Various - Harvard Psychological Studies, Volume 1

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One point only may at once be mentioned in this connection. While we
have cooerdinated the knowledge of phenomena with the knowledge of
purposes we have subordinated mathematics to the latter. As a matter
of course much can be said against such a decision, and the authority
of most mathematicians would be opposed to it. They would say that the
mathematical objects are independent realities whose properties we
study like those of nature, whose relations we 'observe,' whose
existence we 'discover' and in which we are interested because they
belong to the real world. All that is true, and yet the objects of the
mathematician are objects made by the will, by the logical will,
only, and thus different from all phenomena into which sensation
enters. The mathematician, of course, does not reflect on the purely
logical origin of the objects which he studies, but the system of
knowledge must give to the study of the mathematical objects its place
in the group where the functions and products of logical thought are
classified. The arithmetical or geometrical material is a free
creation, and a creation not only as to the combination of
elements--that would be the case with many laboratory substances of
the chemist too--but a creation as to the elements themselves, and the
value of the creation, its 'mathematical interest,' is to be judged by
ideals of thought, that is, by logical purposes. No doubt this logical
purpose is its application in the world of phenomena, and the
mathematical concept must thus fit the world so absolutely that it can
be conceived as a description of the world after abstracting not only
from the will relations, as physics does, but also from the content.
Mathematics would then be the phenomenalistic science of the form and
order of the world. In this way mathematics has a claim to places in
both fields: among the phenomenalistic sciences if we emphasize its
applicability to the world, and among the teleological sciences if we
emphasize the free creation of its objects by the logical will. It
seems to me that a logical system as such has to prefer the latter
emphasis; we thus group mathematics beside logic and the theory of
knowledge as a science of objects freely created for purposes of
thought.

All logical knowledge is divided into Theoretical and Practical. The
modern classifications have mostly excluded the practical sciences
from the system, rightly insisting that no facts are known in the
practical sciences which are not in principle covered by the
theoretical sciences; it is art which is superadded, but not a new
kind of knowledge. This is quite true so far as a classification of
objects of knowledge is in question, but as soon as logical tasks as
such are to be classified and different aspects count as different
sciences, then it becomes desirable to discriminate between the
sciences which take the attitude of theoretical interest and those
which consider the same facts as related to certain human ends. But we
may at first consider the theoretical sciences only. They deal either
with the objectified world, with objects of consciousness which are
describable and explainable, or with the subjectivistic world of real
life in which all reality is experienced as will and as object of
will, in which everything is to be understood by interpretation of its
meaning. In other words, we deal in one case with phenomena and in the
other with purposes.

The further subdivision must be the same for both groups--that which
is merely individual and that which is 'overindividual'; we prefer the
latter term to the word 'general,' to indicate at once that not a
numerical but a teleological difference is in question. A phenomenon
is given to overindividual consciousness if it is experienced with the
understanding that it can be an object for every one whom we
acknowledge as subject; and a purpose is given to overindividual will
in so far as it is conceived as ultimately belonging to every subject
which we acknowledge. The overindividual phenomena are, of course, the
physical objects, the individual phenomena the psychical objects, the
overindividual purposes are the norms, the individual purposes are the
acts which constitute the historical world. We have thus four
fundamental groups: the physical, the psychological, the normative and
the historical sciences.

Whoever denies overindividual reality finds himself in the world of
phenomena a solipsist and in the world of purposes a sceptic: there is
no objective physical world, everything is my idea, and there is no
objective value, no truth, no morality, everything is my individual
decision. But to deny truth and morality means to contradict the very
denial, because the denial itself as judgment demands acknowledgment
of this objective truth and as action demands acknowledgment of the
moral duty to speak the truth. And if an overindividual purpose cannot
be denied, it follows that there is a community of individual subjects
whose phenomena cannot be absolutely different: there must be an
objective world of overindividual objects.

In each of the four groups of sciences we must consider the facts
either with regard to the general relations or with regard to the
special material; the abstract general relations refer to every
possible material, the concrete facts which fall under them demand
sciences of their own. In the world of phenomena the general relations
are causal laws--physical or psychical laws; in the world of purposes
theories of teleological interrelations--normative or historical; the
specific concrete facts are in the world of phenomena objects,
physical or psychical objects, in the world of purposes acts of
will--specific norms or historical acts. If we turn first to
phenomena, the laws thereof are expressed in the physical sciences, by
mechanics, physics, chemistry, and we make mechanics the superior as
chemistry must become ultimately the mechanics of atoms. In the
psychological sciences the science of laws is psychology, with the
side-branch of animal psychology, while human psychology refers to
individuals and to social groups. Social psychology, as over against
individual psychology, is thus a science of general laws, the laws of
those psychological phenomena which result from the mutual influence
of several individuals.

On the other hand, we have as the special concrete products of the
laws, the objects themselves, and the most natural grouping of them
may be from whole to part. In the physical world it means that we
start from the concrete universe, turning then to the earth, then to
the objects on the earth, inorganic and organic. There is here no
logical difficulty. Each one of these objects can be considered in
three aspects, firstly as to its structure, secondly as to its special
laws, that is, the special function of the object as related to the
general sciences of physics and chemistry, and thirdly as to its
natural development. If we apply these three methods of study to the
whole universe we have astronomy, astrophysics and cosmology, to the
whole earth, geography, geophysics, geology, to animals, zooelogy,
physiology, comparative anatomy, and so on.

The special phenomena in the framework of the psychological sciences
group themselves in the same logical order, from the whole to the
part. The psychological totality is empirical mankind, and as we
select the earth as the one part of the universe which is the habitat
of man, so our scientific interest must move from the whole psychical
humanity to those phenomena of human life which are the vehicle of our
civilization, from mankind to its most important function, the
association of man; and as we moved from earth to the special objects
on earth, so we may turn from association to the special phenomena
which result from association. If we separated further the inorganic
from the organic, we must here separate the products of
undifferentiated and of differentiated association. The science of
mankind is race psychology, the science of the association of man is
sociology, the science of the results of undifferentiated association
is Voelkerpsychologie, folk psychology. The science of products of
differentiated association has no special name; its subject matter is
the whole of historical civilization considered as a psychological
naturalistic phenomenon. As soon as we follow the ramification still
further we have to do with the special kinds of these products, that
is, with the volitions, thoughts, appreciations and beliefs. In the
undifferentiated associations they give us morals and habits,
languages and enjoyments and mythological ideas, while the
individually differentiated association gives political, legal and
economic life, knowledge, art and religion: all of course merely as
causal, not as teleological processes, and thus merely as
psychological and not as historical material. Here, as with the
physical phenomena, the structure, the special laws and the
development must be everywhere separated, giving us three sciences in
every case. For instance, the study of mankind deals with the
differences of mental structure in psychical anthropology, with the
special psychical laws in race psychology and with the development in
comparative psychology. The chief point for us is that social
psychology, race psychology, sociology, folk psychology, etc., are
under this system sharply differentiated sciences and that they do not
at all overlap the real historical sciences. There is no historical
product of civilization which does not come under their method but it
must be conceived as a causal phenomenon, not as related to the
purposes of the real man, and thus even the development means merely a
growing complication of naturalistic processes and not history in the
teleological sense.

We turn to the normative sciences. The general theory of the
overindividual purposes is metaphysics; the special overindividual
acts are those which constitute the normative volitions, connected in
the philosophy of morals, the philosophy of state and the philosophy
of law, those which constitute the normative thoughts and finally
those which constitute the normative appreciations and beliefs,
connected in aesthetics and the philosophy of religion. Especial
interest belongs to the philosophy of thought. We have discussed the
reasons why we group mathematics here and not among the
phenomenalistic sciences. We have thus one science which deals
critically with the presuppositions of thought, _i.e._ the theory of
knowledge or epistemology, which can be divided into the philosophy of
physical sciences, the philosophy of psychological sciences, the
philosophy of normative sciences and the philosophy of historical
sciences. We have secondly the science of the processes of thought
dealing with concepts, judgments and reasoning, _i.e._, logic, and we
have finally the science of those objects which the thought creates
freely for its own purposes and which are independent from the content
of the world, _i.e._, mathematics, which leads to the qualitative
aspect of general mathematics and the quantitative aspect of concrete
mathematics. For our purposes it may be sufficient to separate
externally algebra, arithmetic, analysis and geometry. In this way all
the philosophical sciences find their natural and necessary place in
the system, while it has been their usual lot to form an appendix to
the system, incommensurable with the parts of the system itself, even
in the case that the other scheme were not preferred, to make ethics,
logic, aesthetics, epistemology and metaphysics merely special branches
of positivistic sociology and thus ultimately of biology.

In the historical sciences the general theory which stands over
against the special acts has a special claim on our attention. We may
call it the philosophy of history. That is not identical with the
philosophy of historical sciences which we mentioned as a part of
epistemology. The philosophy of historical sciences deals with the
presuppositions by which historical teleological knowledge becomes
logically possible. The philosophy of history seeks a theory which
connects the special historical acts into a unity. It has two
branches. It is either a theory of the personality, creating a theory
of real individual life as it enters as ideological factor into
history, or it seeks the unity of entire humanity. The theory of
personality shows the teleological interrelation of our purposes; the
theory of humanity shows the teleological interrelation of all
nations. The name philosophy of history has been used mostly for the
theory of humanity only, abstracting from the fact that it has been
often misused for sociology or for the psychology of history or for
the philosophy of historical sciences--but the name belongs also to
the theory of personality. This theory of personality is exactly that
second kind of 'psychology' which does not describe and does not
explain but which interprets the inner teleological connections of the
real man. It is 'voluntaristic psychology' or, as others call it who
see correctly the relation of this science to history, 'historical
psychology.' It is practically 'apperceptionistic psychology.' The
special activities of the historical man divide themselves again into
volitions, thoughts, appreciations and beliefs, with their realization
in the state, law, economical systems, knowledge, art and religion.
Each of these special realizations must allow the same manifoldness in
treatment which we found with the special physical or psychical
objects; we can ask as to structure, relation to the general view and
development. But in accordance with the teleological material the
study of the structure here means 'interpretation,' the study of the
general relations here means study of the relation to civilization,
and the study of the development here means the real history. We have,
thus, for the state or law or economy or knowledge or art or religion
always one science which interprets the historical systems of state,
etc., in a systematic and philological way, one science which deals
with its function in the historical world and one which studies
biographically and nationally the history of state, law, economical
life, science, art or religion.

In the sphere of the practical sciences the divisions of the
theoretical sciences must repeat themselves. We have thus applied
physical, applied psychological, applied normative and applied
historical sciences, and it is again the antithesis of psychological
and of historical sciences which is of utmost importance and yet too
often neglected. The application of physical sciences, as in
engineering, medicine, etc., or the application of normative
knowledge in the sciences of criticism do not offer logical
difficulty, but the application of psychological and historical
knowledge does. Let us take the case of pedagogy or of penology,
merely as illustrations. Is the application of phenomenalistic
psychology or the application of teleological voluntarism in question?
Considering the child, the criminal, any man, as psychophysical
apparatus which must be objectively changed and treated, we have
applied psychology; considering him as subject with purposes, as
bearer of an historical civilization whose personalities must be
interpreted and understood and appreciated, then we need applied
historical knowledge. In the first case the science of pedagogy is a
psycho-technical discipline which makes education mechanical and
deprives the teacher of the teleological attitude of inner
understanding; in the second case it is a science of real education
far removed from psychology. All the sciences which deal with service
in the system of civilization, service as teacher, as judge, as social
helper, as artist, as minister, are sciences which apply the
teleological historical knowledge, and their meaning is lost if they
are considered as psycho-technical sciences only.

LIFE (in its immediate reality, felt as a system of telelogical
| experiences, involving the acknowledgement of other subjects of
| experiences)
|
|-VOLITION (will aiming towards new experiences).
| |-Individual: _Practical Life._
| |-Overindividual: _Mortality._
|
|-THOUGHT (will acknowledging the connection of experiences).
| |-Individual: _Judgement_
| |-Overindividual: TRUTH
| |-THEORETICAL KNOWLEDGE (connection of experiences determined by
| | | pure experience).
| | |
| | |-KNOWLEDGE OF PHENOMENA (connection of experiences after
| | | | abstracting their will relations).
| | | |-Knowledge of Phenomena Given to Overindividual Consciousness.
| | | | |-I. PHYSICAL SCIENCES.
| | | | |-A. GENERAL LAWS.
| | | | | |-Mechanics.
| | | | | |-Physics.
| | | | | |-Chemistry.
| | | | |
| | | | |-B. SPECIAL OBJECTS.
| | | | |-1. Universe.
| | | | | |-Astronomy _a, b, c_.
| | | | |
| | | | |-2. Special Parts.
| | | | | |-Geography _a, b, c_.
| | | | |
| | | | |-3. Special Objects on Earth.
| | | | |-Inorganic.
| | | | | |-Mineralogy _a, b, c_.
| | | | |
| | | | |-Organic.
| | | | |-Plants.
| | | | | |-Botany _a, b, c_.
| | | | |
| | | | |-Animals.
| | | | |-Zoology _a, b, c_.
| | | | |-Anthropology _a, b, c_.
| | | |
| | | |-Knowledge of Phenomena given to Indiviual Consciousness.
| | | |-II. PSYCHOLOGICAL SCIENCES.
| | | |-A. GENERAL LAWS.
| | | | |-PHENOMENALISTIC PSYCHOLOGY
| | | | |-Animal Psychology.
| | | | |-Human psychology.
| | | | |-Individual Ps.
| | | | |-Normal.
| | | | | |-Child.
| | | | | |-Adult.
| | | | |
| | | | |-Abnormal.
| | | |
| | | |-B. SPECIAL OBJECTS.
| | | |-1. Mankind.
| | | | |-Race Psychology _a, b, c_.
| | | |-2. Special Functions.
| | | | |-Association of Men.
| | | | |-Sociology _a, b, c_.
| | | |
| | | |-3. Special Products of Association of Men
| | | | (considered as natural phenomena).
| | | |-Products of Undiffereniated Association of Men
| | | | | (Folk Psychology).
| | | | |-Volition.
| | | | | |-Morals _a, b, c_.
| | | | | |-Habits _a, b, c_.
| | | | |
| | | | |-Thoughts.
| | | | | |-Languages _a, b, c_.
| | | | |
| | | | |-Appreciation.
| | | | | |-Enjoyment _a, b, c_.
| | | | |
| | | | |-Belief.
| | | | |-Mythology _a, b, c_.
| | | |
| | | |-Products of Individual Differentiation
| | | | (casual phenomenalistic sciences of civilization
| | | | and its development).
| | | |-Volition.
| | | | |-State _a, b, c_.
| | | | |-Law _a, b, c_.
| | | | |-Economy _a, b, c_.
| | | |
| | | |-Thoughts.
| | | | |-Sciences _a, b, c_.
| | | |
| | | |-Appreciation.
| | | | |-Art _a, b, c_.
| | | |
| | | |-Belief.
| | | |-Religion _a, b, c_.
| | |
| | |-KNOWLEDGE OF PURPOSES (connection of experiences in their
| | | telelogical reality).
| | |
| | |-Knowledge of Purposes of the Overindividual Will.
| | | |-III. NORMATIVE SCIENCES
| | | |-A. GENERAL THEORY of absolute values.
| | | | |-Metaphysics.
| | | |
| | | |-B. SPECIAL ACTS.
| | | |-Volition.
| | | | |-Philosophy of Morals (Ethics).
| | | | |-Philosophy of Law.
| | | | |-Philosophy of State.
| | | |
| | | |-Thoughts.
| | | | |-Presuppositions of Thought.
| | | | | |-Theory of Knowledge.
| | | | | |-Phil. of Physics.
| | | | | |-Phil. of Psych.
| | | | | |-Phil. of Normative Sciences.
| | | | | |-Phil. of Historical Sciences.
| | | | |
| | | | |-Processes of Thought.
| | | | | |-Logic.
| | | | |
| | | | |-Objects Created by Thought.
| | | | |-Mathematics.
| | | | |-Algebra.
| | | | |-Arithmetic.
| | | | |-Analysis.
| | | | |-Geometry.
| | | |
| | | |-Appreciation.
| | | | |-Philosophy of Art (AEsthetics).
| | | |
| | | |-Belief.
| | | |-Philosophy of Religion.
| | |
| | |-Knowledge of Purposes of the Individual Will.
| | |-IV. HISTORICAL SCIENCES.
| | |-A. GENERAL THEORY of real life.
| | | |-Philosophy of History.
| | | |-Theory of Personality.
| | | | |-(Theory of selves.)
| | | | |-("Historical Psychology.")
| | | | |-("VOLUNTARISTIC Psychology.")
| | | | |-("Apperceptional Psychology.")
| | | |-Theory of Humanity.
| | |
| | |-B. SPECIAL ACTS (telelogical interpretative sciences of
| | | civilization and history.)
| | |-Volition.
| | | |-Politics, _a, b, c_.
| | | |-Law, _a, b, c_.
| | | |-Economy, _a, b, c_.
| | |
| | |-Thoughts.
| | | |-Science, _a, b, c_.
| | |
| | |-Appreciation.
| | | |-Art, _a, b, c_.
| | |
| | |-Belief.
| | |-Religion, _a, b, c_.
| |
| |-PRACTICAL KNOWLEDGE.
| |-APPLIED KNOWLEDGE OF PHENOMENA.
| | |-V. APPLIED PHYSICAL SCIENCES.
| | | |-Technical Sciences.
| | | | |-Applied Physics.
| | | | |-Applied Chemistry.
| | | | |-Applied Biology.
| | | |
| | | |-Medicine.
| | |
| | |-VI. APPLIED PSYCHOLOGICAL SCIENCES.
| | |-Psychotechnical Sciences.
| | | |-Psychological Pedagogy.
| | | |-Psychological Penology.
| | |
| | |-Psychiatry.
| |
| |-APPLIED KNOWLEDGE OF PURPOSES.
| |-VII. APPLIED NORMATIVE SCIENCES.
| | |-Volition.
| | | |-Politics.
| | | | |-Science of Public Service.
| | | |
| | | |-Law.
| | | | |-Science of Legal Service. (Practical Jurisprudence.)
| | | |
| | | |-Economy.
| | | |-Science of Social Service.
| | |
| | |-Thoughts.
| | | |-Science of Teaching. (Education.)
| | |
| | |-Appreciation.
| | | |-Science of Artistic Production.
| | |
| | |-Belief.
| | |-Science of Religious Service. (Practical Theology.)
| |
| |-VIII. APPLIED HISTORICAL SCIENCES.
| |-Volition.
| | |-Criticism of State.
| | |-Criticism of Law.
| |
| |-Thoughts.
| | |-Criticism of Science.
| |
| |-Appreciation.
| | |-Criticism of Art.
| |
| |-Belief.
| |-Criticism of Religion.
|
|-APPRECIATION (will resting in isolated experiences).
| |-Individual: _Enjoyment._
| |-Overindividual: _Beauty._
|
|-BELIEF (will resting in the supplements of experience).
|-Individual: _Creed._
|-Overindividual: _Religion.

NOTE: The letters _a, b, c_ below the sciences of Special Objects and
Special Acts indicate the three subdivisions that results from the
threefold aspects;--of structure(_a_), of relation to the general laws
or theories(_b_), and of development(_c_). With regards to physical
phenomena, for instances, we have astronomy(_a_), astrophysics(_b_),
and cosmology(_c_); or geography(_a_), geophysics(_b_), geology(_c_);
or botany(_a_), plant physiology(_b_), phylogenetic development of
plants(_c_). In the same way for psychical objects; for instance:
structural sociology(_a_), functional sociology(_b_), comparative
sociology(_c_); or structure (grammar and syntax) of languages(_a_),
psychology of languages(_b_), comparative study of languages(_c_).
With regard to the telelogical historical sciences the study of
structure takes on here the character of intrepretation; the relation
to the general view is here the dependence on civilization and the
development is here the real history. We have thus, for instance, the
intepretation of Roman law(_a_), dependence of Roman law upon
civilization(_b_), history of Roman law(_c_).