Various - The New York Times Current History of the European War, Vol 1, Issue 4, January 23, 1915

V >> Various >> The New York Times Current History of the European War, Vol 1, Issue 4, January 23, 1915

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Up to Sept, 21 the air mileage made by our airmen since the beginning
of the war amounted to 87,000 miles, an average of 2,000 miles per day,
the total equaling nearly four times the circuit of the world. The total
time spent in the air was 1,400 hours.

There are many points connected with the fighting methods of either side
that may be of interest. The following description was given by a
battalion commander who has been at the front since the commencement of
hostilities and has fought both in the open and behind intrenchments. It
must, however, be borne in mind that it only represents the experiences
of a particular unit. It deals with the tactics of the enemy's infantry:

The important points to watch are the heads of valleys and ravines,
woods--especially those on the sides of hollow ground--and all dead
ground to the front and flanks. The German officers are skilled in
leading troops forward under cover, in closed bodies, but once the
latter are deployed and there is no longer direct personal
leadership the men will not face heavy fire. Sometimes the advance
is made in a series of lines, with the men well opened out at five
or six paces interval; at other times it is made in a line, with
the men almost shoulder to shoulder, followed in all cases by
supports in close formation. The latter either waver when the front
line is checked, or crowd on to it, moving forward under the orders
of their officers, and the mass forms a magnificent target.
Prisoners have described the fire of our troops as pinning them to
the ground, and this is certainly borne out by their action.

When the Germans are not heavily intrenched no great losses are
incurred in advancing against them by the methods in which the
British Army has been instructed. For instance, in one attack over
fairly open ground against about an equal force of infantry
sheltered in a sunken road and in ditches we lost only 10 killed
and 60 wounded, while over 400 of the enemy surrendered after about
50 had been killed. Each side had the support of a battery, but the
fight for superiority from infantry fire took place at about 700
yards and lasted only half an hour. When the Germans were wavering
some of them put up the white flag, but others went on firing, and
our men continued to do the same. Eventually a large number of
white flags, improvised from handkerchiefs, pieces of shirt, white
biscuit bags, &c., were exhibited all along the line, and many men
hoisted their helmets on their rifles.

In the fighting behind intrenchments the Germans endeavor to gain
ground by making advances in line at dusk or just before dawn, and
then digging themselves in, in the hope, no doubt, that they may
eventually get so near as to be able, as at manoeuvres, to reach
the hostile trenches in a single rush. They have never succeeded in
doing this against us. If by creeping up in dead ground they do
succeed in gaining ground by night, they are easily driven back by
fire in the morning. A few of the braver men sometimes remain
behind, at ranges of even 300 or 400 yards, and endeavor to inflict
losses by sniping. Sharpshooters, also, are often noticed in trees
or wriggling about until they get good cover. The remedy is to take
the initiative and detail men to deal with the enemy's
sharpshooters.

A few night attacks have been made against us. Before one of them a
party crept up close to the British line and set alight a hayrick,
so that it should form a beacon on which the centre of the
attacking line marched. Generally, however, in the night and early
morning attacks, groups of forty or fifty men have come on, the
groups sometimes widely separated from one another and making every
endeavor to obtain any advantage from cover. Light balls and
searchlights have on some occasions been used. Latterly the attacks
have become more and more half-hearted. Against us the enemy has
never closed with the bayonet. The German trenches I have seen were
deep enough to shelter a man when firing standing, and had a step
down in rear for the supports to sit in.

As regards our own men, there was at first considerable reluctance
to intrench, as has always been the case at the commencement of a
war. Now, however, having bought experience dearly, their defenses
are such that they can defy the German artillery fire.

VI.

*Becomes an Artillery Duel*.

[Made Public Oct. 10.]

Comparative calm on our front has continued through the fine and
considerably warmer weather. The last six days have been slightly misty
with clouds hanging low, so that conditions have not been very favorable
for aerial reconnoissance.

In regard to the latter, it is astonishing how quickly the habit is
acquired, even by those who are not aviators, of thinking of the
weather in terms of its suitability for flying. There has been a bright
moon also, which has militated against night attacks.

On Saturday, Oct. 3, practically nothing happened, except that each side
shelled the other.

Toward evening on Sunday, Oct. 4, there was a similar absence of
activity. Opposite one portion of our line the enemy's bands played
patriotic airs, and the audiences which gathered gave a chance to our
waiting howitzers.

Not only do their regimental bands perform occasionally, but with their
proverbial fondness for music the Germans have in some places
gramophones [Transcriber: original 'gramaphones'] in their trenches.

On Monday, the 5th, there were three separate duels in the air between
French and German aviators, one of which was visible from our trenches.
Two of the struggles were, so far as could be seen, indecisive, but in
the third the French airmen were victorious, and brought down their
opponents, both of whom were killed by machine gun fire. The observer
was so burned as to be unrecognizable.

During the day some men of the Landwehr were taken prisoners by us. They
were in very poor condition and wept copiously when captured. One, on
being asked what he was crying for, explained that though they had been
advised to surrender to the English, they believed that they would be
shot.

On that evening our airmen had an unusual amount of attention paid to
them, both by the German aviators and their artillery of every
description.

One of our infantry patrols discovered 150 dead Germans in a wood, one
and a half miles from our front. We sent a party out to bury them, but
it was fired upon and had to withdraw.

On Tuesday, the 6th, the enemy's guns were active in the afternoon. It
is believed that the bombardment was due to anger because two of our
howitzer shells had detonated right in one of the enemy's trenches,
which was full of men. Three horses were killed by the German fire.

Wednesday, the 7th, was uneventful.

On Thursday, the 8th, the shelling by the enemy of a locality on our
front, which has so far been the scene of their greatest efforts, was
again continuous. Opposite one or two points the Germans have attempted
to gain ground by sapping in some places with the view of secretly
pushing forward machine guns in advance of their trenches, so that they
can suddenly sweep with crossfire the space between our line and theirs,
and so take any advance of ours on the flank.

It is reported that at one point where the French were much annoyed by
the fire of a German machine gun, which was otherwise inaccessible, they
drove a mine gallery, 50 meters (about 164 feet) long, up to and under
the emplacement, and blew up the gun. The man who drove the gallery
belonged to a corps which was recruited in one of the coal-mining
districts of France.

The German machine guns are mounted on low sledges, and are
inconspicuous and evidently easily moved.

The fighting now consists mostly of shelling by the artillery of both
sides and in front a line of fire from the machine guns as an occasional
target offers. Our Maxims have been doing excellent work and have proved
most efficient weapons for the sort of fighting in which we are now
engaged.

At times there are so many outbursts of their fire in different
directions that it is possible for an expert to tell by comparison which
of the guns have their springs adjusted and are well tuned up for the
day. The amount of practice that our officers are now getting in the use
of this weapon is proving most valuable in teaching them how to maintain
it at concert pitch as an instrument and how to derive the best tactical
results from its employment.

Against us the Germans are not now expending so much gun ammunition as
they have been, but they continue to fire at insignificant targets. They
have the habit of suddenly dropping heavy shells without warning in
localities of villages far behind our front line, possibly on the chance
of catching some of our troops in bivouac or billets. They also fire a
few rounds at night.

The artillery has up to now played so great a part in the war that a few
general remarks descriptive of the methods of its employment by the
enemy are justified. Their field artillery armament consists of
15-pounder quick-fire guns for horse and field batteries of divisions
and there are, in addition, with each corps three to six batteries of
4.3-inch field howitzers and about two batteries of 5.9-inch howitzers.
With an army there are some 8.2-inch heavy howitzers.

The accuracy of their fire is apt at first to cause some alarm, more
especially as the guns are usually well concealed and the position and
the direction from which the fire is proceeding are difficult of
detection. But accurate as is their shooting, the German gunners have on
the whole had little luck, and during the past three weeks an
astonishingly small proportion of the number of shells fired by them
have been really effective.

Quite the most striking feature of their handling of the artillery is
the speed with which they concentrate the fire upon any selected point.
They dispense to a great extent with the method of ranging known by us
as bracketing, especially when acting on the defensive, and direct their
fire by means of squared maps and the telephone. Thus, when the target
is found, its position on the map is telephoned to such batteries as it
is desired to employ against that particular square.

In addition to the guns employed to fire on the targets as they are
picked up, others are told off to watch particular roads, and to deal
with any of the enemy using them.

Both for the location of targets and the communication of the effect of
the fire, reliance is placed on observation from aeroplanes and balloons
and on information supplied by special observers and secret agents, who
are sent out ahead or left behind in the enemy's lines to communicate by
telephone or signal. These observers have been found in haystacks,
barns, and other buildings well in advance of the German lines.
Balloons of the so-called sausage pattern remain up in the air for long
periods for the purpose of discovering targets, and until our aviators
made their influence felt by chasing all hostile aeroplanes on sight the
latter were continually hovering over our troops in order to register
their positions and to note where the headquarters, reserves, gun teams,
&c., were located.

If suitable targets are discovered the airman drops a smoke ball
directly over it or lets fall some strips of tinsel, which glitter in
the sun as they slowly descend to the earth. The range to the target is
apparently ascertained by those near the guns by a large telemeter, or
other range finder, which is kept trained on the aeroplane, so that when
the signal is made the distance to the target vertically below is at
once obtained. A few rounds are then fired, and the result is signalled
back by the aviator according to some prearranged code.

VII.

*A Fight in the Clouds.*

[Dated Oct. 13.]

From Friday the 9th of October until Monday the 12th so little occurred
that a narrative of the events can be given in a few words. There has
been the usual sporadic shelling of our trenches which has resulted in
but little harm, so well dug in are our men, and on the night of the
10th the Germans made yet a fresh assault, supported by artillery fire,
against the point which has all along attracted most of their attention.

The attempt was again a costly failure toward which our guns were able
to contribute with great effect.

Details have been received of an exciting encounter in midair. One of
our aviators on a fast scouting monoplane sighted a hostile machine. He
had two rifles, fixed one on either side of his engines, and at once
gave chase, but lost sight of his opponent among the clouds. Soon,
however, another machine hove into view which turned out to be a German
Otto biplane, a type of machine which is not nearly so fast as our
scouts. Our officer once again started a pursuit. He knew that owing to
the position of the propeller of the hostile machine he could not be
fired at when astern of his opponent. At sixty yards range he fired one
rifle without apparent result. Then as his pace was carrying him ahead
of his quarry he turned round, and, again coming to about the same
distance behind, emptied his magazine at the German.

The latter began at once to descend as if either he or his machine were
hit, and shutting off his engine and volplaning to free his hands, the
pursuer recharged his magazine. Unfortunately it jammed, but he managed
to insert four cartridges and to fire them at his descending opponent,
who disappeared into a cloud bank with dramatic suddenness. When the
British officer emerged below the clouds he could see no sign of the
other. He, therefore, climbed to an altitude of some 7,000 feet and came
to the conclusion that the German must have come to earth in the French
lines.

The French airmen, too, have been very successful during the last three
days, having dropped several bombs among the German cavalry and caused
considerable loss and disorder, and having by similar means silenced a
battery of field howitzers.

The German anti-aircraft guns recently have been unusually active. From
their rate of fire they seem to be nearly automatic, but so far they
have not had much effect in reducing the air reconnoissances carried out
by us.

A striking feature of our line--to use the conventional term which so
seldom expresses accurately the position taken up by an army--is that it
consists really of a series of trenches not all placed alongside each
other, but some more advanced than others, and many facing in different
directions. At one place they run east and west along one side of a
valley. At another almost north and south up some subsidiary valley.
Here they line the edge of woods, and there they are on the reverse
slope of a hill, or possibly along a sunken road, and at different
points both the German and the British trenches jut out like
promontories into what might be regarded as the opponents' territory.

Though both sides have moved forward at certain points, and withdrawn at
others, no very important change has been effected in their
dispositions, in spite of the enemy's repeated counter attacks. These
have been directed principally against one portion of the position won
by us, but in spite of the lavish expenditure of life they have not so
far succeeded in driving us back.

The situation of the works in the German front line as a whole has been
a matter of deliberate selection, for they have had the advantage of
previous reconnaissance, being first in the field.

Behind the front they now have several lines prepared for a step-by-step
defense. Another point which might cause astonishment to a visitor to
our intrenchments is the evident indifference displayed to the provision
of an extended field of frontal rifle fire, which is generally accepted
as being one of the great requirements of a defensive position. It is
still desirable, if it can be obtained without the usually accompanying
drawback of exposure to the direct fire of hostile artillery, but
experience has shown that a short field of fire is sufficient to beat
back the infantry assaults of the enemy, and by giving up direct fire at
long or medium ranges and placing our trenches on the reverse slope of a
hill or behind the crest, it is in many places possible to gain shelter
from the frontal fire of the German guns, for the men are well trained
in musketry and under good fire control, and the dead ground beyond the
short range from their position has comparatively small terrors.

Many of the front trenches of the Germans equally lack a distant field
of fire, but if lost they would be rendered untenable by us by the fact
that they would be exposed to a fire from the German guns in the rear
and to cross-rifle fire from neighboring works.

The extent to which cross-fire of all kinds is employed is also
remarkable. Many localities and areas along the Aisne are not swept from
the works directly in front of them, but are rendered untenable by
rifle fire from neighboring features or by that of guns that are out of
sight. So much is this the case that among these hills and valleys it is
a difficult matter for troops to find out whence they are being shot at.

There is a perpetual triangular duel. A's infantry can see nothing to
shoot at, but are under fire from B's guns. The action of B's guns then
brings upon them the attention of some of A's artillery waiting for a
target, the latter being in their turn assailed by other batteries. And
so it goes on. In a wooded country in spite of aeroplanes and balloons
smokeless powder has made the localization and identification of targets
a matter of supreme difficulty.

VIII.

*The Men in the Trenches.*

[Dated Oct. 13.]

On the firing line the men sleep and obtain shelter in dug-outs they
have hollowed or cut under the sides of the trenches. These refuges are
raised slightly above the bottom of the trench, so as to remain dry in
wet weather. The floor of the trench also is sloped for purposes of
draining. Some of the trenches are provided with overhead cover which
gives protection from the weather as well as from shrapnel balls and
splinters of shells. Considerable ingenuity has been exercised by the
men in naming these shelters. Among the favorite designations are the
"Hotel Cecil," the "Ritz Hotel," the "Billet-Doux Hotel," and the "Rue
Dormir."

On the road barricades also are to be found boards bearing this notice:
"This way to the Prussians."

Obstacles of every kind abound, and at night each side can hear the
enemy driving pickets for entanglements, digging _trous-de-loup_, or
working forward by sapping. In some places obstacles have been
constructed by both sides so close together that some wag suggested
that each side provide working parties to perform this fatigue duty
alternately, inasmuch as the work of the enemy is now almost
indistinguishable from ours, and serves the same purpose.

Quarries and caves, to which allusion already has been made, provide
ample accommodation for whole battalions, and most comfortable are these
shelters which have been constructed in them. The northern slopes of the
Aisne Valley fortunately are very steep, and this to a great extent
protects us from the enemy's shells, many of which pass harmlessly over
our heads, to burst in the meadows along the river bank.

At all points subject to shell fire access to the firing line from
behind is provided by communication trenches. These are now so good that
it is possible to cross in safety a fire-swept zone to the advance
trenches from billets in villages, bivouacs in quarries, or other places
where the headquarters of units happen to be.

It already has been mentioned that according to information obtained
from the enemy fifteen Germans were killed by a bomb dropped upon the
ammunition wagon of a cavalry column. It was thought at the time that
this might have been the work of one of our airmen, who reported that he
had dropped a hand grenade on this convoy, and had then got a bird's-eye
view of the finest display of fireworks he had ever seen. From
corroborative evidence it now appears that this was the case; that the
grenade thrown by him probably was the cause of the destruction of a
small convoy carrying field-gun and howitzer ammunition, which now has
been found a total wreck.

Along the road lie fourteen motor lorries, their iron skeletons twisted
and broken. Everything inflammable has been burned, as have the stripped
trees--some with split trunks--on either side of the road. Of the
drivers, nothing remains except tattered boots and charred scraps of
clothing, while the ground within a radius of fifty yards of the wagons
is littered with pieces of iron, split brass cartridge cases, which have
exploded, and some fixed-gun ammunition with live shells.

If it were possible to reconstruct this incident, if it was, in fact,
brought about as supposed, the grenade from the aeroplane must have
detonated on the leading lorry, on one side of the road, and caused the
cartridges carried by it to explode. Three vehicles immediately in the
rear must then have been set on fire, with a similar result. Behind
these are groups of four and two vehicles so jammed together as to
suggest that they must have collided in desperate attempts to stop. On
the other side of the road, almost level with the leading wagon, are
found more vehicles, which probably were fired by the explosion of the
first.

If this appalling destruction was due to one hand grenade, it is an
illustration of the potentialities of a small amount of high explosive
detonated in the right spot, while the nature of the place where the
disaster occurred, a narrow forest road between high trees, is a
testimony to the skill of the airmen.

It is only fair to add that some French newspapers claim this damage to
the enemy was caused by the action of a detachment of their dragoons.

IX.

*1,100 Dead in a Single Trench.*

[Official Summary, Dated Oct. 27.]

The Official Bureau makes public today the story of an eye-witness,
supplementing the account issued on Oct. 24, and bringing the story of
the general course of operations in France up to Oct. 20. The arrival of
reinforcements, it says, enabled the British troops to assist in the
extension of the Allies' line where the Germans advanced from the
northeast and east, holding a front extending from Mont Descats, about
ten miles northeast of Hazebrouck, through Meteren, five miles south of
that point, and thence to Estaires, thirteen miles west of Lille, on the
River Lys. The statement continues:

"South of the Lys the German line extended to three miles east of
Bethune to Vermelles. The Allies encountered resistance all along the
line on the 12th and 13th, when the enemy's right fell back hastily.
Bailleul, seventeen miles northwest by west of Lille, which had been
occupied by the foe for eight days, was abandoned without a shot being
fired.

[Illustration: GEN. VON BUeLOW
Commanding One of the German Armies in the West
(_Copyright, Photographische Gesellschaft, by permission of the Berlin
Photographic Co., N.Y._)]

[Illustration: CROWN PRINCE RUPPRECHT OF BAVARIA
(_Copyright, Photographische Gesellschaft, by permission of the Berlin
Photographic Co., N.Y._)]

"On the 14th our left wing advanced, driving the enemy back, and on the
night of the 15th we were in possession of all the country on the left
bank of the Lys to a point five miles below Armentieres. The enemy
retired from that town on the 16th, and the river line, to within a
short distance of Frelinghien, fell into our hands.

"The state of the crossings over the Lys indicated that no organized
scheme of defense had been executed, some of the bridges being in a
state of repair, others merely barricaded, while one was not even
defended or broken.

"The resistance offered to our advance on the 15th was of a most
determined character. The fighting consisted of fiercely contested
encounters, infantry attacks on the villages being unavailing until our
howitzers reduced the houses to ruins. Other villages were taken and
retaken three times before they were finally secured.

"The French cavalry here gave welcome support, and on the evening of the
16th the resistance was overcome, the enemy retiring five miles to the
eastward."

Describing an incident of the fighting on this night, the narrative says
that the important crossing of the Lys at Warneton was strongly held by
the Germans with a barricade loopholed at the bottom to enable the men
to fire while lying down.

"Our cavalry, with the artillery, blew the barricade to pieces and
scattered the defenders," the narrative continues. "Advancing
three-quarters of a mile our troops reached the square, when one of the
buildings appeared to leap skyward. A sheet of flame and a shower of
star shells at the same time made the place as light as day and enabled
the enemy, ensconced in surrounding houses, to pour a devastating fire
from rifles and machine guns. Our cavalry extricated themselves with the
loss of one officer wounded and nine men killed and wounded, but a party
of volunteers went back and carried off their wounded comrades from the
inferno.

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