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Various - The New York Times Current History of the European War, Vol 1, Issue 4, January 23, 1915

V >> Various >> The New York Times Current History of the European War, Vol 1, Issue 4, January 23, 1915



[Transcriber: The original document contained a number of errors.
Obvious spelling mistakes have been corrected and a notation
included for each. There were three places with missing text that
have also been annotated. In addition, there were also a number of
inconsistencies in spelling (ex. Perceval Gibbon vs. Percival
Gibbon; Rennekampf vs. Rennenkampf) which have not been changed or
noted given the desire not to introduce unintentional errors.]


[Illustration: FIELD MARSHAL SIR JOHN FRENCH
Commanding the British Forces in France and Belgium
(_From Painting by John St. Helier Lander._)]

[Illustration: GEN. SIR HORACE SMITH-DORRIEN
One of the British Corps Commanders
(_From Painting by John St Helier Lander._)]




THE NEW YORK TIMES

CURRENT HISTORY OF THE EUROPEAN WAR

JANUARY 23, 1915.




Sir John French's Own Story

The Famous Dispatches of the British Commander in Chief to Lord
Kitchener, Secretary of State for War.




I.

*First Report from the Front*


7th September, 1914.

My lord: I have the honor to report the proceedings of the field force
under my command up to the time of rendering this dispatch.

1. The transport of the troops from England both by sea and by rail was
effected in the best order and without a check. Each unit arrived at its
destination in this country well within the scheduled time.

The concentration was practically complete on the evening of Friday, the
21st ultimo, and I was able to make dispositions to move the force
during Saturday, the 22d, to positions I considered most favorable from
which to commence operations which the French Commander in Chief, Gen.
Joffre, requested me to undertake in pursuance of his plans in
prosecution of the campaign.

The line taken up extended along the line of the canal from Conde on the
west, through Mons and Binche on the east. This line was taken up as
follows:

From Conde to Mons inclusive was assigned to the Second Corps, and to
the right of the Second Corps from Mons the First Corps was posted. The
Fifth Cavalry Brigade was placed at Binche.

In the absence of my Third Army Corps I desired to keep the cavalry
division as much as possible as a reserve to act on my outer flank, or
move in support of any threatened part of the line. The forward
reconnoissance was intrusted to Brig. Gen. Sir Philip Chetwode with the
Fifth Cavalry Brigade, but I directed Gen. Allenby to send forward a few
squadrons to assist in this work.

During the 22d and 23d these advanced squadrons did some excellent work,
some of them penetrating as far as Soignies, and several encounters took
place in which our troops showed to great advantage.

2. At 6 A.M., on Aug. 23, I assembled the commanders of the First and
Second Corps and cavalry division at a point close to the position and
explained the general situation of the Allies, and what I understood to
be Gen. Joffre's plan. I discussed with them at some length the
immediate situation in front of us.

From information I received from French Headquarters I understood that
little more than one, or at most two, of the enemy's army corps, with
perhaps one cavalry division, were in front of my position; and I was
aware of no attempted outflanking movement by the enemy. I was confirmed
in this opinion by the fact that my patrols encountered no undue
opposition in their reconnoitring operations. The observations of my
aeroplanes seemed also to bear out this estimate.

About 3 P.M. on Sunday, the 23d, reports began coming in to the effect
that the enemy was commencing an attack on the Mons line, apparently in
some strength, but that the right of the position from Mons and Bray was
being particularly threatened.

The commander of the First Corps had pushed his flank back to some high
ground south of Bray, and the Fifth Cavalry Brigade evacuated Binche,
moving slightly south; the enemy thereupon occupied Binche.

The right of the Third Division, under Gen. Hamilton, was at Mons, which
formed a somewhat dangerous salient; and I directed the commander of the
Second Corps to be careful not to keep the troops on this salient too
long, but, if threatened seriously, to draw back the centre behind Mons.
This was done before dark. In the meantime, about 5 P.M., I received a
most unexpected message from Gen. Joffre by telegraph, telling me that
at least three German corps, viz., a reserve corps, the Fourth Corps and
the Ninth Corps, were moving on my position in front, and that the
Second Corps was engaged in a turning movement from the direction of
Tournay. He also informed me that the two reserve French divisions and
the Fifth French Army on my right were retiring, the Germans having on
the previous day gained possession of the passages of the Sambre
between Charleroi and Namur.

3. In view of the possibility of my being driven from the Mons position,
I had previously [Transcriber: original 'previouly'] ordered a position
in rear to be reconnoitred. This position rested on the fortress of
Maubeuge on the right and extended west to Jenlain, southeast of
Valenciennes, on the left. The position was reported difficult to hold,
because standing crops and buildings made the siting of trenches very
difficult and limited the field of fire in many important localities. It
nevertheless afforded a few good artillery positions.

When the news of the retirement of the French and the heavy German
threatening on my front reached me, I endeavored to confirm it by
aeroplane [Transcriber: original 'areoplane'] reconnoissance; and as a
result of this I determined to effect a retirement to the Maubeuge
position at daybreak on the 24th.

A certain amount of fighting continued along the whole line throughout
the night and at daybreak on the 24th the Second Division from the
neighborhood of Harmignies made a powerful demonstration as if to retake
Binche. This was supported by the artillery of both the First and Second
Divisions, while the First Division took up a supporting position in the
neighborhood of Peissant. Under cover of this demonstration the Second
Corps retired on the line Dour-Quarouble-Frameries. The Third Division
on the right of the corps suffered considerable loss in this operation
from the enemy, who had retaken Mons.

The Second Corps halted on this line, where they partially intrenched
themselves, enabling Sir Douglas Haig with the First Corps gradually to
withdraw to the new position; and he effected this without much further
loss, reaching the line Bavai-Maubeuge about 7 P.M. Toward midday the
enemy appeared to be directing his principal effort against our left.

I had previously ordered Gen. Allenby with the cavalry to act vigorously
in advance of my left front and endeavor to take the pressure off.

About 7:30 A.M. Gen. Allenby received a message from Sir Charles
Fergusson, commanding the Fifth Division, saying that he was very hard
pressed and in urgent need of support. On receipt of this message Gen.
Allenby drew in the cavalry and endeavored to bring direct support to
the Fifth Division.

During the course of this operation Gen. De Lisle, of the Second Cavalry
Brigade, thought he saw a good opportunity to paralyze the further
advance of the enemy's infantry by making a mounted attack on his flank.
He formed up and advanced for this purpose, but was held up by wire
about 500 yards from his objective, and the Ninth Lancers and the
Eighteenth Hussars suffered severely in the retirement of the brigade.

The Nineteenth Infantry Brigade, which had been guarding the line of
communications, was brought up by rail to Valenciennes on the 22d and
23d. On the morning of the 24th they were moved out to a position south
of Quarouble to support the left flank of the Second Corps.

With the assistance of the cavalry Sir Horace Smith-Dorrien was enabled
to effect his retreat to a new position; although, having two corps of
the enemy on his front and one threatening his flank, he suffered great
losses in doing so.

At nightfall the position was occupied by the Second Corps to the west
of Bavai, the First Corps to the right. The right was protected by the
fortress of Maubeuge, the left by the Nineteenth Brigade in position
between Jenlain and Bry, and the cavalry on the outer flank.

4. The French were still retiring, and I had no support except such as
was afforded by the Fortress of Maubeuge; and the determined attempts of
the enemy to get round my left flank assured me that it was his
intention to hem me against that place and surround me. I felt that not
a moment must be lost in retiring to another position.

I had every reason to believe that the enemy's forces were somewhat
exhausted and I knew that they had suffered heavy losses. I hoped,
therefore, that his pursuit would not be too vigorous to prevent me
effecting my object.

The operation, however, was full of danger and difficulty, not only
owing to the very superior force in my front, but also to the exhaustion
of the troops.

The retirement was recommenced in the early morning of the 25th to a
position in the neighborhood of Le Cateau, and rearguards were ordered
to be clear of the Maubeuge-Bavai-Eth Road by 5:30 A.M.

Two cavalry brigades, with the divisional cavalry of the Second Corps,
covered the movement of the Second Corps. The remainder of the cavalry
division, with the Nineteenth Brigade, the whole under the command of
Gen. Allenby, covered the west flank.

The Fourth Division commenced its detrainment at Le Cateau on Sunday,
the 23d, and by the morning of the 25th eleven battalions and a brigade
of artillery with divisional staff were available for service.

I ordered Gen. Snow to move out to take up a position with his right
south of Solesmes, his left resting on the Cambrai-Le Cateau Road south
of La Chaprie. In this position the division rendered great help to the
effective retirement of the Second and First Corps to the new position.

Although the troops had been ordered to occupy the Cambrai-Le
Cateau-Landrecies position, and the ground had, during the 25th, been
partially prepared and intrenched, I had grave doubts--owing to the
information I had received as to the accumulating strength of the enemy
against me--as to the wisdom of standing there to fight.

Having regard to the continued retirement of the French on my right, my
exposed left flank, the tendency of the enemy's western corps (II.) to
envelop me, and, more than all, the exhausted condition of the troops, I
determined to make a great effort to continue the retreat till I could
put some substantial obstacle, such as the Somme or the Oise, between my
troops and the enemy, and afford the former some opportunity of rest and
reorganization. Orders were, therefore, sent to the corps commanders to
continue their retreat as soon as they possibly could toward the general
line Vermand-St. Quentin-Ribemont.

The cavalry, under Gen. Allenby, were ordered to cover the retirement.

Throughout the 25th and far into the evening, the First Corps continued
its march on Landrecies, following the road along the eastern border of
the Foret de Mormal, and arrived at Landrecies about 10 o'clock. I had
intended that the corps should come further west so as to fill up the
gap between Le Cateau and Landrecies, but the men were exhausted and
could not get further in without rest.

The enemy, however, would not allow them this rest, and about 9:30 P.M.
a report was received that the Fourth Guards Brigade in Landrecies was
heavily attacked by troops of the Ninth German Army Corps, who were
coming through the forest on the north of the town. This brigade fought
most gallantly, and caused the enemy to suffer tremendous loss in
issuing from the forest into the narrow streets of the town. This loss
has been estimated from reliable sources at from 700 to 1,000. At the
same time information reached me from Sir Douglas Haig that his First
Division was also heavily engaged south and east of Maroilles. I sent
urgent messages to the commander of the two French reserve divisions on
my right to come up to the assistance of the First Corps, which they
eventually did. Partly owing to this assistance, but mainly to the
skillful manner in which Sir Douglas Haig extricated his corps from an
exceptionally difficult position in the darkness of the night, they were
able at dawn to resume their march south toward Wassigny on Guise.

By about 6 P.M. the Second Corps had got into position with their right
on Le Cateau, their left in the neighborhood of Caudry, and the line of
defense was continued thence by the Fourth Division toward Seranvillers,
the left being thrown back.

During the fighting on the 24th and 25th the cavalry became a good deal
scattered, but by the early morning of the 26th Gen, Allenby had
succeeded in concentrating two brigades to the south of Cambrai.

The Fourth Division was placed under the orders of the general officer
commanding the Second Army Corps.

On the 24th the French cavalry corps, consisting of three divisions
under Gen. Sordet, had been in billets north of Avesnes. On my way back
from Bavai, which was my "Poste de Commandement" during the fighting of
the 23d and 24th, I visited Gen. Sordet, and earnestly requested his
co-operation and support. He promised to obtain sanction from his army
commander to act on my left flank, but said that his horses were too
tired to move before the next day. Although he rendered me valuable
assistance later on in the course of the retirement, he was unable for
the reasons given to afford me any support on the most critical day of
all, viz., the 26th.

At daybreak it became apparent that the enemy was throwing the bulk of
his strength against the left of the position occupied by the Second
Corps and the Fourth Division.

At this time the guns of four German army corps were in position against
them, and Sir Horace Smith-Dorrien reported to me that he judged it
impossible to continue his retirement at daybreak (as ordered) in face
of such an attack.

I sent him orders to use his utmost endeavors to break off the action
and retire at the earliest possible moment, as it was impossible for me
to send him any support, the First Corps being at the moment incapable
of movement.

The French cavalry corps, under Gen. Sordet, was coming up on our left
rear early in the morning, and I sent an urgent message to him to do his
utmost to come up and support the retirement of my left flank; but owing
to the fatigue of his horses he found himself unable to intervene in any
way.

There had been no time to intrench the position properly, but the troops
showed a magnificent front to the terrible fire which confronted them.

The artillery, although outmatched by at least four to one, made a
splendid fight, and inflicted heavy losses on their opponents.

[Illustration: Map 1.--Showing the early stages of the retreat from
Mons, Aug. 22 to Sept. 1.]

At length it became apparent that, if complete annihilation was to be
avoided, a retirement must be attempted; and the order was given to
commence it about 3:30 P.M. The movement was covered with the most
devoted intrepidity and determination by the artillery, which had itself
suffered heavily, and the fine work done by the cavalry in the further
retreat from the position assisted materially in the final completion of
this most difficult and dangerous operation.

Fortunately the enemy had himself suffered too heavily to engage in an
energetic pursuit.

I cannot close the brief account of this glorious stand of the British
troops without putting on record my deep appreciation of the valuable
services rendered by Gen. Sir Horace Smith-Dorrien.

I say without hesitation that the saving of the left wing of the army
under my command on the morning of the 26th August could never have been
accomplished unless a commander of rare and unusual coolness,
intrepidity, and determination had been present to personally conduct
the operation.

The retreat was continued far into the night of the 26th and through the
27th and 28th, on which date the troops halted on the line
Noyon-Chauny-La Fere, having then thrown off the weight of the enemy's
pursuit.

On the 27th and 28th I was much indebted to Gen. Sordet and the French
cavalry division which he commands for materially assisting my
retirement and successfully driving back some of the enemy on Cambrai.

Gen. D'Amade also, with the Sixty-first and Sixty-second French Reserve
Divisions, moved down from the neighborhood of Arras on the enemy's
right flank and took much pressure off the rear of the British forces.

This closes the period covering the heavy fighting which commenced at
Mons on Sunday afternoon, 23d August, and which really constituted a
four days' battle.

At this point, therefore, I propose to close the present dispatch.

I deeply deplore the very serious losses which the British forces have
suffered in this great battle; but they were inevitable in view of the
fact that the British Army--only two days after a concentration by
rail--was called upon to withstand a vigorous attack of five German army
corps.

It is impossible for me to speak too highly of the skill evinced by the
two general officers commanding army corps; the self-sacrificing and
devoted exertions of their staffs; the direction of the troops by
divisional, brigade, and regimental leaders; the command of the smaller
units by their officers; and the magnificent fighting spirit displayed
by non-commissioned officers and men.

I wish particularly to bring to your Lordship's notice the admirable
work done by the Royal Flying Corps under Sir David Henderson. Their
skill, energy, and perseverance [Transcriber: original 'perseverence']
have been beyond all praise. They have furnished me with the most
complete and accurate information, which has been of incalculable value
in the conduct of the operations. Fired at constantly both by friend and
foe, and not hesitating to fly in every kind of weather, they have
remained undaunted throughout.

Further, by actually fighting in the air, they have succeeded in
destroying five of the enemy's machines.

I wish to acknowledge with deep gratitude the incalculable assistance I
received from the General and Personal Staffs at Headquarters during
this trying period.

Lieut. Gen. Sir Archibald Murray, Chief of the General Staff; Major Gen.
Wilson, Sub-Chief of the General Staff; and all under them have worked
day and night unceasingly with the utmost skill, self-sacrifice, and
devotion; and the same acknowledgment is due by me to Brig. Gen. Hon. W.
Lambton, my Military Secretary, and the personal Staff.

In such operations as I have described the work of the Quartermaster
General is of an extremely onerous nature. Major Gen. Sir William
Robertson has met what appeared to be almost insuperable difficulties
with his characteristic energy, skill, and determination; and it is
largely owing to his exertions that the hardships and sufferings of the
troops--inseparable from such operations--were not much greater.

[Illustration: Map. 2.--The retreat continued. From Compiegne, Sept. 1,
to the new position south of Meaux, Sept. 3 and 4.]

[Illustration: Map 3.--Commencement of the battle of the Marne, Sept. 6
(Sunday), morning.
Concentration of the Germans on a central point, and the position of the
British force when it resumed the offensive.]

Major Gen. Sir Nevil Macready, the Adjutant General, has also been
confronted with most onerous and difficult tasks in connection with
disciplinary arrangements and the preparation of casualty lists. He has
been indefatigable in his exertions to meet the difficult situations
which arose.

I have not yet been able to complete the list of officers whose names I
desire to bring to your Lordship's notice for services rendered during
the period under review; and, as I understand it is of importance that
this dispatch should no longer be delayed, I propose to forward this
list, separately, as soon as I can. I have the honor to be,

Your Lordship's most obedient Servant,

(Signed) J.D.P. FRENCH,
Field Marshal,
Commander in Chief, British Forces in the Field.




II.

*The Battle of the Marne.*


17th September, 1914.

My lord: In continuation of my dispatch of Sept. 7, I have the honor to
report the further progress of the operations of the forces under my
command from Aug. 28.

On that evening the retirement of the force was followed closely by two
of the enemy's cavalry columns, moving southeast from St. Quentin.

The retreat in this part of the field was being covered by the Third and
Fifth Cavalry Brigades. South of the Somme Gen. Gough, with the Third
Cavalry Brigade, threw back the Uhlans of the Guard with considerable
loss.

Gen. Chetwode, with the Fifth Cavalry Brigade, encountered the eastern
column near Cerizy, moving south. The brigade attacked and routed the
column, the leading German regiment suffering very severe casualties
and being almost broken up.

The Seventh French Army Corps was now in course of being railed up from
the south to the east of Amiens. On the 29th it nearly completed its
detrainment, and the French Sixth Army got into position on my left, its
right resting on Roye.

The Fifth French Army was behind the line of the Oise, between La Fere
and Guise.

The pursuit of the enemy was very vigorous; some five or six German
corps were on the Somme, facing the Fifth Army on the Oise. At least two
corps were advancing toward my front, and were crossing the Somme east
and west of Ham. Three or four more German corps were [Transcriber:
original 'wree'] opposing the Sixth French Army on my left.

This was the situation at 1 o'clock on the 29th, when I received a visit
from Gen. Joffre at my headquarters.

I strongly represented my position to the French Commander in Chief, who
was most kind, cordial, and sympathetic, as he has always been. He told
me that he had directed the Fifth French Army on the Oise to move
forward and attack the Germans on the Somme, with a view to checking
pursuit. He also told me of the formation of the Sixth French Army on my
left flank, composed of the Seventh Army Corps, four reserve divisions,
and Sordet's corps of cavalry.

I finally arranged with Gen. Joffre to effect a further short retirement
toward the line Compiegne-Soissons, promising him, however, to do my
utmost to keep always within a day's march of him.

In pursuance of this arrangement the British forces retired to a
position a few miles north of the line Compiegne-Soissons on the 29th.

The right flank of the German Army was now reaching a point which
appeared seriously to endanger my line of communications with Havre. I
had already evacuated Amiens, into which place a German reserve division
was reported to have moved.

[Illustration: Map 4.--Sept. 6 (Sunday), evening. First advance toward
the line of the Grand Morin.]

Orders were given to change the base to St. Nazaire, and establish an
advance base at Le Mans. This operation was well carried out by the
Inspector General of Communications.

In spite of a severe defeat inflicted upon the Guard Tenth and Guard
Reserve Corps of the German Army by the First and Third French Corps on
the right of the Fifth Army, it was not part of Gen. Joffre's plan to
pursue this advantage; and a general retirement to the line of the Marne
was ordered, to which the French forces in the more eastern theatre were
directed to conform.

A new Army (the Ninth) had been formed from three corps in the south by
Gen. Joffre, and moved into the space between the right of the Fifth and
left of the Fourth Armies.

While closely adhering to his strategic conception to draw the enemy on
at all points until a favorable situation was created from which to
assume the offensive, Gen. Joffre found it necessary to modify from day
to day the methods by which he sought to attain this object, owing to
the development of the enemy's plans and changes in the general
situation.

In conformity with the movements of the French forces, my retirement
continued practically from day to day. Although we were not severely
pressed by the enemy, rearguard actions took place continually.

On the 1st September, when retiring from the thickly wooded country to
the south of Compiegne, the First Cavalry Brigade was overtaken by some
German cavalry. They momentarily lost a horse artillery battery, and
several officers and men were killed and wounded. With the help,
however, of some detachments from the Third Corps operating on their
left, they not only recovered their own guns, but succeeded in capturing
twelve of the enemy's.

Similarly, to the eastward, the First Corps, retiring south, also got
into some very difficult forest country, and a somewhat severe rearguard
action ensued at Villers-Cotterets, in which the Fourth Guards Brigade
suffered considerably.

On Sept. 3 the British forces were in position south of the Marne
between Lagny and Signy-Signets. Up to this time I had been requested by
Gen. Joffre to defend the passages of the river as long as possible, and
to blow up the bridges in my front. After I had made the necessary
dispositions, and the destruction of the bridges had been effected, I
was asked by the French Commander in Chief to continue my retirement to
a point some twelve miles in rear of the position I then occupied, with
a view to taking up a second position behind the Seine. This retirement
was duly carried out. In the meantime the enemy had thrown bridges and
crossed the Marne in considerable force, and was threatening the Allies
all along the line of the British forces and the Fifth and Ninth French
Armies. Consequently several small outpost actions took place.

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