also God is in things containing them; nevertheless, by a
certain similitude to corporeal things, it is said that all things are
in God; inasmuch as they are contained by Him.

Reply Obj. 3: No action of an agent, however powerful it may
be, acts at a distance, except through a medium. But it belongs to the
great power of God that He acts immediately in all things. Hence
nothing is distant from Him, as if it could be without God in itself.
But things are said to be distant from God by the unlikeness to Him in
nature or grace; as also He is above all by the excellence of His own
nature.

Reply Obj. 4: In the demons there is their nature which is
from God, and also the deformity of sin which is not from Him;
therefore, it is not to be absolutely conceded that God is in the
demons, except with the addition, "inasmuch as they are beings." But
in things not deformed in their nature, we must say absolutely that
God is.
_______________________

SECOND ARTICLE [I, Q. 8, Art. 2]

Whether God Is Everywhere?

Objection 1: It seems that God is not everywhere. For to be everywhere
means to be in every place. But to be in every place does not belong
to God, to Whom it does not belong to be in place at all; for
"incorporeal things," as Boethius says (De Hebdom.), "are not in a
place." Therefore God is not everywhere.

Obj. 2: Further, the relation of time to succession is the same
as the relation of place to permanence. But one indivisible part of
action or movement cannot exist in different times; therefore neither
can one indivisible part in the genus of permanent things be in every
place. Now the divine being is not successive but permanent. Therefore
God is not in many places; and thus He is not everywhere.

Obj. 3: Further, what is wholly in any one place is not in part
elsewhere. But if God is in any one place He is all there; for He has
no parts. No part of Him then is elsewhere; and therefore God is not
everywhere.

_On the contrary,_ It is written, "I fill heaven and earth." (Jer.
23:24).

_I answer that,_ Since place is a thing, to be in place can be
understood in a twofold sense; either by way of other things--i.e. as
one thing is said to be in another no matter how; and thus the
accidents of a place are in place; or by a way proper to place; and
thus things placed are in a place. Now in both these senses, in some
way God is in every place; and this is to be everywhere. First, as He
is in all things giving them being, power and operation; so He is in
every place as giving it existence and locative power. Again, things
placed are in place, inasmuch as they fill place; and God fills every
place; not, indeed, like a body, for a body is said to fill place
inasmuch as it excludes the co-presence of another body; whereas by
God being in a place, others are not thereby excluded from it; indeed,
by the very fact that He gives being to the things that fill every
place, He Himself fills every place.

Reply Obj. 1: Incorporeal things are in place not by contact
of dimensive quantity, as bodies are but by contact of power.

Reply Obj. 2: The indivisible is twofold. One is the term of
the continuous; as a point in permanent things, and as a moment in
succession; and this kind of the indivisible in permanent things,
forasmuch as it has a determinate site, cannot be in many parts of
place, or in many places; likewise the indivisible of action or
movement, forasmuch as it has a determinate order in movement or
action, cannot be in many parts of time. Another kind of the
indivisible is outside of the whole genus of the continuous; and in
this way incorporeal substances, like God, angel and soul, are called
indivisible. Such a kind of indivisible does not belong to the
continuous, as a part of it, but as touching it by its power; hence,
according as its power can extend itself to one or to many, to a small
thing, or to a great one, in this way it is in one or in many places,
and in a small or large place.

Reply Obj. 3: A whole is so called with reference to its
parts. Now part is twofold: viz. a part of the essence, as the form
and the matter are called parts of the composite, while genus and
difference are called parts of species. There is also part of quantity
into which any quantity is divided. What therefore is whole in any
place by totality of quantity, cannot be outside of that place,
because the quantity of anything placed is commensurate to the
quantity of the place; and hence there is no totality of quantity
without totality of place. But totality of essence is not commensurate
to the totality of place. Hence it is not necessary for that which is
whole by totality of essence in a thing, not to be at all outside of
it. This appears also in accidental forms which have accidental
quantity; as an example, whiteness is whole in each part of the
surface if we speak of its totality of essence; because according to
the perfect idea of its species it is found to exist in every part of
the surface. But if its totality be considered according to quantity
which it has accidentally, then it is not whole in every part of the
surface. On the other hand, incorporeal substances have no totality
either of themselves or accidentally, except in reference to the
perfect idea of their essence. Hence, as the soul is whole in every
part of the body, so is God whole in all things and in each one.
_______________________

THIRD ARTICLE [I, Q. 8, Art. 3]

Whether God Is Everywhere by Essence, Presence and Power?

Objection 1: It seems that the mode of God's existence in all things
is not properly described by way of essence, presence and power. For
what is by essence in anything, is in it essentially. But God is not
essentially in things; for He does not belong to the essence of
anything. Therefore it ought not to be said that God is in things by
essence, presence and power.

Obj. 2: Further, to be present in anything means not to be absent
from it. Now this is the meaning of God being in things by His
essence, that He is not absent from anything. Therefore the presence
of God in all things by essence and presence means the same thing.
Therefore it is superfluous to say that God is present in things by
His essence, presence and power.

Obj. 3: Further, as God by His power is the principle of all
things, so He is the same likewise by His knowledge and will. But it
is not said that He is in things by knowledge and will. Therefore
neither is He present by His power.

Obj. 4: Further, as grace is a perfection added to the substance
of a thing, so many other perfections are likewise added. Therefore if
God is said to be in certain persons in a special way by grace, it
seems that according to every perfection there ought to be a special
mode of God's existence in things.

_On the contrary,_ A gloss on the Canticle of Canticles (5) says that,
"God by a common mode is in all things by His presence, power and
substance; still He is said to be present more familiarly in some by
grace." [*The quotation is from St. Gregory, (Hom. viii in Ezech.)].

_I answer that,_ God is said to be in a thing in two ways; in one way
after the manner of an efficient cause; and thus He is in all things
created by Him; in another way he is in things as the object of
operation is in the operator; and this is proper to the operations of
the soul, according as the thing known is in the one who knows; and
the thing desired in the one desiring. In this second way God is
especially in the rational creature which knows and loves Him actually
or habitually. And because the rational creature possesses this
prerogative by grace, as will be shown later (Q. 12). He is said
to be thus in the saints by grace.

But how He is in other things created by Him, may be considered from
human affairs. A king, for example, is said to be in the whole kingdom
by his power, although he is not everywhere present. Again a thing is
said to be by its presence in other things which are subject to its
inspection; as things in a house are said to be present to anyone, who
nevertheless may not be in substance in every part of the house.
Lastly, a thing is said to be by way of substance or essence in that
place in which its substance may be. Now there were some (the
Manichees) who said that spiritual and incorporeal things were subject
to the divine power; but that visible and corporeal things were
subject to the power of a contrary principle. Therefore against these
it is necessary to say that God is in all things by His power.

But others, though they believed that all things were subject to the
divine power, still did not allow that divine providence extended to
these inferior bodies, and in the person of these it is said, "He
walketh about the poles of the heavens; and He doth not consider our
things [*Vulg.: 'He doth not consider . . . and He walketh,' etc.]"
(Job 22:14). Against these it is necessary to say that God is in all
things by His presence.

Further, others said that, although all things are subject to God's
providence, still all things are not immediately created by God; but
that He immediately created the first creatures, and these created the
others. Against these it is necessary to say that He is in all things
by His essence.

Therefore, God is in all things by His power, inasmuch as all things
are subject to His power; He is by His presence in all things, as all
things are bare and open to His eyes; He is in all things by His
essence, inasmuch as He is present to all as the cause of their being.

Reply Obj. 1: God is said to be in all things by essence, not
indeed by the essence of the things themselves, as if He were of their
essence; but by His own essence; because His substance is present to
all things as the cause of their being.

Reply Obj. 2: A thing can be said to be present to another,
when in its sight, though the thing may be distant in substance, as
was shown in this article; and therefore two modes of presence are
necessary; viz. by essence and by presence.

Reply Obj. 3: Knowledge and will require that the thing known
should be in the one who knows, and the thing willed in the one who
wills. Hence by knowledge and will things are more truly in God than
God in things. But power is the principle of acting on another; hence
by power the agent is related and applied to an external thing; thus
by power an agent may be said to be present to another.

Reply Obj. 4: No other perfection, except grace, added to
substance, renders God present in anything as the object known and
loved; therefore only grace constitutes a special mode of God's
existence in things. There is, however, another special mode of God's
existence in man by union, which will be treated of in its own place
(Part III).
_______________________

FOURTH ARTICLE [I, Q. 8, Art. 4]

Whether to Be Everywhere Belongs to God Alone?

Objection 1: It seems that to be everywhere does not belong to God
alone. For the universal, according to the Philosopher (Poster. i), is
everywhere, and always; primary matter also, since it is in all
bodies, is everywhere. But neither of these is God, as appears from
what is said above (Q. 3). Therefore to be everywhere does not
belong to God alone.

Obj. 2: Further, number is in things numbered. But the whole
universe is constituted in number, as appears from the Book of Wisdom
(Wis. 11:21). Therefore there is some number which is in the whole
universe, and is thus everywhere.

Obj. 3: Further, the universe is a kind of "whole perfect body"
(Coel. et Mund. i). But the whole universe is everywhere, because
there is no place outside it. Therefore to be everywhere does not
belong to God alone.

Obj. 4: Further, if any body were infinite, no place would exist
outside of it, and so it would be everywhere. Therefore to be
everywhere does not appear to belong to God alone.

Obj. 5: Further, the soul, as Augustine says (De Trin. vi, 6), is
"whole in the whole body, and whole in every one of its parts."
Therefore if there was only one animal in the world, its soul would be
everywhere; and thus to be everywhere does not belong to God alone.

Obj. 6: Further, as Augustine says (Ep. 137), "The soul feels
where it sees, and lives where it feels, and is where it lives." But
the soul sees as it were everywhere: for in a succession of glances it
comprehends the entire space of the heavens in its sight. Therefore
the soul is everywhere.

_On the contrary,_ Ambrose says (De Spir. Sanct. i, 7): "Who dares to
call the Holy Ghost a creature, Who in all things, and everywhere, and
always is, which assuredly belongs to the divinity alone?"

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