Various - The New York Times Current History of the European War, Vol 1, Issue 4, January 23, 1915

V >> Various >> The New York Times Current History of the European War, Vol 1, Issue 4, January 23, 1915

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About 4 o'clock the weakening of the counter-attacks by the enemy and
other indications tended to show that his resistance was decreasing, and
a general advance was ordered by the army corps commander. Although
meeting with considerable opposition and coming under very heavy
artillery and rifle fire, the position of the corps at the end of the
day's operations extended from the Chemin-des-Dames on the right,
through Chivy, to Le Cour de Soupir, with the First Cavalry Brigade
extending to the Chavonne-Soissons road.

[Illustration: Map 9.--Sept. 13 and 14. Passage of the Aisne, when
bridges were constructed under great difficulties.]

On the right the corps was in close touch with the French Moroccan
troops of the Eighteenth Corps, which were intrenched in echelon to its
right rear. During the night they intrenched this position.

Throughout the battle of the Aisne this advanced and commanding position
was maintained, and I cannot speak too highly of the valuable services
rendered by Sir Douglas Haig and the army corps under his command. Day
after day and night after night the enemy's infantry has been hurled
against him in violent counter-attack, which has never on any one
occasion succeeded, while the trenches all over his position have been
under continuous heavy artillery fire.

The operations of the First Corps on this day resulted in the capture of
several hundred prisoners, some field pieces and machine guns.

The casualties were very severe, one brigade alone losing three of its
four Colonels.

The Third Division commenced a further advance, and had nearly reached
the plateau of Aizy when they were driven back by a powerful
counter-attack supported by heavy artillery. The division, however, fell
back in the best order, and finally intrenched itself about a mile north
of Vailly Bridge, effectively covering the passage.

The Fourth and Fifth Divisions were unable to do more than maintain
their ground.

5. On the morning of the 15th, after close examination of the position,
it became clear to me that the enemy was making a determined stand; and
this view was confirmed by reports which reached me from the French
armies fighting on my right and left, which clearly showed that a
strongly intrenched line of defense was being taken up from the north of
Compiegne, eastward and southeastward, along the whole Valley of the
Aisne up to and beyond Rheims.

A few days previously the Fortress of Maubeuge fell, and a considerable
quantity of siege artillery was brought down from that place to
strengthen the enemy's position in front of us.

During the 15th shells fell in our position which have been judged by
experts to be thrown by eight-inch siege guns with a range of 10,000
yards. Throughout the whole course of the battle our troops have
suffered very heavily from this fire, although its effect latterly was
largely mitigated by more efficient and thorough intrenching, the
necessity for which I impressed strongly upon army corps commanders. In
order to assist them in this work all villages within the area of our
occupation were searched for heavy intrenching tools, a large number of
which were collected.

In view of the peculiar formation of the ground on the north side of the
river between Missy and Soissons, and its extraordinary adaptability to
a force on the defensive, the Fifth Division found it impossible to
maintain its position on the southern edge of the Chivres Plateau, as
the enemy in possession of the Village of Vregny to the west was able to
bring a flank fire to bear upon it. The division had, therefore, to
retire to a line the left of which was at the village of Marguerite, and
thence ran by the north edge of Missy back to the river to the east of
that place.

With great skill and tenacity Sir Charles Fergusson maintained this
position throughout the whole battle, although his trenches were
necessarily on lower ground than that occupied by the enemy on the
southern edge of the plateau, which was only 400 yards away.

Gen. Hamilton with the Third Division vigorously attacked to the north,
and regained all the ground he had lost on the 15th, which throughout
the battle has formed a most powerful and effective bridge-head.

6. On the 16th the Sixth Division came up into line.

It had been my intention to direct the First Corps to attack and seize
the enemy's position on the Chemin-des-Dames, supporting it with this
new reinforcement. I hoped, from the position thus gained, to bring
effective fire to bear across the front of the Third Division, which,
by securing the advance of the latter, would also take the pressure off
the Fifth Division and the Third Corps.

But any further advance of the First Corps would have dangerously
exposed my right flank. And, further, I learned from the French
Commander in Chief that he was strongly reinforcing the Sixth French
Army on my left, with the intention of bringing up the allied left to
attack the enemy's flank, and thus compel his retirement. I therefore
sent the Sixth Division to join the Third Corps, with orders to keep it
on the south side of the river, as it might be available in general
reserve.

On the 17th, 18th, and 19th the whole of our line was heavily bombarded,
and the First Corps was constantly and heavily engaged. On the afternoon
of the 17th the right flank of the First Division was seriously
threatened. A counter-attack was made by the Northamptonshire Regiment
in combination with the Queen's, and one battalion of the Divisional
Reserve was moved up in support. The Northamptonshire Regiment, under
cover of mist, crept up to within a hundred yards of the enemy's
trenches and charged with the bayonet, driving them out of the trenches
and up the hill. A very strong force of hostile infantry was then
disclosed on the crest line. This new line was enfiladed by part of the
Queen's and the King's Royal Rifles, which wheeled to their left on the
extreme right of our infantry line, and were supported by a squadron of
cavalry on their outer flank. The enemy's attack was ultimately driven
back with heavy loss.

On the 18th, during the night, the Gloucestershire Regiment advanced
from their position near Chivy, filled in the enemy's trenches, and
captured two Maxim guns.

On the extreme right the Queen's were heavily attacked, but the enemy
was repulsed with great loss. About midnight the attack was renewed on
the First Division, supported by artillery fire, but was again
repulsed.

Shortly after midnight an attack was made on the left of the Second
Division with considerable force, which was also thrown back.

At about 1 P.M. on the 19th the Second Division drove back a heavy
infantry attack strongly supported by artillery fire. At dusk the attack
was renewed and again repulsed.

On the 18th I discussed with the General Officer commanding the Second
Army Corps and his divisional commanders the possibility of driving the
enemy out of Conde, which lay between his two divisions, and seizing the
bridge, which has remained throughout in his possession.

As, however, I found that the bridge was closely commanded from all
points on the south side, and that satisfactory arrangements were made
to prevent any issue from it by the enemy by day or night, I decided
that it was not necessary to incur the losses which an attack would
entail, as, in view of the position of the Second and Third Corps, the
enemy could make no use of Conde, and would be automatically forced out
of it by any advance which might become possible for us.

7. On this day information reached me from Gen. Joffre that he had found
it necessary to make a new plan and to attack and envelop the German
right flank.

It was now evident to me that the battle in which we had been engaged
since the 12th inst. must last some days longer, until the effect of
this new flank movement could be felt and a way opened to drive the
enemy from his positions.

It thus became essential to establish some system of regular relief in
the trenches, and I have used the infantry of the Sixth Division for
this purpose with good results. The relieved brigades were brought back
alternately south of the river and, with the artillery of the Sixth
Division, formed a general reserve on which I could rely in case of
necessity.

The cavalry has rendered most efficient and ready help in the trenches,
and have done all they possibly could to lighten the arduous and trying
task which has of necessity fallen to the lot of the infantry.

On the evening of the 19th and throughout the 20th the enemy again
commenced to show considerable activity. On the former night a severe
counter-attack on the Third Division was repulsed with considerable
loss, and from early on Sunday morning various hostile attempts were
made on the trenches of the First Division. During the day the enemy
suffered another severe repulse in front of the Second Division, losing
heavily in the attempt. In the course of the afternoon the enemy made
desperate attempts against the trenches all along the front of the First
Corps, but with similar results.

After dark the enemy again attacked the Second Division, only to be
again driven back.

Our losses on these two days were considerable, but the number, as
obtained, of the enemy's killed and wounded vastly exceeded them.

As the troops of the First Army Corps were much exhausted by this
continual fighting, I reinforced Sir Douglas Haig with a brigade from
the reserve, and called upon the First Cavalry Division to assist them.

On the night of the 21st another violent counter-attack was repulsed by
the Third Division, the enemy losing heavily.

On the 23d the four 6-inch howitzer batteries, which I had asked to be
sent from home, arrived. Two batteries were handed over to the Second
Corps and two to the First Corps. They were brought into action on the
24th with very good results.

Our experiences in this campaign seem to point to the employment of more
heavy guns of a larger calibre in great battles which last for several
days, during which time powerful intrenching work on both sides can be
carried out. These batteries were used with considerable effect on the
24th and the following days.

8. On the 23d the action of Gen. de Castelnau's army on the allied left
developed considerably, and apparently withdrew considerable forces of
the enemy away from the centre and east. I am not aware whether it was
due to this cause or not, but until the 26th it appeared as though the
enemy's opposition in our front was weakening. On that day, however, a
very marked renewal of activity commenced. A constant and vigorous
artillery bombardment was maintained all day, and the Germans in front
of the First Division were observed to be "sapping" up to our lines and
trying to establish new trenches. Renewed counter-attacks were delivered
and beaten off during the course of the day, and in the afternoon a
well-timed attack by the First Division stopped the enemy's intrenching
work.

During the night of the 27th-28th the enemy again made the most
determined attempts to capture the trenches of the First Division, but
without the slightest success.

Similar attacks were reported during these three days all along the line
of the allied front, and it is certain that the enemy then made one last
great effort to establish ascendency. He was, however, unsuccessful
everywhere, and is reported to have suffered heavy losses. The same
futile attempts were made all along our front up to the evening of the
28th, when they died away, and have not since been renewed.

On former occasions I have brought to your Lordship's notice the
valuable services performed during this campaign by the Royal Artillery.

Throughout the battle of the Aisne they have displayed the same skill,
endurance, and tenacity, and I deeply appreciate the work they have
done.

Sir David Henderson and the Royal Flying Corps under his command have
again proved their incalculable value. Great strides have been made in
the development of the use of aircraft in the tactical sphere by
establishing effective communication between aircraft and units in
action.

It is difficult to describe adequately and accurately the great strain
to which officers and men were subjected almost every hour of the day
and night throughout this battle.

[Illustration: Map 10.--Sept. 15 to 28. This map shows the intrenched
positions of the Germans, many of which the Allies took with great loss
to the Germans.]

I have described above the severe character of the artillery fire which
was directed from morning till night not only upon the trenches, but
over the whole surface of the ground occupied by our forces. It was not
until a few days before the position was evacuated that the heavy guns
were removed and the fire slackened. Attack and counter-attack occurred
at all hours of the night and day throughout the whole position,
demanding extreme vigilance, and permitting only a minimum of rest.

The fact that between Sept. 12 to the date of this dispatch the total
numbers of killed, wounded, and missing reached the figures amounting to
561 officers, 12,980 men, proves the severity of the struggle.

The tax on the endurance of the troops was further increased by the
heavy rain and cold which prevailed for some ten or twelve days of this
trying time.

The battle of the Aisne has once more demonstrated the splendid spirit,
gallantry, and devotion which animates the officers and men of his
Majesty's forces.

With reference to the last paragraph of my dispatch of Sept. 7, I append
the names of officers, non-commissioned officers, and men brought
forward for special mention by army corps commanders and heads of
departments for services rendered from the commencement of the campaign
up to the present date.

I entirely agree with these recommendations and beg to submit them for
your Lordship's consideration.

I further wish to bring forward the names of the following officers who
have rendered valuable service: Gen. Sir Horace Smith-Dorrien and Lieut.
Gen. Sir Douglas Haig (commanding First and Second Corps, respectively)
I have already mentioned in the present and former dispatches for
particularly marked and distinguished service in critical situations.

Since the commencement of the campaign they have carried out all my
orders [Transcriber: original 'orders.'] and instructions with the
utmost ability.

Lieut. Gen. W.P. Pulteney took over the command of the Third Corps just
before the commencement of the battle of the Marne. Throughout the
subsequent operations he showed himself to be a most capable commander
in the field, and has rendered very valuable services.

Major Gen. E.H.H. Allenby and Major Gen. H. De La P. Gough have proved
themselves to be cavalry leaders of a high order, and I am deeply
indebted to them. The undoubted moral superiority which our cavalry has
obtained over that of the enemy has been due to the skill with which
they have turned to the best account the qualities inherent in the
splendid troops they command.

In my dispatch of the 7th September I mentioned the name of Brig. Gen.
Sir David Henderson and his valuable work in command of the Royal Flying
Corps; and I have once more to express my deep appreciation of the help
he has since rendered me.

Lieut. Gen. Sir Archibald Murray has continued to render me invaluable
help as Chief of the Staff; and in his arduous and responsible duties he
has been ably assisted by Major Gen. Henry Wilson, Sub-Chief.

Lieut. Gen. Sir Nevil Macready and Lieut. Gen. Sir William Robertson
have continued to perform excellent service as Adjutant General and
Quartermaster General, respectively.

The Director of Army Signals, Lieut. Col. J.S. Fowler, has materially
assisted the operations by the skill and energy which he has displayed
in the working of the important department over which he presides.

My Military Secretary, Brig. Gen. the Hon. W. Lambton, has performed his
arduous and difficult duties with much zeal and great efficiency.

I am anxious also to bring to your Lordship's notice the following names
of officers of my personal staff, who throughout these arduous
operations have shown untiring zeal and energy in the performance of
their duties:

_Aides de Camp._

Lieut. Col. Stanley Barry.
Lieut. Col. Lord Brooke.
Major Fitzgerald Watt.

_Extra Aide de Camp._

Capt. the Hon. F.E. Guest.

_Private Secretary._

Lieut. Col. Brindsley Fitzgerald.

Major his Royal Highness Prince Arthur of Connaught, K.G., joined my
staff as Aide de Camp on the 14th September.

His Royal Highness's intimate knowledge of languages enabled me to
employ him with great advantage on confidential missions of some
importance, and his services have proved of considerable value.

I cannot close this dispatch without informing your Lordship of the
valuable services rendered by the Chief of the French Military Mission
at my headquarters, Col. Victor Huguet of the French Artillery. He has
displayed tact and judgment of a high order in many difficult
situations, and has rendered conspicuous service to the allied cause. I
have the honor to be, your Lordship's most obedient servant,

J.D.P. French, Field Marshal,
_Commanding in Chief the British Army in the Field._

IV.

*The Battle in Flanders.*

[Official Abstract of Report for The Associated Press.]

LONDON, Nov. 29.--A report from Field Marshal Sir John French covering
the period of the battle in Flanders and the days immediately preceding
it, issued today by the Official Press Bureau, shows that this battle
was brought about, first, by the Allies' attempts to outflank the
Germans, who countered, and then by the Allies' plans to move to the
northeast to Ghent and Bruges, which also failed. After this the German
offensive began, with the French coast ports as the objective, but this
movement, like those of the Allies, met with failure.

The Field Marshal, doubtless in response to the demands of the British
public, tells what the various units of the expeditionary force have
been doing--those that failed and were cut off and those who against
superior numbers held the trenches for a month. He gives it as his
opinion that the German losses have been thrice as great as those of the
Allies, and speaks optimistically of the future.

The report covers in a general way the activities of the British troops
from Oct. 11 to Nov. 20.

Summing up the situation in concluding his report, the Field Marshal
says:

"As I close this dispatch, signs are in evidence that we are possibly in
the last stages of the battle from Ypres to Armentieres. For several
days past the artillery fire of the enemy has slackened considerably,
and his infantry attacks have practically ceased."

Discussing the general military situation of the Allies, as it appears
to him at the time of writing, Sir John says:

"It does not seem to be clearly understood that the operations in which
we have been engaged embrace nearly all of the central part of the
Continent of Europe, from the east to the west. The combined French,
Belgian, and British Armies in the west and the Russian Army in the east
are opposed to the united forces of Germany and Austria, acting as
combined armies between us.

"Our enemies elected at the commencement of the war to throw the weight
of their forces against our armies in the west and to detach only a
comparatively weak force, composed of very few of the first line troops
and several corps of second and third line troops, to stem the Russian
advance until the western forces could be defeated and overwhelmed.
Their strength enabled them from the outset to throw greatly superior
forces against us in the west. This precludes the possibility of our
taking vigorous offensive action except when miscalculations and
mistakes are made by their commanders, opening up special opportunities
for successful attacks and pursuit.

"The battle of the Marne was an example of this, as was also our advance
from St. Omer and Hazebrouck to the line of the River Lys at the
commencement of this battle. The role which our armies in the west have
consequently been called upon to fulfill has been to occupy strong
defensive positions, holding ground gained and inviting the enemy's
attack, and to throw back these attacks, causing the enemy heavy losses
in his retreat and following him up with powerful and successful
counter-attacks to complete his discomfiture.

"The value and significance of operations of this nature since the
commencement of hostilities by the Allies' forces in the west lie in the
fact that at the moment when the eastern provinces of Germany are in
imminent danger of being overrun by the numerous and powerful armies of
Russia, nearly the whole active army of Germany is tied down to a line
of trenches extending from Verdun, on the Alsatian frontier, to the sea
at Nieuport, east of Dunkirk, a distance of 260 miles, where they are
held, with much reduced numbers and impaired morale, by the successful
action of our troops in the west.

"I cannot speak too highly of the services rendered by the Royal
Artillery throughout the battle. In spite of the fact that the enemy
brought up in support of his attacks guns of great range and shell
power, our men have succeeded throughout in preventing the enemy from
establishing anything in the nature of superiority in artillery. The
skill, courage, and energy displayed by the commanders of the Royal
Artillery have been very marked. The Royal Engineers have been
indefatigable in their efforts to assist the infantry in field,
fortification, and trench work.

"I deeply regret the heavy casualties which we have suffered, but the
nature of the fighting has been very desperate, and we have been
assailed by vastly superior numbers. I have every reason to know that
throughout the course of the battle we have placed at least three times
as many of the enemy hors de combat in dead, wounded and prisoners.

"Throughout these operations Gen. Foch has strained his resources to the
utmost to afford me all the support he could. An expression of my warm
gratitude is also due to Gen. Dubail, commanding the Eighth French Army
Corps on my left, and to Gen. de Maud'huy, commanding the Tenth Army
Corps on my right."

Discussing the details of the engagement from Ypres to Armentieres,
Field Marshal Sir John French explains that he was impressed early in
October with the necessity of giving the greatest possible support to
the northern flank of the Allies in the effort to outflank the Germans
and compel them to evacuate their positions. He says that the situation
on the Aisne warranted the withdrawal of British troops from positions
they held there, as the enemy had been weakened by continual attacks and
the fortifications of the Allies much improved.

The Field Marshal made known his view to Gen. Joffre, who agreed with
it. The French General Staff arranged for the withdrawal of the British,
which began on Oct. 3 and was completed on Oct. 19, when the First Army
Corps, under Gen. Sir Douglas Haig detrained at St. Omer.

The general plan, as arranged by Field Marshal French and Gen. Foch,
commanding the French troops to the north of Noyon, was that the English
should pivot on the French at Bethune, attacking the Germans on their
flank and forcing their way north. In the event that the British forced
the Germans out of their positions, making possible a forward movement
of the Allies, the French and British were to march east, with Lille as
the dividing line between the two armies, the English right being
directed on Lille.

The battle which forms the chief feature of Gen. French's report really
began on Oct. 11, when Major Gen. Gough of the Second British Cavalry
Brigade, first came in contact with German cavalry in the woods along
the Bethune-Aire Canal. The English cavalry moved toward Hazebrouck,
clearing the way for two army corps, which advanced rapidly in a
northeasterly direction. For several days the progress of the British
was only slightly interrupted, except at La Bassee, a high position,
which Field Marshal French mentions as having stubbornly resisted.

Field Marshal French says the Second Corps, under Gen. Smith-Dorrien,
was opposed by overpowering forces of Germans, but nevertheless advanced
until Oct. 18, when the German opposition compelled a reinforcement. Six
days later the Lahore Division of the Indian army was sent to support
the Second Corps.

On Oct. 16 Sir Henry Rawlinson, who had covered the retreat of the
Belgian army from Antwerp with two divisions of English cavalry and two
divisions of French infantry, was stationed on the line east of Ypres
under orders to operate over a wide front and to keep possession of all
the ground held by the Allies until the First Army Corps could reach
Ypres.

Gen. Rawlinson was opposed by superior forces and was unable to prevent
the Germans from getting large reinforcements. With four army corps
holding a much wider front than their size justified, Field Marshal
French says he faced a stubborn situation. The enemy was massed from the
Lys, and there was imperative need for a strengthened line.

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