Various - The New York Times Current History of the European War, Vol. 1, January 9, 1915

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The New York Times

CURRENT HISTORY OF THE EUROPEAN WAR

JANUARY 9, 1915.

What Americans Say to Europe

[Illustration: CHARLES W. ELIOT

_(Photo (c) by Paul Thompson.)_

_See Page 473_]

[Illustration: JAMES M. BECK

_See Page 413_]

In the Supreme Court of Civilization

Argued by James M. Beck.

THE NEW YORK TIMES _submitted the evidence contained in the official
"White Paper" of Great Britain, the "Orange Paper" of Russia, and the
"Gray Paper" of Belgium to James M. Beck, late Assistant Attorney
General of the United States and a leader of the New York bar, who has
argued many of the most important cases before the Supreme Court. On
this evidence Mr. Beck has argued in the following article the case of
Dual Alliance vs. Triple Entente. It has been widely circulated in
France and Great Britain._

Let us suppose that in this year of dis-Grace, Nineteen Hundred and
Fourteen, there had existed, as let us pray will one day exist, a
Supreme Court of Civilization, before which the sovereign nations could
litigate their differences without resort to the iniquitous and less
effective appeal to the arbitrament of arms.

Let us further suppose that each of the contending nations had a
sufficient leaven of Christianity to have its grievances adjudged not by
the ethics of the cannon or the rifle, but by the eternal criterion of
justice.

What would be the judgment of that august tribunal?

Any discussion of the ethical merits of this great controversy must
start with the assumption that there is an international morality.

This fundamental axiom, upon which the entire basis of civilization
necessarily rests, is challenged by a small class of intellectual
perverts.

Some hold that moral considerations must be subordinated either to
military necessity or so-called manifest destiny. This is the Bernhardi
doctrine.

Others teach that war is a beneficent fatality and that all nations
engaged in it are therefore equally justified. On this theory all of the
now contending nations are but victims of an irresistible current of
events, and the highest duty of the State is to prepare itself for the
systematic extermination, when necessary or expedient, of its neighbors.

Notwithstanding the clever platitudes under which both these doctrines
are veiled, all morally sane minds are agreed that this war is a great
crime against civilization, and the only open question is, which of the
two contending groups of powers is morally responsible for that crime?

Was Austria justified in declaring war against Servia?

Was Germany justified in declaring war against Russia and France?

Was England justified in declaring war against Germany?

As the last of these questions is the most easily disposed of, it may be
considered first.

England's Justification.

England's justification rests upon the solemn Treaty of 1839, whereby
Prussia, France, England, Austria, and Russia "became the guarantors" of
the "perpetual neutrality" of Belgium, as reaffirmed by Count Bismarck,
then Chancellor of the North German Confederation, on July 22, 1870, and
as even more recently reaffirmed in the striking fact disclosed in the
Belgian "Gray Book."

In the Spring of 1913 a debate was in progress in the Budget Committee
of the Reichstag with reference to the Military Budget. In the course of
the debate the German Secretary of State said:

"The neutrality of Belgium is determined by international
conventions, _and Germany is resolved to respect these
conventions_."

To confirm this solemn assurance, the Minister of War added in the same
debate:

"Belgium does not play any part in the justification of the
German scheme of military reorganization. The scheme is
justified by the position of matters in the East. _Germany
will not lose sight of the fact that Belgian neutrality is
guaranteed by international treaties._"

A year later, on July 31, 1914, Herr von Below, the German Minister at
Brussels, assured the Belgian Department of State that he knew of a
declaration which the German Chancellor had made in 1911, to the effect
"that Germany had no intention of violating our neutrality," and "that
he was certain that the sentiments to which expression was given at that
time _had not changed_." (See Belgian "Gray Book," Nos. 11 and 12.)

Apart from these treaty stipulations, which are only declaration of
Belgium's rights as sovereign nations, The Hague Conference, in which
forty-four nations (including Germany) participated, reaffirmed as an
axiom of international law the inherent right of a nation to the
sanctity of its territory.

It seems unnecessary to discuss the wanton disregard of these solemn
obligations and protestations, when the present Chancellor of the German
Empire, in his speech to the Reichstag and to the world on Aug. 4, 1914,
frankly admitted that the action of the German military machine in
invading Belgium was a wrong. He said:

"We are now in a state of necessity, and necessity knows no
law. Our troops have occupied Luxemburg and perhaps are
already on Belgian soil. _Gentlemen, that is contrary to the
dictates of international law._ It is true that the French
Government has declared at Brussels that France is willing to
respect the neutrality of Belgium, so long as her opponent
respects it. We knew, however, that France stood ready for
invasion. France could wait, but we could not wait. A French
movement upon our flank upon the lower Rhine might have been
disastrous. So we were compelled to override the just protest
of the Luxemburg and Belgian Governments. _The wrong--I speak
openly--that we are committing_ we will endeavor to make good
as soon as our military goal has been reached. Anybody who is
threatened as we are threatened, and is fighting for his
highest possessions, can only have one thought--how he is to
hack his way through."

This defense is not even a plea of confession and avoidance. It is a
plea of "Guilty" at the bar of the world. It has one merit, that it
does not add to the crime the aggravation of hypocrisy. It virtually
rests the case of Germany upon the gospel of Treitschke and Bernhardi,
that each nation is justified in exerting its physical power to the
utmost in defense of its selfish interests and without any regard to
considerations of conventional morality. Might as between nations is the
sole criterion of right. There is no novelty in this gospel. Its only
surprising feature is its revival in the twentieth century. It was
taught far more effectively by Machiavelli in his treatise, "The
Prince," wherein he glorified the policy of Cesare Borgia in trampling
the weaker States of Italy under foot by ruthless terrorism, unbridled
ferocity, and the basest deception. Indeed, the wanton destruction of
Belgium is simply Borgiaism amplified ten-thousandfold by the mechanical
resources of modern war.

This Answer Cannot Satisfy.

Unless our boasted civilization is the thinnest veneering of barbarism;
unless the law of the world is in fact only the ethics of the rifle and
the conscience of the cannon; unless mankind after uncounted centuries
has made no real advance in political morality beyond that of the cave
dweller, then this answer of Germany cannot satisfy the "decent respect
to the opinions of mankind." Germany's contention that a treaty of peace
is "a scrap of paper," to be disregarded at will when required by the
selfish interests of one contracting party, is the negation of all that
civilization stands for.

Belgium has been crucified in the face of the world. Its innocence of
any offense, until it was attacked, is too clear for argument. Its
voluntary immolation to preserve its solemn guarantee of neutrality will
"plead like angels, trumpet-tongued, against the deep damnation of its
taking off." On that issue the Supreme Court could have no ground for
doubt or hesitation. Its judgment would be speedy and inexorable.

The remaining two issues, above referred to, are not so simple.
Primarily and perhaps exclusively, the ethical question turns upon the
issues raised by the communications which passed between the various
Chancelleries of Europe in the last week of July, for it is the amazing
feature of this greatest of all wars that it was precipitated by
diplomats and rulers, and, assuming that all these statesmen sincerely
desired a peaceful solution of the questions raised by the Austrian
ultimatum, (which is by no means clear,) it was the result of
ineffective diplomacy and clumsy diplomacy at that.

I quite appreciate the distinction between the immediate causes of a war
and the anterior and more fundamental causes; nevertheless, with the
world in a state of Summer peace on July 23, 1914, an issue, gravely
affecting the integrity of nations and the balance of power in Europe,
is suddenly precipitated by the Austrian ultimatum, and thereafter and
for the space of about a week a series of diplomatic communications
passed between the Chancelleries of Europe, designed on their face to
prevent a war and yet so ineffective that the war is precipitated and
the fearful Rubicon crossed before the world knew, except imperfectly,
the nature of the differences between the Governments involved. The
ethical aspects of this great conflict must largely depend upon the
record that has been made up by the official communications which can,
therefore, be treated as documentary evidence in a litigated case.

A substantial part of that record is already before the court of public
opinion in the British and German "White Papers," the Russian "Orange
Paper," and the Belgian "Gray Paper," and the purpose of this article is
to discuss what judgment an impartial and dispassionate court would
render upon the issues thus raised and the evidence thus submitted.

Primarily such a court would be deeply impressed not only by what the
record as thus made up discloses, _but also by the significant omissions
of documents known to be in existence_.

The official defense of England and Russia does not apparently show any
failure on the part of either to submit all of the documents in their
possession, _but the German "White Paper" on its face discloses the
suppression of documents of vital importance, while Austria has as yet
failed to submit any of the documentary evidence in its possession_.

We know from the German "White Paper"--even if we did not conclude as a
matter of irresistible inference--that many important communications
passed in this crisis between Germany and Austria, and it is probable
that some communications must also have passed between those two
countries and Italy. Italy, despite its embarrassing position, owes to
the world the duty of a full disclosure. What such disclosure would
probably show is indicated by her deliberate conclusion that her allies
had commenced an _aggressive_ war, which released her from any
obligation under the Triple Alliance.

The fact that communications passed between Berlin and Vienna, the text
of which has never been disclosed, is not a matter of conjecture.
Germany admits and asserts as part of her defense that she faithfully
exercised her mediatory influence with Austria, but not only is such
mediatory influence not disclosed by any practical results of such
mediation, but the text of these vital communications is still kept in
the secret archives of Berlin and Vienna.

Thus in the official apology for Germany it is stated that, in spite of
the refusal of Austria to accept the proposition of Sir Edward Grey to
treat the Servian reply "as a basis for further conversations,"

"we [Germany] continued our mediatory efforts to the _utmost_
and advised Vienna to make any possible compromise consistent
with the dignity of the Monarchy."

[German "White Paper."]

This would be more convincing if the German Foreign Office in giving
other diplomatic documents had only added the _text_ of the advice which
it thus gave Vienna.

The same significant omission will be found when the same official
defense states that on July 29 the German Government advised Austria "to
begin the conversations with Mr. Sazonof." But here again _the text_ is
not found among the documents which the German Foreign Office has given
to the world. The communications, which passed between that office and
its Ambassadors in St. Petersburg, Paris, and London, are given _in
extenso_, but among the twenty-seven communications appended to the
German official defense it is most significant that not a single
communication is given of the many which passed from Berlin to Vienna
and only two that passed from Vienna to Berlin.

This cannot be an accident. Germany has seen fit to throw the veil of
secrecy over the text of its communications to Vienna, although
professing to give the purport of a few of them.

Until Germany is willing to put the most important documents in its
possession in evidence, it must not be surprised that the world,
remembering Bismarck's garbling of the Ems dispatch, which precipitated
the Franco-Prussian war, will be incredulous as to the sincerity of
Germany's mediatory efforts.

Austria's Case Against Servia.

To discuss the justice of Austria's grievances against Servia would take
us outside the documentary record and into the realm of disputed facts
and would expand this discussion far beyond reasonable length.

Let us therefore suppose _arguendo_ that our imaginary court would
commence its consideration with the assumption that Austria had a just
grievance against Servia, and that the murder of the Archduke on June
28, 1914, while in fact committed by Austrian citizens of Servian
sympathies on Austrian soil, had its inspiration and encouragement in
the political activities either of the Servian Government or of
political organizations of that country.

The question for decision would then be not whether Austria had a just
grievance against Servia, but whether having regard to the obligations
which Austria, as well as every other country, owes to civilization, she
proceeded in the right manner to redress her grievance.

On June 28, 1914, the Austrian Crown Prince was murdered at Serajevo.
For nearly a month there was no action by Austria, and no public
statement whatever of its intentions. The world profoundly sympathized
with Austria in its new trouble, and especially with its aged monarch,
who, like King Lear, was "as full of grief as years and wretched in
both."

The Servian Government had formerly disclaimed any complicity with the
assassination and had pledged itself to punish any Servian citizen
implicated therein.

From time to time, from June 28 to July 23, there came semi-inspired
intimations from Vienna that that country intended to act with great
self-restraint and in the most pacific manner. In his speech to the
French Chamber of Deputies, Viviani says that Europe had in the interval
preceding July 23 express assurances from Austria that its course would
be moderate and conciliatory. Never was it even hinted that Germany and
Austria were about to apply in a time of profound peace a match to the
powder magazine of Europe.

This is strikingly shown by the first letter in the English "White
Paper" from Sir Edward Grey to Sir H. Rumbold, dated July 20, 1914. It
is one of the most significant documents in the entire correspondence.
At the time this letter was written it is altogether probable that
Austria's arrogant and most unreasonable ultimatum had already been
framed and approved in Vienna, and possibly in Berlin, and yet Sir
Edward Grey, the Foreign Minister of a great and friendly country, had
so little knowledge of Austria's policy that he

"asked the German Ambassador today (July 20) if he had any
news of what was going on in Vienna with regard to Servia."
The German Ambassador replied "that he had not, but Austria
was certainly going to take some step."

Sir Edward Grey adds that he told the German Ambassador that he had
learned that Count Berchtold, the Austrian Foreign Minister,

"in speaking to the Italian Ambassador in Vienna, had
deprecated the suggestion that the situation was grave, but
had said that it should be cleared up."

The German Minister then replied that it would be desirable "if Russia
could act as a mediator with regard to Servia," so that the first
suggestion of Russia playing the part of the peacemaker came from the
German Ambassador in London. Sir Edward Grey then adds that he told the
German Ambassador that he

"assumed that the Austrian Government would not do anything
until they had first disclosed to the public their case
against Servia, founded presumably upon what they had
discovered at the trial,"

and the German Ambassador assented to this assumption.

[English "White Paper," No. 1.]

Either the German Ambassador was then deceiving Sir Edward Grey, on the
theory that the true function of an Ambassador is "to lie for his
country," or the thunderbolt was being launched with such secrecy that
even the German Ambassador in England did not know what was then in
progress.

The British Ambassador at Vienna reports to Sir Edward Grey:

"The delivery at Belgrade on the 23d July of the note to
Servia was preceded by a period of _absolute silence_ at the
Ballplatz."

He proceeds to say that with the exception of the German Ambassador at
Vienna--note the significance of the exception--not a single member of
the Diplomatic Corps knew anything of the Austrian ultimatum and that
the French Ambassador when he visited the Austrian Foreign Office on
July 23 was not only kept in ignorance that the ultimatum had actually
been issued, but was given the impression that its tone was moderate.
Even the Italian Ambassador was not taken into Count Berchtold's
confidence.

[Dispatch from Sir M. de Bunsen to Sir Edward Grey, dated Sept. 1,
1914.]

No better proof of this sense of security need be adduced than that the
French President and her Foreign Minister were thousands of miles from
Paris, and the Russian Minister had, after the funeral of the Austrian
Archduke, left Vienna for his annual holiday.

The interesting and important question here suggests itself whether
Germany had knowledge of and approved in advance the Austrian ultimatum.
If it did, it was guilty of duplicity, for the German Ambassador at St.
Petersburg gave to the Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs an express
assurance that

"the German Government _had no knowledge of the text of the
Austrian note before it was handed in and has not exercised
any influence on its contents. It is a mistake to attribute to
Germany a threatening attitude_."

[Russian "Orange Paper," No. 18.]

This statement is inherently improbable. Austria was the weaker of the
two allies and it was Germany's sabre that it was rattling in the face
of Europe. Obviously Austria could not have proceeded to extreme
measures, which it was recognized from the first would antagonize
Russia, unless it had the support of Germany, and there is a
probability, amounting to a moral certainty, that it would not have
committed itself and Germany to the possibility of a European war
without first consulting Germany.

Moreover, we have the testimony of Sir M. de Bunsen, the English
Ambassador in Vienna, who advised Sir Edward Grey that he had "private
information that the German Ambassador (at Vienna) knew the text of the
Austrian ultimatum to Servia before it was dispatched and telegraphed it
to the German Emperor," and that the German Ambassador himself "indorses
every line of it." [English "White Paper," No. 95.] As he does not
disclose the source of his "private information," this testimony would
not by itself be convincing, but when we examine Germany's official
defense in the German "White Paper," _we find that the German Foreign
Office admits that it was consulted by Austria previous to the ultimatum
and not only approved of Austria's course but literally gave her a
carte blanche to proceed_.

This point seems so important in determining the sincerity of Germany's
attitude and pacific protestations that we quote _in extenso_. After
referring to the previous friction between Austria and Servia, the
German "White Paper" says:

"In view of these circumstances, Austria had to admit that it would not
be consistent either with the dignity or self-preservation of the
monarchy to look on longer at the operations on the other side of the
border without taking action. _The Austro-Hungarian Government advised
us of this view of the situation and asked our opinion in the matter. We
were able to assure our ally most heartily of our agreement with her
view of the situation and to assure her that any action that she might
consider it necessary to take in order to put an end to the movement in
Servia directed against the existence of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy
would receive our approval._ We were fully aware in this connection that
warlike moves on the part of Austria-Hungary against Servia would bring
Russia into the question and might draw us into a war in accordance with
our duties as an ally."

Sir M. de Bunsen's credible testimony is further confirmed by the fact
that the British Ambassador at Berlin, in his letter of July 22 to Sir
Edward Grey, states that _on the preceding night_ (July 21) he had met
the German Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and an allusion was
made to a possible action by Austria.

"His Excellency was evidently of opinion that this step on
Austria's part would have been made ere this. He insisted that
the question at issue was one for settlement between Servia
and Austria alone, and that there should be no interference
from outside in the discussions between those two countries."

He adds that while he had regarded it as inadvisable that his country
should approach Austria-Hungary in the matter, he had

"on several occasions in conversation with the Servian
Minister emphasized the extreme importance that
Austro-Servian relations should be put on a proper footing."

[English "White Paper," No. 2.]

Here we have the first statement of Germany's position in the matter, a
position which subsequent events showed to be entirely untenable, but to
which Germany tenaciously adhered to the very end, and which did much to
precipitate the war. Forgetful of the solidarity of European
civilization and the fact that by policy and diplomatic intercourse
continuing through many centuries a United European State exists, even
though its organization be as yet inchoate, he took the ground that
Austria should be permitted to proceed to aggressive measures against
Servia without interference from any other power, even though, as was
inevitable, the humiliation of Servia would destroy the status of the
Balkan States and even threaten the European balance of power.

No space need be taken in convincing any reasonable man that this
Austrian ultimatum to Servia was brutal in its tone and unreasonable in
its demands. It would be difficult to find in history a more offensive
document, and its iniquity was enhanced by the short shriving time which
it gave either Servia or Europe. Servia had forty-eight hours to answer
whether it would compromise its sovereignty, and virtually admit its
complicity in a crime which it had steadily disavowed. As the full text
of the ultimatum first reached the Foreign Chancelleries nearly
twenty-four hours after its service upon Servia, the other European
nations had barely a day to consider what could be done to preserve the
peace of Europe before that peace was fatally compromised.

[English "White Paper," No. 5; Russian "Orange Paper," No. 3.]

Further confirmation that the German Foreign Office did have advance
knowledge of at least the substance of the ultimatum is shown by the
fact that on the same day the ultimatum was issued the Chancellor of the
German Empire instructed the German Ambassadors in Paris, London, and
St. Petersburg to advise the English, French, and Russian Governments
that

"the acts as well as _the demands_ of the Austro-Hungarian
Government cannot but be looked upon as justified."

[German "White Paper," Annex 1B.]

How could Germany thus indorse the "demands" if it did not know the
substance of the ultimatum?

The hour when these instructions were sent is not given, so that it does
not follow that these significant instructions were necessarily prior to
the service of the ultimatum at Belgrade at 6 P.M. Nevertheless, as the
ultimatum did not reach the other capitals of Europe until the following
day, as the diplomatic correspondence clearly shows, it seems improbable
that the German Foreign Office would have issued this very carefully
prepared and formal warning to the other powers on July the 23d unless
it had not only knowledge of Austria's intention to serve the ultimatum
but also at least of the substance thereof.

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